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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Appeal of E. Sciulli ~ From Decision of City of Philadelphia Tax Review Board ~ Appeal of: E. Sciulli

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1623 C.D. 2023

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Unanimous Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeal of Egidio Sciulli :
:
From Decision of City of : No. 1623 C.D. 2023
Philadelphia Tax Review Board :
: Submitted: August 8, 2025
Appeal of: Egidio Sciulli :
:

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM FILED: March 24, 2026

Egidio Sciulli (Appellant) appeals from the order entered by the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) on December 14, 2023, which
affirmed a decision of the City of Philadelphia (City) Tax Review Board (Board)
denying Appellant’s challenge to water and sewer service assessments by the City
Water Revenue Department (Department). After careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND1
Appellant owns property at 1343 Ellsworth Street, Philadelphia, PA
19147 (Property), which is operated as a multi-family residential apartment building
with five units. For approximately two years, between July 2017 and October 2019,
an electronic transmitter on the Property malfunctioned and ceased sending water
usage data to the Department. During this time, the Department billed Appellant
based on estimated readings. Eventually, a Department technician reported to the
Property to install a new transmitter, and while there, the technician was able to
1
Unless otherwise stated, we base the factual background on the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) Opinion, which is supported by the record. See Trial Ct. Op., 5/16/24; see also Bd. Op.,
8/4/23.
manually read the meter and record the tenants’ actual water usage. These manual
readings reflected a higher usage, meaning that Appellant had been underbilled
during this period. Subsequently, the Department issued a corrective bill that back-
charged Appellant for the difference between the estimated and actual usage during
the period in which the transmitter was not functioning properly.
Appellant requested review of the adjusted assessments. On August 3,
2020, a hearing officer adjusted the bill for the period from July 17, 2017, through
December 18, 2019. Additionally, the interest fees were abated 100%.
Appellant appealed to the Board. Following a lengthy continuance, a
hearing was held on February 21, 2023. Although Appellant suggested that the
recorded usage was inconsistent with readings before and after the disputed period,
Appellant’s account history demonstrated fluctuating usage. Additionally,
Appellant posited that neighboring property owners may have been stealing water
during this period and that the Department should conduct an investigation.
However, Appellant offered no evidence in support of this theory. To the contrary,
Enrico Sciulli, a certified master plumber and the Appellant’s son, confirmed that
all water fixtures were working properly and that access to the Property’s meter room
was restricted.
Ultimately, the Board determined that the actual water meter reading
produced back-billing that was reasonable given the property type and a history of
usage fluctuations before and after the transmitter replacement. Accordingly, the
Board concluded that the back charges were appropriate. Nevertheless, the Board
abated 100% of the assessed penalties, contingent on Appellant’s entry into a

2
payment agreement within 30 days, because it found that Appellant had not acted in
bad faith or with negligence.2
Appellant appealed to the trial court.3 The trial court heard no new
evidence and, following argument, denied the appeal for lack of merit. Appellant
then timely appealed to this Court and filed a court-ordered Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a responsive opinion.
II. ISSUES
Appellant identifies three related issues for our review.4 First,
Appellant asserts a violation of his right to due process because he was denied

2
At the time of the hearing, Appellant owed $19,059.78 ($17,957.68 in principal and
$1,102.10 in penalties). Bd.’s Op. at 1 (unpaginated).
3
Appellant appealed to the trial court on April 4, 2023. All motions and Appellant’s brief
were due no later than September 5, 2023. See Trial Ct. Scheduling Order, 6/6/23. On September
8, 2023, Appellant belatedly filed a motion for extraordinary relief, seeking an extension for filing
his brief and suggesting that he would file his brief later that day. See Appellant’s Mot. for
Extraordinary Relief, 9/8/23. He did not. Nevertheless, the City’s motion to quash the appeal was
denied. See City’s Mot. to Quash, 9/12/23; Trial Ct. Order, 12/14/23. Eventually, Appellant filed
a brief, suggesting for the first time that a denial of discovery had violated his due process rights.
See Appellant’s Trial Ct. Br., 10/2/23, at 1; but see also Appellant’s Resp. to City’s Mot. to Quash,
9/15/23 (errantly asserting the purported denial of discovery in response to the City’s request to
dismiss this matter for Appellant’s dilatory conduct).
4
Although represented by counsel throughout these proceedings, Appellant has not developed
legal arguments in support of these issues, risking waiver. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument
shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head
of each part . . . the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of
authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 A.2d 580, 585 n.5 (Pa. 1998)
(holding that failure to develop issue in appellate brief results in waiver); Browne v. Dep’t of
Transp., 843 A.2d 429, 435 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (“At the appellate level, a party’s failure to include
analysis and relevant authority results in waiver.”). Appellant’s block quotations of statutory or
constitutional provisions merely articulate broad, general principles concerning access to the
courts and the availability of legal remedies, and, as such, are inapposite and provide no support
for Appellant’s claims. See Appellant’s Br. at 8-9 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 5101; Pa. Const. art. I, §
11; U.S. Const. art. VI, clause 2; and Pa.R.P.C. 3.4).
Nevertheless, we decline to find waiver on this ground because the issues raised are otherwise
waived or clearly meritless, but we must caution that appellate courts are “neither obliged, nor

3
discovery. See Appellant’s Br. at 2, 7. Second, according to Appellant, the trial
court erred when it referred him to the Freedom of Information Act5 as a means to
obtain the information needed to present his case rather than directing the
Department to provide him with the discovery needed. See id. at 2, 8. Third,
Appellant asserts that the trial court further erred by permitting opposing counsel to
be “unfair” by “denying discovery and telling the tribunal that Appellant’s argument
lacks merit.”6 See id. at 2, 9.
III. DISCUSSION
When a full record has been made before the Board, as it was in this
case, our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been
violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence. See Maggio v. Tax Rev. Bd. of City of
Phila., 674 A.2d 755, 756 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); 2 Pa.C.S. § 754(b). A full record is
defined as “a complete and accurate record of the testimony taken so that the
appellant is given a base upon which he may appeal and, also, that the appellate court
is given a sufficient record upon which to rule on the questions presented.” Kuziak
v. Borough of Danville, 125 A.3d 470, 475 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citation omitted).
Further, it is well settled that a utility customer who complains that he
has been overcharged bears the burden of proof. See Burleson v. Pa. Pub. Util.

even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for a party. To do so places the Court in the
conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 185
n.21 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).
5
5 U.S.C.A. § 552.
6
It is unclear what Appellant means by “unfair,” but Appellant asserts that opposing counsel’s
conduct violates Rule 3.4 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. See id. (mislabeling
this as a “[r]ule of [d]iscipline”); see also 204 Pa. Code r. 3.4. We decline to address this assertion.
Our Supreme Court has adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct and thereunder has inherent
and exclusive power to supervise and govern the conduct of the attorneys who practice law in this
Commonwealth. See Beyers v. Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082, 1091 (Pa. 2007).

4
Comm’n, 461 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Pa. 1983); see e.g., In re Cox (Pa. Cmwlth. 1574
C.D. 2018, filed Dec. 16, 2019), 2019 WL 6838026, at *6 (rejecting the claim that a
Philadelphia water customer was relieved of the obligation to pay a bill, purportedly
never received, because the customer had the burden to establish that the charges
assessed on the bill were incorrect); 210 Pa. Code § 69.414 (a). Here, Appellant does
not claim that he met this burden, see generally Appellant’s Brief, but rather asserts
that the purported denial of discovery prevented him from presenting a case. See id.
at 7.
As noted by the City, there is no evidence of record to support
Appellant’s claim. See City’s Br. at 9, 14; see generally C.R. To be clear, at no
point in these proceedings did Appellant formally request discovery, nor is there any
indication in the record that discovery was denied. As the Board hearing ended,
Appellant’s counsel made a brief statement requesting “all the documents that were
presented by the City,” to which counsel for the Department responded, “I will send
her everything that we showed today.” Notes of Testimony (N.T.) Bd. Hr’g,
2/21/23, at 48-49. Otherwise, the record merely includes several references to a
request that the Department investigate water usage at neighboring properties. See,
e.g., N.T. Bd. Hr’g at 23, 24, 25, 43, 44.
“Section 753(a) of the Local Agency Law incorporates the waiver
doctrine by requiring all legal questions be raised before the administrative agency
hearing the appeal.” Roomet v. Bd. of License & Inspection Rev., 928 A.2d 1162,
1165 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).7 Because Appellant did not raise a discovery issue
before the Board, we deem the issue waived. Id.

7
Section 753(a) provides:

5
Absent any waiver, Appellant’s claim is meritless. Essentially,
discovery is a process by which a party may obtain information “which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in a pending action.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.1; see
generally Pa.R.Civ.P. 4001-4025. It is well settled that “[h]earings before local
agencies are governed by the Local Agency Law, which does not provide for
discovery or application of the Rules of Civil Procedure.” Retirement Bd. of
Allegheny Cnty. v. Colville, 852 A.2d 445, 450 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004); see Appeal
of Borough of Churchill, 575 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1990); Rhodes v. Laurel Highlands Sch.
Dist., 544 A.2d 562, 564 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (rejecting an appellant’s due process
claim, premised upon an agency’s failure to answer interrogatories, because the
Local Agency Law does not provide for discovery).
Additionally, an appeal from an assessment by the Department is a
statutory appeal from a final decision of the Board to a court of common pleas. See
2 Pa.C.S. § 752; 42 Pa.C.S. § 933(a)(2). In such appeals, discovery rules are not
applicable. See Terminal Freight Handling Corp. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 790
2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001); Tanglewood Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v. Pike Cnty.,
642 A.2d 581, 582-83 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (concluding that in the context of tax
assessment appeal that discovery is permitted but not mandated and is left to the trial
court’s discretion); Pa.R.Civ.P. Nos. 4001, 1007. If a party requests that discovery

(a) General rule.--A party who proceeded before a local agency under the terms of
a particular statute, home rule charter, or local ordinance or resolution shall not be
precluded from questioning the validity of the statute, home rule charter or local
ordinance or resolution in the appeal, but if a full and complete record of the
proceedings before the agency was made such party may not raise upon appeal any
other question not raised before the agency (notwithstanding the fact that the
agency may not be competent to resolve such question) unless allowed by the court
upon due cause shown.
2 Pa.C.S. §753(a).

6
be conducted, that party must file a motion with the trial court. Terminal Freight
Handling Corp., 790 A.2d at 1071.
Here, Appellant first mentioned a need for discovery following his
statutory appeal to the trial court. See, e.g., Appellant’s Resp. to City’s Mot. to
Quash, 9/15/23 (“I believe a request for discovery is what is needed.”); N.T. Trial
Ct. Hr’g, 12/14/23, at 4 (“The essence of the appeal is that we’ve been denied from
the very beginning any discovery from the Water Department.”). However, even at
this late stage, Appellant never formally requested discovery. See generally C.R.
Finally, Appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred when it referred
Appellant to the Freedom of Information Act is devoid of merit and, frankly,
misrepresents the record. In opening remarks presented to the trial court, counsel
for Appellant asserted a denial of discovery, provided a summary of the facts,
reiterated Appellant’s request for an investigation, then ended her remarks as
follows:
[Appellant’s counsel]: What we have today is basically, I
think, a violation of the Freedom of Information Act. So
it is constitutional and we can go to the federal government
and that would be probably what our next step is.

[Trial Court]: Okay. Thank you. [City Counsel], your
response please.

N.T. Trial Ct. Hr’g at 6. Clearly, the trial court did not refer Appellant to the
Freedom of Information Act, as a potential remedy, a substitute for discovery, or for
any other reason.8

8
In light of Appellant’s invocation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Responsibility,
we caution Appellant’s counsel to remain mindful of an attorney’s duty of candor toward the
tribunal. See Pa. R. Pro. Conduct r. 3.3 (2024).

7
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s issues lack merit. Accordingly,
we affirm.

8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeal of Egidio Sciulli :
:
From Decision of City of : No. 1623 C.D. 2023
Philadelphia Tax Review Board :
:
Appeal of: Egidio Sciulli :
:

PER CURIAM

ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 2026, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County entered December 14, 2023, is AFFIRMED.