Prejudgment Interest $22,200.22, $57,500 Damages Awarded

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April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jimmy Lee Bynum, Jr. v. Bandza et al.

District Court, C.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:20-cv-02343

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

JIMMY LEE BYNUM, JR.,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-cv-2343

BANDZA et al.,
Defendants.

Order
Now before the Court is the determination of the Plaintiff’s prejudgment
interest award.1
I
On March 13, 2026, the Court granted in relevant part the Plaintiff’s request for
prejudgment interest, and instructed the Plaintiff to file a schedule of his damages.
(D. 148). The Plaintiff did so (D. 149), and the Defendant filed a response. (D. 155).
The matter is therefore fully briefed.
II
The issue before the Court is the amount of prejudgment interest to which the
Plaintiff is entitled. The Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to $25,281.85 in prejudgment
interest. This number assumes a 6% annual interest rate from September 1, 2018 (the
date of the Plaintiff’s termination) through March 27, 2026 (the date on which the
Plaintiff filed his schedule of damages), based on the Plaintiff’s $57,500 backpay
award. The Defendants, meanwhile, assert three objections: (1) prejudgment interest
did not begin accruing until April 2022; (2) it stopped accruing on October 26, 2023;
and (3) the Plaintiff’s calculations for September 2018 are errant. The Court will

1 Citations to the electronic docket are abbreviated as “D. ___ at ECF p. ___.”
address these objections in turn, and will then calculate the Plaintiff’s prejudgment
interest award.
A
First, the Defendants argue that prejudgment interest should be calculated
from April 2022—rather than the Plaintiff’s termination date of September 2018—
because the “Plaintiff did not make any meaningful efforts to search for a new job
until approximately April 2022.” (D. 155 at 2). But, generally, prejudgment interest is
calculated from the date of the Plaintiff’s termination. See Gracia v. Sigmatron Int'l, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1263 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff'd, 842 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2016)
(calculating prejudgment interest from “the date of the [plaintiff’s] firing”); Baier v.
Rohr-Mont Motors, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (quoting S.E.C. v.
Koenig, No. 02 C 2180, 2009 WL 4043319, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2009)) (calculating
prejudgment interest from the date of the plaintiff’s termination until “‘damages have
been ascertained in a meaningful way’”); Woods v. Von Maur, Inc., No. 09 C 7800, 2012
WL 2062400, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2012) (calculating prejudgment interest “from the
date of Woods' termination until the date of entry of the jury's verdict”).
The Defendants, meanwhile, cite to no authority that supports straying from
this general proposition; rather, they provide only an assertion that the Plaintiff failed
to mitigate damages and should not be rewarded for that failure. But even if the Court
accepts the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages, the
Defendants certainly have not shown that failure to be “so egregious” as to limit the
Plaintiff’s statutory right to prejudgment interest. Wescher v. Chem–Tech Int'l, No. 13-
CV-229-PP, 2016 WL 7441655, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 27, 2016) (“The defendant argues
that the court should calculate interest from the date that the case was filed. The court
recognizes that there were delays along the plaintiff's journey to the jury verdict.
Chem–Tech terminated the plaintiff on September 30, 2011. On July 12, 2012, the
plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Labor (“DOL”) seeking assistance
with his USERRA claim. DOL's investigation continued through the end of 2012. The
plaintiff filed this complaint on March 1. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was representing
himself when he filed both the DOL complaint and this complaint, and the court finds
that the delays are not so egregious as to preclude the plaintiff from receiving pre-
judgment interest for the entire period from the date of termination.”).
The Defendants have not provided convincing evidence that the Plaintiff’s
behavior was sufficiently egregious to displace the status quo; their argument is
therefore rejected.
B
The Defendants next object that prejudgment interest “should not extend past
October 26, 2023, which is when the Parties participated in a settlement conference
with Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long.” (D. 155 at 2). After that conference, Judge Long
noted that “[a]fter two hours, Plaintiff’s last demand grossly exceeded what is
available to him by law. Upon reflection, the Court is unable to think of any non-
frivolous basis for this demand.” Id. Consequently, the Defendants argue that the
Plaintiff “should not be rewarded for unnecessarily prolonging this litigation for
another … 2.5 years.” Id. But the ostensible frivolousness of the Plaintiff’s case is undermined by (1) a
$57,500.00 jury verdict that was ultimately entered in the Plaintiff’s favor, and (2) the
general standard that prejudgment interest is calculated until the date that damages
are ascertained. Without the Defendants providing strong evidence that the Plaintiff
purposely delayed this litigation (as opposed to deploying (perhaps ill-advised)
negotiation tactics), the Court is not persuaded it should go against the grain and
truncate the Plaintiff’s interest timeline to October 2023. See Koenig, 2009 WL 4043319,
at *4 (finding that prejudgment interest terminates on the “date that damages have
been ascertained in a meaningful way”). This argument, therefore, is also rejected.
The Court does find, however, that the Plaintiff’s prejudgment interest
calculation must end on the date that damages were “ascertained in a meaningful
way.” Id. (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 836 (1990)). The Plaintiff requests prejudgment interest through March 27, 2026; i.e., the
date on which he filed his damages schedule. But, clearly, damages were
“ascertained” on May 9, 2025—the date on which the Plaintiff received his jury verdict
of $57,500.00 in backpay damages. (D. 123). Plainly, it does not make sense to award
the Plaintiff prejudgment interest after the date on which the jury issued a precise
damages award in his favor. Thus, while the Court disagrees with the Defendants’
suggested date of October 23, 2023, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s prejudgment
interest timeline should run from the date of his termination (September 1, 2018) to
the date on which the jury “ascertained” his damages award (May 6, 2025). See
Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Commc'ns, Inc., No. 14-CV-66-JDP, 2019 WL 2285487, at *1–3
(W.D. Wis. May 29, 2019) (finding that “pre-judgment interest terminate[d]” on the
date of the judgment codifying the jury’s verdict); Woods, 2012 WL 2062400, at *7
(calculating prejudgment interest “from the date of Woods' termination until the date
of entry of the jury's verdict”).
C
Lastly, the Defendants object to the Plaintiff’s interest calculation for the month
of September 2018. Specifically, the Defendants argue that “[h]is interest calculations
are based on a theory that on September 1, 2018, he would have received
compensation for the month of September.” (D. 155 at 2). The Court rejects this
argument. The Plaintiff was terminated on August 31, 2018. Had the Plaintiff not been
terminated, the Plaintiff would have worked for the Defendant the entirety of
September 2018. And, as the Court has established, the Plaintiff’s prejudgment
interest award computation begins with the date of his termination. Accordingly,
September 2018 should be included in the Plaintiff’s prejudgment interest award.
D
Lastly, the Court turns to the calculation of the Plaintiff’s prejudgment interest
award. “Under Seventh Circuit precedent, the Court is required to use the prime rate
when assessing pre-judgment interest.” Baier, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 1011 (citing Partington
v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc., 999 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1993)). Here, the parties
agree that 6% is the proper rate; the Court sees no need to disturb that agreement.
Otherwise, having overruled the Defendants above objections to the Plaintiff’s
prejudgment interest award, and having established that the Plaintiff’s prejudgment
interest runs from September 1, 2018 through May 6, 2025, the Court identifies no
issues with the Plaintiff’s prejudgment interest calculation. Accordingly, the Court
reduces the Plaintiff’s requested amount of $25,281.85 by $3,081.632, for a total
prejudgment interest award of $22,200.22.
III
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiff’s motion for prejudgment interest
is granted in part. The Plaintiff is entitled to $22,200.22 in prejudgment interest based
on his $57,500.00 damages award.

It is so ordered.
Entered on April 23, 2026
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

2 This deduction includes (1) the $812.88 of interest the Plaintiff accrued in 2026 and (2) the $2,268.75 in interest
that the Plaintiff accrued in 2025 after May 5.