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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Ford, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 916 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Olson

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (617)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Judith Ference Olson](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8241/judith-ference-olson/)

J-S47025-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMEL S. FORD :
:
Appellant : No. 916 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 14, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005080-2007

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMEL S. FORD :
:
Appellant : No. 917 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 14, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005081-2007

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMEL S. FORD :
:
Appellant : No. 918 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 14, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005082-2007
J-S47025-25

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMEL FORD :
:
Appellant : No. 919 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 14, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002100-2008

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2026

Appellant, Jamel Ford, appeals pro se from the order entered on March

14, 2025, which dismissed his third petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

We previously summarized the relevant facts and procedural posture of

this case:

A jury convicted [Appellant] of first-degree murder,
possessing an instrument of crime, attempted murder, two
counts of aggravated assault, two counts of witness
intimidation, solicitation-murder, and conspiracy-murder at
the above four trial dockets. In 2009, the trial court
sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of life plus
seventy-two-and-one-half to one hundred forty-five years of
imprisonment. This Court affirmed the judgment of
sentence, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal
[on May 3, 2011]. See Commonwealth v. Ford, 15 A.3d
542 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum), appeal
denied, 38 A.3d 823 (Pa. 2011). . . .

[Appellant] filed a timely first PCRA petition. The PCRA court
appointed counsel and subsequently denied relief without a
hearing. This Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief, and

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J-S47025-25

our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Ford, 159 A.3d 996 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 173 A.3d 264
(Pa. 2017). . . .

In September 2020, [Appellant] filed a pro se letter in the
trial court asserting that the assistant district attorney who
prosecuted him (“the prosecutor”) had altered the trial
transcripts. . . . The PCRA court determined that
[Appellant’s] September 2020 letter constituted a second
PCRA petition and, [on November 16, 2021, the] . . . PCRA
court dismissed [Appellant’s] petition.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 292 A.3d 1112 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(non-precedential decision). On January 20, 2023, this Court affirmed the

dismissal of Appellant’s second PCRA petition. See id.

Appellant filed the current PCRA petition – his third – on January 19,

1. Within the petition, Appellant raised two claims: 1) his sentence

violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and 2) “[t]he trial

court failed to turn over the trial transcripts to [Appellant] . . . [and, thus,

Appellant] could not have prepared a meaningful direct appeal.” Appellant’s

Third PCRA Petition, 1/19/24, at 4. Appellant acknowledged that the petition

was filed outside of the PCRA's one-year time-bar and, thus, is facially

untimely. See id. at 7. Appellant, however, claimed that his petition satisfies

the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA's time-bar. See id.; see

also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Specifically, Appellant attached a letter

from Samuel C. Stretton, Esq. (“Attorney Stretton”), who was the attorney for

Appellant’s co-defendant, Terrell Bowens. In the letter, Attorney Stretton

wrote:

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J-S47025-25

Dear [Appellant]:

I received your letter on June 27 th, 2022. As I told you, my
recollection of the case where I represented Terrell Bowens,
that there was an outburst in the courtroom by I believe the
victims’ family. I objected to it and asked for a mistrial.
Sorry for the delay in getting you this letter but that is my
recollection. The victims’ family, if I recall, became very
upset during the testimony of I forget who, whether it was
the autopsy photos or some of the alleged facts. But there
was a very serious outburst in the courtroom and I objected.

Letter from Attorney Stretton to Appellant, dated 6/29/22, at 1.

Appellant and Terrell Bowens were tried together. See N.T. Trial,

1/21/09-2/10/09. Yet, according to Appellant, the notes of testimony he

received from his trial do not reflect the above “outburst” that Attorney

Stretton recounted. See Appellant’s Third PCRA Petition 1/19/24, at 9.

Therefore, according to Appellant, since a “crucial portion of the transcriptions

[was] missing, it was impossible for the court to render an effective [appellate]

review” of his claims. Id.1

The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s third petition on March 14, 2025

and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We now affirm the dismissal of

Appellant’s patently untimely, serial PCRA petition.

“As a general proposition, we review a denial of PCRA relief to determine

whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and free

of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 830 (Pa. 2014).

---

1 On February 25, 2026, Appellant filed a Motion to Compel Compliance in
which he seeks an order directing the trial court to supplement the record to
include the portion of the transcript reflecting Attorney Stretton’s recollection.
Based upon our decision, we deny the motion.

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J-S47025-25

Before this Court may address the substance of Appellant’s claims, we

must first determine if this petition is timely.

[The PCRA requires] a petitioner to file any PCRA petition
within one year of the date the judgment of sentence
becomes final. A judgment of sentence becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review . . . or at the expiration of time
for seeking review.

...

However, an untimely petition may be received when the
petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the
three limited exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set
forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), are met.
A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed
within [one year] of the date the claim could first have been
presented. In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the
PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, the petitioner must plead
and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised
within the [one-year] timeframe.

See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4-5 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(quotation marks and some citations omitted).

We affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on October 26, 2010 and

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of

appeal on May 3, 2011. Commonwealth v. Ford, 15 A.3d 542 (Pa. Super.

2010) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 38 A.3d 823 (Pa. 2011).

Thus, for purposes of the PCRA, Appellant's judgment of sentence became

final at the end of the day on August 1, 2011, which was 90 days after the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for allowance of

appeal and Appellant's time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the

United States Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (“[a]

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J-S47025-25

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States . . . , or at the

expiration of time for seeking the review”); see also U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.1.

Since the PCRA requires that a petition be filed “within one year of the

date the judgment becomes final,” Appellant had until August 1, 2012 to file

a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Therefore,

Appellant’s current petition, which was filed on January 19, 2024, is patently

untimely and the burden thus fell upon Appellant to plead and prove that one

of the enumerated exceptions to the one-year time-bar applied to his case.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284,

1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (to properly invoke a statutory exception to the

one-year time-bar, the PCRA demands that the petitioner properly plead and

prove all required elements of the relied-upon exception).

Appellant purports to invoke the “newly discovered fact” exception to

the time-bar. This statutory exception provides:

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date
the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and
the petitioner proves that:

...

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]

...

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J-S47025-25

(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph
(1) shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could
have been presented.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

Regarding the newly discovered fact exception, our Supreme Court has

explained:

subsection (b)(1)(ii) has two components, which must be
alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner must establish
that: 1) “the facts upon which the claim was predicated were
unknown” and (2) “could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(ii)(emphasis added). If the petitioner alleges
and proves these two components, then the PCRA court has
jurisdiction over the claim under this subsection.

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007) (emphasis

omitted).

Further, to properly invoke this exception, the petitioner is statutorily

required to file his petition “within one year of the date the claim could have

been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). As our Supreme Court explained,

to satisfy this “one year requirement,” a petitioner must “plead and prove that

the information on which he relies could not have been obtained earlier,

despite the exercise of due diligence.” See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959

A.2d 306, 310-311 (Pa. 2008); Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94,

98 (Pa. 2001).

As Appellant claims, he recently received a letter from Attorney

Stretton, where Attorney Stretton recalled an outburst at Appellant’s trial that

was not transcribed in the notes of testimony. According to Appellant, this

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J-S47025-25

constitutes a newly-discovered fact and renders his third PCRA petition timely.

See Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.

Appellant’s claim immediately fails, as Appellant was in the courtroom

when the alleged outburst occurred and, thus, Appellant would have known

that the outburst was not transcribed as soon as he received the notes of

testimony. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 324 A.3d 452, 468 (Pa. 2024)

(“[t]he plain language of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) . . . makes clear that a

petitioner must plead and prove that ‘the facts upon which the claim is

predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence’”). Therefore, since Attorney

Stretton’s letter does not state a previously unknown fact, Appellant’s claim

on appeal fails.

We conclude that, since Appellant failed to plead a valid exception to

the PCRA’s time-bar, Appellant's petition is time-barred and our “courts are

without jurisdiction to offer [Appellant] any form of relief.” Commonwealth

v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011). We thus affirm the PCRA

court's order, which dismissed Appellant’s third PCRA petition without a

hearing.

Order affirmed. Motion to Compel denied. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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J-S47025-25

Date: 3/17/2026

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