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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Maravilla CA6

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: H052592

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (12.9K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/19/26 P. v. Maravilla CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H052592
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 23CR02274)

v.

JOEL ADALBERTO MARAVILLA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Joel Adalberto Maravilla pleaded no contest to several sexual
offenses involving the 15-year-old victim Jane Doe.1 At sentencing, the trial court
suspended imposition of sentence, placed Maravilla on three years’ probation, and
ordered him to serve 270 days in jail.
Maravilla appeals from the restitution order directing payments to the
California Victim Compensation Board (CalVCB), as well as Jane Doe’s mother,
N.B.2 Maravilla argues the trial court erred by awarding $6,650 to reimburse N.B.
for her out-of-pocket expenses incurred for Jane Doe’s mental health treatment.

1
The victim was referred to as Jane Doe in the proceedings below and we
maintain that designation to protect her privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2
We refer to the victim’s parents by first and last initial to protect
their privacy interests and the victim’s privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.90(b)(10), (11).)
Maravilla also argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
failing to object to the $1,000 ordered paid to CalVCB as reimbursement for
installation of a residential security system.
As we explain below, we conclude that Maravilla’s arguments have no
merit, and we will affirm the restitution order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural background
On May 25, 2023, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney filed a criminal
complaint charging Maravilla with one count of oral copulation of a person under
16 (Pen. Code,3 § 287, subd. (b)(2); count 1), one count of committing a lewd act
upon a child (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); count 2), one count of unlawful contact with a
minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a); count 3), one
count of meeting a minor for lewd purposes (§ 288.4, subd. (b); count 4), one
count of sexual penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (i); count 5), one
count of possession of matter depicting a minor engaging in sexual conduct
(§ 311.11, subd. (a); count 6), one count of using a minor for sex acts (§ 311.4,
subd. (c); count 7), and one count of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person
under 18 years of age (§ 261.5, subd. (d); count 8).
On May 10, 2024, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Maravilla pleaded
no contest to one felony count of unlawful contact with a minor with the intent to
commit a violation of section 289, subdivision (i) (count 3); one count of
misdemeanor possession of matter depicting a minor engaging in sexual conduct
(count 6); and one felony count of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under
18 years of age (count 8). In exchange for his pleas, the remaining charges were

3
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
dismissed and Maravilla was to be sentenced to no more than 364 days and placed
on probation.
At the July 11, 2024 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Maravilla
to 270 days in county jail and placed him on three years’ formal probation. The
trial court ordered Maravilla to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290
and, finding “clear and convincing evidence that [Jane Doe] [had] been harassed
by [Maravilla],” issued a 10-year criminal protective order.
Following a contested restitution hearing on September 19, 2024, the trial
court ordered that Maravilla pay restitution in the amount of $10,133.00 to
CalVCB, $5,924.59 to Jane Doe’s father, M.B., and $12,332.40 to N.B.
Maravilla timely appealed.
B. Factual background4
On May 17, 2023, a therapist called the Capitola Police Department and
reported that her patient, 15-year-old Jane Doe, had disclosed a sexual relationship
with Maravilla, a 27-year-old man. The therapist told police that Jane Doe wanted
her to inform the authorities about the relationship “as a means for her to get out of
it and hold [Maravilla] accountable.”
Police officers met Jane Doe at the hospital that same day after she
underwent a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) examination. Jane Doe told
officers that she met Maravilla when he was working at a market in Scotts Valley.
Jane Doe told Maravilla she was 18 years old and gave him her phone number.
After Maravilla asked for a photo of her identification, Jane Doe admitted to him
that she was only 15 years old.

4
As Maravilla pleaded no contest prior to the preliminary hearing, we
derive the factual background from the probation report and other documents in
the record on appeal.

3
Maravilla and Jane Doe first had intercourse in his car in January 2023.
“On other occasions, [Maravilla] picked up [Jane Doe] at school and took her back
to his apartment to engage in sex (where he resided with his girlfriend of seven
years and his mother).” Maravilla told Jane Doe not to tell anyone they were
having sex because “he could go to jail for the rest of his life.” Jane Doe gave her
phone, tablet, and laptop to police, which contained “many” text messages “of a
sexual nature” she and Maravilla exchanged. She and Maravilla exchanged nude
pictures of themselves and Jane Doe “sent [Maravilla] a video of herself
simulating masturbation.”
On May 23, 2023, police officers had Jane Doe place a pretext call to
Maravilla. In that call, Maravilla admitted that he knew Jane Doe was 15 years
old and that they had a sexual relationship. Maravilla also acknowledged that he
and Jane Doe had had sex the week prior.
After obtaining an arrest warrant, police officers arrested Maravilla on May
26, 2023.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Out-of-pocket expenses for Jane Doe’s mental health treatment
Maravilla argues the trial court erred by ordering that he pay $6,650 to
reimburse N.B. for the out-of-pocket expenses she incurred for Jane Doe’s mental
health treatment as part of his victim restitution. Maravilla contends that the trial
court improperly relied on its own knowledge of CalVCB policies and procedures,
rather than the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, to issue its restitution
order. We disagree.
1. Additional background
Prior to sentencing, N.B. submitted a form to the Santa Cruz County
District Attorney’s Office requesting restitution in the amount of $12,332.40,
consisting of $6,650 in out-of-pocket medical expenses related to Jane Doe’s

4
mental health treatment plus $5,682.40 in travel expenses. N.B. attached
supporting documentation to her request, including an email from Jane Doe’s
mental health treatment provider dated January 3, 2024, explaining that she would
owe “a deductible of $5,500 plus a daily coinsurance [charge] of $235.40 with a
total maximum due during 2024 of $6,650.” N.B. attached a credit card statement
reflecting her payment of $6,650 to the treatment provider on January 4, 2024.5
On July 11, 2024, CalVCB requested restitution in the amount of $10,133,
consisting of $9,133 for the benefits paid for Jane Doe’s mental health treatment,
plus $1,000 for a residential security system.
At sentencing, the trial court calendared a restitution hearing for August 21,
2024.6
At the contested restitution hearing, defense counsel objected to the $9,133
in mental health treatment costs requested by the CalVCB on the ground that the
district attorney had failed to show that “the offenses committed by [] Maravilla
caused the damages requested.” Defense counsel also challenged N.B.’s request
for her $6,650 insurance deductible because there was no “documentation either
way, that the family was compensated for that expense by [CalVCB]” and it
appeared she was “asking for double the damages.” In conclusion, defense
counsel stated that he “object[s] to frankly all of the expenses.”
In response, the district attorney acknowledged that Jane Doe “had mental
health issues” but “went into … treatment after this relationship with []
Maravilla.” The district attorney stated that Jane Doe’s family was not asking for

5
In addition to the challenged amounts awarded for N.B.’s expenses, M.B.
requested, and Maravilla was ordered to pay, $5,924.59 for travel expenses
associated with Jane Doe’s mental health treatment. Maravilla does not challenge
that aspect of the restitution order.
6
At the request of defense counsel, the restitution hearing was subsequently
continued to September 19, 2024.

5
restitution “for things that happened previously” and that Jane Doe’s “other
issues” made her “a[n] impressionable and perfect person to manipulate.” The
district attorney rejected defense counsel’s claim of “double dipping” because “the
$6,650 was specifically [] not covered by their insurance” and “CalVCB charges
the mental health professionals directly.”
In rebuttal, defense counsel challenged the district attorney’s representation
that CalVCB “bill[s] the providers directly,” stating, “I don’t know that, and I
don’t have any documentation of that.” The trial court interjected, “I know that.”
After the parties submitted, the trial court ruled, as follows: “I hear [defense
counsel’s] argument about causation, but one of the problems with people,
especially with mental illness, is that conduct by the defendant can exacerbate the
mental illness problems that they already had, so I am not … buying your
argument that there is no causation here. … I know that the [CalVCB] pays
directly to the treatment provider. [Jane Doe’s] [f]amily’s claiming that they paid
other out of pocket expenses. And therefore I’m going to order restitution as to—
as outlined in the … memorandum, $10,133.00 payable to the [CalVCB],
$5,924.59 for [M.B’s] travel and other expenses, and $12,333.40 to [N.B.].”
2. Applicable legal principles
The California Constitution gives victims of crime the right to receive
restitution from criminal defendants: “Restitution shall be ordered from the
convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition
imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd.
(b)(13)(B).) To effect this constitutional mandate, section 1202.4 requires the
payment of victim restitution “in an amount established by court order, based on
the amount of loss claimed by the victim ... or any other showing to the court.”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) A “victim” for purposes of restitution includes not only the
actual victim of the offense, but also “shall include all of the following: ¶¶ A

6
person who has sustained economic loss as the result of a crime and who satisfies
any of the following conditions: ¶ At the time of the crime was the parent,
grandparent, sibling, spouse, child, or grandchild of the victim.” (§ 1202.4, subd.
(k)(3)(A).)
At a contested restitution hearing, “[o]nce the victim makes a prima facie
showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal acts,
the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of losses claimed by the
victim. [Citation.]” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1543
(Gemelli).) “[T]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance
of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v.
Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 469.) “In considering restitution awards for
economic losses, it has been held that ‘a prima facie case for restitution is made by
the People based in part on a victim’s testimony on, or other claim or statement of,
the amount of his or her economic loss.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lehman (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 795, 801 (Lehman).)
“As a general matter, we review restitution orders for an abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] However, where the specific issue is whether a court has
the authority to issue restitution, we review that question of law independently.
[Citation.] And where the specific issue is whether the court’s factual findings
support restitution, we review those findings for substantial evidence.” (In re
S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1098 (S.O.).) No abuse of discretion exists
where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered.
(People v. Gomez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 111, 116.)
3. Analysis
In this case, the trial court’s order directing that Maravilla pay $6,650 in
restitution to N.B. was supported by the documentation N.B. submitted,
specifically the email from the mental health facility explaining that she had a

7
balance due of $6,650 for Jane Doe’s treatment and the credit card statement
reflecting N.B.’s payment of that amount on January 4, 2024. This evidence met
N.B.’s burden of making a prima facie showing for restitution. (Lehman,
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 801.)
The burden thus shifted to Maravilla to present evidence rebutting or
otherwise disputing the amount of N.B.’s losses. (Gemelli, supra, 161
Cal.App.4th at p. 1543.) Defense counsel’s statement that N.B. was reimbursed
for her out-of-pocket expenses “because that is what the [CalVCB] does” is not
evidence. “Unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence because unsworn
testimony in general does not constitute ‘evidence’ within the meaning of
the Evidence Code. [Citation.]” (People v. Kiney (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 807,
815.) Because Maravilla failed to present admissible evidence supporting his
assertion that CalVCB reimburses victims for insurance deductibles, we need not
decide whether it was improper for the trial court to rely on its own knowledge of
CalVCB’s procedures or the district attorney’s (also unsupported) assertion that
“CalVCB charges the mental health professionals directly.” Accordingly,
Maravilla failed to meet his burden to disprove N.B.’s claim for $6,650 in
restitution.
The trial court’s order that N.B. was entitled to $6,650 in restitution was
supported by substantial evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.
B. No ineffective assistance of counsel
Maravilla argues that his trial court counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the court ordering $1,000 in restitution to CalVCB for a residential
security system. In his view, restitution for a residential security system is only
allowed where a defendant has been convicted of a violation of section 273.5 or a
violent felony offense listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c). We disagree.

8
1. Additional background
As discussed above, at the contested restitution hearing, CalVCB requested
restitution in the amount of $10,133, which included $1,000 for a residential
security system. Defense counsel objected that, as to the restitution related to
mental health treatment and “frankly all of the expenses,” the district attorney had
not shown causation. Defense counsel did not specifically object to the $1,000 for
the security system on the ground that section 1202.4 did not authorize restitution
for that expense since Maravilla had not been convicted of a violation of section
273.5 or any of the violent felony offenses listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c).
2. Applicable legal principles
The standard for evaluating claims that counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance is set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
687–694. This standard provides that: “[t]o secure reversal … upon the ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel under either the state or federal Constitution, [an
appellant] must establish (1) that ... counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, i.e., that counsel’s performance did not meet the
standard to be expected of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that there is a
reasonable probability that [appellant] would have obtained a more favorable
result absent counsel’s shortcomings.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th
926, 1003.) “A reviewing court can begin an ineffective assistance of
counsel inquiry with either element and need not address both elements if one is
not satisfied. [Citations.]” (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88 (Tellez).)
“On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance
only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical
purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and
failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All

9
other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas
corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
It is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that his or her counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. (See In re Thomas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1249, 1257.) “Unless [an
appellant] establishes the contrary, we shall presume that ‘counsel’s performance
fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions
and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 746.) Further, “[f]ailure to raise a
meritless objection is not ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v.
Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 90.)
3. Analysis
Maravilla argues that restitution for a home security system is only
authorized under section 1202.4 where a defendant is convicted of “a violation of
Section 273.5, or a violent felony as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5,”
citing section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J).7 Maravilla was not convicted of any
offenses encompassed within section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J) and,
accordingly, the trial court was not required to order restitution for the residential
security system under that statute. However, that subdivision is not the sole
source of a court’s authority to order restitution and the plain language of section

7
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) provides in pertinent part that “the
restitution order … shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse
the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of
the defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, all of the
following: ¶¶ Expenses to install or increase residential security incurred
related to a violation of Section 273.5, or a violent felony as defined in subdivision
(c) of Section 667.5, including, but not limited to, a home security device or
system, or replacing or increasing the number of locks.”

10
1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) makes clear that the trial court has ample discretionary
authority to craft a restitution order “sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or
victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the
defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to” the categories of
expenses listed in subdivisions (f)(3)(A)–(L). (Italics added.) As Maravilla
acknowledges, other courts of appeal have so held. (See People v. Henderson
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 467, 472 (Henderson) [victim entitled to restitution under
section 1202.4 for installation of security system due to defendant’s conduct
regardless of crime of conviction]; accord, People v. Brooks (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 932, 946.)
Maravilla urges us to reject the reasoning of Henderson and Brooks and
instead follow People v. Salas (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 736 (Salas). In Salas, the
Court of Appeal analyzed the legislative history of section 1202.4 and canons of
statutory construction before ultimately concluding the Legislature intended to
unconditionally exclude restitution for home security systems unless it fell within
subdivision (f)(3)(J) of section 1202.4. We respectfully disagree with the reading
of the statute advanced in Salas. The statute’s use of the phrase “including, but
not limited to” is inclusive rather than exclusive. As noted by Henderson, the
mandatory restitution for home security systems set forth in section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(3)(J) “does not operate to bar discretionary restitution orders for
home security systems where such orders may be otherwise appropriate.”
(Henderson, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 473.)8
In this case, the probation report related the facts of Maravilla’s offenses,
and, at sentencing, the trial court issued a ten-year protective order, finding there

8
A defendant subjected to such a restitution order is obviously not without
recourse, as he or she can always argue on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion in issuing that order. (S.O., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098.)

11
was “clear and convincing evidence” Maravilla had harassed Jane Doe.
Consequently, there is substantial evidence to support a finding that the offenses
of which Maravilla was convicted resulted in the victims—which by statute
include Jane Doe’s parents for purposes of restitution—continuing to fear for Jane
Doe’s safety. Based on this record, the court could have reasonably concluded
that a residential security system was an appropriate expense by the victims to
both encourage and verify Maravilla’s compliance with the 100 yard stay away
order from Jane Doe and her residence. The trial court thereby had the statutory
authority to order restitution for a home security system on the ground that the
victim’s family incurred that expense as the result of Maravilla’s conduct.
Therefore, Maravilla’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object
to the restitution order on the grounds that this $1,000 payment was not authorized
by section 1202.4. Because the trial court had the authority to order restitution for
the installation of the residential security system, Maravilla cannot establish that
he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise that objection below.
III. DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.

12

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WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

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GROVER, ACTING P. J.

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LIE, J.

People v. Maravilla
H052592