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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Perez

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: H053314

• Opinion

• Authorities (24)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.5K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/19/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H053314
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2206478)

v.

ERIC JAIME PEREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

In this appeal, we examine the application of the Fourth Amendment’s
community caretaking doctrine to vehicle impoundment. We consider
whether a police officer’s decision to impound a driver’s vehicle pursuant to
the Vehicle Code solely to prevent further illegal driving satisfies the
community caretaking function. We decide that it does not.
Defendant Eric Jaime Perez pleaded no contest to possession of a
firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of a
controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). The police found
drugs in Perez’s vehicle during an impoundment and inventory search
following a traffic stop. The police also found a firearm and more drugs when
later executing a search warrant on a hotel room linked to Perez.
Prior to entering his no contest pleas, Perez moved to suppress the
evidence found in the inventory and hotel room searches as the fruits of an
illegal seizure. A magistrate denied Perez’s motion and held him to answer.
The trial court likewise denied Perez’s renewed suppression motion.
On appeal, Perez claims the magistrate erred under the Fourth
Amendment in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He asserts that the
impoundment of his vehicle was unlawful because the impoundment did not
serve a community caretaking function. He further contends that the
opening of a closed container inside his vehicle was unlawful because there
was no evidence of a specific standardized police procedure for opening closed
containers during an inventory search.
For the reasons explained below, we agree the prosecution failed to
show the police reasonably impounded Perez’s vehicle pursuant to their
community caretaking function. Therefore, the seizure of the vehicle and
resulting inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment. We reverse the
judgment and remand with directions for the trial court to permit Perez to
withdraw his no contest pleas; if he does so, the court shall vacate its denial
of Perez’s motion to suppress evidence, grant the motion, and conduct further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
In May 2022, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a felony
complaint charging Perez with possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code,
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1), possession of ammunition by a prohibited
person (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2), possession of a controlled
substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 3), transportation of a
controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 4),
misdemeanor driving in violation of a license restriction related to a driving

2
under the influence offense (Veh. Code, 1 § 14601.2, subd. (b); count 5), and
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364,
subd. (a); count 6). As to count 3, the complaint alleged that Perez was
armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022,
subd. (c)) and had suffered two prior convictions for drug possession (Pen.
Code, § 1203.07, subd. (a)(11)).
In September 2022, Perez, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress
evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 (hereafter, suppression
motion or motion).
The district attorney filed an opposition to Perez’s suppression motion.
The district attorney asserted, inter alia, that the police had reasonable
suspicion to stop Perez’s vehicle, had probable cause to arrest Perez for
driving with a suspended license, lawfully decided to impound Perez’s vehicle
and conduct an inventory search, and lawfully seized items pursuant to a
warrant from a hotel room linked to Perez.
In October 2022, a magistrate concurrently heard evidence pertaining
to the preliminary hearing and the suppression motion (hereafter, combined
hearing). The magistrate denied Perez’s suppression motion and held Perez
to answer.
In November 2022, the district attorney filed an information charging
Perez with the same counts and attendant allegations set forth in the felony
complaint. Additionally, the information alleged several aggravating factors
for sentencing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2) [counts 3–4], (b)(3)
[counts 1–6]; Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b).)

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.

3
Perez filed a motion to set aside the information under Penal Code
section 995 and renewed his suppression motion (renewed suppression
motion) (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (i)). The district attorney opposed Perez’s
motions.
In January 2023, the trial court considered the record of the combined
hearing, as well as the written and oral arguments of the parties, and denied
Perez’s motions.
On August 21, 2024, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Perez
pleaded no contest on count 1 (possession of a firearm by a felon) and count 3
(possession of a controlled substance for sale), in exchange for two years of
formal probation and one year of electronic monitoring. Perez admitted the
aggravating factor attached to count 1 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)).
Upon the district attorney’s motion, the trial court dismissed the
information’s remaining counts and allegations.
On May 6, 2025, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and
placed Perez on two years of formal probation with terms and conditions.
Perez filed a notice of appeal based on the sentence or other postplea
matters and the denial of his suppression motion.
B. Background on the Searches and Seizures and Perez’s Suppression
Motion
1. Hearing Evidence on the Traffic Stop, Impoundment, Inventory
Search, and Hotel Room Search
The evidence presented at the combined hearing demonstrated the
following concerning the traffic stop, impoundment, searches, and seizures:
Around 2:00 p.m. on May 26, 2022, Milpitas Police Department Officer
Eric Bernardo observed Perez’s minivan exiting a gas station. Officer
Bernardo effected a traffic stop on the minivan because Perez drove across a

4
sidewalk that traverses a driveway without stopping, in violation of the
Milpitas Municipal Code. Perez eventually pulled over to the side of the road
(near a hotel) on South Main Street in Milpitas. 2 According to Bernardo,
Perez parked his minivan legally, and it was not blocking traffic.
Perez told Officer Bernardo that he (Perez) did not have his driver’s
license and believed it had been “revoked.” Bernardo conducted a records
check and learned that Perez’s license had been suspended since 1993. 3
Bernardo asked Perez several times to exit his minivan, but Perez refused.
After a few minutes, Perez got out of the minivan. Bernardo handcuffed
Perez and escorted him to the sidewalk, leaving Perez with another officer,
Karoly Toth.
Officer Bernardo told Perez that officers were going to search the
minivan because it was going to be towed and impounded “pursuant to
[Perez] driving on a suspended license.” Bernardo testified that he intended
to cite Perez for violating section 14601 (i.e., a prohibition on driving when
one’s license is suspended or revoked) and release Perez without taking him
into custody.
In accord with his statement to Perez during the traffic stop, Officer
Bernardo testified that he decided to impound Perez’s minivan because
“Perez was driving on a suspended license.” Bernardo explained that it is
generally his practice to impound a vehicle when the driver has a suspended
or revoked license. Bernardo added, “That is what the law allows for, and as,

2 The appellate record indicates that Perez had addresses in Milpitas

and San Jose.
3 According to a certified DMV printout (which was entered into

evidence at the combined hearing), Perez’s driver’s license had been revoked
in April 1993, under former section 13352, subdivision (a)(5), for “ ‘DUI or
drugs’ ” (capitalization omitted).
5
you know, part of them driving on a suspended license, just my common
practice is to impound the vehicles, except for certain extenuating
circumstances and certain, various suspension authorities that don’t allow for
that.” When citing and releasing a person for driving on a suspended or
revoked license, Bernardo’s concern “would be that they go right back in the
vehicle and continue to drive.”
According to Officer Bernardo, the Milpitas Police Department did not
have a policy specifically relating to impoundment when the driver is driving
on a suspended or revoked license. When asked (on cross-examination) if
there was a department policy instructing officers to impound a vehicle in
every case of a driver with a suspended license, Bernardo responded, “There
is no should, shall, may policy in place for that.” Bernardo stated that his
decision to impound Perez’s vehicle was made pursuant to his own “personal
practice when drivers have a suspended license.”
Regarding an inventory search following impoundment, Officer
Bernardo testified, “Per Milpitas Police policy, when we’re going to impound a
vehicle, it needs to be inventoried, searched to document any items inside the
correct vehicle in order to mitigate any possibility for lost or stolen items.”
Bernardo explained that when he conducts an inventory search, he typically
looks for valuable items or weapons, such as cell phones and guns. He also
looks for items that the police may be able to release prior to towing the
vehicle away to mitigate the hardship on the person being cited. Bernardo
further explained that an inventory search ensures the vehicle is safe and
free of weapons, so employees of the impounding company are not in danger
when the vehicle is eventually picked up by the owner or in the event
someone tries to enter the vehicle to retrieve an item.

6
During the inventory search of Perez’s minivan, Officer Bernardo found
an open plastic shopping bag situated between the driver’s seat and front
passenger’s seat. The shopping bag held several smaller containers,
including a black storage container (hereafter, storage container or container)
that Bernardo described as a “small kind of box.” Bernardo could not recall
whether the container was “zippered or latched or [had] anything securing
the top.” The container held two bags of a white crystalline substance and
two small glass jars containing a pink and a white powdery substance. The
container also held credit cards bearing Perez’s name and approximately
$300 in cash. Other items found inside the shopping bag included a cigarette
box containing a small plastic bindle of suspected methamphetamine, an
eyeglass case containing $600 in cash, two bags of suspected marijuana, a
digital scale, and a cell phone.
Later, Officer Bernardo packaged the substances he found in Perez’s
minivan and sent them to the crime lab for analysis. A criminalist told
Bernardo that testing of the substances revealed the presence of
methamphetamine and fentanyl. Based on the amount of narcotics, their
packaging, and the presence of cash, a digital scale, and a cell phone,
Bernardo opined that Perez possessed the methamphetamine for sale.
On cross-examination by Perez’s defense counsel, Officer Bernardo
testified that Perez did not consent to the police search of his minivan.
Bernardo further confirmed that the windshield and doors of Perez’s minivan
were intact; Bernardo never asked Perez if he wanted to call someone to
move the vehicle; and Bernardo did not see within the minivan any
electronics or other items of high value in plain sight.
When the magistrate asked Officer Bernardo why he decided to tow the
minivan instead of leaving it legally parked on the street, Bernardo

7
responded, “Well, typically when I stop somebody with a suspended license, I
tow their vehicle, especially in this case since his license has been suspended
since 1993. . . . [Perez] said he believed [his license] was revoked. [¶] In my
opinion, that meant [Perez] knew there was something going on with his
license, that he should not be driving. And due to the almost 30 years of that
status, he had had ample time to correct whatever needed to be corrected and
had obviously been driving anyway. [¶] So, it was my intent to impound his
vehicle.”
Officer Bernardo later testified, “part of the Vehicle Code for [section]
14601 indicates that you can tow their vehicle for being in violation of that
section. [¶] In my eight years [as a police officer], I want to say probably 97
percent of the time I tow the vehicle, because there is a likelihood of
recurrence of them driving the vehicle when they’re not supposed to be. And
it usually comes with an automatic 30-day impound depending on the
different section that they are suspended for under the authority. [¶] And
that then, you know, should -- is supposed to hasten their actions to fix
whatever they’re supposed to be doing to get their license back into valid
status. [¶] Like I say, the fact that Mr. Perez has been suspended for almost
30 years and didn’t seem to have made any effort to fix that status, and had
been clearly driving the vehicle against those violations that he knew about, I
thought it was only appropriate to impound his vehicle, because if released,
which is typical with a suspended driver, they get cited and released at the
scene. He would more than likely get back into the vehicle and continue to
drive it.”
In response to a follow-up question by the prosecutor, Officer Bernardo
added that if a person he cited and released for driving on a suspended
license was observed later that day driving, Bernardo would “feel like [he]

8
didn’t do [his] job properly, especially if they were to be involved in some kind
of accident or somebody was hurt; something to that effect.”
Officer Toth testified that following the search of Perez’s minivan, Toth
reviewed the nearby hotel’s surveillance camera footage. Toth confirmed that
Perez’s vehicle had been at the hotel earlier in the day and Perez had walked
out of one of the hotel’s rooms. Toth obtained and executed a search warrant
for the hotel room linked to Perez “based on the findings, whatever Officer
Bernardo found in the vehicle.” Inside the hotel room, officers found a loaded
semiautomatic firearm, suspected methamphetamine, and a pipe typically
used to smoke methamphetamine. The gun was registered to someone else.
The items seized in the hotel room bolstered Officer Bernardo’s opinion that
Perez possessed narcotics for sale.
2. Magistrate’s Ruling on Perez’s Suppression Motion
The magistrate denied Perez’s suppression motion stating: “So the
court has spent some time looking over the cases each of you cited and I do
believe that based on the evidence presented here, the officer made a car stop
based on a municipal code violation that he observed [Perez] do in terms of
not stopping before crossing the sidewalk driveway, and then turning onto
the street. [¶] [Officer Bernardo] did testify that when he learned that
[Perez] was driving on a suspended driver’s license, and that it had been
suspended for many years, his intent was to impound the vehicle, which he
was allowed to do. And then pursuant to the impound, he did the inventory
search. [¶] So the court will deny the suppression motion at this time.” 4

4 As noted ante (see pt. I.A.), after the magistrate held Perez to answer,

a different bench officer denied Perez’s renewed suppression motion based on
the record of the combined hearing.
9
II. DISCUSSION
Perez contends the prosecution failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating the reasonableness of the challenged search and asserts the
evidence fails to support application of the community caretaking exception.
He asserts a “community caretaking function must be a standardized, non-
discretionary procedure,” and the Milpitas Police Department lacked a policy
guiding the decision to impound, which cannot be supplied by the Vehicle
Code. Perez additionally contends the prosecution failed to put on any
evidence to show that opening a closed container during an inventory search
is covered by the applicable Milpitas Police Department policy. 5
The Attorney General responds that the decision to impound the
minivan was authorized by the Vehicle Code and “served a community
caretaking function to protect the public from the danger posed by [Perez]’s
ongoing unlicensed driving. The officer’s search of the closed container was
also guided by the departmental policy for inventory searches.” The Attorney
General contends that the impoundment authority provided by the relevant
statutes and departmental policy need not be mandatory, and public safety is
a recognized community caretaking rationale. The Attorney General asserts
that the decision to impound was not solely to prevent a future crime but also
to protect the public from Perez’s driving on a suspended license, which he
had done for 29 years. The Attorney General also notes there is no evidence
of any pretext or ruse to search Perez’s vehicle.

5 Perez alternatively claims that his defense counsel provided

ineffective assistance in challenging the opening of the closed storage
container. The Attorney General, however, does not assert forfeiture
regarding Perez’s appellate challenge to that action, conceding that “the issue
appears to have been adequately raised below.”
10
A. Standard of Review
“When a suppression motion is made before a magistrate in conjunction
with a preliminary hearing, as in this case, the magistrate tries the facts,
resolving credibility issues and conflicts in the evidence, weighing the
evidence, and drawing appropriate inferences. [Citations.] If the magistrate
denies the motion and holds the defendant to answer, the defendant must, as
a prerequisite to appellate review, renew his challenge before the trial court
by motion to dismiss under [Penal Code] section 995 or in a special hearing.
[Citations.] At that stage, the evidence is generally limited to the transcript
of the preliminary hearing, testimony by witnesses who testified at the
preliminary hearing (who may be recalled by the prosecution), and evidence
that could not reasonably have been presented at the preliminary hearing.”
(People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 941 (Romeo).)
On appeal, we too “are ‘concerned solely with the findings of the
[magistrate].’ [Citation.] After submission on the transcript at the special
hearing, the appellate court, like the superior court, is bound by the
magistrate’s factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. [Citations.] On review of the superior court ruling by appeal or
writ, a two-step standard of review applies. In the first step of our review,
‘we in effect disregard the ruling of the superior court and directly review the
determination of the magistrate.’ [Citation.] At this stage, we consider the
record in the light most favorable to the People since ‘all factual conflicts
must be resolved in the manner most favorable to the [superior] court’s
disposition on the [suppression] motion.’ ” (Romeo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at
p. 941.)
In the second step, “[a]ccepting as established all implied or express
factual findings by the magistrate as are supported by substantial evidence,

11
we then proceed to measure those findings against Fourth Amendment
standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. [Citation.] At
this stage, we independently apply the law to the factual findings [citations],
determining de novo whether the factual record supports the magistrate’s
conclusion that the challenged search met the constitutional standard of
reasonableness.” (Romeo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 941–942; see also
People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 437, fn. 2 [explaining that
“under the so-called truth-in-evidence provision of the state Constitution,
‘ “issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental
searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional
standards” ’ ”].)
We may affirm the suppression ruling if it is correct on any theory,
even if the court’s reasoning was incorrect. (People v. Hall (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 946, 952.)
B. Legal Principles
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
individuals the “right . . . to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” “The impoundment of
an automobile is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”
(Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 858, 862 (Miranda);
see also § 22650, subd. (b).)
A warrantless search or seizure is presumed unconstitutional, and the
government bears the burden of establishing that its action fell within an
exception to the warrant requirement. (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th
1136, 1156; see also People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723.)
One such exception is the “community caretaking” function, which
allows police officers to “impound vehicles that ‘jeopardize public safety and

12
the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.’ ” (Miranda, supra, 429 F.3d at
p. 864, quoting South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 369
(Opperman).)
In Opperman, the United States Supreme Court explained the
community caretaking function as follows: “In the interests of public safety
and as part of what the Court has called ‘community caretaking functions,
[citation], automobiles are frequently taken into police custody. Vehicle
accidents present one such occasion. To permit the uninterrupted flow of
traffic and in some circumstances to preserve evidence, disabled or damaged
vehicles will often be removed from the highways or streets at the behest of
police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control activities. Police will
also frequently remove and impound automobiles which violate parking
ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the public safety and the
efficient movement of vehicular traffic. The authority of police to seize and
remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety
and convenience is beyond challenge.” (Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at
pp. 368–369, fn. omitted, citing Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433,
441.)
Relatedly, “[i]nventory searches are a well-defined exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. [Citation.] When a vehicle is
impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody, an officer may conduct a
warrantless search aimed at securing or protecting the vehicle and its
contents.” (People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 867 (Lee), citing
Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371 (Bertine) & Opperman, supra,
428 U.S. at p. 373.)
“To determine whether a warrantless search is properly characterized
as an inventory search, ‘we focus on the purpose of the impound rather than

13
the purpose of the inventory.’ [Citation.] ‘The decision to impound the
vehicle must be justified by a community caretaking function “other than
suspicion of evidence of criminal activity” [citation] because inventory
searches are “conducted in the absence of probable cause” [citation].’
[Citation.] For example, impounding serves a community caretaking function
when a vehicle is parked illegally, blocks traffic or passage, or stands at risk
of theft or vandalism. [Citations.] Also relevant to the caretaking inquiry is
whether someone other than the defendant could remove the car to a safe
location.” (Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.) The lack of valid vehicle
registration may also provide reason to impound a vehicle. (Halajian v. D &
B Towing (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1, 16.)
“Although a police officer is not required to adopt the least intrusive
course of action in deciding whether to impound and search a car [citation],
the action taken must nonetheless be reasonable in light of the justification
for the impound and inventory exception to the search warrant requirement.
Reasonableness is ‘the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” 6 (People v.
Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761–762 (Williams).) “The question is
‘whether a decision to impound or remove a vehicle . . . was reasonable under
all the circumstances.’ ” (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 52.)

6 Section 22650, subdivision (b) similarly provides: “Any removal of a
vehicle is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States and [s]ection 13 of [a]rticle I of the California Constitution, and
shall be reasonable and subject to the limits set forth in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. A removal pursuant to an authority, including, but not
limited to, as provided in [s]ection 22651, that is based on community
caretaking, is only reasonable if the removal is necessary to achieve the
community caretaking need, such as ensuring the safe flow of traffic or
protecting property from theft or vandalism.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 592, § 1,
adding § 22650, subd. (b), eff. Jan. 1, 2019.)
14
“The absence of a proper community caretaking function suggests an
impound is a pretext to investigate without probable cause, a purpose which
is inconsistent with an inventory search. [Citation.] Officers may not use an
inventory search as ‘a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence.’ [Citation.] Unlike the probable cause
determination, which rests solely on an objective standard, the inventory
search exception evaluates both the objective reasonableness of the impound
decision and the subjective intent of the impounding officer to determine
whether the decision to impound was ‘motivated by an improper
investigatory purpose.’ [Citation.] Such purpose renders a decision to
impound and the subsequent inventory search unlawful under the Fourth
Amendment.” (Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.)
The Vehicle Code authorizes the police to impound a vehicle under
certain circumstances when a person with a suspended or revoked license has
been driving it. Under section 22651, subdivision (p), the police may
impound a vehicle located within their territorial limits “[i]f the peace officer
issues the driver of a vehicle a notice to appear for a violation of [s]ection
12500, 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.3, 14601.4, 14601.5, or 14604, and the
vehicle is not impounded pursuant to [s]ection 22655.5” (which governs
impoundment based on probable cause in particular circumstances not
relevant here). (Italics added.)
“The obvious purpose of subdivision (p) of section 22651 is to prevent
the offender who is cited on a public street for driving without a valid license
from reoffending when the officer has completed the citation process and
departed.” (People v. Auer (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1664, 1669, disapproved on
other grounds by People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125.) In People v.
Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367 (Green), the Court of Appeal concluded that

15
“section 22651, subdivision (p), provided the required standard impound
procedures.” (Id. at p. 375.)
Section 14602.6, subdivision (a)(1) similarly provides for impoundment
when a person is found driving on a suspended or revoked license:
“Whenever a peace officer determines that a person was driving a vehicle
while his or her driving privilege was suspended or revoked, driving a vehicle
while his or her driving privilege is restricted pursuant to [s]ection 13352 or
23575 and the vehicle is not equipped with a functioning, certified interlock
device, or driving a vehicle without ever having been issued a driver’s license,
the peace officer may either immediately arrest that person and cause the
removal and seizure of that vehicle or, if the vehicle is involved in a traffic
collision, cause the removal and seizure of the vehicle without the necessity of
arresting the person . . .. A vehicle so impounded shall be impounded for 30
days.” 7
“If officers are warranted in impounding a vehicle, a warrantless
inventory search of the vehicle pursuant to a standardized procedure is
constitutionally reasonable.” (Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 761,
citing Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 372.) Nevertheless, “[b]ecause of the

7 Although not dispositive of our legal conclusion, section 14602.6 (as

compared to section 22651, subdivision (p)) does not appear to apply on these
facts. A “violation of section 14602.6 occurs when officers impound a vehicle
when the driver has not been arrested and the vehicle has not been involved
in an accident.” (Thompson v. City of Petaluma (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 101,
110, italics added [citing 95 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 2 (2012) United States v.
Cervantes (9th Cir. 2012) 703 F.3d 1135, 1142–1143].) In the instant matter,
Officer Bernardo testified that after he learned Perez did not have a valid
driver’s license, Bernardo asked Perez to exit the vehicle, handcuffed him,
and intended to cite Perez and release him, rather than arrest him. There
was no evidence that Bernardo arrested Perez for violating section 14601 et
seq. prior to conducting the impoundment and inventory search.
16
risk that an inventory search will be ‘a ruse for a general rummaging,’ . . ., a
valid inventory search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice.”
(People v. Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 138, citing Florida v. Wells (1990)
495 U.S. 1, 4–5.)
In Bertine, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
“reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered
in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a
matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a
different procedure.” (Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 374.) In addition, the
Supreme Court rejected defendant Bertine’s argument that “the inventory
search of his van was unconstitutional because departmental regulations
gave the police officers discretion to choose between impounding his van and
parking and locking it in a public parking place.” (Id. at p. 375.) The Court
explained that “[n]othing in Opperman or [Illinois v. Lafayette (1983) 462
U.S. 640 ] prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion
is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something
other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
As an initial matter, we agree with the Attorney General that the
record supports an implied finding that Officer Bernardo’s decision to
impound Perez’s minivan upon learning that Perez did not have a valid
driver’s license was not based on an investigative motive or a pretext to
conduct an investigatory search of the vehicle. We also agree with the
Attorney General that Bernardo’s decision to impound the minivan under the
Vehicle Code amounts to a permissible exercise of discretion based on
requisite standardized criteria within the meaning of Bertine. (See Green,
supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 372–373, 375; People v. Benites (1992) 9

17
Cal.App.4th 309, 327–328; People v. Steeley (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 887, 892;
People v. Burch (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 172, 176; see also Bertine, supra, 479
U.S. at pp. 375–376.)
Statutory authorization, however “does not, in and of itself, determine
the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure.” (Williams, supra, 145
Cal.App.4th at p. 762; see also Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 869; accord
People v. Brown (Colo. 2018) 415 P.3d 815, 819–820 (Brown).) The
prosecution bears the further burden to show that an impoundment is
constitutionally reasonable under the circumstances. In other words,
notwithstanding general statutory authorization for impoundment, the
prosecution must show that the removal of a vehicle from the street is
specifically justified by a community caretaking function based on the facts
surrounding the vehicle itself. (See Williams, at p. 762; see also People v.
Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247–1248.)
As explained further below, we decide the prosecution did not carry this
additional burden. While the record supports Officer Bernardo’s concerns
about Perez as a driver, the record shows no facts specific to Perez’s vehicle
supporting application of the community caretaking function. Officer
Bernardo’s desire to protect public safety by impounding the minivan to
prevent Perez from unlawful driving without more does not satisfy the
community caretaking function.
The Court of Appeal in Williams addressed a circumstance akin to the
instant case. In Williams, the police officer’s impoundment decision was
proper under the Vehicle Code (see § 22651, subd. (h)(1) [authorizing
impoundment of a vehicle that was driven by an arrestee who is taken into
custody]) (Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 759–760) and the officer
“almost always impounded the cars of drivers he arrested.” (Id. at p. 763.)

18
Other than the statutory authorization, the officer did not “assert any
community caretaking justification for the impoundment.” (Ibid.) The
evidence in Williams demonstrated that the defendant had a valid driver’s
license; the defendant’s car was properly registered to a car rental company,
had not been reported stolen, and was legally parked at the curb in front of
defendant’s home; and there was no enhanced possibility that the car would
be stolen, broken into, or vandalized. (Id. at p. 762.)
The Williams court concluded that the prosecution had failed to
establish the constitutional reasonableness of the impoundment because it
“did not establish that impounding [defendant]’s car served any community
caretaking function.” (Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 763.)
Furthermore, the Williams court rejected the People’s argument—which cited
Bertine—that the impoundment was permissible because it was conducted
pursuant to the Vehicle Code. The court explained that “Bertine did not
abandon the community caretaking function rationale of Opperman.” (Ibid.)
The Williams court added, “Clearly, Bertine does not validate any
impoundment that falls within Vehicle Code section 22651. The
impoundment must still serve a community caretaking function. At best, the
statute may constitute a standardized policy guiding officers’ discretion. It
does not, however, end the inquiry.” (Ibid.)
That Perez had a suspended or revoked license without more does not
qualify impoundment of his vehicle as a community caretaking function. In
Blakes v. Superior Court (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 904, the Court of Appeal
stated that a police practice/policy “to tow when the driver had a suspended
license to prevent more driving under a suspended license . . . does not
provide a community caretaking function for the tow.” (Id. at p. 914; accord
Brown, supra, 415 P.3d at p. 820 [“Although the officers may have reason to

19
suspect that the driver will unlawfully drive the vehicle upon their departure,
the community caretaking exception . . . definitionally cannot support
seizures on the basis of suspicion that the driver has committed, is
committing, or will commit a crime.”].)
As another Court of Appeal has explained, “Federal cases underscore
the impounding of a vehicle driven by an unlicensed driver must be
supported by some community caretaking function other than temporarily
depriving the driver of the use of the vehicle.” (People v. Torres (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 775, 792 [discussing United States v. Caseres (9th Cir. 2008) 533
F.3d 1064, 1075 & Miranda, supra, 429 F.3d at p. 866 ].) As the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated in Miranda, at page 866, “The need to deter a
driver’s unlawful conduct is by itself insufficient to justify a tow under the
‘caretaker’ rationale.”
The Court of Appeal in Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of
San Francisco (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 928 (Coalition) similarly observed that
“numerous cases have emphasized that tows under the caretaking exception
must address some present need of safety or convenience. And Miranda and
its progeny have expressly rejected the argument that deterring future
misconduct can justify a tow under the exception, because that justification
would not address a present need based on the location of the towed vehicle.”
(Id. at p. 945; see also id. at pp. 941–942.) The Coalition court further noted
that “the vehicular community caretaking exception has been held not to
justify the tow of a legally and securely parked car following the arrest of an
unlicensed driver [citations], or following the arrest of a driver on an
outstanding warrant.” (Id. at p. 943 [citing Cervantes, Caseres & Williams].)
Courts of other states have reached a similar conclusion. In Brown, the
Supreme Court of Colorado considered a circumstance in which police officers

20
stopped a driver for failing to obey a traffic sign, discovered he was driving on
a suspended license, and decided to issue a summons and release the driver.
(Brown, supra, 415 P.3d at p. 817.) The officers “decided to impound his
vehicle and, while waiting for the towing company, inventoried its contents,
discovered a number of bags of crack cocaine, and thereafter arrested [the
driver].” (Ibid.)
At the suppression hearing, “the prosecution relied entirely on the fact
that the vehicle was impounded pursuant to departmental procedure, based
on [a city] ordinance granting police officers the discretion to impound a
vehicle being driven by someone whose driver’s license had been suspended.
To the extent the testimony of the officer who ordered the impoundment
reflected any reason other than policy, it suggested only that the defendant
was not offered an option to have the car left at the scene or towed because he
had already demonstrated that he would drive on a suspended license.”
(Brown, supra, 415 P.3d at pp. 820–821.) Further, while the court agreed the
search was not pretextual (id. at p. 817), “[t]here was no suggestion that the
car was impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience where
it was stopped, much less that it was inoperable or otherwise unable to be
safely and legally removed by a licensed party, even if that had been the
case.” (Id. at p. 820.)
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded on these facts that the
inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment. (Brown, supra, 415 P.3d
at p. 821.) It rejected the People’s rationale “that impoundment of the vehicle
of someone driving on a suspended license necessarily falls within the
purposes of police caretaking functions by preventing a presumptively unsafe
driver from endangering the public.” (Ibid.) The Colorado Supreme Court
held that the record failed to demonstrate that seizure of the car “was

21
justified as an exercise of the police caretaking function or was otherwise
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of local
ordinances or police policies and procedures broad enough to grant the
officers discretion to impound the vehicle of a driver merely summoned rather
than arrested for driving with a suspended license.” (Ibid.; see also Hicks v.
State (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2025) 348 A.3d 565, 580 [concluding the
impoundment did not serve a community caretaking function where the
detective decided to impound the vehicle “to teach the appellant a lesson and
deter him from driving on a suspended license”].)
As detailed ante (pt. I.B.1.), Officer Bernardo testified that Perez’s
minivan was legally parked on a city street and was not blocking traffic.
Bernardo also testified that the windshield and doors of the minivan were
intact, and he did not see any high value items in plain sight inside the
vehicle. Further, the prosecution did not present any evidence that the
minivan was parked in a high crime area or unregistered or that there was
reason to believe Perez (who apparently maintained addresses in Milpitas
and San Jose) would be unable to arrange for legal transport of the minivan.
Given these circumstances, it does not matter here that no other person was
present or immediately available to “remove the car to a safe location.” (Lee,
supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.) The prosecution elicited no evidence of any
need to move the minivan from where it was parked on the street in Milpitas.
Even though Officer Bernardo was not required to use “the least
intrusive course of action in deciding whether to impound” Perez’s minivan
(Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 761), Bernardo could have deterred
Perez from readily returning to his vehicle and driving illegally by arresting
Perez for violating section 14601.2. (See People v. Armstrong (1991) 232
Cal.App.3d 228, 232, fn. 2 [“Driving with a suspended license is a

22
misdemeanor justifying a full custodial arrest.”]; § 40303, subds. (a), (b)(10).)
Bernardo also could have attempted to arrange for police to observe Perez’s
parked minivan and, perhaps, eventually tow the vehicle if abandoned. (See
§§ 22660, 22669, subd. (a); Milpitas Mun. Code, § XI-13-5.04; see also
Coalition, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 942, fn. 10.)
In the hearing on the motion to suppress, the prosecution elicited no
evidence of any reason to impound the minivan other than to prevent Perez
from unlawfully driving it after being cited and released. Exercising our
independent judgment under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Officer
Bernardo’s decision to impound Perez’s minivan and conduct an inventory
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 8
Because the impoundment and resulting inventory search violated
Perez’s Fourth Amendment rights, and because the People have made no
argument in this matter that the search of the hotel room was made
pursuant to a valid warrant or the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule should apply, we reverse the judgment with directions for the trial court
to permit Perez to withdraw his no contest pleas. If Perez elects to withdraw
his pleas, the trial court shall vacate its order denying Perez’s suppression
motion, grant the motion, and conduct further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions
for the trial court to permit Perez to withdraw his no contest pleas. If Perez
elects to withdraw his pleas, the trial court shall vacate its order denying

8 Given our conclusion, we need not address Perez’s additional

challenge to the propriety of the inventory search itself.
23
Perez’s motion to suppress evidence, grant the motion, and conduct further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. If Perez elects not to withdraw his
no contest pleas, the judgment will be reinstated.

24

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Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

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Greenwood, P. J.

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Bromberg, J.

H053314
People v. Perez
Trial Court: County of Santa Clara

Trial Judge: Hon. Franklin E. Bondonno

Counsel: J. M. Malik, by appointment of the Court of Appeal under the
Sixth District Appellate Program, for Defendant
and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Julia Y. Je,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

H053314
People v. Perez