Terrell Sims v. Steven Cambell - § 1983 Complaint Dismissed, 30 Days to Amend

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Terrell Sims v. Steven Cambell

District Court, C.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:26-cv-03029

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

• Cited By (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
TERRELL SIMS, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:26-cv-03029-SEM
)
STEVEN CAMBELL, )
Defendant. )
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 by Plaintiff Terrell Sims, an inmate at Graham Correctional
Center (“Graham”). Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Status (Doc.
9).

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s pleading for failure to state a
claim for relief, which renders moot his status request.
I. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any
legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing
them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649
(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721
F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

II. ALLEGED FACTS
On December 8, 2024, Plaintiff called for assistance for his
cellmate, who was having trouble breathing. Less than one minute

later, Plaintiff’s cellmate died. Plaintiff claimed that his cellmate had
earlier told Plaintiff he had six months to live. An hour later,
Plaintiff was escorted to investigative segregation. Plaintiff claims

that a mandatory mental health evaluation is required before being
transferred to restrictive housing, which did not occur. (Pl. Compl.,
Doc 1 at 5-6:1-2.)
Five days later, Plaintiff was transported to SSM Health Saint

Mary’s Hospital in Centralia, where he received a blood transfusion.
Upon his release four days later, Plaintiff returned to investigative
segregation pending the results of an autopsy on his deceased
cellmate, who Plaintiff asserted was terminally ill. Plaintiff asserts

he must receive notice and a hearing before a transfer to restrictive
housing can occur. (Id. at 6-7:3-4.)
III. ANALYSIS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This

requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in
sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that

the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bravo v.
Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Additionally, “[f]or a defendant to be liable under section 1983,
she must be personally responsible for the alleged deprivation of the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492,

498 (7th Cir. 2018). Despite naming Defendant Cambell, the former
Graham warden, Plaintiff does not mention Cambell again in his
pleading. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A
plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by including the

defendant’s name in the caption.”).
To the extent Plaintiff names Defendant Cambell based on his
supervisory responsibility, this is also inadequate to impose § 1983

liability. See Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 495 (7th Cir.
1997) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to
impose § 1983 liability on a supervisor for the conduct of a

subordinate violating a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that because
vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, “a plaintiff must

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
Plaintiff also does not have a constitutional right to a mental

health evaluation before being placed in investigative segregation.
See Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2017);
Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir. 2017)
(stating that a failure to follow departmental guidelines “in itself . . .

does not describe an Eighth Amendment violation”); see also Brown
v. Randle, 847 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2017) (“42 U.S.C. §1983 does
not authorize federal courts to order state officials to pay damages
for violations of state law; remedies in §1983 suits are for violations

of federal law only.”).
Furthermore, “inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding
transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed

for administrative, protective, or investigative purposes.” Townsend
v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiff
did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding

placement in administrative segregation pending an investigation
because this type of segregation is considered “discretionary
segregation,” which inmates have “no liberty interest avoiding,” and

also because plaintiff’s placement in segregation “neither was
indefinite, nor affected his parole eligibility”); see also Thomas v.
Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Both temporary

confinement and investigative status have been determined to be
discretionary segregation, and do not implicate a liberty interest.”).
Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed. However, if
Plaintiff believes he can revise his pleading to state a cause of

action, he may file a Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended pleading, it must be
attached to his motion for leave.

The Court does not accept piecemeal amendments. Plaintiff’s
claims must stand independently without reference to his initial
filing and contain all claims against all defendants. Plaintiff must

specify the constitutional violation, when it occurred, and the
Defendant or Defendants personally involved. See Gentry v.
Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages

under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was
personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional
right.”).

The Court informs Plaintiff that any attempt to join unrelated
claims and defendants is not permitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
In other words, multiple claims against a single defendant are

allowed, but “Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined
with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507
F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 9) is moot with the entry of

the Court’s Merit Review Order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 9) is MOOT.

2) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED for failure to
state a federal claim on which relief may be granted as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

3) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an Amended
Complaint within thirty days of the entry of this order and
in compliance with the Court’s guidance. If Plaintiff does
not submit an amendment on or before the thirty-day
deadline, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s case without
prejudice.

ENTERED April 24, 2026.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

---

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE