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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Phillips CA2/4

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B339154

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/19/26 P. v. Phillips CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B339154

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA075295)
v.

CAMERON PHILLIPS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa Strassner, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Law Office of Brad Poore and Brad J. Poore under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
On April 12, 2019, appellant Cameron Phillips pled no
contest to one count of driving under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage and causing bodily injury. (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd.
(a).) On May 3, 2019, the trial court imposed a stipulated
midterm sentence of two years, suspended execution of the
sentence, and placed appellant on five years of probation.
On April 18, 2024, the court revoked appellant’s probation
pending a probation violation hearing. After that contested
hearing on June 3, 2024, the trial court found appellant in
violation of his probation conditions, terminated probation, and
imposed the previously suspended two-year sentence. Appellant
timely appealed.
While appellant was serving his five-year term of
probation, the Legislature amended the statute governing
probation, section 1203.1. The previous version of the statute
allowed the trial court to grant probation “for a period of time not
exceeding the maximum term for which the person could be
imprisoned,” or “‘not over five years’” for an offense with a

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the full factual and
procedural background because our opinion is unpublished and
the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and its
procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847,
851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial
court's decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal
statement”].) Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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maximum sentence of five years or less. (People v. Faial (2025)
18 Cal.5th 199, 207 (Faial).) Under the amended version of
section 1203.1, the relevant portion of which took effect January
1, 2021, the maximum term of probation a trial court may impose
for most felony offenses is “a period of time not exceeding two
years.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (a); Faial, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 207.)
Appellant’s offense of conviction is one for which the trial court
may now impose a maximum probation term of three years. (See
§ 1203.1, subd. (l)(1); People v. Kite (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 986,
994-998.)
In People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 979, the
Supreme Court held that the “new limitations on the maximum
term of probation in amended section 1203.1 should be applied to
existing, nonfinal plea agreements while otherwise maintaining
the remainder of the bargain.” (See also id. at pp. 963, 969.) In
Faial, the Court further clarified that probation terms exceeding
those permitted under amended section 1203.1 “effectively end[ ]
by operation of law” on the date of the maximum term now
authorized. (Faial, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 218.) The parties
agree, as do we, that under these precedents, appellant’s
probation ended by operation of law on May 3, 2022, three years
after it was imposed, and nearly two years before the trial court
revoked it.
“Once probation ends, . . . a court’s power is significantly
attenuated. Its power to impose a sentence over the defendant
ceases entirely. . . .” (People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 782;
see also § 1203.3, subd. (a) [court has jurisdiction to revoke
probation “during the term of probation”].) The court’s June 3,
2024 order terminating appellant’s probation and ordering
execution of the suspended sentence was therefore erroneous.

3
The “collateral effect” of the retroactive application of
amended section 1203.1 “is to ‘undo’ or ‘unravel’ the orders
terminating [appellant’s] probation and ordering execution of the
suspended sentence.” (Faial, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 218.) “Thus,
if a probation term is shortened . . . under amended section
1203.1, conduct that would have constituted a probation
violation, but is now deemed to have occurred outside this term,
may not be the basis for terminating that probation.” (Id. at p.
220.)
We accordingly reverse the order finding appellant in
violation of probation, terminating probation, and imposing the
suspended sentence. We remand the matter to the trial court
with directions to vacate the order and resentence appellant in
accordance with section 1203.1 and other relevant provisions.
The parties agree that at resentencing, the court should modify
appellant’s term of probation to three years, set aside the prison
sentence, reinstate probation, and terminate probation.
DISPOSITION
The June 3, 2024 order finding appellant in violation of
probation, terminating probation, and imposing the suspended
sentence is reversed. The matter is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J. TAMZARIAN, J.

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