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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Pinnacle North LLC v. Keith a White

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 370640
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (27.4K)

• PDF

Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PINNACLE NORTH, LLC, UNPUBLISHED
March 24, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellee, 11:46 AM

v No. 370640
Oakland Circuit Court
KEITH A. WHITE, LC No. 2020-183261-CB

Defendant-Appellant.

Before PATEL, P.J., and SWARTZLE and MARIANI, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Keith White appeals by right the trial court’s opinion and order granting plaintiff
Pinnacle North, LLC’s motion for settlement of attorney fees. The attorney fees stem from efforts
by plaintiff to recover for the breach of a commercial real estate lease between plaintiff and
defendant’s company, Marketplace Home Mortgage, LLC (MHM). On appeal, defendant also
challenges the trial court’s earlier rulings that concluded plaintiff could hold defendant personally
liable under an alter-ego theory for the liability of MHM, and that a payment of $50,000 to
defendant from MHM amounted to a voidable transfer under the Uniform Voidable Transfers Act
(UVTA), MCL 566.31 et seq. Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a limited-liability company that owns the leased real property at issue, which is
commonly known as the Pinnacle North Office Center. Defendant is the sole member and
president of MHM, a limited-liability company which was no longer in operation at the time of
this litigation.1 When it was an active business entity, MHM had been engaged in the business of
soliciting mortgage loans in several states, including Michigan. In April 2018, plaintiff and MHM
entered into a three-year commercial lease in which MHM agreed to lease space in the Pinnacle

1
There had previously been another member of MHM who held a 1% interest in the company, but
at all times defendant was the sole decisionmaker for the company.

-1-
North Office Center. During the summer months of 2018, however, MHM defaulted on its
payment obligations under the lease.

In the fall of 2018, MHM entered into negotiations to sell its assets to a third party, New
American Funding (NAF). The agreement between NAF and MHM closed on December 31,
2018. By that time, MHM was insolvent. As part of the sale, NAF assumed certain of MHM’s
liabilities, but the lease between plaintiff and MHM was not among them.2 When plaintiff
contacted MHM about overdue rent in January 2019, MHM informed plaintiff of the sale,
including that it did not include plaintiff’s lease and that MHM was no longer in operation and had
no revenue or employees. In December 2019, defendant wrote himself a check from MHM for
$50,000. According to defendant, this was a partial reimbursement for the significant financial
contributions he had previously made to MHM. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against MHM to
recover for its breach of the lease. When MHM failed to appear, plaintiff secured a default
judgment against it “in the amount of $52,548.24, plus interest, costs, and attorney fees from the
date of th[e] judgment going forward.”

After plaintiff was unsuccessful in collecting the default judgment from MHM, it filed the
instant lawsuit against defendant in his individual capacity, seeking (1) to pierce MHM’s corporate
veil and hold defendant personally liable for the default judgment, (2) to challenge the $50,000
payment to defendant as an impermissible transfer under the UVTA, and (3) to recover interest,
costs, and attorney fees.3 Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor
of plaintiff.4 The court concluded that the $50,000 payment was a voidable transfer under the
UVTA, that plaintiff had shown MHM’s corporate veil should be pierced, and that defendant was
“liable for the entire amount of the default judgment against MHM, plus costs, attorney fees, and
interest.” The trial court also set forth a process to determine the amount of plaintiff’s fee award.
Consistent with that process, the court received submissions from the parties and heard argument
on the fee request. The court then entered an order awarding plaintiff approximately $92,000 in
attorney fees, which comprised fees plaintiff incurred in both the instant lawsuit and the prior one
against MHM.

This appeal followed.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

As a preliminary matter, defendant contends that it is Minnesota law, rather than Michigan
law, that should govern this dispute. We disagree.

2
Defendant also became an employee of NAF but, “after less than a year,” he and NAF “parted
ways.”
3
Plaintiff also brought claims against NAF, but NAF was subsequently dismissed from the lawsuit
via stipulated order and is not involved in this appeal.
4
The trial court initially issued its judgment, along with findings of fact and conclusions of law,
on March 27, 2023. After both parties moved to amend the judgment, the court issued an amended
judgment, with additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, on June 13, 2023.

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As noted by plaintiff, MCR 2.112(J) requires a party who intends to rely on the law of
another state to “give notice of that intention either in his or her pleadings or in a written notice
served by the close of discovery.” Defendant, however, admittedly did not raise the potential
application of Minnesota law until after the trial in this case had concluded. Defendant has not
attempted to square this timing with MCR 2.112(J)’s requirements, nor has he offered any
colorable basis for overlooking his noncompliance with those requirements here. Cf. Zantop Int’l
Airlines, Inc v Eastern Airlines, 200 Mich App 344, 352; 503 NW2d 915 (1993) (overlooking the
plaintiff’s failure to provide formal notice of the application of Florida law when the defendant
drafted the contract providing that Florida law governed the transaction at issue and “and even
argued Florida law in its motion for summary disposition”).

Furthermore, in Sutherland v Kennington Truck Serv, Ltd, 454 Mich 274, 286; 562 NW2d
466 (1997), our Supreme Court instructed that we are to apply Michigan law unless a rational
reason to apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction exists. To determine this, the first question is
whether a foreign state has an interest in its law being applied. Id. If not, the party seeking to
apply the law of a foreign state cannot overcome the presumption that Michigan law applies. Id.
If a foreign state does have such an interest, then we must determine if Michigan’s own interests
nonetheless mandate that Michigan law be applied. Id. Here, the only apparent connection that
Minnesota has to this litigation is that MHM was organized under Minnesota law and had its
resident agent registered in Minnesota. But the mere fact that a party has its residence in a foreign
state, without more, “is insufficient to support the choice of a state’s law.” Id. at 287. Accordingly,
even if MCR 2.112(J) did not foreclose defendant’s argument, defendant has failed to show that
Minnesota has an interest in the application of its law to this dispute that would be sufficient to
overcome the presumption that Michigan law applies.

III. ALTER EGO LIABILITY

Turning to the substance of defendant’s claims of error on appeal, defendant first argues
that the trial court erred in concluding that MHM’s corporate veil should be pierced in this case so
that he could be held personally liable for MHM’s liability to plaintiff. We disagree.

Following a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed by this Court for clear
error and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Midwest Valve & Fitting Co v Detroit, 347
Mich App 237, 250; 14 NW3d 826 (2023). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “This
Court also reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on whether to pierce a corporate veil because
piercing a corporate veil is an equitable remedy.” Florence Cement Co v Vettraino, 292 Mich App
461, 468; 807 NW2d 917 (2011).

In Michigan, the legal principles regarding piercing the corporate veil apply to limited-
liability companies. Florence Cement Co, 292 Mich App at 468-469. “Michigan law respects the
corporate form, and our courts will usually recognize and enforce separate corporate entities.”
Gallagher v Persha, 315 Mich App 647, 653; 891 NW2d 505 (2016). “But ‘usually’ means not
always, and when the requisite evidence establishes that the corporate form has been abused, the
corporate form will be pierced so that creditors (and sometimes others) can seek payment of a
corporate debt . . . from a responsible corporate shareholder.” Id. at 654 (cleaned up).

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“The traditional basis for piercing the corporate veil has been to protect a corporation’s
creditors . . . where the stockholders have used the corporate structure in an attempt to avoid legal
obligations.” Rymal v Baergen, 262 Mich App 274, 293; 686 NW2d 241 (2004) (citation and
quotation marks omitted); see also Gallagher, 315 Mich App at 654 (explaining that “piercing the
veil of a corporate entity is an equitable remedy sparingly invoked to cure certain injustices that
would otherwise go unredressed in situations where the corporate entity has been used to avoid
legal obligations”) (cleaned up). This includes instances when an individual shareholder or officer
of the corporation has “so misused the corporation that it was unable to pay on [an] outstanding
judgment and an injustice would occur if the corporate form was not ignored.” Gallagher, 315
Mich App at 664. That said, simply “establishing an entity for the purpose of avoiding personal
responsibility is not by itself a wrong that would warrant disregarding the entity’s separate
existence.” Green v Ziegelman, 310 Mich App 436, 459; 873 NW2d 794 (2015).

“[T]here is no mechanical test for determining when the existence of a separate entity must
be disregarded and . . . whether to disregard the separate existence of an entity depends on the
totality of circumstances.” Id. at 457. See also Glenn v TPI Petroleum, Inc, 305 Mich App 698,
716; 854 NW2d 509 (2014) (listing various “[f]actors used by courts to determine the propriety of
piercing the corporate veil”). As a general matter, however, “[i]n order for a court to order a
corporate veil to be pierced, the corporate entity (1) must be a mere instrumentality of another
individual or entity, (2) must have been used to commit a wrong or fraud, and (3) there must have
been an unjust injury or loss to the plaintiff.” Florence Cement Co, 292 Mich App at 469.

Applying these principles to the record in this case, we find no reversible error in the trial
court’s conclusion that MHM’s corporate veil should be pierced. First, as to defendant’s use of
MHM as a mere instrumentality, the court did not err in concluding that defendant “blurred the
lines between himself and MHM” and failed to treat MHM “as an entity separate from himself.”
See, e.g., id. at 470 (explaining that “[s]uch a failure is a hallmark of a claim for piercing the
corporate veil” and “[e]ssentially, where members do not treat an artificial entity as separate from
themselves, neither will this Court”). As the trial court recognized, defendant acknowledged at
trial that he personally borrowed money from The Friedman Group to capitalize MHM; according
to defendant, he took out the loan personally, rather than having MHM do so, to avoid having it
reflected as a liability of MHM’s. MHM then repaid the loan directly to The Friedman Group
(rather than to defendant) through a $193,000 payment in 2018. See id. (finding support for
piercing the corporate veil where the LLC’s members “made no distinction between their own
debts and [the LLC’s] debts”). Defendant also acknowledged that, as of 2019, MHM owed
American Express $270,000, and that MHM continued to pay American Express over other
creditors in light of defendant’s potential personal liability for that debt. And defendant does not
dispute that he had MHM write him a check for $50,000 in December 2019, when MHM was
admittedly insolvent. Defendant testified that this payment was to reimburse him for money he
had previously contributed toward MHM’s legal fees in unrelated litigation; when MHM received
a favorable settlement in that litigation, defendant decided to make the payment to himself “so [he]
could feel like [he] won a little at least” amidst the losses he had otherwise been suffering at the
time. As discussed infra, that payment was impermissible under the UVTA.

Defendant stresses that plaintiff points only to matters that occurred when he was winding
down MHM’s affairs, none of which impugns how he interacted with MHM during the number of
years prior that it was operating. We do not find that focus, however, to meaningfully undermine

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plaintiff’s bid for equitable relief in this case, which centers around the conduct and circumstances
that ultimately left MHM in breach of its lease and plaintiff without meaningful recourse against
MHM for that breach. See Green, 310 Mich App at 458 (“[W]hen considering whether to
disregard the separate existence of an artificial entity, a court must first examine the totality of the
evidence surrounding the owner’s use of an artificial entity and, in particular, the manner in which
the entity was employed in the matter at issue.”) (emphasis added). And we agree with the trial
court that, on the record before it, such conduct and circumstances were sufficient to demonstrate
in this case that defendant treated MHM “as a mere instrumentality for [himself] as [an]
individual[].” Florence Cement Co, 292 Mich App at 469.

The record likewise supported the trial court’s conclusion that defendant used his control
over MHM in a manner that wronged plaintiff. “In considering this element, it is not necessary to
prove that the owner caused the entity to directly harm the complainant; it is sufficient that the
owner exercised his or her control over the entity in such a manner as to wrong the complainant.”
Green, 310 Mich App at 458. Here, after entering into the three-year lease with MHM in April
2018, MHM began the process of selling its assets to NAF in the fall of 2018. The sale closed
within a few months, and plaintiff only learned of it when subsequently trying to contact MHM
about overdue rent—at which point MHM informed plaintiff that the lease, and MHM’s liability
under it, had not been assumed as part of the sale and that MHM was no longer in operation and
had no revenue. And while plaintiff then went unpaid for what MHM owed it, defendant used
MHM’s assets to write himself a check for $50,000 and to pay off $270,000 in credit card debt for
which he would otherwise be personally liable.

Finally, the record also supported the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff suffered an
unjust loss as a result of defendant’s actions with respect to MHM, which prioritized use of MHM’s
assets to compensate himself and limit his personal liabilities while leaving MHM in breach of its
lease with plaintiff and plaintiff unable to recover from MHM for that breach. And as defendant
himself maintains, there was no reason to anticipate such circumstances would come to pass at the
time plaintiff entered into its lease with MHM. Cf. Green, 310 Mich App at 459 (explaining that
“a loss is not unjust if the complainant had full knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
owner’s use of the entity and agreed to proceed despite that knowledge”).

In sum, we see no grounds to disrupt the trial court’s conclusion that MHM’s corporate
veil should be pierced so as to hold defendant personally liable for plaintiff’s losses arising from
MHM’s breach of the lease agreement.

IV. VOIDABLE TRANSFER

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the $50,000 payment
from MHM to defendant in December 2019 was a transfer that was voidable as to plaintiff, an
existing creditor. We disagree.

As noted, we review a trial court’s findings of fact following a bench trial for clear error
and its conclusions of law de novo. See Midwest Valve & Fitting Co, 347 Mich App at 250. We
also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. See O’Neal v St John Hosp & Med Ctr,
487 Mich 485, 493; 791 NW2d 853 (2010).

-5-
The UVTA provides that certain transfers or obligations are voidable as to existing
creditors. Specifically, MCL 566.35 states, in pertinent part:

(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving
a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the
debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the
transfer or obligation.

MCL 566.31(s) defines “transfer” as follows:

“Transfer” means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in
an asset. Transfer includes payment of money, release, lease, license, and creation
of a lien or other encumbrance.

And as to the concept of “reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation,”
MCL 566.33 provides, in relevant part:

(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or
satisfied. Value does not include an unperformed promise made otherwise than in
the ordinary course of the promisor’s business to furnish support to the debtor or
another person.

(2) For the purposes of [MCL 566.34(1)(b)] and [MCL 566.35], a person
gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor
in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or
execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.

In seeking relief under MCL 566.35(1), a creditor bears “the burden of proving the elements of the
claim for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” MCL 566.35(3). If the creditor carries that
burden, it may obtain as relief, among other things, the “[a]voidance of the transfer or obligation
to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim.” MCL 566.37(1)(a).

We find no reversible error in the trial court’s conclusion that the $50,000 payment in this
case was a voidable transfer under MCL 566.35(1). There is no dispute that the payment, which
occurred in December 2019, was made when MHM was insolvent. And MCL 566.31(s) makes
clear that a “[t]ransfer includes payment of money.” Here, the trial court found that the $50,000
payment was a distribution to defendant in return for a prior capital contribution defendant had
made to MHM—and defendant does not dispute on appeal that the payment constituted a return

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of a capital contribution.5 As defendant acknowledges, that payment of money constituted a
transfer as defined by the UVTA.

Defendant contends, however, that the $50,000 payment was not a voidable transfer under
MCL 566.35(1) because MHM did, in fact, receive “a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the transfer.” According to defendant, the payment, which was made in December 2019, “was
merely a way to equalize the $50,000 he had paid months earlier” to MHM through a capital
contribution to cover MHM’s legal fees in an unrelated matter. In support, defendant relies on
cases that recite the general concept of an exchange of equivalent value—that what comes out
must be reasonably equivalent to what goes in, and that “[a]s long as the unsecured creditors are
no worse off because the debtor . . . has received an amount reasonably equivalent to what it paid,
no fraudulent transfer has occurred.” Harman v First Am Bank of Md, 956 F2d 479, 484 (CA 4,
1992). None of defendant’s cited authority, however, addresses circumstances similar to those
here, nor does defendant explain how MHM’s “unsecured creditors,” like plaintiff, would have
been left “no worse off” by the $50,000 payment simply because it did not exceed the amount in
capital contributions that defendant had previously made. Id. When the $50,000 payment was
later made to defendant in December 2019, no “property [was] transferred” to MHM “in exchange”
at that time, nor was any “antecedent debt . . . secured or satisfied.”6 MCL 566.33(1). Instead, as
the trial court found, the payment was simply a check that defendant had MHM write him after it
had become insolvent, compensating defendant for a prior contribution he had made “so [he] could
feel like [he] won a little at least” without providing anything to MHM in exchange for doing so.
Defendant has not identified, and we have not found, any authority demonstrating that the trial
court erred in deeming such a transfer voidable under the UVTA. Cf., e.g., Matter of Oakland
Physicians Med Ctr, LLC, 596 BR 587, 618-624 (Bankr ED Mich, 2019) (determining that certain
advances were capital contributions rather than loans and thus the debtor did not receive
“reasonably equivalent value” through their mere repayment). Accordingly, we reject defendant’s
claim of error to that effect.

5
Below, the parties disputed whether the payment was such a return, or was instead a repayment
of a loan that defendant had previously made to MHM. The trial court rejected defendant’s loan-
repayment characterization, and defendant does not challenge that determination on appeal.
Defendant, however, does criticize the trial court’s use of the term “distribution” when describing
the $50,000 payment because, according to defendant, a “distribution” specifically refers to
transfers that are made for the benefit of members with respect to their membership interests and
defendant “did not receive any payment on account of his membership interest.” It is not apparent
from the trial court’s findings, however, that the court was using the term in a strictly technical
sense, rather than simply to communicate that MHM had distributed money to defendant as a
return of his prior capital contribution. Nor does defendant suggest that this distinction might bear
on whether the payment constituted a “transfer” as defined by the UVTA.
6
As noted, the trial court rejected defendant’s attempt to characterize the $50,000 as a repayment
of a prior loan, and defendant does not dispute that determination on appeal. Nor has defendant
attempted to argue that MCL 566.33(2)’s provision regarding “reasonably equivalent value” may
somehow provide any support for his position.

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V. ATTORNEY FEES

As his final claim of error, defendant argues the trial court erred by awarding plaintiff its
requested attorney fees. We disagree.

The trial court’s attorney-fee award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Pirgu v United
Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 274; 884 NW2d 257 (2016). An abuse of discretion occurs when
the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Id. Any
findings of fact on which the court based its award are reviewed for clear error, and questions of
law are reviewed de novo. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 164; 693 NW2d 825 (2005); US
Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Citizens Ins Co, 241 Mich App 83, 85; 613 NW2d 740 (2000). Whether
a court was authorized to award attorney fees in the first instance is a legal question reviewed de
novo. In re Capuzzi Estate, 470 Mich 399, 402; 684 NW2d 677 (2004).

Defendant first argues that the trial court lacked authority to award plaintiff attorney fees.
In general, a prevailing party may not recover attorney fees as an element of costs and damages
“unless expressly allowed by statute, court rule, common-law exception, or contract.” Reed, 265
Mich App at 164. Here, the trial court awarded plaintiff attorney fees under a provision of the
lease agreement between plaintiff and MHM. The trial court held that, because it had pierced the
corporate veil between MHM and defendant, plaintiff’s “alter ego claim [fell] within the fee
shifting provision of the Lease,” and defendant was correspondingly responsible for the attorney-
fee award. The applicable provision of the lease provided that MHM would be held liable for
reasonable attorney fees in the event MHM defaulted on its obligations to make rental payments.
This provision stated, in pertinent part:

Tenant will pay, in addition to the rentals and other sums agreed to be paid
hereunder, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses in any suit or action
instituted by or involving Landlord to enforce the provisions of, or the collection of
the rentals due Landlord under this Lease[.] [Emphasis added.]

As discussed, plaintiff secured a default judgment against MHM for its breach of the lease,
which awarded plaintiff “$52,548.24, plus interest, costs, and attorney fees from the date of th[e]
judgment going forward.” Plaintiff tried but was unable to collect that judgment from MHM,
requiring plaintiff to then file the instant lawsuit in an attempt to recover from defendant directly.
We see no error in the trial court’s conclusion that this lawsuit, which plaintiff was forced to
undertake to collect what it was owed under the lease, constituted “any suit or action instituted by
or involving [plaintiff] to enforce the provisions of, or the collection of the rentals due [plaintiff]
under th[e] Lease,” and thus plaintiff was entitled to claim reasonable attorney fees for it.

Resisting this conclusion, defendant argues, as he did below, that plaintiff could not recover
anything beyond the amount specifically awarded in the judgment against MHM without first
seeking to amend that judgment, which plaintiff never did. Like the trial court, however, we fail
to see why this might be so in light of the plain language of the lease as well as of the judgment
itself, which expressly awarded plaintiff “attorney fees from the date of th[e] judgment going
forward.” Plaintiff also argues, as he did below, that the UVTA does not itself authorize the award
of attorney fees. But even if we take that to be true, we agree with the trial court that it would not

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undermine the propriety of the fee award here given the plain language of the lease, which provided
its own, adequate basis for the award.

Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court failed to duly evaluate the reasonableness of
plaintiff’s fee request, pointing to the framework and factors set forth in Pirgu and Smith v Khouri,
481 Mich 519, 528-530; 751 NW2d 472 (2008). The record, however, reflects that the trial court
did not err in this regard. As noted, the court, in its written judgment, specified a process for
adjudicating the amount of the fee award: first, plaintiff was to finish submitting invoices for any
fees it planned to request; then, defendant would have the opportunity “to object to the
reasonableness of any attorney fees”; and then, if defendant so objected, plaintiff would have to
file “a motion for settlement of attorney fees . . . along with [defendant’s] objections,” which the
court would ultimately decide (after holding a hearing if the court deemed one necessary). The
parties and court abided by this process, with plaintiff submitting its requested fees and defendant
filing objections to their reasonableness. Defendant’s objections tracked the arguments set forth
above—that plaintiff’s fee request did not fall within the terms of the lease and that plaintiff could
not recover on its request without amending the prior judgment against MHM. In its ensuing order
regarding the fee award, the trial court explained why those objections were unavailing and, as
discussed, we do not see any reversible error in the court’s conclusions to that effect.

On appeal, defendant criticizes the trial court for not doing more, contending that plaintiff
“proved only that [it] paid the bills and that the hourly rates were fair, but did not prove that the
volume of hours were reasonable.” The court, however, duly addressed the objections defendant
chose to raise regarding the reasonableness of plaintiff’s fee request; if defendant is now
suggesting he had additional objections or arguments, he had full opportunity to put them before
the court at that time. Defendant failed to do so,7 and we see no grounds to assign error to the trial
court for that failure or to overlook it on appeal. See, e.g., Baxter v Geurink, 493 Mich 924 (2013)
(“Because the plaintiffs did not challenge the hourly rate or the amount of time expended before
the trial court, the issue regarding actual costs was not preserved for appellate review.”); Milligan
v Milligan, 197 Mich App 665, 671; 496 NW2d 394 (1992) (“Because the plaintiffs did not
challenge the hourly rate or the amount of time expended before the trial court, the issue regarding
actual costs was not preserved for appellate review.”).

7
Defendant posits that he did raise a broader set of arguments and objections below, pointing to a
portion of his post-trial proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. This filing, however,
well pre-dated the court’s judgment that expressly set forth the process for adjudicating plaintiff’s
fee request—which included affording defendant the opportunity to raise whatever objections he
may have “to the reasonableness of any attorney fees.” As discussed, the trial court then duly
considered the objections defendant chose to raise pursuant to that process; to the extent
defendant’s earlier filing indicated additional arguments or objections, defendant waived them for
purposes of appellate review by opting not to pursue them any further through the court’s ordered
process. See, e.g., Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 210; 670 NW2d 675 (2003) (explaining
that reversible error may not be predicated “upon alleged error to which the aggrieved party
contributed by plan or negligence”).

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Affirmed.

/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Philip P. Mariani

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