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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Kohl, L.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 871 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Dubow

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.9K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Dubow

J-S03013-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LOUIS ALLEN KOHL :
:
Appellant : No. 871 MDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 2, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-36-CR-0000644-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: MARCH 18, 2026

Appellant, Louis Allen Kohl, appeals pro se from the June 2, 2025 order

entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-

46, as untimely. After careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On June 7,

2021, Appellant pleaded guilty to numerous sexual offenses against a minor

victim. That same day, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of

10 to 20 years of incarceration and ordered a Sexually Violent Predator

(“SVP”) assessment. On March 23, 2022, the trial court entered an order

classifying Appellant as an SVP. Appellant did not file any post-sentence

motions or a direct appeal from his judgment of sentence.

On May 18, 2022, Appellant filed a timely first PCRA petition, which the

PCRA court dismissed as meritless. Appellant appealed to this Court, and we
J-S03013-26

dismissed the appeal owing to Appellant’s failure to file a docketing statement

as required by Pa.R.A.P. 3517. See Commonwealth v. Kohl, No. 1647 MDA

2023 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 5, 2024).

On January 21, 2025, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA petition,

his second, in which he raised numerous claims, including that his plea/SVP

hearing counsel had been ineffective for failing to notify him that he had a

right to appeal from the court’s order designating him an SVP, to request the

appointment of an expert to provide evidence that Appellant is not an SVP,

and to request transcription of the notes of testimony from the hearing.

Appellant conceded that the petition was untimely and invoked the

governmental interference exception to the PCRA’s one-year jurisdictional

time bar. In particular, Appellant asserted that the trial court failed to inform

him of his right to appeal from the SVP designation, resulting in governmental

interference, and, in support, claimed that “the SVP hearing notes of

testimony were not transcribed until June 12, 2024[,] and [Appellant] was not

informed of his right to appeal at the March 23, 2022[] SVP hearing.” Petition

at 3.

On March 4, 2025, the PCRA court notified Appellant of its intent to

dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907

because the petition was untimely and Appellant had not satisfied any of the

exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. On March 27, 2025, Appellant filed an

amended PCRA petition. With respect to his contention that governmental

interference excused his untimely filing, he reasserted the allegations set forth

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J-S03013-26

in the petition and added that “the trial court asked [him] after sentencing []

if he read and understood all the rights he has to appeal after today [sic]” and

that in March 2024, a fellow inmate informed him that the “trial court erred

when it told [him] that [he] could appeal from the order sentencing [him] to

10 to 20 years in prison[]” and that Appellant “should make a request to the

court reporter to transcribe the notes from the 3/23/22[] SVP hearing.”

Amended Petition, 3/27/25, at 3.

On June 2, 2025, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s amended

petition as untimely.

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

Whether the [PCRA] court erred when it held that the interference
by governmental officials exception to the one year time limit has
been alleged or proved by [Appellant], since [Appellant] failed to
explain why, without the exercise of due diligence, [Appellant] did
not ascertain the governmental interference earlier, which is a
requirement that does not appear in the exception statute, the
interference being that the trial court failed to inform [Appellant]
that he had the right to appeal from the 3/23/22[] order
determining [Appellant] to be an SVP, even though Pa.R.Crim.P.
704 required [Appellant] be advised of his right to appeal, and
[Appellant] had the statutory right to appeal, at that time,
resulting in a breakdown in the judicial system.

Appellant’s Br. at 2.1

---

1 The Commonwealth did not file a brief as appellee.

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J-S03013-26

Appellant challenges the trial court’s determination that he failed to

plead and prove the applicability of the governmental interference exception

to the PCRA’s time-bar.

We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the record

supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is otherwise free of

legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014). This

Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if they are

supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.

Super. 2007). “We give no such deference, however, to the court’s legal

conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super.

2017).

As a preliminary matter, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a

jurisdictional requisite. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 983 (Pa.

2008). Pennsylvania law is clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an

untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161

(Pa. 2003). In order to obtain relief under the PCRA, a petition must be filed

within one year from the date the judgment of sentence became final. 42

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant concedes that his petition, filed nearly three

years after his judgment of sentence became final, is facially untimely.

Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition, however,

if the petitioner pleads and proves one of the three exceptions to the time-bar

set forth in Section 9545(b)(1). Any petition invoking a timeliness exception

must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.

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J-S03013-26

Id. § 9545(b)(2). Appellant argues that his claims satisfy the governmental

interference exception provided in Section 9545(b)(1)(i). Appellant’s Br. at

8-10.

The governmental interference exception invoked by Appellant requires

the petitioner to prove that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the

result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the

Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i); see

also Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(explaining that to establish the government interference exception under

Section 9545(b)(1)(i), “a petitioner must plead and prove (1) the failure to

previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government

officials, and (2) the petitioner could not have obtained the information earlier

with the exercise of due diligence.”).

Due diligence requires a petitioner to make reasonable efforts to

uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief. Commonwealth

v. Brensinger, 218 A.3d 440, 448-49 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc). A

petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new facts earlier

by exercising due diligence. Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98

(Pa. 2001).

Here, the PCRA court found that

[a]ssuming arguendo, that the failure to advise [Appellant] of his
appellate rights constitutes governmental interference,
[Appellant] altogether fails to explain why, ‘with the exercise of

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J-S03013-26

due diligence, he did not ascertain this alleged interference of
governmental officials earlier and seek redress in his prior PCRA
petition.’

PCRA Ct. Op., 10/14/25, at 7.

We will not, as the PCRA court did, assume arguendo that Appellant’s

claim that the trial court’s failure to advise him of his appellate rights after it

designated him an SVP constituted governmental interference that would

excuse the untimely filing of the instant PCRA petition. Rather, we note that

this Court has, in fact, reached the opposite conclusion—that the failure of the

trial court to apprise a defendant of his post-sentence rights is not an error

that “would transcend the jurisdictional parameters of the PCRA[.]”

Commonwealth v. Grafton, 928 A.2d 1112, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(emphasis added). This means here that, even if the trial court failed to inform

Appellant of his right to appeal from his designation as an SVP, this failure

does not constitute governmental interference for purposes of pleading and

proving an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. We, thus, conclude that

Appellant has not satisfied the governmental interference exception to the

PCRA’s time-bar, and the PCRA court did not err in dismissing his petition as

untimely.2

---

2 See Commonwealth v. Miller, 787 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(reiterating the general rule that “if a trial court’s decision is correct, we may
affirm on any ground.”).

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J-S03013-26

Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/18/2026

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