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March 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Mary E. Oxley Dean v. John G. Dean, IV

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-2817-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (25)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (28.7K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2817-24

MARY E. OXLEY DEAN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOHN G. DEAN, IV,

Defendant-Appellant.

---

Argued December 2, 2025 – Decided March 23, 2026

Before Judges Susswein and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
Docket No. FM-12-0871-20.

Robert H. Siegel argued the cause for appellant (Siegel
Law, attorneys; Robert H. Siegel, of counsel and on the
briefs).

Rebecca A. Hand argued the cause for respondent
(Cosner Law Group, attorneys; Rebecca A. Hand, on
the brief).

PER CURIAM
Defendant John G. Dean, IV, appeals from the Family Part's April 22,

2025 order denying his request for reconsideration of the March 10, 2025 order,

which denied his request for modification or termination of alimony and granted

in part plaintiff Mary E. Oxley Dean's request for counsel fees. We affirm.

I.

The parties were married for approximately thirteen years, from October

26, 2006, until their divorce on December 17, 2019. The parties voluntarily

entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) on August 7, 2019, which

was initially incorporated into their Judgment of Divorce from Bed and Board

and later into their Final Judgment of Divorce.

During the marriage, defendant was employed with the U.S. Department

of Homeland Security, and at the time of the parties' divorce, he was earning a

base salary of $151,291. Defendant agreed to pay limited durational alimony to

plaintiff of $47,000 per year, calculated upon his base salary, his Veterans

Administration pension (VA pension) of $47,138 per year, and his yearly

Veterans (VA) disability income of $22,512 for a total annual income of

$216,213. According to paragraph 1.3 of the MSA, defendant's alimony

obligation would terminate when defendant "actually retires and [plaintiff]

A-2817-24
2
commences receipt of 65% of [defendant's] pension and Thrift Savings Plan"

(TSP).

Relevant to this appeal, paragraph 2.9 of the MSA addressed defendant's

VA pension, federal government pension (FERS) 1 and TSP. The MSA noted

that the VA pension was "already in pay status," and plaintiff would be "named

[a]lternate [p]ayee for the amount of [fifty dollars] per month of this benefit in

order for her to continue her health coverage, if necessary." Plaintiff was named

as defendant's beneficiary on this account to receive "pre and post [s]urvivor

[a]nnuity." No further distribution of this account was designated.

The parties agreed that plaintiff would receive 65% of the FERS pension

"at the time of [defendant's] retirement." They also agreed to have a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) prepared "within thirty (30) days of the

execution of this [MSA]" to "ensure segregation of [plaintiff's] share." As for

the TSP account, the parties agreed that plaintiff would also receive 65% of that

account "at the time of [defendant's] retirement," and a QDRO would be

1
Although not included in the record, FERS is an acronym for the Federal
Employees Retirement System. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, FERS
Information, OPM (March 12. 2026), https://www.opm.gov/retirement-
center/fers-infrmation/.

A-2817-24
3
prepared "to ensure partial immediate segregation of 65% to [plaintiff] . . .

within thirty (30) days after the execution of this [MSA]."

Defendant's federal employment ended on January 31, 2024. In April

2024, he accepted a new full-time position with Syracuse University as

Associate Director of Defense Programs, earning approximately $140,000

annually.

However, before he started his new position, defendant filed a motion to

terminate or modify alimony, resulting in the February 22, 2024 order. Although

the family court did not grant defendant's request, the court directed plaintiff

"immediately upon [] receipt of FERS pension benefits, [to] notify [d]efendant,

and the parties shall thereafter enter into a [c]onsent [o]rder terminating

[d]efendant's alimony obligation, effective the date [p]laintiff begins receiving

her FERS pension benefits." The court based its decision on defendant's

"representation that he [was] retiring, which the [c]ourt interpret[ed] as a

permanent retirement, not merely moving from one position to the next after a

brief (or more long term) pause."

On April 2, 2024, defendant filed another motion seeking to terminate his

alimony obligation. On June 7, 2024, the court denied defendant's request to

terminate his alimony obligation without prejudice. The order, in part, stated

A-2817-24
4
that the parties, "by consent," agreed defendant's alimony obligation would end

"upon [p]laintiff's receipt of her monthly FERS pension benefits , as well as her

receipt of her portion of the [TSP] monies[,]" which had not yet occurred.

In December 2024, defendant stopped making his alimony payments

without the court's approval. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed an enforcement

motion, seeking to compel defendant to resume making his alimony payments.

Defendant filed a cross-motion—his third attempt—to terminate alimony based

on his purported retirement.

On March 10, 2025, the family court issued an order granting plaintiff's

enforcement motion, finding defendant in violation of litigant's rights, directing

defendant to resume alimony payments, denying defendant's cross-motion to

terminate alimony, and awarding plaintiff counsel fees of $2,500 . The court

explained that defendant "testified on February 22, 2024, in response to the

[c]ourt's questions, that he was fully retired and that he did not intend on

obtaining alternate employment at that time." Within two months of that

hearing, defendant accepted new employment. Thus, the court concluded

defendant acted in bad faith "by claiming he was fully retired when he really

had every intention of seeking new employment elsewhere."

A-2817-24
5
Defendant filed for reconsideration, which the court denied on April 22,

2025.

On appeal, defendant argues the family court erred by denying

reconsideration of the March 10, 2025 order and misapplying the Supreme

Court's holding in Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 514 (1990), and by denying his

request for a plenary hearing. Defendant also claims the court erred in its

analysis of defendant's modification request by using his time-of-divorce

income rather than his income at the time of retirement.

II.

A.

Our court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for reconsideration

under Rule 4:49-2 for an abuse of discretion. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy,

244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021); Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020);

Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022); Pitney Bowes

Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div.

2015). "The rule applies when the court's decision represents a clear abuse of

discretion based on plainly incorrect reasoning or failure to consider evidence

or a good reason for the court to reconsider new information." Pressler &

Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 4:49-2 (2026).

A-2817-24
6
We ordinarily accord great deference to discretionary decisions of Family

Part judges, in recognition of the family courts' "special jurisdiction and

expertise in family matters." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83

(2016) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "Discretionary

determinations, supported by the record, are examined to discern whether an

abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546,

564 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547 (2006)). However,

"[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow

from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Hitesman v.

Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 26 (2014) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.

Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

B.

Defendant contends the family court erred by misapplying the

reconsideration standard under Rule 4:49-2 and disregarding the holding of

Innes. 117 N.J. at 514. Specifically, defendant argues the court erred by

underestimating the amount by which his income had decreased and by

including his VA pension as income in contravention of the Innes holding, which

prohibits double counting of income "generated by a retirement share that has

been equitably distributed." Id. at 514. Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that the

A-2817-24
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family court neither misapplied the reconsideration standard nor disregarded the

holding of Innes.

Under Rule 4:49-2, motions for reconsideration are granted only under

very narrow circumstances in which either: "1) the [c]ourt has expressed its

decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious

that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance

of probative, competent evidence." Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274,

288 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).

Defendant initially claims that the court erred in its analysis of whether

changed circumstances warranting a modification or termination of alimony had

occurred because it relied upon defendant's time-of-divorce base salary of

$151,291 rather than his income of approximately $180,000 at the time his

employment with the Department of Defense ended. This assertion is without

merit.

"Parties to a divorce action may enter into voluntary agreements

governing the amount, terms, and duration of alimony, and such agreements are

subject to judicial supervision and enforcement." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34,

48 (2016) (quoting Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 203 (1999)). Such

agreements executed "voluntarily and understandingly for the purpose of

A-2817-24
8
settling the issue of [alimony] are specifically enforceable, but only to the extent

that they are just and equitable." Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564, 569

(1970) (citations omitted).

Agreements may be modified "upon a showing of changed

circumstances." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 49 (quoting Berkowitz, 55 N.J. at 569).

When a party moves to terminate or reduce alimony, the court must first

determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing of changed

circumstances. R.K. v. F.K., 437 N.J. Super. 58, 62 (App. Div. 2014).

The changed circumstances analysis begins with the clear and unequivocal

terms of the MSA. See Bisbing v. Bisbing, 445 N.J. Super. 207, 218 (App. Div.

2016). When assessing changed circumstances, a family court must examine

the parties' current situation and compare it to the situation when the support

obligation was initially entered. Beck v. Beck, 239 N.J. Super. 183, 190 (App.

Div. 1990) ("It is clear that the changed-circumstances determination must be

made by comparing the parties' financial circumstances at the time the motion

for relief is made with the circumstances which formed the basis for the last

order fixing support obligations."); see also Deegan v. Deegan, 254 N.J. Super.

350, 354-55 (App. Div. 1992) ("An analysis of 'changed circumstances' is not

limited to what the parties might have contemplated at the time of the divorce

A-2817-24
9
. . . [but rather] 'whether the change in circumstances is continuing and whether

the agreement or decree has made explicit provision for the change.'" (quoting

Lepis, 83 N.J. at 152)).

Here, the terms of the MSA pertaining to alimony provided for the factors

upon which alimony was based, which included defendant's base salary of

$151,291, his VA pension of $47,138, and his VA disability income of $22,512,

totaling gross annual income of $216,213. Nothing in the MSA nor in caselaw

supports defendant's contention that his base salary of approximately $180,000

at the time he left his employment with the Department of Defense should be

used to assess whether his financial circumstances have substantially changed

"impair[ing] [his] ability to support himself." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157. Thus, the

family court's use of defendant's income as set forth in the MSA as a starting

point for the changed circumstances analysis was not palpably incorrect or

irrational; nor did the court overlook any legal authority on this issue.

Defendant next contends the court misapplied Innes by including the VA

pension and disability benefits in calculating income. He argues that the court

ignored Innes by including the VA pension as income when it had been equitably

distributed.

In Innes, the Court held:

A-2817-24
10
What the trial court can no longer do, however, is
determine alimony by considering income generated by
a retirement share that has been equitably distributed,
either at the time of divorce or when it considers a
modification application. . . . Hence, we hold that
payments generated by pension benefits that had been
previously equitably distributed are not income for
purposes of alimony modification.

[117 N.J. at 514.]

The Court held that "it is inappropriate to make equitable distribution of a

retirement benefit and then consider that distributed share for purpose of

determining alimony" because "'double-dipping' of this asset [is] improper."

Ibid.

The Court's holding in Innes has no application here because the VA

pension, as the unambiguous terms of the MSA confirm, was included as income

for alimony purposes and were not equitably distributed. Paragraph 1.1 of the

MSA expressly states that the VA pension and VA disability income were

included as income for the purpose of calculating defendant's biweekly alimony

obligation of $1,858. Moreover, the VA pension was in "pay status," and

therefore, was part of defendant's income stream. On the contrary, the FERS

and TSP accounts were to be divided through QDROs, with plaintiff receiving

a designated share of those assets. Accordingly, we discern no error in the court

A-2817-24
11
considering those same income streams in evaluating defendant's post-judgment

modification request.

C.

Defendant next argues that the family court erred by denying his request

for a plenary hearing on the issue of whether the VA pension should be included

as income for purposes of determining this post-judgment modification request.

A plenary hearing is necessary only when a genuine issue of material fact exists.

Palmieri v. Palmieri, 388 N.J. Super. 562, 564 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Shaw v.

Shaw, 138 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App. Div. 1976)). "[N]ot every factual dispute

that arises in the context of matrimonial proceedings triggers the need for a

plenary hearing." Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 422 (App. Div. 2010)

(quoting Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (1995)) (alteration in

original).

[T]o be entitled to a hearing on whether a previously-
approved support award should be modified, the party
moving for the modification bears the burden of making
a prima facie showing of changed circumstances.
Specifically, the party seeking modification of
an alimony award must demonstrate that changed
circumstances have substantially impaired the ability to
support himself or herself.

[Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. at 290 -91 (quoting Crews v.
Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 28 (2000) (citations omitted)
(internal quotations omitted)) (alteration in original).]

A-2817-24
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The MSA provides for termination of alimony upon the following

conditions: (1) defendant's actual retirement; and (2) plaintiff's receipt of both

the FERS and TSP distributions. It is undisputed that plaintiff remains

employed full-time, earning approximately $140,000, and that the TSP account

has not yet been distributed. The record is void of any updated information

regarding defendant's VA pension or VA disability income. Therefore, the

family court did not abuse its discretion in not granting a plenary hearing

because defendant did not meet the threshold showing of changed circumstances

and failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact

entitling him to a plenary hearing.

D.

Defendant contends the family court erred in not granting reconsideration

of paragraphs one through four of its March 10, 2025 order. Paragraph two of

the order granted plaintiff's requests for attorneys' fees. Our review of this claim

is impeded because defendant fails to articulate the basis for his assertion that

the court erred in not reconsidering this specific provision of the March 10, 2025

order. See R. 2:6-2; cf. Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105,

112 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that a complaint is dismissed for failing to

articulate a basis for its claim).

A-2817-24
13
An award of attorneys' fees in family matters rests in the sound discretion

of the family court. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a; R. 5:3-5(c). We will overturn the

family court's decision concerning an attorney fee award "only on the 'rarest

occasion,' and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Barr v. Barr,

418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J.

Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) citing Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317

(1995)).

In this case, the family court concluded that defendant acted in bad faith

because he failed to advise the court in his pleadings of his new employment

and testified he was fully retired and did not intend on obtaining alternat e

employment at that time. The record supports the court's finding of bad faith.

Moreover, paragraph 5.2 of the MSA states: "[s]hould either party fail to

abide by the terms of this Agreement, the defaulting party will indemnify the

other for all reasonable expenses and costs, including attorneys' fees incurred in

successfully enforcing this agreement." Defendant unilaterally ceased making

alimony payments in December 2024, and as a result, plaintiff was compelled

to file an enforcement motion. The court found defendant in violation of

litigant's rights, and therefore, plaintiff prevailed in her enforcement application.

A-2817-24
14
Therefore, we reject defendant's argument that the court erred in not

reconsidering the attorney fee award because we discern no abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is
a true copy of the original on file in
my office.

Clerk of the Appellate Division

A-2817-24
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