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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of New Jersey v. Spencer S. Young

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-3314-23

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.9K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3314-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SPENCER S. YOUNG, a/k/a
SPENCER YOUNG, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

---

Submitted February 24, 2026 – Decided March 17, 2026

Before Judges Rose and DeAlmeida.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 14-03-
0459.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Designated Counsel,
on the briefs).

Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Melinda A. Harrigan,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a May 31, 2024 order denying his second petition

for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. Because the

petition was untimely under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), we affirm.

Convicted for his participation in the 2013 beating death of Tommy

Sudano after an apparent drug deal, defendant is serving a fifty-year prison term

subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. We affirmed

defendant's convictions and sentence, State v. Young, No. A-0460-16 (App. Div.

Mar. 12, 2019) (slip op. at 29), and the Supreme Court denied certification, 239

N.J. 409 (2019).

Defendant thereafter filed a timely self-represented PCR petition,

generally asserting ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

Assigned counsel (first PCR counsel) thereafter filed a sixty-three-page brief

detailing four alleged errors in appellate counsel's representation and three

alleged deficiencies in trial counsel's efforts. First PCR counsel also filed a

nine-page supplemental brief expounding upon his initial submission. During

oral argument on the petition, first PCR counsel amplified defendant's

contentions.

On November 8, 2021, the first PCR judge, who was not the trial judge,

issued a well-reasoned written decision denying defendant's petition. We

A-3314-23
2
affirmed, State v. Young, No. A-1554-21 (App. Div. July 20, 2023) (slip op. at

9), and the Court denied certification, 255 N.J. 378 (2023).

While defendant's appeal from the denial of his first PCR petition was

pending, he executed a verified second PCR petition, dated May 2, 2022,

generally asserting ineffective assistance of trial and first PCR counsel. As

explained below, defendant claims he sent his second PCR petition to the court

for filing in May 2022.

Nearly two years later, on March 18, 2024, defendant's assigned attorney

(second PCR counsel) signed and filed an amended petition for PCR. Among

other documents, second PCR counsel annexed to the amended petition a March

2, 2023 letter from defendant to "Kristy Smith, CCM, 71 Monument Park,

Freehold, New Jersey 07728," stamped received on March 24, 2023, by the

Monmouth County Criminal Division.

In the letter, defendant stated, in pertinent part:

This letter is in regards to my petition for [PCR],
pursuant to R[ule] 3:22-4(b), I sent to you [in] May
2022. I am currently appealing my first PCR which was
denied November 2021.

I need this PCR filed because I only have a year
to file it from the denial of the first PCR, pursuant to
R[ule] 3:22-12(a)(2).

A-3314-23
3
May 2022 would make my petition timely under
the rule. However, I have received nothing from this
[c]ourt stating that the petition was filed.

Please find enclosed a copy of the petition that
was filed and proof of service. [1]

In his supporting brief, second PCR counsel elaborated upon defendant's

assertions against trial counsel and first PCR counsel. Citing the one-year time

bar for filing second and subsequent PCR petitions under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(C),

counsel further argued defendant's second self-represented petition was timely.

Counsel noted defendant's "second petition was not uploaded to e[C]ourts until

April 23, 2023,"2 but claimed "the certified mail receipt attached to the filing

contains the date it was received by the court on May 25, 2022." Because

defendant's first petition was denied on November 8, 2021, counsel argued the

petition was filed "well within the one-year filing period."

Following arguments on defendant's second petition, the same PCR judge

who denied defendant's first petition issued a cogent written decision denying

1
In his appellate appendix, defendant included a copy of what appears to be the
back and front of a certified mail card. A tracking number appears on both sides
of the card, but they are not the same. In addition, there appears to be writing
under defendant's name on the front of the card and the date, "5/25/22," on the
back of the card.
2
The petition provided on appeal is not stamped filed.
A-3314-23
4
relief. Pertinent to defendant's reprised timeliness claim, the judge recognized

defendant's claim that he filed his second PCR in May 2022, but found "th[e]

court ha[d] no record of receiving it." The judge further determined, "The US

Postal Service receipt dated May 25, 2022, submitted by defendant is not proof

of filing." The judge concluded defendant's second PCR petition "was not filed

until March 24, 2023" – the same day defendant's March 2, 2023 correspondence

enclosing the petition was stamped filed.

Turning to the merits, the PCR judge rejected defendant's claims against

trial and first PCR counsel, finding defendant failed to assert a prima facie case

for relief under the applicable standards. Accordingly, the judge found

defendant was not entitled to a hearing on his claims.

On appeal, defendant renews nearly all of the points raised before the

second PCR court, asserting:

POINT I

THE [SECOND] PCR COURT IMPROPERLY
APPLIED PROCEDURAL BARS TO THE
PETITION.

A. The [Second] PCR Court Unfairly
Determined that [Defendant] Failed to
Meet the One-Year Deadline in Filing a
Second PCR Petition Because [Defendant]
Provided a Signed Copy of His Verified
Petition Dated Within the One[-]Year

A-3314-23
5
Deadline, Along With A Signed Certified
Mail Receipt Showing Receipt by the
Court Within the One[-]Year Deadline.

B. The Grounds Raised by [Defendant]
Were Not Subject to the Previously
Adjudicated Procedural Bar of R[ule] 3:22-
5.

POINT II

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE DURING
SEVERAL KEY AREAS DURING TRIAL; FIRST
PCR COUNSEL COMPOUNDED THE HARM BY
FAILING TO RAISE THESE CLAIMS DURING THE
FIRST PCR APPLICATION.

A. Trial Counsel's Failure to Obtain and
Use the Victim's Criminal History
Showing Drug Related Offenses Was
Ineffective In Light of the State's Theory
that [Defendant] and Co-Defendant
Intended to Rob the Victim.

B. Both Trial Counsel and PCR Counsel
Failed to Investigate Three Witnesses
Identified by [Defendant] – Shamir Reed,
Lashawn Alfred, and Courtney Robinson.

C. Trial Counsel's Failure To Object To
Ongoing Leading Questions During The
State's Redirect Examination Of The
State's Key Eyewitness Denied
[Defendant] A Fair Trial, Which First PCR
Counsel Also Failed to Raise.

A-3314-23
6
POINT III

FIRST PCR COUNSEL FAILED TO PROVIDE THE
COURT WITH A CERTIFICATION PROVIDED TO
HIM BY [DEFENDANT] THAT WOULD HAVE
SUPPORTED HIS MIRANDA[3] SUPPRESSION
ISSUE ON PCR.

POINT IV

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AT THE
SENTENCING PHASE DUE TO FAILURE TO
OBJECT TO THE COURT'S SUA SPONTE
AMENDMENT OF THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION THAT INCREASED
[DEFENDANT]'S SENTENCE BY TWELVE YEARS
AND BY FAILING TO ARGUE REMORSE AS A
MITIGATING FACTOR. FIRST PCR COUNSEL
COMPOUNDED THIS ERROR BY FAILING TO
RAISE THESE CLAIMS.

Of particular relevance to this appeal, defendant maintains the certified

mail receipt demonstrates his petition was delivered on May 25, 2022, prior to

the November 8, 2022 deadline. Citing our Supreme Court's decision in State

v. Hannah, 248 N.J. 148, 155 (2021), defendant argues the PCR judge should

have relaxed the time bar to prevent a "fundamental injustice."

Well-settled principles guide our review. Rule 3:22-4(b) places strict

limitations on second and subsequent petitions for PCR. The Rule compels

3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
A-3314-23
7
dismissal of a subsequent PCR petition unless the defendant can satisfy the time

requirement under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), and alleges the following grounds for

relief:

(A) that the petition relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to defendant's
petition by the United States Supreme Court or the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, that was unavailable
during the pendency of any prior proceedings; or

(B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought could
not have been discovered earlier through the exercise
of reasonable diligence, and the facts underlying the
ground for relief, if proven and viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would raise a reasonable
probability that the relief sought would be granted; or

(C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the
defendant on the first or subsequent application for
[PCR].

[R. 3:22-4(b).]
In turn, Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) imposes a time limitation for subsequent PCR

petitions. Under the Rule, a second or subsequent petition for PCR must be filed

within one year after the latest of:

(A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
was initially recognized by the United States Supreme
Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right
has been newly recognized by either of those Courts
and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases
on collateral review; or

A-3314-23
8
(B) the date on which the factual predicate for the relief
sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could
not have been discovered earlier through the exercise
of reasonable diligence; or

(C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent
application for [PCR] where ineffective assistance of
counsel that represented the defendant on the first or
subsequent application for [PCR] is being alleged.

[R. 3:22-12(a)(2).]

A 2009 amendment to the Rule makes clear beyond question that the one-

year limitation for second or subsequent petitions is non-relaxable. See R. 3:22-

12(b); State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 293 (App. Div. 2018) (recognizing

a second or subsequent petition filed beyond the one-year time frame "c[an]not

be excused in the same manner as the late filing of a first PCR petition"); R. 1:3-

4(c) (prohibiting the court and the parties from enlarging the time to file a

petition for PCR under Rule 3:22-12). We have held the PCR court "has an

independent, non-delegable duty to question the timeliness of [a first PCR]

petition." State v. Brown, 455 N.J. Super. 460, 470 (App. Div. 2018). We

further held, "[a]bsent sufficient competent evidence to satisfy this standard, the

court does not have the authority to review the merits of the claim." Ibid.

(emphasis added). We discern no reason why that duty would not apply to the

A-3314-23
9
PCR court's consideration of a second or subsequent PCR petition, especially

because the time bar for these petitions is non-relaxable.

PCR petitions are "file[d] with the criminal division manager's office of

the county in which the conviction took place." Rule 3:22-1. "[F]iling can only

be effected by the receipt of the filed paper by the designated office." Pressler

& Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 1:5-6 (2026); see also State

v. Fitzpatrick, 443 N.J. Super. 316, 324-35 (App. Div. 2015) (recognizing "[t]he

mailing of a notice of appeal is not the controlling date; rather, the controlling

date is the date of filing").

In Hannah, our Supreme Court reiterated "a defendant is 'generally barred

from presenting a claim on PCR that could have been raised at trial or on direct

appeal, R. 3:22-4(a), or that has been previously litigated, R. 3:22-5.'" 248 N.J.

at 178 (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 546 (2013)). The Court stated

"those rules" did not require the Court to ignore a fundamental unfairness. Ibid.

Further, Hannah considered PCR "based on newly discovered evidence,"

possibly "exculpatory evidence," id. at 168, and "critical evidence," id. at 155.

The Court did not, however, consider the strict time bar imposed under Rule

3:22-12(a)(2), applicable to defendant's second PCR petition.

A-3314-23
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Against those governing principles, we conclude defendant's second PCR

petition was time-barred as his petition was filed well beyond the one-year time

requirement embodied in Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). Moreover, the equitable relief he

seeks under the Court's decision in Hannah is not applicable. We therefore

affirm the May 31, 2024 order. In view of our disposition, we decline to

consider the merits of defendant's claim. See Brown, 455 N.J. Super. at 470.

Affirmed.

A-3314-23
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