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Parental Rights Termination for D.S. Affirmed by Arizona Court

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Filed March 25th, 2026
Detected March 25th, 2026
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Summary

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's decision to terminate a mother's parental rights to her child, D.S. The termination was based on the mother's mental illness and the child's placement out of the home for fifteen months. The court reviewed the facts in favor of upholding the lower court's order.

What changed

The Arizona Court of Appeals, in a memorandum decision, affirmed the termination of Maria S.'s parental rights to her child, D.S. The termination was granted by the superior court on the grounds of the mother's mental illness and the child's fifteen months of out-of-home placement, pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) and (8)(c). The appellate court reviewed the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court's order.

This decision is non-precedential and may only be cited as authorized by Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c). While this is an appellate court decision, it does not create new regulatory obligations for regulated entities. Legal professionals involved in family law or child welfare cases may find this decision illustrative of how parental rights termination cases are handled and affirmed on appeal in Arizona.

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Top Caption [Combined Opinion

                  by Cynthia J. Bailey](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10814803/in-re-term-of-parental-rights-as-to-ds/#o1)

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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.S.

Court of Appeals of Arizona

Combined Opinion

                        by Cynthia J. Bailey

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0170
FILED 03-25-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD43029
The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley
By David W. Bell
Counsel for Appellant Maria S.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Marika J. Hodge
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda Adams
Counsel for Appellee D.S.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Maria S. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental
rights to D.S. (“Child”) on the statutory grounds of mental illness and
fifteen months’ out-of-home placement.1 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-
533(B)(3), (8)(c). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We review the facts in the light most favorable to upholding
the superior court’s order. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz.
547, 549, ¶ 7
(App. 2010).

¶3 Mother is the biological parent of Child, who was born in
2017. Mother has been determined to be seriously mentally ill (“SMI”) and
has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, anxiety, and depression. In May 2023, Mother voluntarily
checked herself in for inpatient psychiatric treatment, bringing Child with
her. The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) placed Child in a foster home
and filed a dependency petition based on Mother’s inability to care for
Child while in treatment.

¶4 The superior court found Child dependent and ordered a
family reunification case plan. After being discharged from inpatient
treatment, Mother moved to a transitional living center. DCS provided
Mother with various rehabilitative and reunification services, including
psychological consultations; a psychological evaluation; parenting skills
services, including Family Connections and the Nurturing Parenting
Program (“NPP”); and in-person and virtual supervised visitation. Child
remained in foster care throughout the dependency.

¶5 Mother participated in the services and worked to address her
mental health. Mother used two providers for SMI services. She also

1 The superior court also terminated the parental rights of the alleged
biological fathers, D.F. and John Doe. They are not parties to this appeal.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.
Decision of the Court

received three NPP referrals and twice participated in that program.
However, her case manager was concerned about Mother’s ability to
understand all the information in the NPP and the referrals were ultimately
closed. NPP provided several reasons for the closure, including that
Mother “showed regression from previous assessment scores,” “rel[ied] on
her daughter for emotional support multiple times,” and expressed that her
“idea of safety was keeping [Child] home full-time and not allowing her to
engage with others.”

¶6 Mother also participated in Family Connections, a service to
help Mother establish herself in a permanent home. Around this time,
Child asked to discontinue visits with Mother and the service was closed.
Child said Mother’s home was unclean and she felt unsafe there. Child was
participating in her own therapy at this time and had disclosed that she was
abused by individuals that Mother allowed into her home. DCS’s case
manager confirmed Mother’s inability to keep the home clean and noted a
particular occasion when she arrived to find the home in disarray and
animal feces on the sofa and floor.

¶7 The DCS case worker unsuccessfully tried to persuade Child
to resume in-person visits. In the meantime, a DCS unit psychologist
recommended, and DCS provided, virtual visits, but Child eventually
discontinued those as well. After the same DCS psychologist expressed
concern that further visits could traumatize Child and lead to a fracture in
her potential future relationship with Mother, DCS did not require Child to
attend virtual visits.

¶8 In April 2025, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental
rights on mental illness and fifteen months’ out-of-home placement
grounds, and the superior court held a termination adjudication hearing in
October 2025. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights that same
month on both grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(c). The court found
DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to provide Mother with
appropriate reunification services and that DCS proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination was in Child’s best
interests.

¶9 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 To terminate parental rights, the superior court must find
clear and convincing evidence of at least one statutory ground in A.R.S. §

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.
Decision of the Court

8-533(B) and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination
is in the child’s best interests. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz.
246, 249, ¶ 12
(2000); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005).
“The [superior] court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in
the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We will accept the
superior court’s findings unless no reasonable evidence supports those
findings, and we will affirm a termination order unless it is clearly
erroneous. See id.

¶11 On appeal, Mother argues clear and convincing evidence did
not support the statutory grounds for termination. Mother does not
challenge the court’s best-interests finding on appeal, and accordingly, we
accept the finding and do not address it further. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at
249, ¶ 13
.

¶12 To terminate parental rights for mental illness or mental
deficiency, the superior court must find that (1) the parent is unable to
discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness or a mental
deficiency and (2) reasonable grounds exist to believe the condition will
continue for a prolonged indeterminate period. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). Under
the fifteen months’ out-of-home placement ground, the court may
terminate a parent’s rights when (1) “[t]he child has been in an out-of-home
placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer
pursuant to court order or voluntary placement,” (2) “the parent has been
unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-
home placement,” and (3) “there is a substantial likelihood that the parent
will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and
control in the near future.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

¶13 Mother argues the State failed to provide her with
appropriate reunification services. Before terminating parental rights on
the mental illness ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), the court must find
that the State made reasonable efforts to provide “rehabilitative services
that could restore a mentally ill parent’s ability to care for a child within a
reasonable time.” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185,
191-92, ¶¶ 31, 34
(App. 1999). Similarly, before terminating on the fifteen-
months out-of-home placement ground, the court must find that the State
has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services.
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.
Decision of the Court

¶14 To show diligent efforts, DCS must provide the parent “with
the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help her
to become an effective parent.” Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227
Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 14
(App. 2011) (citation omitted). DCS should also
“maintain consistent contact with the parent” and “make reasonable efforts
to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult.” Donald W.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23, ¶ 50 (App. 2019). But DCS “is not
required to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent
participates in each service it offers.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-
501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994).

¶15 Mother contends she received inadequate support from one
mental health provider, which forced her to switch to a second provider.
She argues this lack of support cost her valuable rehabilitation time during
which she could have been receiving treatment. She attributes the delay
directly to her case manager’s failure to stay in contact with the service
providers. Indeed, the DCS case manager testified that her communication
with the mental health service providers was unreasonably low. Even so,
the superior court found the case manager repeatedly reached out to and
left messages for both service providers, indicating she sought to increase
communication with those providers. The court also found the case
manager “communicated with Mother in person, by phone and by text
messages;” “encouraged [Mother] to continue with her SMI mental health
services;” “worked with Mother in person to get Mother’s HUD application
done;” and “worked with community resources to fully furnish Mother’s
housing.” In addition, the court found DCS provided other rehabilitative
services to address Mother’s mental health, including referrals for the NPP
and Family Connections programs and psychological evaluations. The
record supports the court’s findings.

¶16 Mother also argues that DCS improperly ended Child’s
visitation with Mother. Child asked to end visitation because she felt
unsafe with Mother and Mother’s house was unclean. The case manager
encouraged Child to resume visits by reminding Child of positive
interactions Child had with Mother during past visits and “repeatedly
ask[ing] the Child about her willingness to visit Mother.” On the advice of
a DCS psychologist, the case manager recommended virtual visits to
continue contact between Child and Mother, and those visits occurred until
Child asked to discontinue them. DCS’s psychologist reported that Child
was stressed by Mother’s inappropriate comments and behaviors during
visitation and that Child was often emotionally and behaviorally
dysregulated after visitation. DCS chose not to require Child to resume
visits out of concern for potentially traumatizing Child, as Child had

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.
Decision of the Court

previously reported being abused while in Mother’s care and was engaged
with a therapist to increase her sense of safety and agency. The superior
court’s finding that DCS made reasonable efforts to support visitation and
acted reasonably in relying on the psychologist’s recommendation that
Child not be forced to continue visiting Mother is supported by the record.

¶17 Finally, Mother argues the court ignored evidence that her
mental health is improving and her diagnosed mental health conditions are
treatable, and that DCS was unaware of and did not adequately present the
progress she had made. To Mother’s credit, the DCS case manager testified
that Mother had made some of the behavioral changes required for a
reunification plan including that she secured and maintained stable
housing and cooperated with her mental health services. And the superior
court noted that it heard “a significant amount of testimony relative to the
efforts made by the DCS Case Manager to coordinate with Mother’s
behavioral health providers.” The court also found that the case manager
consulted more than she normally would with the DCS psychologist and
provided multiple referrals to Family Connections and NPP. The superior
court also considered evidence and testimony that Mother was
participating in treatment to the best of her ability but noted that
rehabilitation efforts had been ongoing for over two years and there was
still doubt as to whether Mother could safely parent Child. In the end, the
court found that “even if [the case manager] had been coordinating on a
daily basis with Mother’s mental health providers that Mother’s situation
would remain the same: given the severity of her mental illness, she is not
able to safely parent the Child.” The record supports the court’s findings.

¶18 The superior court did not err by terminating Mother’s
parental rights because reasonable evidence supports the court’s ruling that
DCS met its statutory burden on both grounds for termination. See A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(3), (8)(c).

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

6

Named provisions

Combined Opinion

Source

Analysis generated by AI. Source diff and links are from the original.

Classification

Agency
AZ Courts
Filed
March 25th, 2026
Instrument
Enforcement
Legal weight
Non-binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Minor
Document ID
No. 1 CA-JV 25-0170
Docket
1 CA-JV 25-0170

Who this affects

Applies to
Legal professionals
Activity scope
Child Welfare
Geographic scope
US-AZ US-AZ

Taxonomy

Primary area
Judicial Administration
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Family Law Child Welfare

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