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March 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Raymond Strong v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-12362
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12362 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 1 of 3

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-12362
Non-Argument Calendar

RAYMOND L. STRONG,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:23-cv-00486-JSS-DCI

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Raymond L. Strong, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
peals from the district court’s May 6, 2025, judgment denying his
USCA11 Case: 25-12362 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 25-12362

28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. We lack jurisdiction over
the appeal.
We issued jurisdictional questions asking the parties to ad-
dress (1) whether the notice of appeal is timely, and (2) if not,
whether the notice should be construed as a motion to reopen the
appeal period under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6)
and whether there is a factual question regarding when Strong re-
ceived the district court’s order and judgment. Strong responds
that his appeal is timely because he did not receive the order and
judgment until June 6, 2025. The Secretary of the Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections responds that the appeal is untimely and that
Strong is not entitled to Rule 4(a)(6) relief.
The timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a juris-
dictional requirement, and we cannot entertain an appeal that is
out of time. Green v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 606 F.3d 1296, 1300-01 (11th
Cir. 2010). If there is not a federal party, a notice of appeal must be
filed within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is
entered. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (a). Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro
se prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed filed on the date that he
delivers it to prison authorities for mailing. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1).
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) authorizes the
district court to reopen the time to file an appeal if (1) the court
finds that the moving party did not receive notice of the appealed
order within 21 days of its entry, (2) the party moves for such relief
within 180 days of the order’s entry or within 14 days of receiving
notice of the order, whichever is earlier, and (3) the court finds that
USCA11 Case: 25-12362 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 3 of 3

25-12362 Opinion of the Court 3

no party would be prejudiced by reopening. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).
We will construe a late pro se notice of appeal in a civil case as a
motion to reopen the appeal period under Rule 4(a)(6) if the appel-
lant indicates that he did not receive notice of the entry of an order
or judgment within 21 days of its entry. Sanders v. United States, 113
F.3d 184, 187 (11th Cir. 1997).
Here, we lack jurisdiction because Strong’s notice of appeal
is untimely and relief is not available under Rule 4(a)(6). Because
the district court entered judgment on May 6, 2025, Strong had un-
til June 5, 2025, to appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (a). Since Strong did
not deliver his notice of appeal to prison officials until July 2, the
notice is untimely. See id.; Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1).
Because Strong alleged in his untimely notice of appeal that
he did not receive timely notice of the dismissal order and judg-
ment, we construe the notice as a motion to reopen the appeal pe-
riod under Rule 4(a)(6). See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6); Sanders, 113
F.3d at 187. However, because Strong received notice of the order
and judgment on June 6, the time to move for relief under Rule
4(a)(6) expired 14 days later, which was June 20. See Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(6)(B). As such, his construed motion, deemed filed on July
2, is also untimely. See id.; Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1). Because his no-
tice is untimely and Rule 4(a)(6) relief is not available, we lack ju-
risdiction over the appeal. See Green, 606 F.3d at 1300-01.
Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdic-
tion. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.