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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Chang

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: F088521

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (67.9K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/25/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088521
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF409217)
v.

MARVIN JOSEPH CHANG, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Nathan G.
Leedy, Judge.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary, Lewis A.
Martinez, and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Marvin Joseph Chang was convicted in July 2024 of a litany of charges
stemming from a police chase and gun battle with officers outside of Three Rivers.
Defendant suffered from delusions that he was being pursued by CIA agents who
intended to harm or kill him. The sole issue on appeal here is whether the trial court
should have provided an instruction on imperfect self-defense during the guilt phase of
the trial to permit defendant to argue that his belief in the necessity of self-defense was
honest, if not reasonable. The court denied this instruction, citing People v. Elmore
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 121 (Elmore). Elmore stands for the proposition that imperfect self-
defense may not be invoked by one who is operating entirely under the influence of a
delusion, without an “objective correlate.” (Id. at pp. 136–137.) We find the mere
presence of a peace officer cannot be such an objective correlate. The objective correlate
must at least conceivably relate to a reasonable need for self-defense. Imperfect self-
defense is a species of mistake of fact, where a person may hold the actual, if
unreasonable, belief that self-defense is necessary. A pure delusion is not a mistake of
fact; rather, it is “perception of facts not grounded in reality.” (People v. Mejia-Lenares
(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1453, fn. omitted (Mejia-Lenares).) Defendant’s belief
that all peace officers were working on behalf of the CIA to kill him is clearly a delusion,
not just a mistake of fact.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 19, 2021, E.M. was at a gas station in Three Rivers, searching for her
purse while seated in her car. She heard a knock on the window and saw a gun pointed at
her. A man asked for her purse, but having not turned off the car, she drove away instead
of giving it to him. E.M. stopped her car approximately a block away and called 911.
While waiting for assistance to arrive, she heard gunshots. Additionally, Megan T., who
worked nearby, also heard gunshots around this time.

2.
A 911 dispatch went out reporting that shots were fired at the gas station in Three
Rivers and directing officers to be on the lookout for a white Prius, driven by a man
dressed in gray. Officers Crass and Wallace heard the call and decided to respond,
knowing that the only road out of Three Rivers would take someone past their current
position. The officers, who worked for CalFire, were wearing peace officer uniforms, but
were in a CalFire truck. They spotted defendant, wearing a gray sweatshirt, driving a
white Prius westbound away from Three Rivers. The officers turned to follow defendant
and engaged their lights and sirens to pull him over. Defendant displayed a firearm out
of the window of the car while the officers were behind him.
A short while later, defendant stopped suddenly on the highway, partially turning
his car in the middle of the highway. He then opened the car door and immediately
began firing at Officers Crass and Wallace. The officers had no opportunity to give
defendant commands of any kind, because he started firing before they even left their
vehicle. The officers returned fire. Defendant then sped away, and the officers resumed
their pursuit of him. Other deputies joined in the pursuit, as defendant continued to fire
shots out of the car’s window. The Prius and pursuing vehicles exceeded speeds of
95 miles per hour during the chase. Defendant ran several other vehicles, including a
UPS truck, off the road while fleeing down the highway. Additional officers, including
Officer Wilson of the California Highway Patrol, joined in the pursuit.
Meanwhile, ahead of the convoy, another deputy was deploying spike strips across
some of the lanes of traffic. As defendant reached that deputy, he veered to the other side
of the freeway and turned onto another road while firing at the deputy from his car. As
the various officers continued their pursuit on this other road, smoke began billowing out
from the Prius, at which point defendant drove the car into an orchard and stopped. After
the car came to a stop, defendant fled on foot. Most of the officers set up a perimeter
around the orchard to prevent him from leaving.

3.
Officer Wilson proceeded into the orchard to check the Prius and attempted to
locate defendant, ultimately parking her vehicle behind defendant’s. After she climbed
out of her vehicle, defendant began firing at Wilson from the trees, and she retreated
behind her vehicle and returned fire. When Wilson went to reload her gun, the magazine
did not seat correctly and fell out of the gun and onto the ground, at which point
defendant ran towards her, continuing to shoot. Wilson attempted to move around the
vehicle, but was shot in the shoulder, breaking her collarbone. After being shot, and
while running away from defendant, Wilson slipped and fell to the ground, which
allowed defendant to catch up with her. Wilson testified that, at that moment, she was
“anticipating getting shot in the back of the head.” Defendant did not shoot Wilson
again, but began striking her with a hard object, presumably the handgun he was holding.
Another officer spotted defendant and Wilson fighting and fired several shots, which
caused defendant to flee.
Several remaining officers pursued defendant as he fled the scene where he had
assaulted Officer Wilson. He was spotted by Officer Wallace, who shouted to alert the
other officers as to defendant’s location. When defendant heard the shouting, he turned
toward Wallace and, believing he might be fired upon next, Wallace shot defendant in the
leg with a shotgun slug. Following this, defendant was handcuffed and arrested.
Officers found a nine-millimeter firearm with an extended, 30-round magazine
and a live round jammed in the chamber, lying next to defendant. Defendant was also
wearing body armor under his sweatshirt. Additionally, when officers searched
defendant’s car, they located an assault rifle with an extended, 50-round magazine, a
machete, a pan with mushrooms in it, copious amounts of ammunition for both the rifle
and the pistol, several extra magazines, and marijuana. The assault rifle was behind the
driver’s seat, wrapped in a blanket. The mushrooms were hallucinogenic. Although
defendant’s toxicology screen did not detect any psilocybin or THC—the active
ingredients in hallucinogenic mushrooms and marijuana, respectively—the evidence

4.
indicated the metabolites of psilocybin are very unstable and are removed from the body
very quickly and, therefore, the test could not rule out the use of mushrooms.
Defendant testified in his own defense. He stated he normally lived in Los
Angeles with his mother. Although he had moved out some months prior, he returned to
the house a few days before the incident to leave his mother a note1 and “grab
some … camping gear and things to survive in the wilderness.” Defendant had decided
to “live inside the national park,” because he was scared “[o]f the government and CIA
trying to silence [him].” He said he first noticed “a white pickup truck following [him]
on the 10 freeway by the Rosemead exit,” which he believed was the CIA. He also
claimed a helicopter was following him through several different cities in Southern
California. Defendant testified that on the night before he left, the CIA was “driving by
and discharging their firearms,” which scared him because they were “not being as
subtle” as they had been, and he believed they were “trying to scare [him] on purpose.”
The next day, he packed his two dogs in the car, destroyed his laptop and cell phone,2 and
left for Yosemite with a compass and a map. However, he “kept getting lost,” so he
decided to go to Sequoia National Park “because it was closer on the map.” Defendant
was a convicted felon who had previously served a prison term following a conviction for
assault with a deadly weapon in 2008. Defendant testified that, because he was a
convicted felon, he had to obtain the guns he had illegally. He had also illegally obtained
a ballistic vest. Defendant stated he obtained these items because he was “gearing up for

1 The note read: “Dear mom. The establishment is trying to silence me. I must
hide. I love you. Vegan anarchy spiritual.”
2 According to defendant, he destroyed his cell phone and computer because he
“didn’t want the NSA to watch [him] and tell the CIA where [he] was going.” He also
testified, “[T]hey could listen to you through your phone and your laptop.” When asked
who “they” were, defendant replied, “The CIA, the NSA, the Illuminati, the New World
Order, the people who control the world.”

5.
a revolution.” According to defendant, he knew that his political activities could result in
his being monitored by the government.
Defendant was arrested by police in Sierra Madre on January 31, 2021—
approximately three weeks before the incident underlying this case—for possession of a
firearm, mushrooms, and a knife. He knew it was illegal for him to possess a firearm at
that time, and that he could go back to prison for doing so. He also testified he was afraid
of the CIA and FBI then as well; however, he did not fire at any of those officers and
complied with the arrest without fleeing, even though he was “high on mushrooms.”
Shortly before leaving Southern California for Sequoia, defendant posted a
profanity-laden video to his Instagram account mocking and taunting the CIA, the NSA,
and the FBI. He then left for a national park, where he intended to “eat the grass
and … forage for food.” He thought the CIA would be easier to avoid in the mountains
because it was “mostly wilderness.” Defendant testified he “was trying to wait a few
years in the wilderness first and then try to sneak my way back” to Southern California
after he had “let the heat die down.”
On the day of the incident, defendant testified that E.M. pulled into the gas station
after he was there, and he believed she was with the CIA. He tapped on her window with
the gun and told her to leave, which she did. He then poured gas all over the gas station
and told “[t]he bug that I thought was in my car,” “If you guys don’t back up, I’m gonna
burn us all, and I’ll meditate to escape the pain.” Because E.M. drove away, he did not
light the gas station on fire. He then “fired two shots in the air … [t]o let them know that
[he] was armed,” before driving away. Defendant testified he had decided to head back
to Los Angeles, because the CIA had found him in Sequoia National Park.
Defendant testified he shot at the police when they tried to pull him over because
he thought the CIA was “after [him]” and “was trying to kill [him]” or “silence [him].”
He stated he did not intend to kill the officers he was shooting at but instead was “trying
to get away” because he was “scared.” Defendant testified he thought the officers would

6.
“either kill [him] or take [him] to Guantanamo Bay … [a]s a political prisoner,” because
he was a “lightworker,” which he explained meant that he “fight[s] the forces of evil.”
According to defendant, he was in fear for his life when he “first saw those [CalFire]
officers that tried to stop [him],” because he thought “they were police that was called in
by the CIA.” Defendant admitted that he fired at the officers first. Defendant claimed he
did not intend to kill the officers, who he believed wore bulletproof vests. He thought
they would merely be injured but did acknowledge he was “willing to injure or kill to
escape to save [his] life.” Defendant also acknowledged firing his weapon from the
vehicle, although he was unsure who he was firing at.
Recalling the assault in the orchard, defendant said he shot Officer Wilson in the
shoulder because, when he went up to her and told her to stop shooting, she continued
trying to reload her gun, but he did not want to kill her. Defendant explained that if he
wanted to kill her, he would have shot her in the head, which he could have done.
According to defendant, while he had both a nine-millimeter and an assault rifle, he fired
only the pistol because “the police, they wear level IIIA bulletproof vests, and that’s
designed to only protect them up to .44 Magnum, so the AR-15 would penetrate that vest.
I didn’t want to kill anyone so I didn’t take out my AR-15.”
Following his arrest, defendant was diagnosed with a schizoaffective disorder with
bipolar type with delusional ideation. The jury was told by expert witnesses that
government-related delusions are common, and that defendant’s delusions presented as
genuine. According to the evaluating doctors, a person’s delusions could be perceived as
a real threat and might cause the individual to act out to avoid that threat. Defendant was
ordered to be medicated by the court, although he stated he did not want to take any
medication. According to defendant, the medication helped, and he no longer had
thoughts about the CIA or about police officers’ connections to the CIA and was no
longer afraid of police officers.

7.
Defendant was charged with 19 counts in relation to this incident, including:
eight counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187;3 counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 12 &
13); two counts of assault with a firearm upon a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(1);
counts 7 & 9); driving against oncoming traffic during flight from a pursuing officer
(Veh. Code, § 2800.4; count 4); reckless driving during flight from a pursuing officer
(id., § 2800.2; count 11); throwing an object at an occupied vehicle with intent to inflict
great bodily injury (id., § 23110, subd. (b); count 5); reckless discharge of a firearm
(§ 246.3, subd. (a); count 14); assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b);
count 15); making a criminal threat against E.M. (§ 422, subd. (a); count 16); unlawful
possession of body armor (§ 31360, subd. (a); count 17); unlawful possession of a firearm
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 18); and unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1); count 19). Various firearm enhancements were alleged related to the
personal use and discharge of a firearm in violation of sections 12022.5 and 12022.53, as
well as the existence of prior strikes, which are not recounted here as they are not
relevant to this opinion.
Defendant requested an instruction based on imperfect self-defense. The trial
court commented, “The problem I’m having here is that so far as I can tell, the entirety of
Mr. Chang’s belief in the need to respond with force in this case is dependent upon this
delusion that these law enforcement officers are in cahoots with the CIA who is
surveilling Mr. Chang and seeking to have Mr. Chang killed. I don’t see how that can be
disentangled from the sequence of events.” According to the court, “[f]rom the get-go,
[defendant] … is operating under this delusion that the CIA is after him. That’s how it
starts at the gas station. … He produces the gun and fires shots because he thinks that the
CIA has followed him to Three Rivers, and once the police get involved, he automatically
thinks that all of those police personnel are also working in tandem with the CIA and

3 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.

8.
therefore are attempting to kill him.” The court further observed: “And here, there’s no
suggestion, for example, that the police did anything wrong throughout the course of
these events. There’s no hint they used any excessive force or behaved inappropriately in
any way that would suggest to a reasonable person capable of assessing the facts that
force was appropriate or necessary in any way.” Ultimately, the court declined to give an
imperfect self-defense instruction for voluntary manslaughter, because “all of the
evidence here in my view establishes that any belief that [defendant] had and the need to
use deadly force to defend himself was entirely dependent upon and produced by these
delusions that have been testified to.”
Ultimately, defendant was found guilty of counts 1 (attempted murder),
2 (attempted murder), 4 (driving against traffic), 7 (assault with a firearm), 9 (assault with
a firearm), 10 (attempted murder), 11 (driving recklessly), 12 (attempted murder),
13 (attempted murder), 14 (reckless discharge of a firearm), 15 (assault with a firearm),
17 (possession of body armor), 18 (possession of a firearm), and 19 (possession of
ammunition); and not guilty of counts 3 (attempted murder), 5 (throwing an object at a
vehicle), 6 (attempted murder), 8 (attempted murder), and 16 (criminal threats).
On the five convictions for attempted murder, defendant was sentenced to 50 years
to life on count 1 and 30 years to life on counts 2, 12, and 13, all of which were ordered
to be served consecutively. Sentencing on count 10 was stayed pursuant to section 654.
Additional time was imposed for some of the charged enhancements pursuant to
section 12022.53, including 25 years on count 1 and 20 years on each of counts 2, 12,
and 13, for a total prison term of 225 years to life. Sentencing on the remaining
enhancements was stayed. Defendant also received an additional determinate sentence of
63 years eight months. A notice of appeal was timely filed.

9.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue on appeal in this case pertains to the trial court’s refusal to instruct
the jury on imperfect self-defense,4 based on defendant’s claim that he honestly, if
unreasonably, believed he needed to use force to protect himself from the police, because
they were affiliated with the CIA and were seeking to kill him. The doctrine of imperfect
self-defense holds that, if a person kills in the good faith, but unreasonable, belief of
needing to act in self-defense, “ ‘the belief negates what would otherwise be malice, and
that person is guilty of voluntary manslaughter …, not murder.’ ” (People v. Schuller
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243 (Schuller).) While phrased in a manner that suggests it is an
affirmative defense, imperfect self-defense is “ ‘not a true defense; rather, it is a
shorthand description of one form of voluntary manslaughter. And voluntary
manslaughter … is not a defense but a crime ….’ ” (Id. at p. 253.) Thus, a request for an
instruction on imperfect self-defense is a request for an instruction on a lesser-included
offense. (Id. at p. 252; People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461.) We review de novo
whether a trial court appropriately refused an instruction on a lesser included offense.
(People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705.) An instruction is required in this
circumstance when supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence “from which a
jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude ‘that the lesser offense, but not the
greater, was committed.’ ” (Ibid.)
In Elmore, our Supreme Court considered “whether the doctrine of unreasonable
self-defense is available when belief in the need to defend oneself is entirely delusional.”
(Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 130.) The court concluded it is not. (Ibid.) After
summarizing the general mens rea required for first degree murder—namely, “ ‘[a]
killing with express malice formed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation’ ”—the

4 Cases discussing this concept use both the phrase “imperfect self-defense” and
“unreasonable self-defense.” This opinion generally uses the phrase “imperfect self-
defense.”

10.
court noted that the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter can stem from two
bases: heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense. (Id. at p. 133.) Reasonable self-
defense “is a complete justification” for a killing, “and such a killing is not a crime.” (Id.
at pp. 133–134.) A killing in self-defense that is unreasonable under the circumstances
“is not justifiable. Nevertheless, ‘one who holds an honest but unreasonable belief in the
necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury does not harbor
malice and commits no greater offense than manslaughter.’ ” (Id. at p. 134.) This is
“most accurately characterized as an actual but unreasonable belief.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
“Whenever there is substantial evidence that the defendant killed in unreasonable self-
defense, the trial court must instruct on this theory of manslaughter.” (Ibid.)
In upholding the viability of this form of voluntary manslaughter, the Supreme
Court has differentiated between the now-defunct doctrine of diminished capacity and
imperfect self-defense. (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 776.) The court found
more than 30 years ago that, when the Legislature eliminated the doctrine of diminished
capacity, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense remained intact. (Id. at p. 778.) This is
because, “[u]nlike diminished capacity, imperfect self-defense is not rooted in any notion
of mental capacity or awareness of the need to act lawfully. To the contrary, a person
may be entirely free of any mental disease, defect, or intoxication and may be fully aware
of the need to act lawfully—and thus not have a diminished capacity—but actually,
although unreasonably, believe in the need for self-defense.” (Id. at pp. 777–778.)
“Thus, unreasonable self-defense is not premised on considerations of mental disorder.”
(Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 136.) An argument for unreasonable self-defense “ ‘is
based on a defendant’s assertion that he lacked malice … because he acted under an
unreasonable mistake of fact—that is, the need to defend himself against imminent peril
of death or great bodily harm.’ ” (Ibid.)
Indeed, this court has previously noted imperfect self-defense is “a species of
mistake of fact,” and because of that, “cannot be founded on delusion.” (Mejia-Lenares,

11.
supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1453.) As we explained in Mejia-Lenares, “[a] person
acting under a delusion is not negligently interpreting actual facts; instead, he or she is
out of touch with reality. That may be insanity, but it is not a mistake as to any fact.”
(Id. at pp. 1453–1454.) The Supreme Court in Elmore agreed with this analysis, noting
that “unreasonable self-defense, as a form of mistake of fact, has no application when the
defendant’s actions are entirely delusional.” (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 136–137.)
“A defendant who makes a factual mistake misperceives the objective circumstances.
A delusional defendant holds a belief that is divorced from the circumstances.” (Id. at
p. 137.)
The critical distinguishing feature which renders a delusional belief inapplicable
for imperfect self-defense is the “absence of an objective correlate.” (Elmore, supra,
59 Cal.4th at p. 137.) The Supreme Court offered this analogy: “A person who sees a
stick and thinks it is a snake is mistaken, but that misinterpretation is not delusional. One
who sees a snake where there is nothing snakelike, however, is deluded. Unreasonable
self-defense was never intended to encompass reactions to threats that exist only in the
defendant’s mind.” (Ibid.)
Critical to the Supreme Court’s holding in Elmore was that, in order for an
imperfect self-defense instruction to be inapplicable, the belief must be entirely
delusional, i.e., without an objective correlate. The Elmore court continued to approve a
prior holding which allowed an imperfect self-defense instruction where the defendant,
due to “a state of tension” that left him “highly sensitive to external stimuli and
abnormally fearful for his personal safety,” “reacted to apparent threats more violently
and unpredictably than an average person would.” (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 137.)
Thus, where a defendant holds a belief which, “ ‘although skewed by mental illness, was
nevertheless factually based,’ ” he may still avail himself of imperfect self-defense.
(Ibid.; Mejia-Lenares, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449.) Only “purely delusional
perceptions of threats to personal safety cannot be relied upon to claim unreasonable self-

12.
defense.” (Elmore, at pp. 138–139, italics added; see id. at pp. 130, 135, 136.) Instead,
“a belief in the need for self-defense that is purely delusional is a paradigmatic example
of legal insanity.” (Id. at p. 135.) Without any objective correlate, “[a]t a sanity trial, and
only at a sanity trial, the defense can maintain that purely delusional perceptions caused
the defendant to believe in the necessity of self-defense.” (Id. at p. 146.)
Because of this, where there is substantial evidence of an objective correlate to the
need for self-defense, an imperfect self-defense instruction should be given. Schuller is
instructive on this point. In Schuller, the evidence tended to show the defendant was
delusional, having testified that following a car accident he began experiencing “visions
of his dead ancestors and a ‘beautiful light,’ ” which led him to believe he was sent to
“ ‘pave the way for the second coming … of Christ’ and that a battle was being fought
with ‘Satan’s army.’ ” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 246.) Witnesses testified the
defendant appeared to be experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations. (Ibid.) The
defendant ultimately killed the man with whom he had been staying, claiming he had
“shared the light” with the victim, who turned out to be Lucifer. After the victim
revealed himself as Lucifer, the defendant claimed the victim attempted to stab him
(although the defendant noted he did not believe the victim actually was Lucifer at the
time of the stabbing). (Id. at p. 247.) The defendant claimed he shot the victim in the
head, which caused the victim to fall to the ground, but the victim then leaped back up
and again attempted to attack the defendant, resulting in the defendant shooting the
victim several more times in the head. (Ibid.)
The trial court in Schuller refused an instruction on imperfect self-defense,
because it concluded the defendant’s testimony “demonstrated his ‘reaction [to the
victim] was produced by the mental disturbance alone.’ ” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 249.) The Court of Appeal concluded this was error, because the shooting was not
entirely delusional, given the testimony from the defendant that the victim was
brandishing a knife toward him. (People v. Schuller (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 221, 232–

13.
233, revd. on other grounds (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237.)5 The Court of Appeal noted that it
was the province of the jury to determine “whether a defendant is credible.” (Ibid.)
“Thus, a single witness, including the defendant, can provide evidence establishing the
objective circumstances necessary to support the instruction.” (Id. at p. 233.)
Here, we discern no error in the trial court’s refusal to instruct on imperfect self-
defense. Prior to defendant firing upon the officers, there simply was no objective
correlate to suggest defendant’s life was being threatened by the police. Defendant
argues that merely the pursuit by and presence of the CalFire officers who initially
engaged with defendant was a sufficient objective correlate to give rise to an imperfect
self-defense instruction, noting “[t]he officers were real” and “[t]he officers were really
pursuing [defendant].”6 We cannot agree. In virtually any case, there will be something
objective that exists in the world with which a defendant is interacting. In Elmore, a
53-year-old woman was sitting at a bus stop when the defendant walked past her, before

5 While the Supreme Court ultimately reviewed and disapproved the Court of
Appeal’s opinion in People v. Schuller, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 221 on harmless error
grounds, it did not reach the issue of whether partially delusional beliefs may serve as a
basis for imperfect self-defense. (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 251, fn. 2.)
6 Defendant also suggests the officers firing their weapons at him was a sufficient
objective correlate to warrant the instruction. In the right circumstances, this argument
might have merit. However, as the trial court correctly instructed the jury, a defendant
does not have the right to provoke a conflict by his use of deadly force to warrant his
claimed self-defense. (People v. Hinshaw (1924) 194 Cal. 1, 26; People v. Ramirez
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940, 947 [“[W]hen a defendant contrives a ‘deadly’ assault
[citation], there can be no incommensurate or unjustifiable response by the victim: he or
she is fully entitled to use deadly force and the defendant has no right to claim self-
defense against those deadly measures”]; see People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735,
761–762.) Here, the testimony from the initial responding officers was that, as soon as
defendant stopped his car, he began firing at them, before they even had the opportunity
to give verbal commands. Even in defendant’s narrative of the encounter, he shot at the
officers first and would have been willing to kill them if needed. Thus, there can be no
argument the officers shooting at defendant was the objective correlate providing the
basis for imperfect self-defense. They were acting lawfully by defending themselves
against an assailant who had indisputably fired at them first.

14.
turning around to confront her. (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 130.) The defendant
“appeared to pull on something around her neck. [The victim] raised her hands
defensively, stood, and tried to walk away,” at which point the defendant stabbed her
with a sharpened paintbrush. (Ibid.) The defendant’s testimony was confusing: He
inconsistently suggested that someone had said or done something violent, although he
could not identify what was said or done, or who had purportedly said or done it. (Id. at
p. 131.) However, there were obviously some objective facts related to the defendant’s
actions in Elmore: there actually was a woman sitting at the bus stop, and she actually
stood up, raised her hands, and attempted to walk away. Yet none of these could be
connected to any objective correlate to a need for self-defense, which is the state to which
the objective facts identified must correlate. In Elmore, as in this case, whatever threat
purportedly existed at the beginning of the encounter was entirely within the defendant’s
mind.
This contrasts with the Court of Appeal’s holding in People v. Schuller, which
found an imperfect self-defense instruction was warranted because, even if under the
influence of a delusion to some extent, the defendant testified the victim had tried to stab
him. (People v. Schuller, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 235–236.) The court concluded
the “defendant’s own testimony, even though uncorroborated and not otherwise credible,
supported an instruction on actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense.”
(Id. at p. 236.) “Of course, the jury was free to reject defendant’s self-defense testimony
as unsupported or unreliable.” (Ibid.) “ ‘In determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of
the defense evidence’ [citation], and a court is not permitted to concern itself with
inconsistencies in the evidence [citation], rather the court must ‘consider[] the evidence
in the light most favorable to the defendant.’ ” (Ibid.) However, testimony that the
victim attempted to stab the defendant is an objective fact which correlates to the need for
self-defense.

15.
The distinction is thus readily apparent: whatever the claimed objective correlate
is, it must relate to the claimed need for self-defense. It is not sufficient to point merely
to any objects or actions that exist in the real world. The objective correlate—whether an
object or an action or some combination thereof—must directly correlate to a threat in
such a way that it could plausibly translate into the need for self-defense, even if, in that
particular case, a jury might judge that self-defense was not reasonably necessary. One
must bear in mind that, at its core, imperfect self-defense is a species of mistake of fact.
(Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 136–137.) Thus, an unknown individual pointing a cell
phone at a defendant might be sufficient in certain circumstances to lead to an imperfect
self-defense instruction, even if a jury found it unreasonable under the circumstances to
believe the cell phone was a weapon. It is at least plausible for a reasonable person to
mistake a small, dark-colored object pointed at them for a gun in the right circumstances,
and someone pointing a gun at the defendant might reasonably give rise to the need for
self-defense. The same could not be said of an individual merely talking on a cell phone
or holding nothing at all in his hands.
Here, the officers were merely attempting to pull over a car that a criminal suspect
was driving. More importantly, the officers had not acted in any way to suggest to an
objective observer that they might harm defendant before he began shooting at them.
They had neither displayed weapons7 nor issued threats before defendant opened fire.
Defendant had no history with these officers that might lead a reasonable person to
believe these officers meant to kill him. Indeed, while they were peace officers, they

7 By this observation, we do not mean to suggest that any time an officer brandishes
a weapon, a defendant could invoke an imperfect self-defense argument upon being
charged for firing at the officer. Here, for instance, the officers were responding to a call
of shots already having been fired, and it likely was reasonable for them to assume the
individual they were pursuing might shoot at them. The fact they did not brandish any
weapons here, prior to defendant shooting at them, simply solidifies our finding that there
was no objective correlate here. It is not, per se, a sufficient condition to warrant such an
instruction in the future.

16.
were not even driving a police vehicle, but rather were driving a CalFire truck. Nothing
has been identified to us as a fact that would objectively correlate to a plausible need for
self-defense, and we cannot hold that peace officers are such an inherent threat that their
mere engagement with a suspect could serve as such an objective correlate on its own.
There was no objective correlate for the belief that these officers were attempting to
assassinate defendant. The belief in the need for self-defense here was solely a delusion
within defendant’s mind based on his subjective belief that the officers were CIA agents
who wanted to kill him. The trial court therefore did not err in finding there was
insufficient objective correlates to warrant an imperfect self-defense instruction.
DISPOSITION
Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

DESANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, Acting P. J.

HARRELL, J.

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