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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Jordan, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 778 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Murray

• Opinion

• Authorities (26)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (69.1K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Murray

J-S02030-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOSHUA JORDAN :
:
Appellant : No. 778 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 28, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0012114-2013

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 20, 2026

Joshua Jordan (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order dismissing his

second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). See

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant asserts the PCRA court improperly

denied collateral relief on his claims of (1) a violation of his rights under Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),1 based upon the Commonwealth’s

suppression of exculpatory evidence of police misconduct, committed in

unrelated criminal cases, by officers involved in the investigation regarding

Appellant’s case; and (2) Appellant’s actual innocence of the crimes of which

he was convicted. After careful review, we affirm.

---

1 “Under Brady, the prosecution’s failure to divulge exculpatory evidence is a

violation of a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.”
Commonwealth v. Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 75 (Pa. 2009); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
J-S02030-26

A prior panel of this Court summarized the evidence adduced at

Appellant’s jury trial as follows:

[T]he Commonwealth presented the testimony of Philadelphia
Police Detectives Omar[r] Jenkins [(Detective Jenkins)] and John
Komorowski [(Detective Komorowski)], Philadelphia Police
Officers Michael Kilroy, Christian Cruz, Craig Perry, Jesus Cruz,
Robert Bakos, and Brian Waltman [(Officer Waltman)],
Philadelphia Deputy Medical Examiner Dr. Albert Chu, Unique
Riggins [(Riggins or Mr. Riggins)], Kenneth White, Shawn Adams
[(Adams or Mr. Adams)], and Isaac Guy [(Guy or Mr. Guy)].
Appellant testified on his own behalf and presented the testimony
of Andrea Jordan and Elbert Jordan. Viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the
evidence established the following.

On July 14, 201[3], at approximately 9:58 p.m., Craig
Jackson [(Jackson)], the decedent, was playing a game of
basketball at the courts at B and Olney Streets in Philadelphia.
Jackson’s team was playing against Appellant’s team. As the
game progressed, Jackson and Appellant fouled each other,
inciting an argument that escalated, with a physical fight
seemingly imminent. Appellant left the court, went to his book
bag, and withdrew a semiautomatic firearm, pointing it at
Jackson. Jackson told Appellant, “If you’re going to shoot, go
ahead and shoot.” Appellant responded by shooting at Jackson
multiple times, striking Jackson once in the left chest, and once in
the left buttock.

Appellant then fled the scene, placing the gun back into the
book bag. Jackson was transported to Einstein Hospital by
emergency medical personnel, where he was pronounced dead ….
Witnesses [] Riggins and [] Guy saw Appellant later that night.
Appellant had changed his clothes and told Riggins and Guy, “I’m
not playing with this nigger. If he lives, I’m going to shoot him
again.”

In police interviews shortly after the shooting, witnesses
Riggins and [] Adams both identified Appellant as the shooter from
a photo array. Police attempted to arrest Appellant at [his] home
on July 20, 2013, but he was not present at the time. Police
encountered Appellant on the street on July 21, 2013[,] and asked
him to identify himself. Appellant gave a false name, and multiple

-2-
J-S02030-26

birthdates. After being shown a photograph the police had
retrieved of the person whose name Appellant was using,
Appellant gave his real name and birthdate. Upon his arrest,
Appellant stated that “he wasn’t on the basketball courts that
night.”

While in prison awaiting trial, Appellant made a series of
phone calls. In one conversation, Appellant told his mother that
he “really should’ve ran.” In several other conversations,
[Appellant] repeatedly asked whether there were video cameras
covering the playground, making sure that his brother[,] Isaiah[,]
had “checked every aspect of that park.” In another conversation,
Appellant and Isaiah urgently discussed the problem that
someone named “Pete” had the gun and wanted to “swap it out”
instead of destroying it. Isaiah assured Appellant that he would
“break that jawn down … and throw it, throw it, throw it,” to which
Appellant replied, “You got it?” In another conversation, after
hearing that the defense investigator confirmed that there were
no cameras covering the crime scene, Appellant told Isaiah, “I was
at the crib th[]ough wink wink. Know what I’m saying I was at
the crib.” Isaiah and Appellant also discussed the problem of “the
motherfuckers [] saying [that Appellant] did it.” Isaiah assured
Appellant that they would find out who those people were before
court.

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 273 A.3d 1052, 429 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(unpublished memorandum at 1-4) (brackets omitted) (quoting PCRA Court

Opinion, 4/22/21, at 5-6).

Appellant’s jury trial occurred on July 11-15, 2016. The jury found

Appellant guilty of one count each of first-degree murder, possession of a

firearm without a license, possession of a firearm on the streets of

Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime. 2 The trial court

sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment based on his murder conviction, plus

---

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 6106(a)(1), 6108, 907(a).

-3-
J-S02030-26

an aggregate consecutive term of 6½ to 13 years’ imprisonment on the

remaining convictions.3 Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions, which

the trial court denied.

Appellant timely filed a direct appeal. On December 29, 2017, this Court

affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 181 A.3d

1280, 3272 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum). The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of

appeal on July 31, 2018. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 190 A.3d 592 (Pa.

2018).

On November 26, 2018, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition,

his first. The PCRA court appointed Appellant PCRA counsel. On March 20,

2020, in lieu of filing an amended PCRA petition, PCRA counsel filed a motion

to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d

927 (Pa. 1988) (setting forth the requirements for withdrawal from

representation during collateral review), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550

A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc) (same). On January 15, 2021, following

appropriate notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court dismissed

---

3 The trial court additionally sentenced Appellant to serve three to six months

of consecutive imprisonment, for contempt of court, based upon his verbal
outburst at sentencing. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/20/25, at 1 (noting that
the trial court found Appellant in contempt after he “yelled, ‘Fuck you all
family,’ to the family of [Jackson] after the sentencing.” (quoting N.T.,
7/15/16, at 19)).

-4-
J-S02030-26

Appellant’s petition and granted PCRA counsel permission to withdraw her

appearance.

Appellant timely filed a pro se appeal from the dismissal of his first PCRA

petition. On appeal, Appellant asserted multiple issues, including claims of

(1) a Brady violation based upon the Commonwealth’s suppression of police

internal investigation reports/misconduct complaints regarding Detective

Jenkins, and evidence of the detective’s misconduct committed in an unrelated

homicide investigation; and (2) ineffective assistance rendered by Appellant’s

trial counsel and PCRA counsel for failing to previously raise this Brady

violation as a basis for relief. See Jordan, 273 A.3d 1052 (unpublished

memorandum at 7).

This Court affirmed the dismissal order. See generally id. Regarding

Appellant’s claim related to Detective Jenkins’s misconduct, we held “the PCRA

court correctly concluded that” this claim “lack[s] arguable merit, and, in the

alternative, fail[s] to satisfy the prejudice prong of the test for

ineffectiveness.”4 Id. (unpublished memorandum at 17); see also id.

---

4 In order to establish a claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner must plead

and prove three prongs:

(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) he
suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice
measured by whether there is a reasonable probability the result
of the proceeding would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015).

-5-
J-S02030-26

(unpublished memorandum at 15-17) (accompanying analysis in affirming

PCRA court’s determination that Appellant failed to establish a Brady violation

related to evidence of Detective Jenkins’s misconduct).

On May 29, 2024, Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his

second. Appellant asserted he had recently discovered new, exculpatory

evidence of misconduct committed by police personnel involved in the instant

criminal investigation, including (1) Philadelphia Police Department Detective

Ronald Aitken (Detective Aitken), the lead detective in Appellant’s case who

also recorded the police statement of Riggins; (2) Detective Komorowski, who

recorded Guy’s police statement; and (3) Officer Waltman, who had served

trial subpoenas upon Guy and Riggins. See PCRA Petition, 5/29/24, ¶¶ 34-

1. Specifically, Appellant claimed that on June 5, 2023, the Philadelphia

County District Attorney’s Office provided him with Philadelphia Police

Department Police Misconduct Disclosures (PMDs), which detailed instances of

police misconduct by the three above-mentioned officers, committed in

criminal cases unrelated to Appellant’s. Id. ¶ 19; see also id. Appendix.

Appellant claimed he established a Brady violation related to the

Commonwealth’s non-disclosure of the evidence of these officers’ misconduct.

See id. ¶¶ 23-75.

According to Appellant, the

misconduct committed by these officers has been part of the
pattern and practice of abuse from the Philadelphia Homicide
Department going back at least two decades. The Commonwealth
failed to disclose any information that would have put

-6-
J-S02030-26

[Appellant’s] defense team on notice that there had been multiple
instances in which these [officers] had participated in unlawful
interrogations and the creation of false identifications.

Id. ¶ 42. Appellant further asserted that “[t]his newly discovered evidence

could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of [Appellant’s] trial by

the exercise of reasonable diligence,” id. ¶ 44, and that, “[h]ad the jury heard

the new evidence[,] it would likely have compelled a different verdict.” Id. ¶

63.

Appellant raised an additional claim in his petition, asserting that his

“actual innocence” of the crimes charged entitled him to collateral relief. 5 See

id. ¶¶ 76-89. Appellant averred such a claim “may be a cognizable and free-

standing basis for relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.” Id. ¶ 77 (citation omitted).

On October 11, 2024, Appellant filed a pro se Motion for Leave to Amend

and Supplement his PCRA petition (supplemental PCRA petition). Appellant

raised a claim of after-discovered evidence of police misconduct committed by

Detective Jenkins in unrelated cases, as well as a Brady challenge. According

to Appellant, “on August 27, 2024,” the Commonwealth provided him with a

---

5 We observe that although Appellant, on direct appeal, raised challenges to

the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions, this
Court found he waived these challenges based upon his failure to preserve
them in the trial court. See Jordan, 181 A.3d 1280 (unpublished
memorandum at 2-4) (finding Appellant’s claims waived where he failed to
specify, in his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal, which of his convictions were not supported by
sufficient evidence or were against the weight of the evidence).

-7-
J-S02030-26

PMD that contained information related to Detective Jenkins’s misconduct in

other cases. Supplemental PCRA Petition, 10/11/24, at 1. Appellant pointed

out that

Detective Jenkins obtained statements from both [Mr.] Riggins
and [Mr.] Adams, the two primary witnesses against [Appellant]
at trial. Both [Mr. Riggins and Mr. Adams] purportedly identified
[Appellant] as the shooter in their police statements and then
recanted those portions of their statements at trial.

Id. at 3 (citations omitted). The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss on

November 21, 2024.

On January 9, 2025, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent

to dismiss the petition without a hearing. On January 27, 2025, Appellant

filed a pro se Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to 907 Notice. On

February 28, 2025, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s motion for extension of

time, noting that the motion “does not request additional time to respond to

the [] 907 Notice, but rather sets forth substantive arguments in opposition

to dismissal of [Appellant’s] PCRA petition.” Order, 2/28/25; see also id.

(stating that the PCRA court “will consider” the arguments Appellant raised in

his motion for extension “in rendering [the court’s] final decision.”).

By order entered on February 28, 2025, the PCRA court dismissed

Appellant’s second PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant timely filed a

pro se notice of appeal. Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents two issues for our review:

-8-
J-S02030-26

1. Did the PCRA court err where it concluded that that the
   suppressed evidence of misconduct by Detective [] Aitken,
   Detective [] Komoroski, Detective [] Jenkins, and [Officer
   Waltman] was not material under Brady v. Maryland, 373
   U.S. 83 (1963)?

2. Did the PCRA court err in finding Appellant’s claim of actual
   innocence untimely, where it was based in part on the newly
   obtained suppressed evidence of misconduct by Detective []
   Aitken, Detective [] Komorowski, Detective [] Jenkins, and []
   Officer [] Waltman, who participated in obtaining the unreliable
   evidence used to convict Appellant at trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (some capitalization modified).

We review the dismissal of a PCRA petition to determine “whether the

PCRA court’s factual findings are supported by the record and free of legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 323 A.3d 611, 620 (Pa. 2024). Our

scope of review “is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence

of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the

PCRA court level.” Commonwealth v. Conforti, 303 A.3d 715, 725 (Pa.

2023) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed

unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”

Commonwealth v. Gibson, 318 A.3d 927, 933 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation

omitted).

A PCRA petitioner bears “the burden of persuading th[e appellate c]ourt

that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief.”

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa. 2019). Further,

“[w]here a PCRA petition does not raise a ‘genuine issue of material fact,’ the

reviewing court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition.”

-9-
J-S02030-26

Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (Pa. 2013) (citation and

brackets omitted).

Under the PCRA, all petitions must be filed within one year of the date

the judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). For purposes of the

PCRA, “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review … or at

the expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s

timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not

address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely

filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

Here, because Appellant did not petition the United States Supreme

Court for further review following our Supreme Court’s July 31, 2018, order

denying allowance of appeal, his judgment of sentence became final on

October 29, 2018. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also U.S. SUP. CT. R.

13 (providing a petition for writ of certiorari must be filed within 90 days after

the entry of the order denying discretionary review). Accordingly, Appellant’s

second PCRA petition is facially untimely.

Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA

petition if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of the three

exceptions to the PCRA’s time limitation set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1)(i-iii). These exceptions provide that a PCRA petition may be filed

when the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the

• 10 - J-S02030-26

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

Id. Furthermore, any petition attempting to invoke one of the timeliness

exceptions “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have

been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2).

Here, in his PCRA petition, Appellant invokes the timeliness exceptions

for newly-discovered facts and governmental interference, set forth in 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii), respectively. See PCRA Petition, 5/29/24,

at 1-2. Additionally, Appellant pled that he filed his petition within one year

of the date that he discovered the new evidence upon which he predicates his

claim of entitlement to collateral relief. Id. at 2.

To establish the newly-discovered fact exception, the petitioner bears

the burden of pleading and proving “(1) the facts upon which the claim was

predicated were unknown[;] and (2) they could not have been ascertained by

the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227

(Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). The focus of the newly-discovered fact

exception “is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or

• 11 - J-S02030-26

newly willing source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Lopez,

249 A.3d 993, 1000 (Pa. 2021) (citation, emphasis, and footnote omitted).

“Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental

interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove that the failure to

previously raise these claims was the result of interference by government

officials, and that the information could not have been obtained earlier with

the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d

1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i).

“Once jurisdiction is established, a PCRA petitioner can present a

substantive after-discovered-evidence claim” under PCRA subsection

9543(a)(2)(vi). Commonwealth v. Reeves, 296 A.3d 1228, 1232 (Pa.

Super. 2023); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi).

[T]o prevail on an after-discovered evidence claim …, a petitioner
must prove that (1) the exculpatory evidence has been discovered
after trial and could not have been obtained at or prior to trial
through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative;
(3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it
would likely compel a different verdict.

Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017).

With respect to Appellant’s first issue, which asserts Brady violations

based upon new, exculpatory evidence of police misconduct, both the

Commonwealth and the PCRA court agree that this claim satisfies the

requirements of the newly-discovered fact exception. See Commonwealth

Brief at 12 n.2 (“Appellant’s Brady claim has arguably met the new fact

exception to the PCRA time-bar[,] as he filed his PCRA petition within one year

• 12 - J-S02030-26

of receiving the Philadelphia Police Department [PMDs].”); PCRA Court

Opinion, 5/20/25, at 7 (same). We agree, and therefore, proceed to address

the merits of Appellant’s issues.

Appellant contends the PCRA court improperly denied relief on his Brady

claim asserting the Commonwealth’s suppression of evidence of police

misconduct, committed in unrelated cases, by Detective Aitken, Detective

Komoroski, Detective Jenkins, and Officer Waltman. See Appellant’s Brief at

16-32. According to Appellant, information contained in the PMDs he attached

to his PCRA petition establishes the following:

 Officer Waltman, prior to Appellant’s jury trial, “was found
liable by a jury for a malicious prosecution against Khanefah
Boozer,” wherein Officer Waltman knowingly gave false
testimony in connection with Boozer’s criminal proceedings.
Id. at 18;

 “The disclosure concerning Detective Komorowski reveals
several incidents of misconduct leading to his separation from
the police department that took place after [Appellant’s]
conviction became final but that nonetheless cast doubt on his
credibility and the reliability of the witness he interviewed,
[Mr.] Guy.” Id. at 17;

 Regarding Detective Aitken, “[i]n 1995, the Internal Affairs
Division sustained allegations that Detective Aitk[e]n physically
abused a suspect he arrested and then acted unprofessionally
toward onlookers at the scene.” Id.;

 Finally, regarding Detective Jenkins, Appellant asserts, without
elaboration, that the detective (1) has “a lengthy rap sheet of
his own,” id. at 27, and (2) interviewed, in connection with the
instant murder investigation, Riggins and Adams, both of
whom “testified that their statements were altered.” Id. at 20.

• 13 - J-S02030-26

Appellant contends that the Commonwealth violated Brady, where “[d]espite

being aware of disclosable misconduct evidence relating to [the subject]

officers, the Commonwealth did not provide it to the defense” prior to or at

trial. Id. at 19.

According to Appellant, “the evidence of police misconduct would have

been favorable at trial in light of the witnesses’ testimony, some of whom

partially recanted their police statements” inculpating Appellant, including

Guy, Riggins, and Adams. Id. at 30; see also id. at 21-26 (detailing these

witnesses’ testimony). Appellant concedes that “Guy, Riggins, and Adams[]

did not specifically allege any police misconduct in connection with their

interviews” conducted in the instant case by the respective subject officers.

Id. at 29. However, Appellant points out that to obtain “relief on the Brady

claim, [he] needs only to establish a ‘reasonable probability of a different

result,’ had the evidence of prior misconduct been available,” a standard that,

Appellant maintains, he met. Id. (citation omitted).

Preliminarily, we recognize that a “Brady claim is cognizable on

collateral appeal under the PCRA.” Simpson, 66 A.3d at 264 n.16 (citing,

inter alia, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi)). A Brady claim “presents a question

of law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1084 (Pa. 2020). To

establish a Brady violation, a petitioner “must show that: (1) the prosecution

concealed evidence; (2) which was either exculpatory evidence or

• 14 - J-S02030-26

impeachment evidence favorable to him; and (3) he was prejudiced by the

concealment.” Simpson, 66 A.3d at 264. “The defendant bears the burden

of demonstrating that the Commonwealth withheld or suppressed evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 887 (Pa. 2011). To establish

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, had

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Simpson, 66 A.3d at 264 (citation omitted). Cf.

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 308 (Pa. 2011) (“Conversely, the

mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped

the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial does not establish

materiality in the constitutional sense.” (citation and brackets omitted)).

In evaluating whether a reasonable probability of a different
outcome has been demonstrated, the question is not whether the
defendant would more likely than not have received a different
verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received
a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 335 A.3d 685, 717 (Pa. 2025) (citation

omitted). In the PCRA context, a petitioner must demonstrate that the alleged

Brady violation “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Ly, 980 A.2d at

76 (citation omitted).

Further, our Supreme Court has stated that “Brady does not require the

disclosure of information that is not exculpatory but might merely form the

groundwork for possible arguments or defenses.” Commonwealth v.

• 15 - J-S02030-26

Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 450 (Pa. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted);

see also Ly, 980 A.2d at 75 (stating that the “prosecutor is not required to

deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence

favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of

a fair trial.” (citation omitted)).

Instantly, insofar as Appellant raises a Brady claim premised on

evidence of police misconduct committed by Detective Jenkins, this claim is

not cognizable, as it is previously litigated. To be eligible for relief under the

PCRA, the petitioner must show that “the allegation of error has not been

previously litigated or waived.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). “An issue is

previously litigated if ‘the highest appellate court in which [an appellant] could

have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.’”

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (quoting 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2)). Our Supreme Court has stated that “a PCRA

petitioner cannot obtain review of claims that were previously

litigated by presenting new theories of relief … to relitigate previously

litigated claims.” Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 39 (Pa. 2002)

(emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 A.2d 232, 240 (Pa.

2001) (same).

Here, in connection with Appellant’s appeal from the dismissal of his first

PCRA petition, this Court considered and rejected his Brady claim related to

evidence of Detective Jenkins’s misconduct. See Jordan, 273 A.3d 1052

• 16 - J-S02030-26

(unpublished memorandum at 15-17). Appellant is precluded from obtaining

review of this previously litigated claim by relying upon new theories of relief,

including more recent PMDs and other allegations of Detective Jenkins’s

misconduct. Bond, 819 A.2d at 39. Accordingly, Appellant’s present claim

implicating Detective Jenkins is not cognizable as being previously litigated.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court determined that Appellant

failed to establish a Brady violation with regard to his claims implicating

Detective Aitken, Detective Komoroski, and Officer Waltman (collectively, “the

subject officers”):

[Appellant’s] Brady claim fails because the record establishes that
he was not prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose
the misconduct history of the [subject officers]. In [Appellant’s]
case, Detective Aitken took a statement from Commonwealth
witness [] Riggins, and Detective Komorowski took a statement
from Commonwealth witness [] Guy. N.T., 7/11/16, at 256; N.T.,
7/13/16, at 45, 174. … Officer Waltman served a subpoena on
Mr. Riggins. Id. at 188-91. None of these Commonwealth
witnesses alleged misconduct against any of the [subject
officers] at any time. See N.T., 7/11/16, at 252-56; N.T.,
7/12/16, at 121-40; N.T., 7/13/16, at 148-54.

Additionally, the record establishes that any
subsequent recantations of these witnesses resulted from
fear of retaliation for cooperating with the government, not
because their initial statements to police were coerced.
Specifically, when asked about the day of the shooting, Mr.
Riggins testified at his trial deposition, “I am not going to make it
through the summertime, man I’m going to be dead before
September,” indicating his fear of retaliation for testifying against
[Appellant]. N.T., 4/1/16, at 76-78; N.T., 7/12/16, at 32.
Moreover, Mr. Riggins testified at trial that he did not want to
testify because, where he comes from, it could get him killed. See
N.T., 7/12/16, at 22-23. Mr. Adams also testified at his trial

• 17 - J-S02030-26

deposition about the risk he faced for testifying, saying that he
heard around his neighborhood that there was a “price” on his
head. N.T., 4/1/16, at 47, 64-65; N.T., 7/12/16, at 152-54.
Additionally, Mr. Guy testified at trial that, initially, he did not tell
police that he saw [Appellant] running from the scene of the
shooting because he was scared, and “snitches get stitches, so
you don’t want to rat on that person.” N.T., 7/13/16, at 144-45.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth presented compelling
evidence that established [Appellant’s] guilt. Mr. Riggins, Mr.
Adams, and Mr. Guy all identified [Appellant] as the shooter in
photo arrays following the murder. N.T., 4/1/16, at 29-30, 93;
N.T., 7/11/16, at 268-69; N.T., 7/12/16, at 143-46; N.T.,
7/13/16, at 46, 55-56, 176-77. Mr. Riggins also testified that he
was playing basketball with [Appellant] and [] Jackson, saw
[Appellant] and [] Jackson foul each other, and saw [Appellant]
retrieve a gun from his bag and shoot [] Jackson. N.T., 4/1/16,
at 73-74, 79-82; N.T., 7/11/16, at 236-47; N.T., 7/12/16, at 43-
44. The Commonwealth presented evidence that, later on the
night of the shooting, [Appellant] told Mr. Riggins, “I’m not playing
with this nigger. If he lives, I’m going to shoot him again.” N.T.,
4/1/16, at 89; N.T., 7/11/16, at 260-61; N.T., 7/12/16, at 17;
N.T., 7/13/16, at 44. This is corroborated by the testimony of Mr.
Guy, who worked at the pool near the same basketball court on
the night of the shooting and testified that he heard gunshots and
then saw [Appellant] running from the scene with a gun. N.T.,
7/13/16, at 131-37, 150. Mr. Guy similarly testified that, later
that night, [Appellant] told Mr. Guy “what happened and why he
did it,” and that “if he see [Jackson] again, he’ll do it again.” Id.
at 147-48.

Additionally, the statements and testimony from Mr.
Riggins, Mr. Guy, and Mr. Adams were corroborated by
compelling evidence of [Appellant’s] consciousness of
guilt. Specifically, the Commonwealth presented [evidence at
trial of Appellant’s] phone calls from prison, in which [he] told his
mother that he “really should’ve ran” and instructed his brother
to “[check] every aspect of [the] park” where the shooting
occurred for cameras. N.T., 7/12/16, at 227-33; Commonwealth
Exhibit 12 (Prison Transcripts); Commonwealth Exhibit 43 (Prison
Tape). [Appellant’s] phone calls from prison also corroborated the
witness[es]’ fear of retaliation. Particularly, one conversation
involved an unknown male who said, “When we go to [the]
preliminary [hearing and] we find out who telling on you that is

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the only thing, when we find out who telling on you then we … find
out how we going to go about this.” N.T., 7/12/16, at 227-33;
Commonwealth Exhibit 12 (Prison Transcripts); Commonwealth
Exhibit 43 (Prison Tape). All of this is strong circumstantial
evidence that [Appellant] was responsible for shooting [] Jackson.

Accordingly, the evidence of [the subject officers’] unrelated
misconduct does not give rise to a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed, the result of [Appellant’s trial] would
have been different. See Simpson, 66 A.3d at 264. Therefore,
[Appellant] is not entitled to relief under Brady[,] and the [PCRA
c]ourt did not err in dismissing [Appellant’s] claim.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/20/25, at 8-11 (footnote omitted; emphasis added;

some record citations modified). The PCRA court’s findings are supported by

the record and the law, and we agree with its determination.

Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the Commonwealth had no obligation

under Brady to disclose to the defense evidence of misconduct committed by

the subject officers in cases wholly unrelated to Appellant’s. Appellant failed

to establish the materiality of such evidence absent some proof that the

subject officers committed misconduct in Appellant’s case. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Rahman, 309 A.3d 1071, 2023 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS

2905, 2023 WL 8244825 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished memorandum at

15)6 (upholding PCRA court’s rejection of the appellant’s Brady claim based

on evidence of police misconduct, where appellant failed to demonstrate that

evidence of police misconduct “in wholly unrelated cases was material to [the

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6 Non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their
persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

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a]ppellant’s case or the PCRA proceedings, such that its omission resulted

in prejudice to [the a]ppellant.”). Appellant has failed to (1) point to evidence

in the record to show any indication that the subject officers committed

misconduct in the instant case; or (2) articulate what evidence he would

present at an evidentiary hearing beyond his generalized assertions of the

subject officers’ misconduct in unrelated cases. In sum, we cannot conclude

that the purported nondisclosure of the misconduct of the subject officers “so

undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of

guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Ly, 980 A.2d at 76 (citation

omitted).

Furthermore, to the extent Appellant would proffer the subject officers’

misconduct solely for the purposes of impeachment, he is unable to satisfy

the after-discovered evidence test on this basis. Burton, 158 A.3d at 629 (to

establish an after-discovered evidence claim under subsection 9543(a)(2)(vi),

the petitioner must prove, inter alia, that the exculpatory evidence is not being

offered solely to impeach credibility); see also Commonwealth v. Brown,

134 A.3d 1097, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2016) (upholding PCRA court’s rejection of

Brown’s claim that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding after-

discovered evidence based on newspaper articles detailing the misconduct of

two Philadelphia Police detectives in cases unrelated to Brown’s, where,

absent proof that these two officers had committed misconduct in Brown’s

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case, evidence of their misconduct committed in other cases could only be

used by Brown to impeach the officers’ credibility).

Based upon the foregoing, the PCRA court properly determined that

Appellant failed to establish any Brady violation, or an after-discovered

evidence claim under subsection 9543(a)(2)(vi).7 Appellant’s first issue

merits no relief.

In his second issue, Appellant argues the PCRA court erred in denying

collateral relief on his “actual innocence” claim, which, he asserts, “may be a

cognizable and free-standing basis for relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.” Appellant’s Brief at 34 (citing

---

7 In Appellant’s argument section, he raises an additional issue, under a
separate heading, asserting that he “is entitled to relief because the evidence
of police misconduct constitutes after-discovered evidence requiring a new
trial[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 33 (bold omitted). However, Appellant did not
raise this issue in either his (1) court-ordered Rule 1925(b) concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal; or (2) brief’s statement of questions
presented. Therefore, Appellant waived this issue. See Commonwealth v.
Lamont, 308 A.3d 304, 316 n.12 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“It is settled claims which
are not raised in either the Rule 1925(b) statement or in the statement of
questions involved are waived.”); Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (stating that “[n]o
question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions
involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues
not included in the Statement … are waived.”). Nevertheless, even if not
waived, this claim would not entitle Appellant to relief, based upon our
determination that his Brady claim asserting newly-discovered evidence of
the subject officers’ misconduct in unrelated cases does not constitute after-
discovered evidence under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi).

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Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 406 (1993)).8 According to Appellant,

“Pennsylvania’s history of fiercely protecting its citizens’ rights against

arbitrary state action supports the recognition of a freestanding innocence

claim under the state due process clause.” Id. at 35; see also id. (“As a

matter of substantive due process, Pennsylvania appellate courts have

regularly held our state constitution provides individuals with greater

protection than its federal counterpart.”).

Contrary to Appellant’s suggestion, Herrera and its progeny entitle him

to no relief. As this Court recognized in Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d

418 (Pa. Super. 2016), decisions such as McQuiggin and Herrera, which

apply the federal habeas corpus statute of limitations, are “irrelevant to our

construction of the timeliness provisions set forth in the PCRA.” Id. at 420-

21 (citing Commonwealth v. Saunders, 60 A.3d 162, 165 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(holding that decisions implicating federal habeas corpus law are “of no

---

8 The United States Supreme Court, in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383

(2013), observed that the Court “ha[s] not resolved whether a prisoner may
be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.”
Id. at 392 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404-05). However, based on various
decisions by that Court, the McQuiggin Court held that “a credible showing
of actual innocence may allow a prisoner to pursue his constitutional claims …
on the merits notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar to [collateral]
relief.” Id. Quoting Herrera, the McQuiggin Court noted, “This rule, or
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, is grounded in the ‘equitable
discretion’ of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not
result in the incarceration of innocent persons.” Id. (quoting Herrera, 506
U.S. at 404).

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moment with respect to the way Pennsylvania courts apply the plain language

of” the PCRA’s time-bar exceptions)).

Instantly, the PCRA court, citing Brown, correctly determined that

Appellant’s bald claim of his actual innocence fails to establish any PCRA time-

bar exception, and thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to address it. 9 See PCRA

Court Opinion, 5/20/25, at 11; Brown, 143 A.3d at 420-21. We agree.

Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue merits no relief.

Based upon the foregoing, as the PCRA court correctly concluded that

Appellant was not entitled to collateral relief on either of his claims, the court

did not err or abuse its discretion in dismissing Appellant’s second PCRA

petition.

Order affirmed.

Date: 3/20/2026

---

9 Further, even if the PCRA court had jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s claim

of his actual innocence, it is belied by the record. At trial, the Commonwealth
introduced substantial evidence of Appellant’s guilt, including (1) statements
from multiple eyewitnesses who identified Appellant as the shooter; and (2)
Appellant’s inculpatory post-arrest statements made in recorded telephone
calls from prison, in which he discussed creating a false alibi, disposing of the
firearm used in the shooting, his regrets about not fleeing from the authorities
prior to his arrest, and identifying and confronting witnesses who implicated
Appellant as the perpetrator.

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