Reeve v Fair Work Commission - Recusal Application

Original Word Document (107.5 KB) FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Reeve v Fair Work Commission [2026] FCA 368

| File number(s): | QUD 648 of 2025 |
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| Judgment of: | MEAGHER J |
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| Date of judgment: | 27 March 2026 |
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| Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application – recusal – whether actual or apprehended bias demonstrated – whether applicant denied procedural fairness – application dismissed |
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| Legislation: | Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2)

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) s 48

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) Divs 2.3, 29.1 rr 2.27, 16.21, 26.01

Oaths Act 1867 (Qld) Pt 6A) |
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| Cases cited: | Antoun v The Queen [2006] HCA 2; 80 ALJR 497

Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; 195 ALR 225

DOQ17 v Australian Financial Security Authority (No 2) [2018] FCA 1270; 363 ALR 681

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 138

Kennedy v Secretary Department of Industry (No 2) [2016] FCA 746

Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; 151 CLR 288

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507

QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; 279 CLR 148

Rajski v Scitec Corp Pty Ltd [1986] NSWCA 1

Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342

Reeve v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2025] FCA 1480

Reeve v Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (No 2) [2026] FCA 242

Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2024] FWCFB 434

Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2023] FWC 1565

Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2024] FWC 2776 |
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| Division: | Fair Work Division |
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| Registry: | Queensland |
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| National Practice Area: | Employment and Industrial Relations |
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| Number of paragraphs: | 104 |
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| Date of hearing: | 19 March 2026 |
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| Counsel for the Applicant: | The Applicant did not appear |
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| Counsel for the Fourth and Fifth Respondents: | Mr M Jones |
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| Solicitor for the Fourth and Fifth Respondents: | Steindls Lawyers (Qld) |
ORDERS

| | | QUD 648 of 2025 |
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| BETWEEN: | MR OLIVER REEVE

Applicant | |
| AND: | FAIR WORK COMMISSION

First Respondent

ADAM HATCHER (IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE FAIR WORK COMMISSION)

Second Respondent

CHRISTOPHER SIMPSON (COMMISSIONER, FAIR WORK COMMISSION) (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent | |

| order made by: | MEAGHER J |
| DATE OF ORDER: | 27 MARCH 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s application for the recusal of Justice Meagher is dismissed.

2.    By 4:00pm AEST on 3 April 2026, the fourth and fifth respondents file and serve written submissions of no more than 3 pages with respect to costs.

3.    By 4:00pm AEST on 10 April 2026, the applicant file and serve written submissions in reply of no more than 3 pages with respect to costs.

4.    The question of costs will thereafter be determined on the papers.

5.    The matter be listed for a case management hearing on a date to be advised after 10 April 2026.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MEAGHER J

BACKGROUND

1 This is an application for my recusal by the applicant, Mr Reeve, in this proceeding (Reeve v FWC). The applicant commenced the substantive proceeding by an application for extension of time filed on 17 July 2025, in which he seeks an order extending the time to file an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The applicant seeks to bring an application for judicial review of three decisions of the Fair Work Commission (FWC), namely, Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2023] FWC 1565, Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2024] FWC 2776, and Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2024] FWCFB 434.

2 These matters relate to what the applicant says are complaints about alleged “adverse action and whistleblower retaliation following protected disclosures” that he made regarding “serious financial misconduct, perjury, and fraud” involving his former employer, PKF HR Services Gold Coast (PKF), and “associated parties”. The applicant has another matter on foot in this Court, which has also been allocated to my docket. That claim arises out of the same facts as this matter, and is Reeve v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (QUD551/2025) (Reeve v CAANZ). However, no order has been made joining the matters, or providing that material filed in one matter is taken to be filed in the other.

3 The applicant is a litigant in person and currently resides in New Zealand.

4 The applicant’s application in this matter names the following as respondents:

(1)    The FWC;

(2)    Mr Adam Hatcher, in his capacity as President of the FWC;

(3)    Mr Christopher Simpson, in his capacity as a Commissioner of the FWC;

(4)    Mr Matthew Butler, a Partner at PKF; and

(5)    PKF.

5 The first to third respondents filed submitting notices, wanting to be heard only on the question of costs. Thus, the only active respondents in this matter are the fourth and fifth respondents, Mr Butler and PKF.

6 A first case management hearing in Reeve v CAANZ was heard before me on 18 September 2025. At the case management hearing, the respondents in that matter foreshadowed that they would be applying for summary dismissal or a strikeout of the applicant’s statement of claim (Summary Judgment Application). I explained to the applicant that as it currently stood, his statement of claim was too broad for the Respondents to be able to respond to it, and that he would need to better particularise his allegations. I therefore made orders listing a further case management hearing on 19 November 2025, allowing time for the parties to correspond regarding the respondents’ concerns about the applicant’s statement of claim in that matter.

7 Separately, on 3 November 2025, the applicant was notified by email that Reeve v FWC had been allocated to my docket, and that a first case management hearing was listed in this matter for 19 November 2025.

8 Less than one hour prior to the case management hearing listed on 19 November 2025, my Associate received an email from the applicant seeking inter alia to adjourn the case management hearing in Reeve v FWC on the grounds that he had suffered a “significant deterioration in [his] health” and had “urgent responsibilities caring for several unwell family members” (First Adjournment Application (QUD648/2025)). The applicant’s email attached, among other things, a medical report by Dr Ambica Prasad Jha (Jha Report) dated 17 February 2025, and a document entitled “Meeting agenda for the Australian Human rights commission”. The Jha Report stated, inter alia, that:

(1)    The applicant’s mental health concerns have been exacerbated following workplace conflicts and related legal disputes. This was also recorded in the “Risk Assessment” section of the Jha Report, which noted that structured legal support was required to mitigate risks and recommended court-appointed legal representation.

(2)    The applicant reported “heightened suspicion regarding legal proceedings” and displayed “[o]bservable anxiety during discussion of legal matters”.

9 The applicant’s email in support of the adjournment also referred to “outstanding FOI and RTI processes, the ongoing concealment of critical evidence, and the absence of legal representation due to the coordinated conduct of several of the parties”. The applicant sought an adjournment until each of the following had occurred:

(1)    There had either been an “intervention”, or findings had been received, from the Australian Human Rights Commission.

(2)    He was in a position to engage reliable legal counsel.

(3)    The alleged hidden information which he was allegedly pursuing through various “channels” was “produced by the parties in question”.

10 The applicant did not appear at the case management hearing in Reeve v FWC on 19 November 2025. The fourth and fifth respondents’ solicitor opposed the First Adjournment Application (QUD648/2025), primarily on the ground that the applicant had brought the proceeding with knowledge of his pre-existing health concerns and lack of legal representation, which he now asserted as grounds for an adjournment. Additionally, the fourth and fifth respondents argued that the applicant, in seeking time to engage legal representation and obtain documents which the fourth and fifth respondents did not believe existed, effectively sought an indefinite extension of time. The fourth and fifth respondents’ solicitor, foreshadowing an application that the fourth respondent be removed as a respondent (Removal of Respondent Application), also submitted that the applicant had brought the proceeding “somewhat vexatiously” given that it was not apparent why certain respondents in Reeve v FWC were parties to the proceeding.

11 While broadly accepting the fourth and fifth respondents’ submissions opposing the First Adjournment Application (QUD648/2025), I considered that the applicant should be afforded an opportunity to appear at a further case management hearing to discuss the matters raised by the fourth and fifth respondents, particularly given that he is a litigant in person and that this was to have been the first case management hearing in this matter. On this basis, I granted the First Adjournment Application (QUD648/2025) and adjourned the case management hearing in Reeve v FWC to 3 December 2025.

12 The applicant’s email did not specifically request an adjournment of the case management hearing in Reeve v CAANZ, also listed on 19 November 2025, though it attached written submissions which were relevant to the substantive parts of that matter. In any event, I treated the applicant’s email as an adjournment application (First Adjournment Application (QUD551/2025)) and refused to grant it. My reasons for doing so are set out in Reeve v Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [2025] FCA 1480.

13 At the case management hearing, I made orders timetabling the filing, in Reeve v CAANZ, of the following documents:

The applicant’s amended statement of claim.

The respondents’ application for summary judgment and strikeout application in respect of the applicant’s statement of claim in that matter.

Any supporting affidavits and written submissions.

14 On 28 November 2025, the fourth respondent in Reeve v FWC lodged the Removal of Respondent Application and an accompanying affidavit, which were accepted for filing on 1 December 2025. The application sought:

(1)    That the fourth respondent cease to be a party to the proceeding, on the basis that he had been improperly or unnecessarily joined.

(2)    The fourth respondent’s costs.

15 At the case management hearing on 3 December 2025 (the most recent in Reeve v FWC) the applicant again sought an adjournment (Second Adjournment Application (QUD648/2025)) so that certain documents could be produced or, alternatively, so that discovery could occur, in respect of information that the applicant said existed but was allegedly “being hidden from [him] illegally”. The applicant spent considerable time detailing his concerns regarding the alleged suppression of evidence, alleging that there were confidential conversations occurring within the Court and other decision-making or regulatory bodies, and that decisions were being made on the basis of alleged falsified information. The fourth and fifth respondents opposed the Second Adjournment Application (QUD648/2025) on the grounds that, again, the adjournment sought was for an indeterminate period, and the documents sought did not exist. Furthermore, as foreshadowed at the case management hearing in Reeve v FWC on 19 November 2025, the fourth respondent sought the hearing of Removal of Respondent Application.

16 I declined to grant the Second Adjournment Application (QUD648/2025) and timetabled the Removal of Respondent Application to a hearing on 19 March 2026. This approach was adopted on the basis that the fourth respondent is entitled to have the Removal of Respondent Application heard in a timely manner, and further delay would arise were the case management hearing to be adjourned, in circumstances where the nearest hearing date available for this application was sufficiently distant that it allowed time for the applicant to obtain legal representation and otherwise prepare for the hearing of the Removal of Respondent Application. I also made orders directed to the applicant’s conduct in sending broadcast correspondence regarding these proceedings and copying the Court in correspondence between the parties which is not within the purview of the Court. Those orders require the parties to send all correspondence solely to the Court Registry, and to limit such correspondence to matters relevant to the proceeding (Correspondence Orders (QUD648/2025)).

17 In addition, I raised with the applicant difficulties which had arisen in relation to the structure of his affidavits and related exhibits. I provided a lengthy explanation of how material is ordinarily provided to the Court. I referred the applicant to Div 29.1 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and directed him to Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 138 at [51] – [57] to assist his understanding of the Court’s role in relation to a litigant in person. I also drew the applicant’s attention to the Court’s Central Practice Note and various guides regarding communications with the Court and Registry staff.

18 On 4 December 2025, I convened a case management hearing in Reeve v CAANZ for the applicant’s benefit, during which I reiterated the timetabling orders made on 19 November 2025 in that proceeding. At this hearing, I again sought to address the applicant’s confusion regarding the manner of filing evidence, and again directed him to the relevant part of the Rules. I also directed the applicant to Flightdeck Geelong at [51] – [57]. I made further orders timetabling the filing of material in respect of the Summary Judgment Application and additionally provided the applicant with an opportunity to make additions or amendments to the amended statement of claim which he had lodged with the Court, and when he indicated he did not wish to make any further amendments, ordered that it be accepted for filing. The orders also directed the applicant to file in the prescribed form an affidavit which he had lodged on 27 October 2025, and which the Registry had rejected due to issues with form. Finally, as I had done in Reeve v FWC, I made orders requiring the parties to send all correspondence solely to the Court Registry, and to limit such correspondence to matters relevant to the proceedings (Correspondence Orders (QUD551/2025)).

19 The hearing of the Summary Judgement Application in Reeve v CAANZ was listed for 25 February 2026 at 10:15am AEST.

20 On 23 December 2025, as foreshadowed, the respondents in Reeve v CAANZ filed the Summary Judgment Application which sought, inter alia:

(3)    An order for summary judgment of the whole or part of that proceeding under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Rules.

(4)    Further and in the alternative, an order that the applicant’s amended statement of claim dated 27 October 2025 be struck out in whole or alternatively in part under r 16.21 of the Rules, without leave to replead or alternatively with leave to replead.

The applicant’s interactions with the Court registry

21 As alluded to above at [18 ], a common theme of this proceeding and Reeve v CAANZ is the difficulty the applicant has had in filing documents with the Court Registry in accordance with the requirements laid down in the Rules. It is worthwhile setting out the applicant’s interactions with the Court Registry in both this proceeding as well as Reeve v CAANZ, as there is significant overlap in the applicant’s attempts in filing documents in both these proceedings. Additionally, the applicant’s difficulty in filing documents appears to have been the catalyst for bringing recusal applications, first in Reeve v CAANZ, and subsequently in Reeve v FWC.

22 Between 15 and 29 January 2026, the applicant sought to file, both in person and via the Court’s online eLodgment portal, several affidavits and what appear to be annexures, entitled “Evidence Books”. Sometimes, the lodgements which the applicant effected comprised up to 20 documents, which the applicant said made up his affidavit. The affidavits additionally contained significant unexplained and therefore confusing duplication in both the body and annexures. Additionally, one affidavit lodged in Reeve v CAANZ contained paragraph numbers which continued sequentially from the last paragraph of a previous affidavit, rather than beginning at [1]. It had also become apparent at the case management hearing in relation to Reeve v FWC on 3 December 2025 that the applicant had assumed that documents filed in one matter had in fact been filed in the other matter, or both matters.

23 Div 2.3 of the Rules contains general provisions about the powers of the Registry to reject documents that fail to comply with the Court’s filing requirements. Relevantly, r 2.27 provides as follows:

A document will not be accepted for filing if:

(a)    it is not substantially complete; or

(b) it does not substantially comply with these Rules; or

(c)    it is not properly signed; or

(d)    a Registrar has refused to accept the document; or

(e)    the Court has given a direction that the document not be accepted; or

(f)    the Court has given a direction that the document not be accepted without the Court’s leave, and leave has not been obtained.

(Emphasis added.)

24 Div 29.1 of the Rules sets out the formal requirements of an affidavit filed in the Federal Court of Australia as follows:

(1)    An affidavit must comply with Form 59 and be made in the first person.

(2)    The first visible page (being the first page, the cover page or the front cover page) must state:

(a)    the deponent’s description; and

(b)    the date on which the affidavit was sworn.

Note: Description is defined in the Dictionary.

(3)    An affidavit must be divided into numbered paragraphs and, to the extent practicable, each paragraph must deal with a separate subject.

(4)    A document that accompanies an affidavit must be annexed to the affidavit unless the document is:

(a)    an original; or

(b)    of such dimensions that it cannot be annexed.

(5)    If paragraph (4)(a) or (b) applies, the document must be exhibited.

(6)    Each page, including any annexure, must be clearly and consecutively numbered starting with page ‘1’.

(7)    Each page of the affidavit (but not any annexure) must be signed by the deponent (other than a deponent who is unable to sign the affidavit because of a physical disability) and by the person before whom it is sworn.

(8)    Each annexure and exhibit must be identified on its first page by a certificate entitled in the same manner as the affidavit and by the deponent’s initials followed by a number (starting with ‘1’ for the first annexure or exhibit).

(9)    The annexures and exhibits must be numbered sequentially.

(10) No subsequent annexure or exhibit in any later affidavit sworn by the same deponent may duplicate the number of a previous annexure or exhibit.

(11) Each exhibit to an affidavit must be signed on the first page of the exhibit by the person before whom the affidavit is sworn

(Original emphasis.)

25 Initially, the Court Registry refused to accept the applicant’s lodgements for filing on the basis that they did not comply with Div 29.1 of the Rules. In response, the applicant sent emails to the Court Registry and to my Associate requesting clarification about the rejected lodgements and alleging “an ongoing and well-documented pattern of procedural obstruction and evidentiary suppression that has already been raised in [his] affidavits and correspondence”. Overall, it is clear that the applicant and the Court Registry have made consistent efforts, by both telephone and email, to clarify the requirements for filing documents with this Court. As well, the applicant attended the Court Registry in person seeking to file documents in both Reeve v FWC and Reeve v CAANZ.

26 The applicant appears, however, to have received contradictory information regarding whether his documents had been accepted for filing. For example, on 16 January 2026, the Court Registry informed the applicant that a lodgement dated 27 October 2025 was refused “[a]s per order dated 04.12.25”. Later that day the Court Registry informed the applicant that an affidavit lodged as part of a lodgement dated 27 October 2025 in Reeve v CAANZ was to be rejected, but that an amended statement of claim was to be accepted and would be “internally lodged”. In relation to affidavits presented in person at the Court Registry on 15 January 2026, the Court Registry informed the applicant on 16 January 2026 that these were “being processed” and that once they were processed, he would be informed of their “status” and “filed copies [would] be emailed” to him. On 6 February 2026, the Court Registry informed the applicant that affidavits filed on 15 January 2026 would be accepted for filing, but that duplicates filed on 29 January 2026 would be rejected. The Court Registry’s email contained the following explanation:

Upon referral to chambers and investigation by The Registry, the lodgements presented to the Registry on the 15/01/2026 are identical to the lodgement submitted online on the 29/01/2026.

As they are identical, the ones presented to the Registry Counter have been accepted for filling and the ones provided through eLodgment will be rejected in due course.

The documents filed online will be rejected because the evidence book is not a document that was ordered for production, nor is it an approved document for filling [sic].

(Emphasis added.)

27 In the circumstances, unfortunately, the Court Registry’s efforts ultimately did not result in the applicant better understanding the requirements for preparing and filing documents. Owing to the applicant’s confusion around the requirements he needed to satisfy in order for his lodgements to be accepted, and in the interests of clarifying which documents the applicant would rely upon at the hearing of the Summary Judgment Application, on 6 February 2026 I wrote to the parties in Reeve v CAANZ to convene a case management hearing on the morning of 9 February 2026. The applicant was informed that the purpose of the case management hearing was to resolve the confusion arising out of his documents and to “make orders to assist the applicant in filing the documents he seeks to rely upon at the interlocutory hearing”. In response, the applicant responded to the effect that:

He was unable to attend the case management hearing.

Insufficient notice was given to him regarding the case management hearing, which was inconsistent with procedural fairness.

He “consider[ed] this attempt to urgently convene a hearing without reasonable opportunity to prepare or seek representation to be another instance of procedural prejudice”.

The affidavits and “evidence books” he had submitted were “filed in good faith, are consistent with the Court’s procedural requirements, and directly address the evidence raised by the Respondents”.

28 In response, I directed the Court Registry to reply to Mr Reeve, noting that the case management hearing was largely for his benefit, was intended to assist him file the documents to be relied upon, and was to facilitate the efficient course of the hearing of the Interlocutory Application set down on 25 February 2026. The applicant was requested to provide a reason why he would be unable to attend the case management hearing, in the absence of which, it would proceed as scheduled.

29 The applicant failed to appear at the case management hearing on 9 February 2026. At the case management hearing, I reiterated that it had been convened to assist the applicant in preparing his documents in a form acceptable for use by the Court. I noted that the case management hearing was convened at the earliest possible date, in order to give the applicant as much time as possible to prepare his documents.

30 At that case management hearing, on 9 February 2026 I made orders (Filing Orders (QUD551/2024)) which provided for the applicant to prepare a consolidated, indexed and paginated list and legible copies of all documents that he would seek to rely upon at the hearing of the Summary Judgment Application. Thus, the applicant was excused from complying with the usual form in relation to affidavits and exhibits. My orders further provided for a Registrar of the Court to convene a conference to assist the applicant to organise these documents. My reasoning for making these orders was recorded in the transcript for the case management hearing of 9 February 2026, which I also directed the Registry to send to the parties.

31 Between 16 January and 11 February 2026, it was common for the applicant to send repeated emails to my Associate and the Court Registry, in contravention of both the Correspondence Orders (QUD648/2025) and the Correspondence Orders (QUD551/2025) that I made on 3 and 4 December 2025, respectively. The applicant would sometimes send multiple emails per minute, up to 25 emails in the space of five minutes. The emails which Mr Reeve sent in this context often departed from the courteous and respectful tone expected in correspondence with the Court in that they consisted of one or two sentences such as the following:

(1)    “I require a response and clarification immediately”.

(2)    “Excuse me, you don’t get to bark nonsense at me and then ignore me when proven wrong. You are BREAKING THE LAW”.

(3)    “You are to respond immediately instead of trying to manipulate the process again. Read the attached”.

32 On 9 February 2026, the applicant first raised the possibility of me recusing myself from Reeve v CAANZ in informal email correspondence to the Court Registry (first email), in the following words: “Confirm my valid affidavits have been filed correctly and the criminal Justice Meagher has recused herself from my cases immediately.” The applicant sent further, repeated correspondence calling for my recusal as follows:

(1)    “You will respond stating your fraudulent orders based on your own processes have been rescinded and you will remove yourself from my matters due to your obvious and continued criminality”.

(2)    “I’m getting very ill again now because of you disgusting criminals, thank you for that. Confirm your fraudulent orders have been rescinded and the CRIMINAL Justice Meagher has been recused from my matters”.

(3)    “Justice Meagher, recuse yourself NOW”.

33 On 9 February 2026, I directed the Court Registry to email the parties stating that I was content to treat the applicant’s first email as an application for recusal (Recusal Application (QUD551/2025)). I provided proposed timetabling orders for the parties to file and serve submissions and any affidavit evidence to be relied on in the Recusal Application (QUD551/2025).

34 On 10 February 2026, the applicant sent correspondence to the Court Registry in which he confirmed that he wished his first email to be treated as an application for recusal in respect of Reeve v CAANZ. On 10 February 2026, I made orders (Recusal Timetabling Orders (QUD551/2025)) timetabling the provision of materials in respect of the Recusal Application (QUD551/2025), which the Court Registry sent to the parties.

35 In response to the Filing Orders (QUD551/2025), the applicant asserted that in preparing the documents sought to be filed, he had “complied with [his] obligations” and had ensured the documents “were intelligible, indexed and capable of being relied upon”. The applicant stated:

I am also concerned that repeated mischaracterisation of my compliance has the practical effect of suppressing evidence and delaying the proper progression of the matter. That is not a neutral administrative issue and should be addressed promptly.

36 However, it is worth noting that despite the applicant’s assertions, a review of the documents contained within the applicant’s “Evidence Books” reveals that some of the documents contained therein are in fact illegible.

37 The applicant further stated that he would not meet in person to discuss his evidence, required any conference, clarification or directions to be in writing or conducted remotely, and did not consent to “informal or off-record processes”. The applicant requested that the Court Registry identify any further clarification that it required regarding the format or presentation of his evidence, and requested confirmation that “[n]o material has been excluded, disregarded, or withheld without notice”.

38 Generally, the applicant continued to assert that his documents were filed in a format acceptable to the Court Registry.

39 In email correspondence on 10 February 2026 directed to the Honourable Michelle Rowland MP, to which my Associate was copied, the applicant made several allegations, including:

(1)    There were “false and internally inconsistent procedural orders” which permitted the Respondents to “knowingly advance false statements to the Court”, whilst preventing the applicant from “placing admissible and probative evidence” before the Court, representing a “distortion of process”.

(2)    I had “imposed requirements that are objectively unobtainable, including impossible timeframes and nonsensical evidentiary hurdles that have no proper foundation in statute, rules of court or procedural fairness”. The applicant alleged that my orders had been issued despite the fact that his evidence had allegedly already met the relevant procedural requirements.

(3)    The above “pattern of conduct” pointed to collusion which permitted the Respondents to “adapt their positions after receiving the benefit of suppressed evidence”. By contrast, the applicant alleged that he was denied access to documents and information he was legally entitled to receive.

(4)    The above conduct was “consistent with bad faith, abuse of judicial power, and denial of natural justice”. The applicant alleged that I “can no longer be considered independent in my matters and must be removed from them immediately”. The applicant raised the question of whether I was fit to continue as a Justice of the Court.

40 On the same day, the applicant sent a letter to the Prime Minister articulating similar concerns.

41 On 11 February 2026, the applicant sent an informal document to my Associate which outlined the grounds of the Recusal Application (QUD551/2025). In substance, the grounds of the Recusal Application (QUD551/2025) were:

(1)    The case management hearing listed on 9 February 2026 was convened on short notice, preventing reasonable preparation or attendance.

(2)    Orders were made on 9 February 2026 in the applicant’s absence, despite this allegedly being the applicant’s first opportunity to address the Court on the material he had sought to file.

(3)    The formatting “objections” I raised with respect to the applicant’s affidavits were not relevant and were “designed to limit or suppress the contents” of the affidavits.

(4)    There was no lawful basis under Div 29.1 of the Rules to reject the applicant’s affidavits in their form at the time.

(5)    I was seeking to “override existing practice” by making the Filing Orders (QUD551/2025), without prior notice or justification. This represented “procedural inventions” designed to “frustrate the admissibility of extensive evidence”.

(6)    I had exhibited a pattern of favourable treatment to the Respondents.

(7)    I had failed to respond to the applicant’s requests for clarification of alleged prior contact on my part with the Respondents. The applicant claimed that such contact included confidential correspondence between Chambers and counsel for the Respondents. The applicant suggested that this was a failure to disclose conflicts of interest.

42 The applicant substantially repeated these allegations in further emails and attachments sent to the Court Registry and my Associate.

43 On 12 February 2026, the applicant met with a Registrar of the Court via Microsoft Teams to discuss the organisation of his evidence, following which an officer of the Registry assisted the applicant in compiling his material in accordance with the Filing Orders (QUD551/2025).

44 On 13 February 2026, the applicant sent an email to the Office of the Attorney-General, to which my Associate was copied, alleging that “agencies within [the Attorney-General’s] portfolio are in possession of and/or circulating serious allegations concerning me, including allegations of domestic violence or sexual assault, which are entirely false and have never been put to me formally and I can assure you have never happened”. The applicant alleged that concealed material was being “relied upon to make adverse decisions” against him, in breach of the requirements of natural justice and potentially amounting to “defamation and misuse of public office”.

45 On 13 February 2026, the applicant sought to file certain documents, including:

(1)    An interlocutory application in support of the Recusal Application (QUD551/2025).

(2)    An accompanying affidavit (Recusal Affidavit (QUD551/2025)), sworn by the applicant on 12 February 2026, but not witnessed. In a covering letter, the applicant stated that he was unable to witness his affidavits due to being unable to travel to Australia.

46 On 13 February 2026, I directed the Court Registry to email the applicant explaining that Pt 6A of the Oaths Act 1867 (Qld) provided for affidavits to be witnessed electronically and that, provided that the applicant served unsigned copies on the Respondent on 13 February 2026, I was prepared to extend the time for filing his witnessed Recusal Affidavit (QUD551/2025). I directed the Court Registry to inform the applicant that the documents referred to above in [45 ] would be accepted for filing as drafts. Further, given the applicant’s indication that he was unable to “travel internationally”, I also directed the Court Registry to bring s 48 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) to the applicant’s attention.

47 On 13 February 2026, it came to my Associate’s attention that on 12 February 2026, the applicant had written to the Respondents in Reeve v CAANZ seeking that “Mark Rice, Mark Doorley, Vanessa Chapman are to be available for questioning in all hearings moving forward”, and that the Respondents intended to treat this correspondence as an informal application to cross-examine Ms Chapman and the second respondent in Reeve v CAANZ (Cross-Examination Application), noting that they did not intend to call Mr Doorley to give evidence in the Summary Judgment Application. On 13 February 2026, I directed the Court Registry to inform the parties that the hearing of the Summary Judgment Application listed for 25 February 2026 would be vacated, and that only the hearing of the Recusal Application (QUD551/2025) and any application by the applicant to appear remotely, pursuant to s48 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act would proceed on that date. The Summary Judgment Application and the Cross-Examination Application would not be heard until after the Recusal Application (QUD551/2025) had been decided.

48 On 16 February 2026, the applicant filed: (1) a witnessed Recusal Affidavit (QUD551/2025); and (2) an interlocutory application seeking leave to appear remotely pursuant to s 48 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act (Remote Appearance Application (QUD551/2025)), which was supported by an affidavit.

49 On 16 February 2026, the applicant also filed interlocutory applications in Reeve v FWC seeking: (1) my recusal from that matter (Recusal Application (QUD648/2025)); and (2) leave to appear remotely in that application pursuant to s 48 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act (Remote Appearance Application (QUD648/2025)). The applicant’s Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was accompanied by a supporting affidavit (Recusal Affidavit (QUD648/2025)).

50 On 17 February 2026, I made orders (Recusal Timetabling Orders (QUD648/2025)) timetabling the provision of materials in respect of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), which the Court Registry sent to the parties. The Court Registry later confirmed with the parties that the Remote Appearance Application (QUD648/2025) and the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) would be heard on 19 March 2026, and the Removal of Respondent Application would be vacated until the outcome of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) was known.

51 On 25 February 2026, at 9:24am AEST, as he had previously done before other hearings, the applicant wrote to my Associate stating that he was unable to attend the hearing of the Remote Appearance Application (QUD551/2025) and the Recusal Application (QUD551/2025) listed for 10:15am AEST that day. It was unclear whether the applicant was seeking an adjournment of that hearing, but I decided to treat it as such (Second Adjournment Application (QUD551/2025)) and granted the adjournment. My reasons for doing so are set out in my judgment in Reeve v Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (No 2) [2026] FCA 242. I then listed the Remote Appearance Application (QUD551/2025) and the Recusal Application (QUD551/2025) for hearing on 9 April 2026.

52 On 3 March 2026, it came to my attention that the applicant had not yet filed and served documents which could be described as submissions in support of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), as contemplated by the Recusal Timetabling Orders (QUD648/2025). I therefore directed the Court Registry to send an email to the parties, requesting that the applicant advise whether an extension of time for compliance was required. In response to an email by the applicant advising that he did not understand what was being asked of him, on 4 March 2026, I directed the Court Registry to send a further email explaining the difference between written submissions and affidavit evidence. In response, the applicant wrote, inter alia, the following:

I had understood that the argument in support of the recusal application was already set out within the two affidavits filed in support of the interlocutory application, including the affidavit sworn 12 February 2026 (attached again for convenience). That affidavit sets out the factual basis upon which I say there is a reasonable apprehension of bias.

I note your explanation that the Court ordinarily expects written submissions to be filed as a separate document presenting the legal argument based on the affidavit evidence. My understanding had been that the affidavit material itself sufficiently outlined the basis of the application, but I appreciate the clarification.

…

Given the financial and personal burden already imposed by these proceedings, I had intended to address any additional legal argument briefly in oral submissions rather than incur further expense. If the Court instead requires written submissions, I would appreciate confirmation and any guidance as to the preferred length or format.

53 In response, on 9 March 2026, I directed the Court Registry to inform the applicant that I was content to treat his affidavit material as submissions in support of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), but that I was also content to receive reply submissions pursuant to the Recusal Timetabling Orders (QUD648/2025), as well as oral submissions at the hearing of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025).

54 On 19 March 2026, at 9:56am AEST, 19 minutes before the hearing of the Remote Appearance Application (QUD648/2025) and the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), the applicant sent an email entitled “Submissions for todays [sic] hearing” to, inter alia, my Associate, the Court Registry, and the respondents’ solicitors, as follows:

I write in relation to today’s hearing and the materials I have sought to place before the Court.

I respectfully request that the Court accept my submissions and affidavit material filed for the purposes of the hearing.

I wish to explain that the ongoing conduct of these proceedings has placed me under significant personal and financial strain. As a self-represented litigant, I have experienced substantial difficulty navigating procedural requirements, particularly in circumstances where I have been unable to secure legal representation despite extensive efforts.

This has been compounded by repeated challenges in filling material, which has made it increasingly difficult for me to properly present my case. I have done my best to comply with the Court’s requirements and directions, and any deficiencies in form are not intentional but arise from those circumstances.

I remain committed to engaging with the process respectfully and in good faith, and I seek only a fair opportunity to present my evidence and submissions.

I would also be grateful to receive copies of the transcript and any orders made following today’s hearing at the earliest opportunity, so that I may properly understand the Court’s reasons and consider any further steps available to me.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

(Emphasis added.)

55 The applicant’s email attached, inter alia, a document entitled “Oral submission for 19th”, which contained submissions in support of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025).

56 It appeared sufficiently clear that by his email of 19 March 2026, the applicant did not seek an adjournment of the Remote Appearance Application (QUD648/2025) or the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025). By contrast to prior emails that the applicant had sent to the Court ahead of case management hearings, the applicant here made no mention of the hearing being adjourned, whereas previous such emails contained requests such as, “I respectfully request that the matter be adjourned”, or hypothetical statements such as, “[i]f the Court proceeds in my absence”. The emphasised section in the above-quoted email appeared to clearly contemplate that the Remote Appearance Application (QUD648/2025) and the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) would go ahead. Further, the fact that the applicant provided the Court with submissions regarding the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) supports the inference that the applicant intended for the application to proceed. In these circumstances, I decided that the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) should proceed.

57 In relation to the applicant’s request to be provided with a transcript following the hearing, such requests are dealt with in Pt 6 of the Court’s Access to Documents and Transcripts Practice Note (GPN-ACCS). [6.2] of the Practice Note provides that copyright in all transcripts belongs to the Commonwealth and, subject to the Rules or any Court order, “transcripts cannot be shared between parties or distributed to any other recipients”. [6.3] of the Practice Note provides that:

A party or non-party (including the media) may purchase the whole, or a part, of a transcript in a proceeding from the Court’s Authorised Transcript Provider, unless the Court has ordered or directed that a transcript:

(a) is, in whole or in part, confidential or the subject of restrictions on access; or

(b) may not be published or reproduced without leave of the Court.

(Footnotes omitted.)

58 [6.4] of the Practice Note provides that subject to the restrictions in [6.2] and [6.3], “a transcript will be provided if a formal request for a transcript is submitted to the Court’s Authorised Transcript Provider using the approved form and after payment of the relevant charge”. It is not clear whether the applicant has submitted a formal request to the Court’s Authorised Transcript Provider. In any event, whether a transcript will be provided usually falls to be decided by the Court’s Authorised Transcript Provider. It may be that the applicant has understood the direction I made that the Registry provide him with a transcript of the case management hearing of 9 February 2026 in Reeve v CAANZ to be one which is routinely made or otherwise that a transcript is available upon request. That is not the case; rather, that direction is an example of another accommodation to the applicant shown by the Court, as by making that direction, the Court bears the burden of the cost of the transcript.

APPLICATION TO APPEAR REMOTELY

59 As the applicant did not appear at the hearing on 19 March 2026, it was not necessary to consider the Remote Appearance Application (QUD648/2025).

APPLICATION FOR RECUSAL

Orders sought

60 The applicant seeks the following orders:

1.    That Her Honour Justice Meagher recuse herself from further conduct or hearing of this proceeding on the grounds of actual bias, apprehended bias, procedural unfairness, and failure to disclose conflicts of interest.

2.    That the matter be re-listed for a case management hearing before a different judicial officer as soon as practicable.

61 The fourth and fifth respondents oppose the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) and wish to be heard on the question of costs.

Materials relied on

62 The applicant relies on:

His interlocutory application filed 16 February 2026.

His affidavit filed 16 February 2026.

His document entitled “Oral submission for 19th”, emailed to the Court Registry and my Associate on 19 March 2026.

63 The grounds on which the applicant relies in his interlocutory application in support of my recusal are the following:

(1)    My alleged undisclosed conflicts of interest comprising “material connections to the parties or individuals involved in this matter, including protected associations and involvement in issues subject to public interest immunity claims (PII), undermining the appearance of impartiality”. The relevant individuals are said to include the fourth respondent and “regulatory officials”. Further, the applicant alleges that I have failed to disclose suppressed information from prior related proceedings.

(2)    My engagement in an alleged “[p]attern of [p]rocedural [u]nfairness”, in which I had allegedly:

(a)    “[A]ttempted to restrict the Applicant’s ability to file material, despite it meeting all formal and procedural requirements”.

(b)    Accepted the respondents’ material “without the same level of scrutiny”.

(c)    Convened “unjustified short-notice hearings and pressured compliance under unreasonable timeframes”.

(d)    “Failed to address or even acknowledge credible and supported concerns raised by the Applicant regarding suppression of evidence and regulatory misconduct”.

(3)    My alleged failure to provide the applicant with “an equal opportunity to present his case”, and my imposition of an “excessive procedural burden” on his evidence, which had not been applied to the respondents, representing a denial of natural justice.

(4)    A reasonable apprehension of bias said to arise from my “language, tone and decision-making” which had “aligned consistently with the Respondents’ position”, despite the applicant having filed over 600 pages of material.

(5)    Alleged collusion between my Chambers and the respondents, taking the form of “improperly shared and undisclosed communications” in reliance upon which I had “made references and procedural decisions”, and which the applicant had not been allowed to view.

(6)    Alleged suppression of evidence through “illegitimate filing barriers”, which had applied to the applicant’s “affidavits and accompanying evidence bundles” regarding alleged retaliatory conduct of CAANZ and other individuals, whilst the “false materials provided by the Respondents [had] been allowed without scrutiny”.

64 In his affidavit, the applicant gave, inter alia, the following examples of alleged procedural unfairness and bias:

(1)    Case management hearings convened “with less than 24 hours’ notice and unreasonable demands to reformat or refile already accepted documents”.

(2)    My alleged acceptance of an affidavit of CAANZ’s solicitor, filed in Reeve v CAANZ, which was said to contain a “defamatory” Courier Mail article regarding the applicant.

(3)    My alleged unwillingness to investigate certain “Public Interest Immunity” issues surrounding a certain Mr Brendan Butler and certain evidence said to be “concealed under sealed orders”.

65 The fourth and fifth respondents rely on their written submissions filed on 11 March 2026.

PRINCIPLES

Obligations of a litigant in person

66 Before proceeding to the principles applicable to deciding whether I should recuse myself, it is worth setting out the obligations of a litigant in person towards the Court to the other parties to the matter. As noted above, the Court has given the applicant the benefit of the doubt by way of (1) explanations of the filing requirements of the Court, (2) additional opportunities for the applicant to provide further material in support of his case, (3) extensions of time and adjournments, and (4) explanations of the Court’s role in relation to a litigant in person. This has been done in pursuit of the Court’s duty to provide assistance to a litigant in person in order to diminish the disadvantage which accrues: Flightdeck Geelong at [52] – [53].

67 However, a litigant in person who seeks to avail themselves of the Court’s processes must bear in mind that though they are not represented, they are nevertheless subject to the rules of the Court. In Flightdeck Geelong, Markovic, Derrington and Anastassiou JJ at [54] quoted Samuels JA in Rajski v Scitec Corp oration Pty Ltd [1986] NSWCA 1 as follows:

[T]he absence of legal representation on one side ought not to induce a court to deprive the other side of one jot of its lawful entitlement … An unrepresented party is as much subject to the rules as any other litigant. The court must be patient in explaining them and may be lenient in the standard of compliance which it exacts. But it must see that the rules are obeyed, subject to any proper exceptions. To do otherwise, or to regard a litigant in person as enjoying a privileged status, would be quite unfair to the represented opponent.

(Emphasis added.)

68 The Court, further, may reprimand a litigant in person, as it may reprimand any party, in the event that they fail to meet their obligations to treat other parties with courtesy and respect: DOQ17 v Australian Financial Security Authority (No 2) [2018] FCA 1270; 363 ALR 681 at [21]. The applicant should be reminded of these requirements in light of the correspondence referred to above at [31 ] – [32 ] which, plainly, is not an appropriate way of addressing the Court or other parties to this proceeding. The mere fact that the applicant is a litigant in person should not lead the Court to deprive the respondents of their entitlement to expect courteous communication and compliance with the Rules on the applicant’s part. Nor should it diminish the applicant’s respect for and courtesy towards the Court.

Applications for a Judge’s recusal

69 Where the Court is constituted by a single Judge, as it is in this case, the single Judge must determine whether they should recuse themselves based on the evidence before them: QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; 279 CLR 148 at [122] – [130] and [307].

70 The principles relating to recusal applications are well-settled. A Judge is disqualified from determining a case if they are “biased or a party or a member of the public might reasonably apprehend that the judge is biased”: Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; 195 ALR 225 at [30].

71 Actual bias arises where a decision-maker is “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented”: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507 at [72], see also [178] – [187]. Apprehended bias arises if “a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 at [6].

72 Referring to Ebner, in QYFM, Kiefel CJ and Gageler J explained at [38] that application of the test for determining apprehended bias requires:

(1) identification of the factor which it is said might lead a judge to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits; (2) articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and (3) assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer.

73 The criterion in the test in Ebner is a “double might”, which emphasises that it is “concerned with ‘possibility (real and note remote), not probability’”: QYFM at [37]. However, an application that a Judge should not continue to sit should not be accepted “unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case”: Ebner at [19].

74 The principles surrounding an application that a Judge recuse themselves should be applied whilst bearing in mind the Judge’s duty to sit. In Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; 151 CLR 288, Mason, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ observed at 294:

[I]t would be an abdication of judicial function and an encouragement of procedural abuse for a judge to adopt the approach that he should automatically disqualify himself whenever he was requested by one party so to do on the grounds of a possible appearance of pre-judgment or bias, regardless of whether the other party desired that the matter be dealt with by him as the judge to whom the hearing of the case had been entrusted by the ordinary procedures and practice of the particular court.

75 In Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342, Mason J observed at 352:

Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.

76 As Flick J remarked in Kennedy v Secretary, Department of Industry (No 2) [2016] FCA 746 at [19], quoting Olowofoyeku, ‘Inappropriate Recusals’ (2016) 132 LQR 318 at 323, “appeasement is not an appropriate ground for recusal” and further, “on occasions acceding to an application for disqualification is only succeeded by another application to disqualify a newly allocated judge”.

77 Therefore, in deciding whether the evidence adduced by the applicant satisfies the tests for either actual or apprehended bias, I must bear in mind that unless either of these tests is satisfied, I have a duty to sit and hear this matter. The authorities make clear that no credence should be given to a mere preference of a recusal applicant that another Judge hear their matter, and that a Judge should not recuse themselves simply because a party has demanded it: see JRL at 352 (Mason J); Antoun v The Queen [2006] HCA 2; 80 ALJR 497 at 34.

SUBMISSIONS

78 There appears to be no dispute between the parties that the High Court’s test in Ebner is the authoritative test for deciding whether a Judge should recuse themselves from a matter on the ground of apprehended bias. The applicant does not appear to make submissions in respect of actual bias, instead confining himself to the test for apprehended bias set out in Ebner at [27].

79 The applicant’s submissions do not appear to be structured in the same manner as the grounds set out in his interlocutory application, referred to above at [63 ]. In his written submissions, the applicant first focuses on two main factors which he says might give rise to a reasonable apprehension in a fair-minded observer that I might not bring an impartial mind to this matter. These are:

(1) Firstly, a “[p]attern of procedural irregularities” whereby the applicant’s material has been frequently rejected, delayed or “subjected to additional requirements” after already being accepted. In the applicant’s submission, this alleged irregularity might cause a fair-minded lay observer to question whether the “procedural framework is being applied consistently between the parties, particularly where the respondents’ material has not been subjected to the same barriers”.

(2) Secondly, an “[u]nequal treatment of evidentiary material”, in which the respondents’ material has been “accepted and considered”, whilst the applicant’s “attempts to place supporting evidence before the Court have repeatedly encountered procedural obstacles”. In the applicant’s submission, this alleged pattern “creates the appearance of unequal treatment”.

80 The applicant also advances a third, related factor, in which he contends that the overlap between this matter with other, related matters involving the same factual background, including regulatory and disciplinary proceedings, means that the (alleged) restriction or differential treatment of evidentiary material “contributes to the perception that [his] case cannot be presented fully”.

81 In the applicant’s submissions, when the above three factors are considered collectively, a reasonable observer might apprehend that the Court might not approach the matter “with a completely open mind”.

82 The fourth and fifth respondents’ submissions address each of the grounds of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), referred to above at [63 ], in turn.

Ground 1 – Undisclosed conflicts of interest

83 In relation to the first ground, that I have undisclosed conflicts of interest which comprise material connections to parties in this matter, the fourth and fifth respondents rely on Ebner at [30] for their submission that:

The question to be determined for resolving allegations of conflicts of interest between judges and parties to a litigation, their lawyers or witnesses, is “ how it is said that the existence of the ‘ association ’ or ‘ interest ’ might be thought (by the reasonable observer) possibly to divert the judge from deciding the case on its merits ”.

When determining such question, “ he bare identification of an ‘ association ’ will not be sufficient to answer the relevant question ”.

(Original emphasis, footnotes omitted.)

84 I accept the fourth and fifth respondents’ submission that the bare identification of an association is not sufficient to answer this question. What is required is that the applicant demonstrate how a supposed association, if shown to exist, might be thought, by the reasonable observer, to divert me from deciding the matter on its merits: Ebner at [30]. The fourth and fifth respondents submit, and I accept, that the applicant has provided no explanation or particulars regarding (1) the claimed connection between me and the fourth respondent, (2) details of the relevant “regulatory officials” and my connection to or association with them, and (3) what information the applicant alleges has been suppressed, and how this is connected to any association between me and either the fourth respondent or “regulatory officials”. His evidence does not go beyond a bare assertion of a conflict of interest based on supposed associations in support of which he has produced no evidence. The first ground of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) fails.

Ground 2 – Failure to accord procedural fairness

85 In respect of the applicant’s submission that I have failed to accord him procedural fairness, the fourth and fifth respondents submit that:

(1)    The applicant’s reliance on short-notice case management hearings, as an example of procedural unfairness, is misplaced, as he has been afforded ample time to prepare for hearings.

(2)    The difficulties that the applicant has experienced in having his documents accepted for filing are not a denial of procedural fairness. Rather, the applicant has been made aware of the requirements under the Rules. Further, the Rules have not been applied differently as between the applicant and the fourth and fifth respondents.

86 I largely agree with these submissions. The procedural history of this proceeding demonstrates that the applicant has been given substantial time to prepare his material. The timetabling orders made on 3 December 2025 in Reeve v FWC provided the parties with over three months to prepare for the Removal of Respondent Application. At the case management hearing held on that day, I also spent considerable time seeking to understand the issues which the applicant sought to agitate in this proceeding. I directed him to the relevant parts of the Rules and noted which parts of the material filed presented issues of form. I referred to the Court’s role in relation to a litigant in person and directed him to a relevant extract from Flightdeck Geelong, where this role is explained.

87 In relation to the applicant’s references to “short-notice hearings” convened “with less than 24 hours’ notice”, I infer that these relate to the case management hearing in Reeve v CAANZ, held on 9 February 2026. I reject the applicant’s submissions that these bespeak a pattern of procedural unfairness. First, it is worth noting that more than 24 hours’ notice was given to the applicant. Notice of the case management hearing was provided on 6 February 2026. Second, the applicant was made aware that the case management hearing was solely for his benefit, as its intention was to assist him to organise his documents in a form that would be acceptable for filing. It was scheduled at the first possible opportunity, once it became clear that there had been ongoing difficulties with the applicant filing his material, so that the applicant could be given the most time possible to organise and lodge his material ahead of the hearing of the Summary Judgment Application, which was listed for 25 February 2026. Further, the Filing Orders (QUD551/2025) made at that case management hearing relaxed the part of the Rules that applied to filing material, rather than restricted the applicant’s ability to file material. This was done to assist the applicant in putting before the Court the material that he considered relevant to that matter.

88 Third, I agree with the fourth and fifth respondents’ submissions that the applicant’s difficulties in filing documents are not a result of a denial of procedural fairness. Notwithstanding the sometimes confusing and contradictory communication from the Court Registry in relation to the filing status of the applicant’s documents, the history of the Court Registry’s dealings with the applicant demonstrates ongoing efforts to assist him in understanding the requirements of the Rules. Additionally, as the applicant has frequently noted in his correspondence, he is not a lawyer and has been making his best efforts to comply with the Rules. It is not surprising that parties represented by lawyers with experience in proceedings in this Court should have fewer difficulties in understanding and complying with the Rules around filing. This is not the result of a differential treatment of the applicant versus the fourth and fifth respondents.

89 Finally, it is worth noting that the filing requirements are not targeted at any particular party to a proceeding. The filing requirements are set out in the Rules, which are made by the Judges of the Court, or a majority thereof: s 59 of the Act. They are not the result of a single Judge’s attempts to suppress evidence. One party’s difficulty in complying with the filing requirements set out in the Rules is not a result of “obstruction”; nor is it the result of preference for one party’s material over another’s. In any event, the applicant’s materials have been accepted for filing and are now before the Court.

90 I reject this ground of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025). For the above reasons, the three factors outlined in the applicant’s submissions, set out above at [79 ] – [80 ], are also rejected.

Ground 3 – Failure to provide the applicant an equal opportunity to present his case

91 In respect of the applicant’s submission that I have failed to provide him with an equal opportunity to present his case, the fourth and fifth respondents rightly point out that, as the applicant accepts, he has “made ‘multiple submissions, including over 600 pages of evidence’”. In other words, the fourth and fifth respondents submit that it is plain that the applicant has been allowed to present his case.

92 The fourth and fifth respondents further note that the applicant has not pointed out which documents, in his submission, are being suppressed or excluded from the Court’s record. I agree with these submissions. Again, I note that the procedural history of this matter demonstrates that the applicant has been provided with ample opportunity to prepare and provide his material, has been given indulgences by way of relaxed filing requirements and has been sent reminders by the Court Registry when there was a possibility that he required an extension of time to comply with the Recusal Timetabling Orders (QUD648/2025). The applicant has, at several points, also been sent email correspondence explaining the filing requirements and the difference between affidavit material and submissions. Thus, the Court has assisted the applicant extensively to allow him to present his case.

93 Additionally, it is worth noting that this proceeding is at an early stage. Before the applicant brought the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), the only hearing listed in this matter was an interlocutory application, namely the Removal of Respondent Application, which has not been heard in light of the applicant making the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025). In circumstances where (1) the applicant has filed extensive material which appears to comprise both evidentiary material and submissions, which has been accepted for filing, and (2) the central issue in this proceeding (i.e., an extension of time to file an application for judicial review against the FWC’s decisions) has not yet been heard, it is difficult to see how it could be said that the applicant has not had an opportunity to present his case. Owing to the early stage of the proceeding, it is unclear how the applicant can mount the argument that I have “accepted and considered” the fourth and fifth respondents’ material yet failed to consider his material, when neither party’s material filed in support of the Removal of Respondent Application, nor material relating to the central issue in this matter, currently falls for the Court’s consideration.

94 Accordingly, I reject the third ground of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025).

Ground 4 – A reasonable apprehension of bias arising from my language, tone and decision-making

95 I infer that the examples which the applicant gives as set out above at [64 ] (1) – (3) are in support of this ground. In response, the fourth and fifth respondents first make a broad submission that the applicant has not identified which communications are considered to have been hostile, or how they are attributed to me. They then submit that, even if hostile communications had occurred, they do not demonstrate an already formed conclusion that is incapable of alteration, as is required to satisfy the test for bias: see Jia at [71] – [72]. As the applicant has not particularised the communications upon which he relies for this ground, it is not possible for me to make a finding that any hostile communications have occurred between the Court and the applicant. As has been canvassed in the procedural history of both this proceeding and Reeve v CAANZ, the Court has gone to great lengths to explain, both orally at case management hearings and by email, the difficulties with the applicant’s material and the requirements of the Rules. As has already been discussed, the Court has also shown many indulgences to the applicant.

96 Second, the fourth and fifth respondents submit that the issue of the admission of a Courier Mail article in Reeve v CAANZ, and any issue of credibility, should be resolved in that proceeding, and have “no bearing on any decision concerning whether any jurisdictional error occurred in the making of decisions by the Fair Work Commission.” I agree that the mere fact that an article tendered in Reeve v CAANZ does not demonstrate any prejudgment on my part of any issue in this proceeding. The mere fact of affidavit evidence being accepted by the Court Registry does not affect the weight that the Court ultimately decides to give to that evidence. In any event, the applicant has not shown what, if any, preformed conclusion I have reached regarding the contents of that article, nor how it bears on the issues to be decided in this case.

97 Thirdly, the fourth and fifth respondents submit that whilst the thrust of the applicant’s submission about my failure to investigate “Public Interest Immunity” issues surrounding Mr Brendan Butler and certain evidence said to be “concealed under sealed orders” is “not understood”, their overarching submission in this regard is that the Court is not required to “investigate matters involving third parties”. I agree with this submission. The Court’s jurisdiction is not a jurisdiction “at large”. In this proceeding, it is limited to considering first, whether the applicant should be granted an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of the FWC’s decisions, and second, if an extension is granted, to consider any application for judicial review.

98 Accordingly, I reject the fourth ground of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025).

Ground 5 – Alleged collusion between my Chambers and the respondents

99 As the fourth and fifth respondents submit, it is not clear from the applicant’s material what he relies on to support this ground of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025). The applicant does not identify any references to, or decisions based on, alleged undisclosed material. It may be that the applicant refers to the refusal, on 12 January 2026, of two applications made under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act) to view internal communications in this matter and in Reeve v CAANZ, which the applicant made on 11 December 2025. The applicant has copied my Associate into ongoing correspondence in relation to these applications.

100 Whether or not the applicant relies on these decisions, I accept the fourth and fifth respondents’ submission that the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of any undisclosed material relied on, any undisclosed communication between Chambers and the respondents, or any collusion. I reject this ground of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025).

Ground 6 – Alleged suppression of evidence through filing requirements

101 As the fourth and fifth respondents submit, this ground appears to repeat Grounds 2 and 4. It suffices to simply restate, first, that the filing requirements have been significantly relaxed for the applicant’s benefit, second, that the applicant’s material has now been accepted for filing, and third, that the stage that the proceedings are at means that there has not yet been an opportunity to consider either party’s material, other than in relation to the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025).

102 I reject this ground of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025).

CONCLUSION

103 The applicant has not demonstrated any actual or apprehended bias or procedural unfairness. The Recusal Application (QUD648/2025) is dismissed.

104 At the hearing of the Recusal Application (QUD648/2025), the fourth and fifth respondents indicated that they wished to be heard separately on the question of costs. Accordingly, I have made orders for the parties to provide the Court with short written submissions on costs, to be heard on the papers. I have also made orders which provide for a case management hearing to be listed, with a view to listing the Removal of Respondent Application.

| I certify that the preceding one hundred and four (104) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Meagher. |
Associate:

Dated: 27 March 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

| | QUD 648 of 2025 |
| Respondents | |
| Fourth Respondent: | MATTHEW BUTLER (PARTNER, PKF HR SERVICES GOLD COAST) |
| Fifth Respondent: | PKF HR SERVICES GOLD COAST |
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