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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Commonwealth v. Anthony Eberhart.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-P-0380

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-380

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ANTHONY EBERHART.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Anthony Eberhart, was charged with murder in

the first degree, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1, armed

assault with intent to murder, in violation of G. L. c. 265,

§ 18 (b), a second count of armed assault with intent to murder,

assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation

of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b), assault and battery by discharge of

a firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15E, illegal

possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and unlawful

possession of a loaded firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269,

§ 10 (n).

As to the murder count, after trial, the jury found the

defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter. The defendant was found not guilty on all other

charges except unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful

possession of a loaded firearm. In this direct appeal, the

defendant raises three claims of error. For the reasons that

follow, we vacate the firearms convictions and, with respect to

the voluntary manslaughter conviction, we affirm the verdict but

vacate the sentence. The relevant facts and procedural

circumstances are included within our discussion of each.

A. Lack of a firearm license.

1. Background. It is an element of the two firearm crimes

of which the defendant was convicted, unlawful possession of a

firearm and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, that the

firearm be possessed by one without a license to carry a

firearm. G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (2); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,

496 Mass. 627, 639 (2025). During trial, on April 13, 2023, the

day before the Commonwealth finished its case in chief, the

Supreme Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Guardado,

491 Mass. 666 (2023). Although having a license to carry was

previously treated as an affirmative defense in unlawful

possession cases, Guardado made clear that the Commonwealth has

the burden to prove absence of firearms licensure beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id. at 690.

2
Without any guidance as to how absence of licensure might

properly be proved, the next day, the Commonwealth proposed

calling a Springfield police detective, Officer Felix Perez, who

had been trained on what the prosecutor and he referred to as

"CJIS" or Criminal Justice Investigative Services. Officer

Perez testified that CJIS is a database maintained by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation that contains information about,

among other things, "license[s] to carry." He testified to

being trained on its use and using it between 2004 and 2005

while stationed in Iraq, and that he had worked with CJIS during

the twenty-one years he served in the miliary police between

1992 and 2013. He testified that he was trained and certified

to use CJIS, through the Springfield police department, by

taking a test and getting recertification every two years.

In response to a question about whether or not he knew how

records are entered into CJIS, Officer Perez testified that he

had spoken with the records department within the Springfield

police department, and that he knew how records are entered into

the database from his observation of the records department. He

stated only that he knew how records were reported "if there are

no firearm records."

Officer Perez testified that he did a search of the records

in CJIS to determine if the defendant had a valid license to

3
carry a firearm in the State of Massachusetts, and that the

search result yielded no record to indicate that the defendant

had a license to carry. He testified that he did a search for

the defendant in August of 2020, using the proper spelling of

his name and the defendant's birthdate of August 23, 1979. He

testified that he repeated the search the morning of his

testimony.

1. Discussion. During the pendency of this appeal, the

Supreme Judicial Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v.

Smith, 496 Mass. 304 (2025). In that case, the Supreme Judicial

Court articulated what foundational testimony must be given by a

witness testifying that a search of a database of public records

failed to return a record. The court held that the individual

"must be familiar with the process of searching the database and

with the government record-keeping practices with respect to the

database." Id. at 305.

The defendant argues that the Springfield police

detective's testimony was insufficient to demonstrate knowledge

of the government's recordkeeping practices with regard to the

database. We agree.1

1 Because of this, we need not reach the other arguments
raised by the defendant with respect to the testimony of the
detective, including the argument that the testimony contained
hearsay or violated the confrontation clause of the Sixth

4
In Smith, 496 Mass. at 312, the Commonwealth called a

Massachusetts Department of Criminal Justice Information

Services employee as the witness, who not only testified from

"his extensive experience using the database," but also

"explained how information enters the Statewide database from

licensing authorities during the license application process."

The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the testimony

satisfied the standard discussed above, since it "amply

established that [the witness] was familiar with the process of

searching the database and adequately established that he

understood the relevant government record-keeping practices."

Id. at 313.

By contrast, while the detective's testimony in our case

sufficed to demonstrate his familiarity with searching the

database, nothing in the testimony indicated any knowledge of

how firearm license records are generated, entered, or

maintained, other than that he'd seen data entered by the

records department of the Springfield police department. The

officer's testimony did not make any reference to the firearm

license application process, to licensing authorities, or

Amendment to the United States Constitution, arguments
foreclosed by other holdings in Smith, 496 Mass. at 313-315, as
well as any arguments that the detective's testimony about the
database he searched was inaccurate.

5
indeed, even to the Statewide nature of the database. The

Commonwealth thus did not establish that Officer Perez had

sufficient familiarity with the government's recordkeeping

practices to testify to the results of his search of the firearm

license database.

Consequently, as the defendant argues, because a proper

foundation was not laid for the testimony about the results of

the search, the convictions on the unlawful possession of a

firearm and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm charges must

be vacated and the case remanded. The Commonwealth may retry

the defendant on these charges should it so choose.

The defendant also argues that there was insufficient

evidence to support the firearms convictions because there was

no evidence that the birthdate or name used by the officer in

the search belonged to him. Cf. Smith, 496 Mass. at 318-319

("The evidence was not sufficient to prove that the defendant

lacked a license to carry or firearm identification card,

however, because the Commonwealth introduced no evidence that

the birth date used to search the database was the defendant's

birth date"). We disagree. In this case, the Commonwealth also

introduced evidence of the defendant's fingerprint card, which

contained his name and date of birth, which matched Officer

Perez's testimony.

6
B. Sentencing on the voluntary manslaughter conviction.

1. Background. The defendant next argues that the trial

judge improperly sentenced the defendant with respect to the

voluntary manslaughter charge for conduct for which he was not

convicted. "[A] sentencing judge may not undertake to punish

[a] defendant for any conduct other than that for which [he]

stands convicted in the particular case." Commonwealth v.

Howard, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 328 (1997), quoting Commonwealth

v. LeBlanc, 370 Mass. 217, 221 (1976). Even "[a]mbiguity as to

whether a defendant has been improperly sentenced as punishment

for other offenses creates a sufficient concern about the

appearance of justice that resentencing is required."

Commonwealth v. Henriquez, 440 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2003).

As noted above, the defendant was acquitted of murder in

the first degree and in the second degree. He was convicted of

voluntary manslaughter. This conviction means that the jury

found that the killing by the defendant amounted either to the

use of excessive force in self-defense or that it was committed

in the heat of passion or sudden combat. See Commonwealth v.

Medeiros, 395 Mass. 336, 341 (1985). The judge however said at

sentencing, "nor will I read into the jury's verdict on

voluntary manslaughter to somehow divine that they believed that

7
there was a degree of innocence or self-defense [on] the part of

Mr. Eberhart."

1. Discussion. To begin with, the jury were properly

instructed that they could find self-defense, and that if

excessive force had been used in self-defense, they should

convict the defendant only of voluntary manslaughter. If that

is not what they did, then the jury necessarily found either

heat of passion or sudden combat, on which they were also

properly instructed. Each of these -- self-defense, heat of

passion, or sudden combat -- is thought to reduce culpability,

which is why one who acts in such circumstances is guilty not of

murder, but only of voluntary manslaughter.

One who kills a person in such circumstances therefore

might be described as having been found to have a degree of

innocence. At the very least, the statement by the judge

presents some ambiguity as to whether the judge's sentencing

decision included factors, particularly the absence of self-

defense or heat of passion or sudden combat, of which the jury

had declined to convict the defendant. The sentence, of course,

was in the statutory range, and therefore might have been an

appropriate sentence, taking consideration only of properly

considered factors. But we express no opinion on the

8
defendant's appropriate sentence. The case must be remanded for

resentencing consistent with this decision.2

C. Closing argument.

Finally, the defendant raises claims of error with respect

to the prosecutor's closing argument. First, apparently

responding to a defense argument that the situation in which the

defendant found himself amounted to a three on one altercation,

with the defendant being the one, the prosecutor said "it's not

three on one, if you will. It's three on about ten, if you want

to look at the numbers." This is the only aspect of the closing

to which the defendant objected. Even assuming this was error,

something we do not decide, it was not prejudicial where the

prosecutor's next sentence was, "But that's neither here nor

there," and the jurors were able to see for themselves on the

video footage what took place.

The second, unpreserved claim of error raised here by the

defendant is the prosecutor, when talking about the duty to

retreat, said the defendant "had numerous friends around him

that helped him up, picked him up and supported him." Although

2 Because the sentencing judge has now retired, it will
necessarily be assigned to a different judge. In light of our
conclusion about the need for resentencing, we need not
determine whether the vacatur of the firearms convictions
standing alone, in the absence of a decision by the Commonwealth
to retry those charges, would have required resentencing.

9
it is not crystal clear to us how the presence of friends not

involved in the altercation would have made it easier to

retreat, given that the language is not used as part of the

argument about excessive force in self-defense, we conclude

that, even if the use of that statement were in error, it did

not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

Finally, the defendant argues, again for the first time on

appeal, that the prosecutor improperly argued that the defendant

"fired six rounds at the Blantons" -- Andre, Justin and Debbie

Blanton, the victims -- "in two seconds" and that this "was not

something where someone fires back and you make a decision, oh,

now I'll fire back to defend myself." The prosecutor later

stated instead that, "At least two rounds -- at least two muzzle

shots go off in the direction of the Blantons before Justin

Blanton" -- the decedent -- "fires back."

The defendant argues that this is a misstatement of

evidence because "the evidence presented by the Commonwealth's

own witness was that two shots were fired toward the ground in

the vicinity of the Blantons before Justin Blanton fires back."

10
Even if this variance in the closing from the testimony to

which the defendant points were an error, it did not create a

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.3

Conclusion. On the indictments charging unlawful

possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a loaded

firearm, the judgments are vacated. On the remaining charge of

voluntary manslaughter, the verdict is affirmed, the sentence is

vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing consistent

with this memorandum and order, or, should the Commonwealth

choose so to proceed, for a new trial on the firearms charges to

be followed by resentencing.

So ordered.

By the Court (Rubin,
D'Angelo & Toone, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: March 26, 2026.

3 Although not argued by the defendant, we also note that
if, indeed, as the defendant suggests, this second statement
reflected the prosecutor realizing that he had made an error in
his first statement, his obligation was not merely to contradict
himself, but to alert the jury he had misspoken.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

11