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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Webster, A.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 824 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Ford Elliott

• Opinion

• Authorities (22)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (44.9K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by [Kate Ford Elliott](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8229/kate-ford-elliott/)

J-S45040-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ALEXANDER DAVID WEBSTER :
:
Appellant : No. 824 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 28, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-59-CR-0000291-2023

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED: MARCH 20, 2026

Appellant, Alexander David Webster, appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County, following a

non-jury trial at which the court found him guilty of burglary, strangulation,

criminal trespass, criminal mischief, simple assault, harassment, and

terroristic threats.1 Appellant raises three issues on appeal. Upon review, we

affirm.

On June 1, 2023, Appellant and the victim (Victim) were engaged to be

married to each other. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 12. Prior to that date, they

had a history of living together in Appellant’s house and had split up their

---

• Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(1)(i), 2718(a)(1), 3503(a)(1)(i), 3304(a)(5),
2701(a)(1), 2709(a)(1), and 2706(a)(1), respectively.
J-S45040-25

relationship several times due to disputes. See id. at 12, 18, 22, 43. Victim

resided in her own apartment for six months before June 1; however, she had

an open invitation to go to Appellant’s house as they were still working on

their relationship. See id. at 18-19.

That morning, Victim stopped by Appellant’s house to see if he wanted

to have lunch with her. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 10. She rejected his

invitation to watch a video with him and left his house. See id. Victim’s

apartment was one of two apartments on the second floor of her building, with

the other apartment being occupied by her neighbor, Taylor Hilfiger. See id.

at. 3.2

Around 2:00 p.m. on June 1, Hilfiger heard “very loud banging and then

screaming” at the door to Victim’s apartment. N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 4. She

looked out of her door’s peephole and saw Appellant screaming at Victim to

let him in while punching and kicking Victim’s door. See id. Victim screamed

back, “[N]o you’re not allowed in. You’re too mad. Don’t come in.” Id.

Appellant got through the door, and Hilfiger heard screaming for

approximately a minute. See id.

Then, Hilfiger saw Appellant leave the apartment and Victim came out.

See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 4. Hilfiger walked out of her apartment and Victim

---

2Victim and Hilfiger’s apartment front doors were directly across from one
another. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 3.

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J-S45040-25

told her that Appellant stole her phone and she wanted to call 911. See id.3

Afterwards, Hilfiger called the police and told them she needed an ambulance

because Victim had “marks on her throat.” Id. at 5.

Around 2:15 p.m., Corporal Alan Krall from the Pennsylvania State

Police arrived at the scene and found Victim “very distraught and emotional.”

N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 25-26. Victim told Corporal Krall that Appellant had

“choked her with two hands.” Id. at 27. He observed a long vertical crack on

the doorframe of the front door of Victim’s apartment. See id. Additionally,

he saw that Victim had a very light red mark across her neck from her right

ear to under her left ear and took multiple photographs of the abrasions and

her apartment. See id.; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit A (sixteen photographs

from June 1, 2023).

After recording Victim’s written statement, Corporal Krall spoke to

Hilfiger and then went to Appellant’s apartment to speak with him. See N.T.

Trial, 1/7/25, at 28. Appellant did not admit to being physical with Victim or

to breaking the door of her apartment. See id. At a later date, Corporal Krall

spoke to the property owner of Victim’s building and received from him an

estimate for the broken door. See id. at 29. A non-jury trial in connection with

the above facts took place on January 7, 2025.

---

3 Victim confirmed that, initially, she thought Appellant took her phone, but

he did not. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 21.

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J-S45040-25

At trial, Hilfiger testified that she called 911 and told the dispatcher that

an ambulance was needed because Victim had “marks on her throat” and that

they “looked like hand marks.” N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 5. Additionally, Hilfiger

added that the door of Victim’s apartment was never broken or damaged

before the June 1 incident. See id. Then, Victim testified that Appellant:

[c]ame to my apartment and was pounding on my door and acting
just irate. He was upset because I wouldn’t watch a video. I didn’t
understand why he was so upset over that, but he kept pounding
and pounding and pounding and I said, could you please – I asked
him to calm – I asked him to please calm down and come back
later, like when he was calm, and he just kept pounding and
pounding and pounding. I’m like, you have to go, like, please
leave. But he didn’t. I was standing by the door and he just –
pound, pound - and the door – like I could hear the frame – I
could hear the whole door just crack - and he got in.

[…]

He grabbed me by the throat, took me all the way to where my
kitchen table is, which is like – sorry – I guess maybe like twenty
feet. So, he had me by my throat all the way back there and
looked at me and told me – told me that if I called the cops he
would kill me, and he shoved me to the ground and then he
punched my air conditioner. He did have my phone. I thought he
took the phone - sorry - but he had thrown the phone, so the
phone was in my apartment - and then he left.

N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 10-11.

Furthermore, Victim testified that her door was locked when Appellant

was pounding on it, and she told him that she didn’t want him to come into

her apartment. See id. at 12. Then, Corporal Krall testified that what Victim

told him was consistent with her trial testimony, except that Appellant had

choked her with two hands, and that “she couldn’t breathe for a short period

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J-S45040-25

of time…her throat hurt, her throat burned, she got dizzy, and it – and she

was in fear for her life.” Id. at 37.

Next, Appellant testified that, on the day of the incident, he believed

Victim had taken his Vyvanse medication. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 40-41

(explaining he took multiple medications for bipolar disorder, attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder, and helping him sleep). He claimed that his son’s

medication had been missing prior to that, and he assumed that Victim had

taken it. See id. at 42. Appellant decided to go to Victim’s apartment to get

back his house key, post-office box key, and car key. See id. at 43. He

admitted he was “extremely upset” and pounded on her door “harder than”

he should have, hearing a crack as he left. Id. at 42-43.

Further, Appellant contradicted Victim and stated that she had let him

into her apartment and unlocked the door herself. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at

1. He also stated that Victim allegedly had rosea, a skin rash, and “gets red

quite frequently.” Id. at 50-51. Appellant explained he did not choke her and

left because Victim was so upset. See id. at 52-53. Finally, Appellant’s mother

testified that, while Appellant and Victim lived together, his medications went

missing. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 65-66. The mother admitted that

Appellant’s nature can be “aggressive” if he gets upset. See id. at 72. After

closing arguments, the trial court found Appellant guilty of all counts

mentioned above. See id. at 85-87; Order (verdict), 1/7/25.

On March 28, 2025, a sentencing hearing was held, and Victim chose to

not attend. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 2/13/25, at 5. The court asked the

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J-S45040-25

Commonwealth if Victim had a position with respect to Appellant’s sentence

because a restitution statement dated prior to the trial was attached to

Appellant’s pre-sentence investigation report. See id. The restitution

statement was prepared by a victim witness coordinator, and it had a notation

stating: “[Victim w]ould like the case over with. She has forgiven [Appellant]

and does not want jail time. They are friends now and have made amends.

Would like [the protection from abuse (PFA)] dropped.” See id. at 6;

Restitution Statement, 12/13/24, at 1.4 The Commonwealth responded that it

had been made aware of the restitution statement during a bail hearing on

January 16, 2025. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 2/13/25, at 6. However, the

court clarified that, at the bail hearing, Victim had testified contrary to what

the note reflected. See id. at 7, 29. Then, Appellant was sentenced to a period

of twenty-two to forty-four months of incarceration. See id. at 30-34; Order

(sentencing), 3/28/25, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, the Commonwealth

responded, and a hearing was held on May 21, 2025. See generally Post-

Sentence Motion, 4/7/25; Commonwealth’s Response to Post-Sentence

Motion, 4/16/25. Appellant, in his motion, challenged the sufficiency and

weight of the evidence, and asserted that the Commonwealth failed to disclose

---

4 The restitution statement was part of the record as Exhibit A of the
Commonwealth’s response to Appellant’s post-sentence motion.

-6-
J-S45040-25

the restitution statement prior to trial, amounting to a Brady5 violation. See

Post-Sentence Motion, 4/7/25, at 2-13 (unpaginated). After the hearing, the

trial court denied the post-sentence motion. See Order (denying post-

sentence motion), 5/23/25.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and a court-ordered concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1925(b), and the trial court adopted its post-sentence

opinion as its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Notice of Appeal, 6/13/25; Rule

1925(b) Order, 7/16/25; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 8/6/25; Trial Court

Opinion, 5/23/25; Order, 8/8/25 (adopting May 23, 2025 opinion as Rule

1925(a) opinion).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit an
error of law in determining that the Commonwealth’s failure
to disclose a written statement made by the alleged victim
to the [Tioga County] Office of the Victim Witness Advocate
prior to trial was not a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963)?

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit an
error of law by determining that the evidence presented by
the Commonwealth at trial was sufficient to sustain a verdict
of guilty against Appellant?

III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit an
error of law by determining that the verdict of guilty against
Appellant was not against the weight of evidence?

---

5 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

-7-
J-S45040-25

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (suggested answers of the trial court omitted; numbering

formatted).

First, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and

committed an error of law in concluding that the Commonwealth did not

violate Brady by failing to timely disclose a written restitution statement made

by Victim to the victim witness coordinator less than one month before trial.

See Appellant’s Brief at 9.

We have previously summarized the import of the Brady decision, as

follows:

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 [.] In
response to the dictates of Brady, our Supreme Court
promulgated [Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 573 with
respect to discovery in criminal cases. The Rule lists certain items
and information that are subject to mandatory disclosure by the
Commonwealth when they are: requested by the
defendant; material to the case[;] and (3) within the
possession or control of the prosecutor. [See] Pa.R.Crim.P.
573(B). Mandatory discovery includes any evidence favorable to
the accused that is material to either guilt or punishment. [See]
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(a).

Commonwealth v. Duck, 171 A.3d 830, 838 (Pa. Super. 2017).

A Brady claim “presents a question of law, for which our standard of

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.

Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1084 (Pa. 2020). In asserting a Brady claim, a

defendant must prove that: “(1) the evidence was favorable to the accused,

-8-
J-S45040-25

either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2) the prosecution

has suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the

evidence was material, meaning that prejudice must have ensued.” Id. at

1086.

Relying on Rule 573 and Brady, Appellant contends that the restitution

statement disclosed at his sentencing hearing fell squarely within defense

counsel’s March 27, 2024 discovery request for Victim’s written or

memorialized statements. See Appellant’s Brief at 9-10 (“[U]nder Rule

573(B), the Commonwealth had a mandatory obligation to turn the restitution

statement over.”). Moreover, Appellant argues he has satisfied the three-

prong Brady test. See id. at 13. First, he asserts that the restitution

statement constituted impeachment evidence because Victim was the primary

witness and her credibility was central to the verdict. See id. at 10, 13.

Second, he notes that the Commonwealth failed to disclose the restitution

statement prior to trial. See id. at 11. Third, he alleges that the restitution

statement was material, because, had defense counsel been aware of it, he

could have cross-examined Victim regarding “its contents, her intent, her

inconsistencies, and the possibility of [the] Commonwealth [using] bullying

tactics to scare her into testifying as she did.” Id. at 13.

Furthermore, Appellant alleges that the restitution statement could have

bolstered his own testimony and challenged the credibility of Victim, thereby

increasing his likelihood of acquittal. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. Appellant

concludes that the Commonwealth’s suppression of the restitution statement

-9-
J-S45040-25

until after trial violated Brady and requires reversal and remand for a new

trial. See id. at 13. We disagree.

Following our review of the record, we conclude no Brady violation took

place. We agree with the trial court that the restitution statement was neither

exculpatory nor useful for impeachment evidence at trial. See Trial Court

Opinion, 5/23/25, at 5-6.

As stated above, the restitution statement indicated that Victim wanted

the case to be over with, did not want Appellant to face jail-time, and wanted

the PFA dropped. See Restitution Statement, 12/13/24, at 1. However, the

restitution statement did not contain anything about the June 1 incident; it

simply suggests that Victim did not want Appellant to serve jail time and

wanted the PFA dropped. See id. Her expression of forgiveness, if anything,

was inculpatory as to Appellant because it implied that Appellant had wronged

her. In any event, Appellant was aware that Victim went back and forth on

her decision of whether to drop the PFA against him. See N.T. Sentencing

Hearing, 2/13/25, at 18-19, 21. Additionally, Appellant and Victim testified at

trial that they had a “rocky” relationship. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 12, 43.

Therefore, Appellant’s argument that a Brady violation occurred is meritless.

Next, Appellant raises challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the

evidence in the same section of his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-21.

Although he correctly sets forth the distinct standards of review governing

these claims, his analysis blends the two doctrines. See id. at 13-14, 21

(“Accordingly, because the Commonwealth failed to meet their burden to

• 10 - J-S45040-25

sustain guilty verdicts and/or the weight of the evidence was against a finding

of guilty to all of the above charges[.]”). In essence, Appellant conflates

weight and sufficiency, which is improper because a weight claim concedes

that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction.

See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-53 (Pa. 2000)

(explaining distinctions between claim challenging sufficiency of evidence and

claim challenging weight of evidence). This combined review is also improper

because review of the sufficiency of evidence does not include an assessment

of credibility of testimony offered by the Commonwealth. See

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 713-14 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

Instead, arguments as to credibility are more properly characterized as

challenges to the weight of evidence. See id. To the extent that Appellant fails

to meaningfully separate these two claims, we could find them waived. See

Commonwealth v. Sexton, 222 A.3d 405, 416 (Pa. Super. 2019) (finding

Appellant’s claim waived for weight of the evidence due to conflating weight

and sufficiency claims). Moreover, this combination of arguments violates the

rule requiring separate portions of a brief be dedicated to separate issues.

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). However, given that his separate arguments as to

sufficiency and weight are identifiable, we will nevertheless address the merits

of his claims separately.

First, we will assess Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence

for his burglary, strangulation, simple assault, terroristic threats, and criminal

• 11 - J-S45040-25

trespass convictions. “A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence presents a

question of law, and as such, the standard of review is de novo and scope of

review is plenary.” See Commonwealth v. Headley, 242 A.3d 940, 943 (Pa.

Super. 2020). Additionally:

We assess the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner. We
must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the
fact-finder to have found every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact[-
]finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered.

Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 740-41 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en

banc) (citation omitted).

First, Appellant raises a sufficiency challenge to his burglary conviction.

See Appellant’s Brief at 18. Under the subsection charged in this case, a

person commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to enter to commit

a crime therein, the person “enters a building or occupied structure, or

separately secured or occupied portion thereof, that is adapted for overnight

accommodations in which at the time of the offense any person is present and

the person commits, attempts or threatens to commit a bodily injury crime

• 12 - J-S45040-25

therein[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)(i). Appellant argues that the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his burglary conviction because the Commonwealth

failed to prove that he entered Victim’s apartment with the intent to commit

a crime. See Appellant’s Brief at 18. He contends the evidence did not

establish strangulation, simple assault, or terroristic threats; therefore, his

burglary conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. See id. We

disagree.

Although Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove

which specific crime he intended to commit upon entry in Victim’s apartment,

our Supreme Court has held that the Commonwealth is not required to prove

the specific offense intended to be committed within the invaded dwelling

unless it was otherwise specified in the criminal information. See

Commonwealth v. Alston, 651 A.2d 1092, 1095 (Pa. 1994) (“[I]n order to

secure a conviction of burglary, the Commonwealth is not required to allege

or prove what particular crime Appellant intended to commit after his forcible

entry into a private resident.”); Commonwealth v. Brown, 886 A.2d 256,

260 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“When the Commonwealth does specify, in the

information or indictment, the crime defendant intended to commit, the

Commonwealth must prove the requisite intent for that particular crime in

order to prove a burglary or attempted burglary.”). Here, the criminal

information states that “[d]efendant did enter an occupied residence with

intent to cause bodily injury and make terroristic threats” to Victim. Bill of

Information, 6/1/23, at 2. As discussed in detail below, the evidence was

• 13 - J-S45040-25

likewise sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for terroristic threats. See

infra at 17-18.

Further, the evidence presented at Appellant’s trial, when viewed in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, established that Appellant entered

Victim’s apartment without her permission, threatened her, and choked her.

We agree with the trial court that pictures of the broken door frame, Victim’s

marks on her throat and the testimony of Hiliger, Victim, and Corporal Krall

were sufficient to sustain Appellant’s burglary conviction. See Trial Court

Opinion, 5/23/25, at 4; 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)(i). Indeed, the fact-finder

could infer Appellant’s intent from his aggressive actions at Victim’s door prior

to his entry. Accordingly, the evidence supports Appellant’s burglary

conviction. See Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 740-41.

Next, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence for his

strangulation conviction. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. Strangulation is

committed when “[t]he defendant knowingly or intentionally impeded the

breathing of another person by applying pressure to the throat or neck.”

Commonwealth v. Weitzel, 304 A.3d 1219, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2023); 18

Pa.C.S. § 2718(a)(1). The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines “intentionally”

as the actor’s “conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause

such a result.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(1)(i); see also Commonwealth v.

Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 641 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[I]ntent can be proven by

direct or circumstantial evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or

from the attendant circumstances.”). Moreover, “[i]nfliction of a physical

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injury to a victim shall not be an element of the offense” of strangulation. 18

Pa.C.S. § 2718(b).

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he applied pressure to the throat or neck of Victim,

impeding her breathing or blood flow. See Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant

contends that the Commonwealth only “offered a few blurry and grainy

photographs,” and there was no testimony from a physician or nurse. See id.

at 19. Therefore, he asserts that the evidence failed to sustain his conviction

for strangulation. See id. We disagree.

First, Appellant’s contention that the Commonwealth needed to provide

medical testimony lacks merit, as that is not an element of the crime needed

to support a conviction for strangulation. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2718(b). Upon

review of the record, we conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient

evidence to sustain Appellant’s strangulation conviction. See Bowens, 265

A.3d at 740-41. Victim testified that Appellant grabbed her by the throat,

causing her to struggle to breathe, and that she had scratch marks on her

throat. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 15-16. Hilfiger and Corporal Krall’s testimony

regarding Victim’s red marks on her neck corroborated Victim’s testimony.

See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 4-5, 27. Moreover, the Commonwealth provided

photographic evidence of Victim’s throat, captured by Corporal Krall about

fifteen minutes after the incident. See id. at 27-28; Commonwealth Trial

Exhibit A (showing pictures of Victim’s scratches on throat). Therefore, we find

the evidence sufficient to establish that Appellant knowingly impeded Victim’s

• 15 - J-S45040-25

breathing by applying pressure to her throat. See Weitzel, 304 A.3d at 1224;

Miller, 172 A.3d at 641. Accordingly, the evidence supports Appellant’s

strangulation conviction. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474,

479 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[A] solitary witness’s testimony may establish every

element of a crime, assuming that it speaks to each element, directly and/or

by rational inference.”).

Next, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence for his simple

assault conviction. See Appellant’s Brief at 20. The offense of simple assault

requires that the Commonwealth prove that the defendant either attempted

to cause bodily injury to another person or intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly caused bodily injury to another person. See 18 Pa.C.S. §

2701(a)(1). “Bodily injury” is defined by statute as “[i]mpairment of physical

condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. “The existence of substantial

pain may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the use of physical

force even in the absence of a significant injury.” Commonwealth v.

Wroten, 257 A.3d 734, 744 (Pa. Super. 2021).

Appellant argues that, because the Commonwealth failed to prove

strangulation, it cannot sustain his conviction for simple assault, which

requires proof of bodily injury. See id. at 20. He contends the Commonwealth

failed to establish that Victim experienced “substantial pain,” noting that

Victim did not testify that she was hurt or felt pain. Id. Appellant further

asserts that the Commonwealth presented no medical testimony or treatment

records to corroborate Victim’s bodily injury. See id.

• 16 - J-S45040-25

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as the verdict winner, as we must, under our controlling standard of review,

Victim’s testimony established that Appellant committed physical force to

Victim’s throat, causing her difficulty breathing, and leaving visible marks.

See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 12. From these circumstances, the trial court, as

the fact-finder, was able to reasonably infer that Victim experienced

substantial pain or bodily injury. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/25, at 4.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth did not need to present medical testimony

or explicit testimony of Victim’s pain to establish bodily injury. See Wroten,

257 A.3d at 744. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain

Appellant’s simple assault conviction. See Bowens, 265 A.3d at 740-41.

Next, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of his terroristic threats

conviction. See Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. To sustain a conviction for

terroristic threats the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant: (1)

made a threat to commit a crime of violence; and (2) the threat was

communicated with the intent to terrorize. See Commonwealth v.

Campbell, 253 A.3d 346, 348 (Pa. Super. 2021); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).

Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for

terroristic threats because the only evidence that he threatened to kill Victim

was her testimony. See Appellant’s Brief at 20. He contends Victim did not

report any death threat to Hilfiger immediately after the incident and raised it

only later to police, undermining her credibility. See id. Given these alleged

inconsistencies, Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth failed to prove

• 17 - J-S45040-25

beyond reasonable doubt that he threatened to kill Victim. See id. at 21. We

disagree.

At trial, Victim testified that, while Appellant was choking her, he stated

that if she called the cops, he would kill her. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 10, 17.

This Court has explained that, when a “[d]efendant makes the threat while at

the same time engaging in activity indicating an intent to carry out the threat,

the threat is not a mere spur-of-the-moment statement made in anger, and

the evidence is sufficient to support a terroristic threats conviction.” Weitzel,

304 A.3d at 1226. Applying that reasoning here, we find that Appellant

threatened to kill Victim while actively choking her, which supports a terroristic

threat conviction. See Campell, 253 A.3d at 348-49.

To the extent Appellant challenges Victim’s credibility based on

inconsistencies in her reporting of the threat, such a claim goes to weight of

evidence, not its sufficiency. See Juray, 275 A.3d at 1044. Moreover, the

uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if believed, is sufficient to

sustain a conviction. See Commonwealth v. Crosby, 226 A.3d 104, 106-09

(Pa. Super. 2020) (defendant’s statement to victim that she was going to kill

victim and others was sufficient to support terroristic threats conviction). The

trial court, sitting as the fact-finder, credited Victim’s testimony that Appellant

said he was going to kill her. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 86 (“[Appellant] did

say he was going to kill [Victim] so [terroristic threats is] sustained.”).

Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s terroristic

threat conviction. See Bowens, 265 A.3d at 740-41.

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Finally, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of his criminal trespass

conviction. See Appellant’s Brief at 21. Under the subsection charged in this

case, a person commits the offense of criminal trespass if knowing that he is

not licensed or privileged to do so, he “enters or gains entry by subterfuge or

surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure or separately

secured or occupied portion thereof[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1)(i). Lack of

privilege may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. See

Commonwealth v. Benito, 133 A.3d 333, 336 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding

spouse’s refusal to permit defendant entry into apartment constitutes lack of

privilege).

Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to sufficiently prove

that he broke into Victim’s apartment. See Appellant’s Brief at 21. He argues

that the Commonwealth’s own evidence suggested that Victim unlocked her

apartment door deadbolt and allowed Appellant in voluntarily. See id.

Accordingly, he concludes that the Commonwealth failed to sustain Appellant’s

conviction of criminal trespass. See id. Again, we disagree.

We find that the record supports the conclusion that Appellant was not

licensed or privileged to enter Victim’s apartment. Although Appellant claims

Victim unlocked the door voluntarily, the evidence established that Appellant

was in a rage and pounded on the door with such force that she feared he

would break it. See N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 12. The photographs of the broken

door frame, together with the testimony of Victim and Corporal Krall,

permitted the trial court, as the fact-finder, to conclude that Appellant

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committed criminal trespass. See id. at 12, 37; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit

A (photographs of broken door frame). Under these circumstances, the fact-

finder was free to reject Appellant’s characterization of the entry as voluntary

and to determine that he knowingly entered without privilege to do so. See

Benito, 133 A.3d at 336. Thus, the evidence supports Appellant’s criminal

trespass conviction. See Bowens, 265 A.3d at 740-41.

Next, we address Appellant’s final issue, his challenge to the weight of

the evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 14.

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
the trial judge is to determine that[,] notwithstanding all the facts,
certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citations omitted).

Any conflicts in the evidence or contradictions in testimony are

exclusively for the fact-finder to resolve. See Commonwealth v. Roane, 204

A.3d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2019). Our Court gives great deference to the trial

court’s decision regarding the weight of evidence because it had the

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented. See Commonwealth v.

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Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 600 (Pa. Super. 2018). Furthermore, “[i]n order for

a defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of evidence, the evidence

must be so tenuous, vague[,] and uncertain that the verdict shocks the

conscience of the court.” See Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301,

311 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence includes a brief

argument addressing only his strangulation, terroristic threats, and criminal

trespass convictions. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-19, 20-21. He attempts to

add argument that the trial court erred for disregarding the weight of the

evidence for all of the convictions, generally challenging the credibility of

Victim’s testimony at trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 21. We disagree that

Appellant has demonstrated that the denial of his post-sentence weight claim

was an abuse of discretion.

Although Appellant correctly recites the correct legal standards that

apply to challenges to the weight of the evidence, his discussion of the issue

is conclusory. See Appellant’s Brief at 14. The trial court found Victim’s

testimony more credible “in terms of what occurred.” N.T. Trial, 1/7/25, at 84.

Appellant essentially requests that we replace the trial court’s credibility

determinations with our own; this we cannot do. See Commonwealth v.

Sanchez, 262 A.3d 1283, 1288-89 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“[I]t is not the function

of the appellate court to substitute its judgment based on a cold record for

that of the trial court. The weight to be accorded conflicting evidence is

exclusively for the fact[-]finder, whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal

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if they are supported by the record.”) (citation omitted). In the absence of a

more developed argument from Appellant, the trial court’s denial of the post-

sentence weight claim is supported by the record, and the court’s legal

conclusion is sound. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/25, at 4-5. We discern no

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court on Appellant’s third issue. See

Windslowe, 158 A.3d at 712.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/20/2026

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