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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Loza CA2/8

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B343313

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.2K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/19/26 P. v. Loza CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B343313

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA106952)
v.

JULIANA LOZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph J. Burghardt, Judge. Affirmed.
Mher Cholakhyan, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Juliana Loza appeals from the denial of her Penal Code
section 1018 motion to withdraw a no-contest plea. (Further
statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.) Loza, who claims she lacked information about the
immigration consequences of her plea, contends the superior
court abused its discretion by incorporating an unwarranted
prejudice standard into its analysis and by improperly weighing
the totality of the circumstances surrounding her plea. As the
superior court acted within its discretion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Plea
In November 2023, Loza, then represented by private
counsel, pleaded no contest to assault with a firearm in violation
of section 245, subdivision (a)(2), without the benefit of a plea
bargain. In a colloquy we will discuss further below, the superior
court advised Loza she would, based on the nature of the
forthcoming conviction, be deported if she was not a United
States citizen. The court also told Loza it would not sentence her
to longer than 365 days in custody and probation if she provided
certain mitigation evidence at sentencing.
2. The Section 1018 Motion to Withdraw the Plea
In April 2024, Loza announced she wished to withdraw her
plea. The superior court appointed the public defender to
represent her for that purpose. Loza’s motion to withdraw,
invoking section 1018, argued she was not a United States
citizen, her counsel had not advised her of the immigration
consequences of her plea, and she would not have pleaded had
she been advised of those consequences. The motion included
declarations from Loza’s prior attorneys stating they did not
discuss immigration consequences with Loza.

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The court held an evidentiary hearing. Loza testified to her
international upbringing, the various countries she had lived in
after age 18, and her work as a Mexican lawyer and diplomat.
Due to her work and citizenship, Loza had possessed both a
Mexican diplomatic and standard passport, though she
relinquished the former in 2017 and the latter had expired.
Loza had lived in the United States “most of the time” since
2008. In 2015, she began the process of applying for residency
with the assistance of immigration counsel. At that time, she
and her then-husband were unsure whether they would live in
the United States or elsewhere, since she had property in Spain,
France, and Australia, and had sold property in London and
Mexico. Work on her application “fell through the cracks,”
though, after her husband became ill and passed away and as the
COVID-19 pandemic took hold. She had not talked to her
immigration counsel since 2020, after her husband’s passing.
Loza testified deportation “would be an incredible
hardship” because she was still sorting out her late husband’s
estate and she feared the cartel in Mexico. She would not have
pleaded guilty had she known it would compromise her legal
status in the United States.
Several weeks after this evidentiary presentation, the court
heard argument from counsel and denied Loza’s motion. The
court determined Loza had not established prejudice—that is, she
had not met her burden to show she would have declined to plea
had she been better informed—and, “in addition,” the court
determined Loza had “not shown good cause” to withdraw her
plea. It cited her minimal ties to the United States, her failure to
make significant progress in seeking legal status, her expressed
understanding of the immigration consequences at her change of

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plea, the strength of the prosecution’s case, and the prosecutor’s
indication he would not have offered an immigration safe plea.
The court also found Loza had not been a credible witness.
3. Sentence and Appeal
The superior court sentenced Loza to two years of formal
felony probation and 365 days in county jail. Loza received a
certificate of probable cause and timely appeals the denial of her
withdrawal motion. (See § 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.304(b)(1).)
DISCUSSION
A court “may . . . permit” withdrawal of a guilty or no
contest plea for “good cause shown” at any point before judgment.
(§ 1018; see also § 1016 [no contest and guilty pleas given same
legal effect].) “Good cause” includes mistake, ignorance, or any
other factor that overcomes the exercise of free judgment, and a
defendant must establish “good cause” by clear and convincing
evidence. (People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 894
(Patterson).) “[A] court asked to set aside a guilty plea based on
mistake or ignorance of the deportation consequences is ‘properly
vested with discretion to grant or to deny the motion after
considering all factors necessary to bring about a just result.’ ”
(Id. at p. 899.) We, in turn, review a superior court’s decision for
abuse of discretion, which may occur if the decision was based on
a legal error. (Id. at p. 894; People v. Codinha (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 1047, 1070 [same].) Legal error aside, we do not
reweigh evidence or reassess a witness’s credibility; instead, we
“accept the trial court’s factual findings to the extent they are
supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Lopez (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 561, 574 (Lopez).) There is no abuse of discretion
unless the court exercises its “discretion in an arbitrary,

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capricious or patently absurd manner resulting in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Shaw (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th
492, 496; People v. Nocelotl (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1091, 1097
(Nocelotl).)
I. The Superior Court Did Not Apply the Wrong Legal
Standard.
Loza contends the superior court committed legal error
when it made its no-prejudice finding—a finding, in essence, that
Loza would still have pleaded even had she understood the
potential adverse immigration consequences—rather than rely on
the absence of “good cause.”
Initially, we note Loza’s motion explicitly invoked a
prejudice test. It stated, “[t]o obtain reversal of the conviction,
prejudice must be shown, i.e. a reasonable probability that the
client would not have entered this plea if the client had been told
the truth about its immigration consequences.” Overlooking
possible invited error or forfeiture, however, as the People have
not argued these matters, the superior court did not commit legal
error.
The court’s no-prejudice finding was “in addition” to its
finding of no good cause. Aside, then, from any potentially
problematic no-prejudice finding, the court applied the good
cause test of section 1018, and the presumption is it did so
properly. (Evid. Code, § 664.) In any event, the court could,
when considering good cause under section 1018, consider the
materiality of the information withheld and whether it resulted
in “a guilty plea [defendant] would not otherwise have entered.”
(Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 897.) In fact, our Supreme
Court has described a section 1018 motion, brought under
circumstances like those presented here, as a post-plea “claim

5
that the defendant would not have entered the plea had he or she
understood the plea would render the defendant deportable.”1
(Id. at p. 899.) And appellate courts have looked to such a
prejudice inquiry when reviewing motions under section 1018.
(E.g., Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 581 [prejudice
established]; People v. Dillard (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 657, 665
[prejudice not established]; People v. Breslin (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416 [prejudice required].)
The superior court, here, did not apply an erroneous legal
standard.
II. Denying the Section 1018 Motion Was Within the
Superior Court’s Discretion.
Nor did the superior court abuse its discretion in applying
section 1018. It is undisputed that Loza is not a United States
citizen, that her counsel did not advise her of the immigration
consequences of her plea, and that a conviction for assault with a
firearm can carry adverse immigration consequences. (See
People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 14–15 [noncitizen
convicted of assault with a firearm and sentenced to at least a
year in prison “conclusively presumed deportable”].) Contrary to
Loza’s contention, however, these facts did not compel the
superior court to grant her motion. Rather, the decision whether
to grant or deny a section 1018 motion lies within the superior
court’s discretion after considering all relevant factors. (People v.
Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 798.) “We would not
necessarily conclude that a court abused its discretion if it either

1 Loza asserts that Patterson reserved a prejudice analysis
exclusively for habeas claims for ineffective assistance of counsel.
But Patterson discussed prejudice in both contexts. (Patterson,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 898–899, 900.)

6
granted or denied a motion to set aside a plea of guilty on
evidence that an accused was or was not aware of the possibility
of deportation; the test of abuse in such circumstances is whether
after consideration of all relevant factors there was good cause
shown for granting the motion and whether justice would be
promoted thereby.” (Ibid.; see also Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 899.)
Loza essentially argues the superior court improperly
weighed her testimony and disregarded matters favorable to plea
withdrawal. Nothing in the record, however, suggests the court
failed to consider all relevant evidence, and we cannot reweigh
evidence under an abuse of discretion review. (Lopez, supra, 66
Cal.App.5th at p. 574.) Rather, substantial evidence supports the
court’s findings, and its ultimate rejection of good cause was
within its discretion.
First, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that Loza understood the court’s immigration advisement at the
change of plea hearing. During the plea colloquy, this transpired:
“The Court: You also understand that if you’re not a
citizen of the United States, you’ll be deported,
denied naturalization, amnesty and re-entry and
excluded from admission to the United States or
removed, based on this conviction and the laws of the
United States? Do you understand? Do you want me
to repeat it?
Ms. Loza: No. I understand it. I don’t agree with it,
but I understand.
The Court: In terms of the immigration
consequences?
Ms. Loza: Yes.

7
The Court: A lot of people don’t agree with it. I just
have to make sure you understand it.
Ms. Loza: My understanding was that it has to do
with the violence of the crime, not necessarily just
any crime.
The Court: I just need to read you the immigration
consequences.
Ms. Loza: That’s fine. That’s fine. I understand.”2
The court’s admonition advised Loza that her plea would
result in deportation, and Loza, an attorney who had been
trained in Mexico and a former diplomat, indicated her
understanding. It is relevant “whether the defendant
acknowledged understanding the advisement and whether he or
she expressed concerns about possible deportation consequences
or sought additional time to consult with counsel.” (Patterson,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 899.) “It is not enough that a defendant
assert that she has changed her mind as to the most expeditious
course to follow.” (In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 686,
superseded on other grounds as noted in People v. Mendez (1999)
19 Cal.4th 1084, 1103–1104; accord People v. Archer (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 693, 702.)
Second, substantial evidence supports the superior court’s
finding that Loza had minimal ties to the United States. Loza
testified she had property in Spain, France, and Australia and
had lived abroad at numerous points in her life. Further, she
was a sophisticated, trained attorney who had entered the United
States as a Mexican diplomat. She never applied for residency

2 The reporter’s transcript attributes this final response to
the prosecutor. The People contend Loza made this statement,
and Loza does not challenge that reasonable contention.

8
despite having consulted attorneys to start the process a decade
ago.
Third, substantial evidence supports the superior court’s
finding that the prosecution would not have offered an
immigration-neutral plea. No such offer appears in the record.
Meanwhile, the prosecutor stated he would not have made such
an offer, nor would he in the future, given the seriousness of the
charge, and Loza originally pleaded without the benefit of any
plea agreement.
Relatedly, and fourth, substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding regarding the strength of the prosecution’s case.
The 79-year-old victim testified at the preliminary hearing, which
formed the factual basis for Loza’s plea. The victim was the
former wife of Loza’s late husband. Loza came to the victim’s
home and attacked her. The victim fell, and Loza strangled her,
pointed a firearm at her, and threatened to kill her. When the
victim tried to call for help, Loza took the victim’s cellphone and
shot it five times. The prosecutor advised, without objection from
the defense, that third-party witnesses saw the attack and that
when one of them called 911, the recording captured the sound of
multiple gunshots.
We also decline Loza’s request that we reassess the
superior court’s detailed adverse credibility finding against Loza
and its resulting decision to disregard portions of her testimony
that might have supported withdrawal. The court premised its
credibility finding not only on its observation of Loza as a
witness, but also on its dealings with Loza throughout the case
and documents the prosecution provided indicating Loza provided
false identification to law enforcement after a traffic accident.
The superior court was not required to turn a blind eye to its

9
dealings with Loza and was free to reject her testimony that she
would not have pleaded had she known of the immigration
consequences or that she had greater ties to the United States.
(See People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527 [“An appellate
court may not simply second-guess factual findings that are
based on the trial court’s own observations”]; People v. Ravaux
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 918 [“The court may also take into
account the defendant’s credibility and [her] interest in the
outcome of the proceedings”].) Nor has Loza provided any legal
support for her claim that the court’s credibility finding was
based on an irrelevant, collateral issue it was foreclosed from
considering.
Looking at the entirety of the record, the superior court’s
conclusion that Loza had not established good cause by clear and
convincing evidence was within its discretion and “not arbitrary,
whimsical, or capricious.” (Nocelotl, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1097.) The findings the court made were supported and
permitted its conclusion, pursuant to the good-cause standard,
that any mistake or ignorance of adverse immigration
consequences had not overcome Loza’s free will when she
pleaded. (Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 894.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

SCHERB, J.
We Concur:

WILEY, Acting P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.

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