Roberson v. Aramark Employment Discrimination Case Dismissed
Summary
Magistrate Judge William E. Duffin recommended dismissal of Tammi Roberson's second amended complaint against Aramark after screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court found that even construing the pro se complaint liberally, Roberson failed to state a claim under Title VII because she did not allege her termination was connected to a protected characteristic. Roberson worked in food services at Brown Deer Middle/High School and was fired on May 9, 2025, after her wife had a verbal confrontation with co-workers. The court noted she had been granted unemployment benefits because Aramark had no good reason for termination, but this did not establish discriminatory conduct.
“Even construing Roberson's complaint liberally, as the court is required to do for a pro se plaintiff, she cannot state a claim under Title VII because she does not allege that her termination or any discriminatory conduct occurred because of a protected characteristic.”
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What changed
The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of Roberson's second amended complaint, finding she failed to state a Title VII employment discrimination claim. The court applied the Seventh Circuit standard requiring plaintiffs to allege facts allowing a plausible inference that adverse action was connected to protected characteristics. Even with liberal construction for pro se filings, Roberson's complaint lacked this essential element.\n\nEmployers and their counsel should note the court's emphasis that receiving unemployment benefits due to an employer's lack of documented cause does not, by itself, establish discriminatory conduct. Organizations facing discrimination complaints should maintain contemporaneous documentation of legitimate business reasons for employment decisions to defend against similar claims. This case reinforces that termination following workplace incidents unrelated to protected characteristics may not support Title VII liability absent additional factual development.
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April 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Tammi Roberson v. Aramark
District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 2:26-cv-00334
Precedential Status: Unknown Status
Trial Court Document
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
TAMMI ROBERSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 26-CV-334
ARAMARK,
Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
On February 27, 2026, Tammi Roberson filed a pro se complaint alleging
discrimination by her former employer, defendant Aramark. (ECF No. 1.) Upon
screening, the court determined that she failed to state a claim on which relief could be
granted but allowed her to file an amended complaint if she wished to proceed with her
lawsuit. (ECF No. 4.) Roberson then filed a letter clarifying the complaint (ECF No. 6),
which the court screened and determined also failed to state a claim (ECF No. 7).
However, the court again offered Roberson an opportunity to amend her complaint.
Roberson filed what is effectively her second amended complaint on April 15, 2026. (ECF
No. 8.)
The court will now screen Roberson’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 8) to
determine if it (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2).
1. Factual Allegations
Roberson states that she worked in food services for Aramark at Brown Deer
Middle/High School. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) On or about May 9, 2025, the director of food
services, Tate Flom, sent her home after her wife engaged in a verbal confrontation with
two co-workers in the kitchen. (Id.) About one to two weeks later Roberson received a
text message from Flom indicating that her employment was terminated with no stated
reason. (Id. at 2–3.)
Roberson filed for unemployment and was granted benefits “due to the fact he
(Aramark) had no good reason to fire [her].” (ECF No. 8 at 3.) She states that she “can’t
assume anything other the fact known I was fired with no good reason.” (Id.) Her original
complaint referenced a potential claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. (See
ECF No. 1 at 4.) Roberson states in her second amended complaint that she does not “have
an ADA.” (ECF No. 8 at 3.)
2. Analysis
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that the pleading requirement
for Title VII employment discrimination claims is low: “To survive screening or a motion
to dismiss, a plaintiff need only allege enough facts to allow for a plausible inference that
the adverse action suffered was connected to her protected characteristics.” Kaminski v.
Elite Staffing, 23 F.4th 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2022). Even construing Roberson’s complaint
liberally, as the court is required to do for a pro se plaintiff, she cannot state a claim under
Title VII because she does not allege that her termination or any discriminatory conduct
occurred because of a protected characteristic.
After two amendments, Roberson’s complaint is still missing key details about
how her termination could have been wrongful. Because she has not alleged anything
creating a plausible inference that anyone treated her differently on account of a protected
characteristic, the court will recommend that this action be dismissed.
3. Conclusion
Roberson has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in the district
court. Because not all parties have had the opportunity to consent to the jurisdiction of a
magistrate judge, the Clerk of Court will randomly assign the case to a district judge for
consideration of this court’s recommendation that the action be dismissed. See Coleman v.
Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 860 F.3d 461, 475 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that a magistrate
judge cannot “resolve the case finally” “unless all parties to the action have consented to
the magistrate judge’s authority”).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Roberson’s second amended
complaint and this action be dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and
(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), any written objections to any recommendation herein or
part thereof shall be filed within fourteen days of service of this recommendation. Failure
to timely object waives a party’s right to review.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 16th day of April, 2026.
WILLIAM E. DUFFI
US. Magistrate Judge
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