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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Aguirre CA2/6

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B344458

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (10.7K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/17/26 P. v. Aguirre CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. Nos. B344458,
B344480
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 2010007713,
2009003793)
v. (Ventura County)

ANGEL GARCIA AGUIRRE,

Defendant and Appellant.

Angel Garcia Aguirre appeals the trial court’s decision
declining an invitation to strike his five-year enhancement for a
prior serious felony conviction. We remand for the limited
purpose of ordering a recalculation of Aguirre’s actual custody
credits through the date of resentencing but otherwise affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
Because Aguirre’s second appeal pertains only to
sentencing issues, we describe the facts of the underlying cases
briefly.
2009003793 (Robbery Case)
In January 2009, Aguirre and his cohort approached the
victim as he was arriving to open his business. They pointed a
semi-automatic firearm at the victim’s head and demanded
money. After searching the victim, they took his car keys, wallet,
credit cards, $400 in cash, jacket and back support belt the victim
was wearing. They walked the victim to his car and searched for
more money. Before they left, they told the victim not to follow
them or they would shoot him. Law enforcement later recovered
a handgun, the victim’s back brace, and photographs on Aguirre’s
cell phone holding a firearm to another person’s head. Aguirre
had been watching the victim’s business for a month prior to the
robbery.
2010007713 (Drug Sales Case)
In November 2009, a confidential informant purchased an
ounce of methamphetamine from Aguirre.
Resentencing Hearing
In a previous appeal (People v. Aguirre (Jan. 22, 2024,
B324973, B325025) [nonpub. opn.]), we remanded to allow the
trial court to consider the new provisions of Penal Code2 section

1 We grant the People’s request to take judicial notice filed

November 4, 2025, of the prior clerk’s transcript and augmented
clerk’s transcript in case numbers B324973/B325025.

2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise stated.

2
1172.1 and to make the required finding regarding whether he
posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety based on
the risk he will commit a “super strike.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)(7),
(b)(2).)
The resentencing hearings were held in November 2024
and January 2025. The trial court recalled Aguirre’s sentence,
finding he did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety. After considering Aguirre’s invitation to strike his prior
serious felony enhancement, the court declined to do so and
reimposed the original sentence of three years midterm for
robbery (§ 211), 10 years for the firearm enhancement
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and five years for the prior serious felony
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) for a total aggregate term of 18
years.
DISCUSSION
Aguirre contends the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to strike his prior serious felony enhancement because
it did not give his post-conviction and mitigating factors their
“proper weight.” We disagree.
Standard of Review
A trial court’s refusal to dismiss a prior serious felony
enhancement is reviewed on appeal under the deferential abuse
of discretion standard. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
373, People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298, People v.
Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985.)
Section 1172.1
When recalling and resentencing pursuant to section
1172.1, subdivision (a)(2), the court is required to apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and consider the
following post-conviction factors under section 1172.1,

3
subdivision (a)(5): “[T]he disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice. The court
shall consider if the defendant has experienced psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma . . . at the time of the commission
of the offense, and whether those circumstances were a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense.”
Section 1385
Under section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), a trial court “shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any
initiative statute.” (Italics added.) Section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2), provides that, in exercising its discretion under subdivision
(c), “the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating
circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of
the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
The Supreme Court in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1024, 1029, explained that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), does
not require dismissal of a sentence enhancement anytime there is
a mitigating circumstance absent a court finding that dismissal
would endanger public safety. “[A]bsent a finding that dismissal
would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to
impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns

4
significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances
when they are present. [Citation.] In other words, if the court
does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the
presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will
generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the
sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the
great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal
of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Id. at p.
1029; People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157
[“Section 1385, subdivision does not mean that, whenever a
listed mitigating circumstance is present, the trial court must
dismiss all enhancements unless it finds dismissal would
endanger public safety”].)
No Abuse of Discretion
In declining Aguirre’s invitation to strike the enhancement
under sections 1172.1 and 1385, the trial court explained the
factors it had considered: “For purposes of resentencing, the
Court shall consider any post-conviction factors -- specifically,
any disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation, any
diminished physical condition that reduces defendant’s risk of
future violence, and evidence that circumstances have changed
since the original sentence -- so that a continued incarceration is
not in the interest of justice.”
The trial court further explained it needed to “take
into consideration, not just the post-conviction factors, such
as the 17 certificates while in [the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)], the 37 certificates
with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the fact that [Aguirre]

5
has been in a level-one facility and has not had any
significant criminal conduct while being incarcerated.”
The trial court also considered Aguirre’s willingness to
comply with terms of parole, that he was remorseful, he availed
himself of programming opportunities while incarcerated, he
acknowledged wrongdoing at an early stage in the proceedings,
and that he “may have experienced some psychological or
childhood trauma.” The court acknowledged that, “no one was
hurt physically during the cases at hand. There was a small
financial loss.”
Finally, the trial court also acknowledged that Aguirre’s
prior serious felony conviction was over five years old but noted
that he had several reprimands and writeups at the Ventura
County jail.
After careful consideration of the mitigating factors, the
trial court noted the following aggravating factors:
“Defendant was armed with a firearm during the robbery,
and as such, the crime involved a threat of great bodily harm.
The defendant was an active participant in the taking of the
victim’s property. That’s demonstrated by him pointing the gun
at the victim’s head while the cohort actually took the items.
“The manner in which the crime was carried out shows a
criminal sophistication – the fact that Mr. Aguirre was at the
business; there are facts that the defendant was under the
impression that on a particular day there would be a significant
amount of cash the victim either had or was in the business; . . .
and the fact that he monitored the business for a period of one
month prior to the commission of this offense.
“Prior criminal record indicates a pattern of regular and
increasingly serious conduct by the defendant. . . . [T]he

6
defendant was engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious
danger to society for the underlying matter.
“Defendant’s convictions prior: Convictions as an adult or
sustained petitions in [juvenile] delinquency proceedings are
diverse and increasing in seriousness. . . . It shows a pattern of
recidivist conduct as a robber with firearms. It seems that in
each of the matters, where there was a robbery, there was also a
firearm.”
The trial court concluded that “the aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors in this particular case, such
that to impose the lower term would be contrary to the interest of
justice, and that is considering all the aggravating and mitigating
factors both at the time of the offense and post-conviction
factors.”
Ultimately, the trial court reasoned that striking the
enhancement would not be in the interest of justice. Aguirre’s
contention that the court did not give “proper weight” to his
mitigating and post-conviction factors is not supported by the
record. The court assessed the mitigating factors and
acknowledged the weight of those factors but determined that
aggravating factors were collectively more significant. In so
doing, the court acted within its discretion. When a trial court
declines to strike a five-year sentencing enhancement for a
serious prior felony conviction, “[n]o error occurs if the trial court
evaluates all relevant circumstances to ensure that punishment
fits the offense and the offender.” (People v. Shaw (2020) 56
Cal.App.5th 582, 587.)
“ ‘[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to
strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited
circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where

7
the trial court was not “aware of its discretion” to dismiss . . . or
where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to
dismiss,’ or where ‘ “the sentencing norms [established by the
Three Strikes law may, as a matter of law,] produce[] an
‘arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd’ result” under the
specific facts of a particular case . . . . [¶] But “[i]t is not enough
to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to
strike one or more” prior conviction allegations.’ [Citations]. ‘[A]
trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608,
637.)
The trial court’s denial is not “so irrational or arbitrary
that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) “ ‘ “ ‘A merely debatable
ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 605.) “Where the record
demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and
reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the
law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling . . . .” (People v. Myers
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.)
On this record, Aguirre has failed to show that an abuse of
discretion occurred. The trial court was aware of the factors it
was required to consider under sections 1172.1, subdivision (b)
and 1385, subdivision (c), and it gave each factor due
consideration concluding it was not in the interest of justice to
strike the five-year enhancement. Aguirre’s prior criminal
record, specifically his multiple robbery convictions, including a
bank robbery that occurred after the robbery in the instant cases,

8
all while armed with a firearm, support the trial court’s decision
to deny striking the enhancement.
Recalculation of Actual Custody Credits
The trial court awarded Aguirre 185 days of “actual
[custody] credit” which reflected his credits from the date of his
incarceration to the date of his original sentencing hearing on
July 16, 2016, and ordered the CDCR to calculate credits for the
time he has been incarcerated at CDCR.
A trial court must calculate a defendant’s custody credits
when resentencing. (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20,
37 [when a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it
must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody, whether
in jail or prison, up to that time].) We thus remand for the trial
court to calculate Aguirre’s actual custody credits.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to recalculate
Aguirre’s actual custody credits as of the date of the resentencing
hearing and to amend the abstract of judgment accordingly. The
trial court shall forward a copy of the amended abstract to the
CDCR. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

DEROIAN, J.*
We concur:

YEGAN, J, Acting P. J. CODY, J.

• Judge of the Santa Barbara Superior Court assigned by

the Chief Justice pursuant to article 6, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

9
Ethel R. Hernandez, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

---

Sarah Swysen Sanger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Sophia A. Lecky,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.