Jump To

Top Caption [Combined Opinion

                  by Cynthia J. Bailey](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10814802/macneil-v-carter/#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

MacNeil v. Carter

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 25-0422 FC

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (19)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (64K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Cynthia J. Bailey

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

JOSEPH MACNEIL, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

CHRISTIE HAZEL CARTER, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0422 FC
FILED 03-25-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC 2022-093409
The Honorable Keith A. Miller, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Guymon Law, Chandler
By Joanna Amaris Medrano
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Adam C. Rieth, P.L.L.C., Mesa
By Adam C. Rieth
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
MACNEIL v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Joseph MacNeil (“Father”) appeals from the superior court’s
dissolution decree and its order on his motion to alter or amend. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Christie Carter (“Mother”) married in 2019. In
2022, Father petitioned for legal separation and the matter was later
converted to a dissolution proceeding. Soon after, Father moved for
temporary orders regarding legal decision-making and parenting time. The
superior court awarded Mother sole legal decision-making after finding
Father committed “a serious act of domestic violence against Mother . . .
and ha[d] not yet rebutted the presumption in [Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”)] [§] 25-403.03.” The court required Father’s parenting time be
supervised and ordered that he complete “a domestic violence perpetrators
class, regularly attend Alcoholics Anonymous, and regularly attend an
anger management class.” The court later modified its temporary order to
permit Father and Mother to exercise equal parenting time.

¶3 In July 2024, the superior court held a dissolution trial and
later issued a dissolution decree, awarding Mother sole legal decision-
making and ordering the parties to exercise equal parenting time. It also
ordered Father to pay child support; allocated the parties’ community and
separate real property, personal property, and debts; ordered Father to
make a $75,000 property equalization payment to Mother; and awarded
Mother a portion of her attorneys’ fees. Father timely moved to alter or
amend the decree, and the court modified only the parties’ winter-break
parenting time.

¶4 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(1) and (2).

2
MACNEIL v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Decision-Making

¶5 Father challenges the superior court’s award of sole legal
decision-making to Mother.

¶6 We review the superior court’s legal decision-making order
for an abuse of discretion. DeLuna v. Pettito, 247 Ariz. 420, 423, ¶ 9 (App.
2019). The court abuses its discretion “when the record is devoid of
competent evidence to support the decision, or when the court commits an
error of law in the process of reaching a discretionary conclusion.”
Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471, ¶ 4 (App. 2018) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). We review a court’s interpretation of
statutes de novo. Pima Cnty. v. Pima Cnty. Law Enf’t Merit Sys. Council, 211
Ariz. 224, 227, ¶ 13 (2005).

¶7 The court considers the best-interests factors in A.R.S. § 25-
403(A) when determining legal decision-making, including whether there
has been domestic violence pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-403.03. A.R.S. § 25-
403(A)(8). “In a contested legal decision-making . . . case, the court shall
make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the
reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child.” A.R.S. §
25-403(B). A court’s failure to make the required findings constitutes an
abuse of discretion. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 51, ¶ 11 (App. 2009).

¶8 Father contends the superior court erred by finding that he
committed “significant” domestic violence and by failing to “explain [or]
provide written findings” for its determination under A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(A).1 Father is mistaken.

¶9 Under A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A), the court cannot award joint
legal decision-making if it finds either “significant domestic violence” or “a
significant history of domestic violence.” A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A). The court
has “discretion to weigh the evidence and determine the degree of the

1 Father also maintains that he completed anger management classes and

alcohol abuse treatments, which means any finding of domestic violence
would not preclude equal parenting time. Because the superior court
awarded him equal parenting time on a 5-2-2-5 parenting time schedule, we
need not address his argument.

3
MACNEIL v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

domestic violence’s ‘significance’ for the purpose of § 25-403.03(A).”
DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 424, ¶ 15.

¶10 Here, the superior court evaluated the DeLuna factors and
determined Father’s acts “constituted significant domestic violence.” See
id. at ¶ 15 n.6 (listing three factors that the court may consider in
determining whether domestic violence is significant: 1) seriousness, 2)
frequency or pervasiveness, and 3) passage of time). The court found
“Mother credibly testified that Father violently held her down and
screamed at her while drunk” and that “Father threw things at her.” The
court also affirmed its previous findings that “[t]here were serious acts of
domestic violence perpetrated by Father against Mother that occurred
around the time of the parties’ separation.” The court’s previous finding
noted that “Father verbally abused Mother, smashed a vase of roses in her
presence, and choked her.”

¶11 Father argues the court failed to consider evidence as to 1) his
acquittal in a July 2022 domestic-violence criminal case, 2) the lack of
domestic violence since the parties separated, and 3) his allegation that
Mother committed domestic violence against him. But the decree includes
findings on these issues. The superior court found that 1) although Father’s
assault charge was dismissed, “the same facts supported” the order of
protection Mother obtained against Father, 2) there has “not been any
recurrence of domestic violence” since its temporary orders ruling, and 3)
Father’s allegation that Mother committed domestic violence against him
in an October 2022 incident “[did] not constitute domestic violence under
the statute.”

¶12 The court thus did not err in finding Father committed
significant domestic violence. Because we affirm the superior court’s
significant domestic violence finding, we need not address Father’s
remaining challenges to the court’s A.R.S. § 25-403 findings.

II. Property Division

¶13 We review the superior court’s division of community
property for an abuse of discretion. Bell-Kilbourn v. Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz.
521, 523, ¶ 4 (App. 2007). And we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to upholding the court’s ruling and will affirm the ruling if the
evidence reasonably supports it. Kohler v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106, 107, ¶ 2
(App. 2005).

¶14 “The [superior] court has broad discretion to equitably divide
assets and liabilities.” Hoobler v. Hoobler, 254 Ariz. 130, 137, ¶ 13 (App.

4
MACNEIL v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

2022). An equitable distribution of property “need not be . . . exactly equal,
but must result in substantial equality.” Miller v. Miller, 140 Ariz. 520, 522
(App. 1984).

A. The superior court did not err by denying Father’s waste claim
or his petition to find Mother in contempt of the preliminary
injunction.

¶15 Father contends the superior court erred by failing to find
Mother committed waste and by denying his reimbursement request for the
cost to repair damage to the marital residence. Relatedly, he argues the
court erred by awarding Mother $10,000 for the value of community
property he alleges she destroyed. He also argues the court erred by
denying his petition for enforcement and contempt which alleged that
Mother’s alleged waste and property destruction violated the preliminary
injunction.

¶16 The superior court may consider “excessive or abnormal
expenditures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition of
community [property]” as waste. A.R.S. § 25-318(C). The party alleging
waste bears the burden of establishing “that the other party’s disposition of
community property was ‘excessive or abnormal’ or constituted
‘destruction’ of the community property.” Goodell v. Goodell, 257 Ariz. 563,
571, ¶ 35 (App. 2024) (citation omitted).

¶17 Father testified he spent $25,000 to replace furniture and make
repairs for damage Mother caused to the marital residence but he provided
no other evidence of his expenditures. Mother denied Father’s damage
claim and testified that Father’s request was unreasonable because she left
bedding, furniture, and “newer appliances” at the house, and she asked the
court to order each party keep the property each had in their possession.
She also denied that she sold any community property from the residence.

¶18 The superior court did not explicitly rule on the waste issue
at the dissolution trial, and the dissolution decree was silent on the issue.
Any issue not ruled on by the superior court is deemed denied. See Birnstihl
v. Birnstihl, 243 Ariz. 588, 590, ¶ 4 (App. 2018) (citing Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Parr, 96 Ariz. 13, 15 (1964) (explaining motions not ruled
on are deemed denied)). “We will defer to the trial court’s determination
of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to give conflicting evidence.”
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347-48, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). Accordingly,
Father has shown no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of his marital
waste claim.

5
MACNEIL v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

¶19 Further, the court “decline[d] to enter any contempt finding
related to the condition that Mother left the marital residence after she was
ordered to vacate it.” We defer to the court’s credibility determinations and
the weight it gives to conflicting evidence. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 13.
Because the record supports the court’s denial of Father’s petition for
enforcement and contempt of the preliminary injunction, the court did not
abuse its discretion.

B. The superior court erred by denying Father’s Bobrow claim.

¶20 Father argues the superior court erred by not ordering Mother
to reimburse him for post-petition community expenses.

¶21 When a party uses his or her separate property to pay post-
petition community expenses, the court must account for the post-petition
payments “in an equitable property distribution.” Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241
Ariz. 592, 596, ¶ 19 (App. 2017). We assess the overall property allocation
to determine whether the denial of a party’s reimbursement claim for post-
petition mortgage payments is equitable. See Barron v. Barron, 246 Ariz. 580,
591, ¶¶ 43-44 (App. 2018), vacated in part on other grounds, 246 Ariz. 449.

¶22 Father first contends he should be reimbursed for post-
petition mortgage payments on the marital residence, which was
determined to be his sole and separate property. In his reply brief,
however, Father appears to withdraw this claim, requesting reimbursement
only for post-petition payments he made towards Mother’s health
insurance and car insurance.

¶23 In the joint pre-trial statement, Father requested
reimbursement for $2,684 in car insurance expenses and $6,886 in health
insurance expenses. At the dissolution trial, Father again requested
reimbursement for these payments. He testified he made post-petition
payments of $314 per month for Mother’s health insurance and $122 per
month for Mother’s car insurance. Father also listed these payments in his
Affidavit of Financial Information (“AFI”). Mother did not object to
Father’s car-insurance reimbursement request. She did, however, object to
his health-insurance reimbursement request, stating she requested to be
removed from Father’s health insurance because she “had alternative
health insurance.” But when she was cross-examined, she admitted she did
not “currently” have her own health insurance.

¶24 The superior court found the case did not present “a unique
set of facts or circumstances,” and “[t]herefore, an equal division of
community property is appropriate to achieve equity.” But it did not

6
MACNEIL v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

address Father’s request for reimbursement of post-petition health and car
insurance payments. Because the court made no express findings or rulings
as to Father’s Bobrow claim, his claim is deemed denied. See Birnstihl, 243
Ariz. at 590, ¶ 4. But the lack of findings leaves us unable to discern on
what basis the superior court denied the claim or whether the amount of
Father’s post-petition payments was included in its calculation of the
$75,000 property equalization payment it ordered Father to pay to Mother.

¶25 No reasonable evidence supports the court’s denial of
Father’s reimbursement request for these post-petition payments.
Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the court to rule on Father’s Bobrow
claim.

III. Father’s Alleged Ouster

¶26 Father contends he was entitled to his share of the fair rental
value of the marital residence during the 14 months after “he was ousted.”
Although Father raised the ouster argument in the joint pre-trial statement,
he presented no evidence that he was ousted or otherwise developed this
argument at trial and has therefore waived it on appeal. See BMO Harris
Bank N.A. v. Espiau, 251 Ariz. 588, 593-94, ¶ 25 (App. 2021) (stating that
arguments not raised at the trial court are waived on appeal); Cont’l Lighting
& Contracting Inc. v. Premier Grading & Utilities, LLC, 227 Ariz. 382, 386, ¶ 12
(App. 2011) (“[L]egal theories must be presented timely to the trial court so
that the court may have an opportunity to address all issues on their
merits.”). Father has shown no error.

IV. Temporary Spousal Maintenance Award

¶27 Father argues the court “erred [by] not retroactively vacating
its award of temporary spousal maintenance” to Mother after it denied her
request for spousal maintenance at the dissolution trial. He argues the court
had to vacate the temporary spousal maintenance order because it found
Mother was not entitled to spousal maintenance going forward. We
disagree.

¶28 “We review the court’s decision to modify the amount of
[spousal maintenance] for an abuse of discretion.” Maximov v. Maximov,
220 Ariz. 299, 300, ¶ 2 (App. 2009). The court abuses its discretion only
when the record, viewed most favorably to affirming, is “devoid of
competent evidence to support the decision.” Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518,
520, ¶ 5 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

7
MACNEIL v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

¶29 At the dissolution trial, Mother sought spousal maintenance
of $3,000 per month for 12 months. The decree affirmed the $1,800 per
month temporary spousal maintenance award to Mother, but the court
found that “no additional support is now needed.” At the temporary
orders hearing, Mother’s AFI indicated her business did not yield net
income. By the dissolution trial one year later, Mother’s updated AFI
showed her business income had increased to $3,640.61 per month. The
record supports the superior court’s conclusion that Mother’s ability to
meet her financial needs had changed since the temporary orders hearing.
Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the
temporary orders awarding Mother spousal maintenance.

V. Child Support

¶30 Father argues the superior court abused its discretion by
failing to account for Father’s daycare payments when it calculated child
support.2

¶31 We review child support determinations for an abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Berger, 140 Ariz. 156, 167 (App. 1983). The court
abuses its discretion only when the record, viewed most favorably to
affirming, is “devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.” Little,
193 Ariz. at 520, ¶ 5 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶32 Father testified that he paid $1,200 a month in childcare
expenses, and Mother confirmed this amount in her testimony. Father,
however, has cited no authority showing the court had to include these
costs in its child support calculation. And he concedes that the “inclusion
of daycare expenses is discretionary.” On this record, the superior court
did not abuse its discretion. See A.R.S. § 25-320 app. § III.B.4.a (“The
amount paid for childcare so a parent can work or seek employment may
be added to the Basic Child Support Obligation.” (emphasis added)).

VI. Mother’s Award of Partial Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

¶33 Father challenges the superior court’s award of attorneys’ fees
and costs to Mother.

2 In Father’s reply brief, he states that he also argued “that the child support

worksheet should have been retroactively modified to credit him for paying
the daycare fees.” He did not raise this issue in his opening brief; it is
therefore waived. See Muchesko v. Muchesko, 191 Ariz. 265, 268 (App. 1997).

8
MACNEIL v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

¶34 We review an award of attorneys’ fees made under A.R.S.
§ 25-324 for an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Berger, 140 Ariz. at
167. The court abuses its discretion if it commits an error of law in making
a discretionary decision. In re Marriage of Williams, 219 Ariz. 546, 548, ¶ 8
(App. 2008).

¶35 To award attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 25-324, a court must
consider 1) the financial resources of the parties and 2) the reasonableness
of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings. A.R.S.
§ 25-324(A). The superior court expressly considered each.

¶36 Father contests the superior court’s finding that he had
considerably more resources available than Mother. Father argues the
court should have considered Mother’s other financial resources including
“her IRA account and Canadian investments,” her business worth $100,000,
and the $75,000 property equalization payment. Father testified to the
Canadian investments but did not know their value. And he introduced a
screenshot of the balance in Mother’s IRA account. Father contends the
court did not consider this evidence, but we presume the court fully
considered the relevant evidence in reaching its decision. See In re Marriage
of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. at 410, ¶ 21. Further, Father omits that he also received a
business worth $100,000.

¶37 As to the equalization payment, Father disregards that this
payment includes the amount awarded to Mother based on the Drahos
calculations for four residential properties at issue in the dissolution. See
Saba v. Khoury, 253 Ariz. 587, 592, ¶ 15 (2022) (holding the Drahos formula
“properly recognizes the nature of the separate property as separate while
apportioning a fair and equitable reimbursement to the community.”).
Father provides no case law, and we have found none, requiring the court
to consider a community property equalization payment as income for
attorneys’ fees purposes.

¶38 As to their incomes, Mother’s AFI showed she earned
$3,640.61 per month, while the joint pre-trial statement indicated Father
earned $9,000.00 per month.

¶39 Father also argues Mother did not qualify for attorneys’ fees
due to her unreasonable actions. The court found both parties acted
unreasonably, noting each took aggressive positions that prolonged the
case. It further found neither party fully prevailed on the merits, and it
awarded Mother only a portion of her attorneys’ fees and costs. “[A]n
applicant need not show both a financial disparity and an unreasonable

9
MACNEIL v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

opponent in order to qualify for consideration for an award.” Magee v.
Magee, 206 Ariz. 589, 591, ¶ 8 n.1 (App. 2004).

¶40 The superior court’s findings and conclusions are supported
by the evidence, and the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
Mother a portion of her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

VII. Denial of Father’s Motion to Alter or Amend

¶41 Father next argues the court erred by denying his motion to
alter or amend. He re-urges his arguments on legal decision-making, his
Bobrow and waste claims, the denial of his request to retroactively modify
the temporary spousal maintenance award, the failure to include daycare
expenses in the child support calculations, and the award of attorneys’ fees
to Mother. Based on our holding, supra Section II.B., the court erred by
denying Father’s motion to alter or amend regarding his Bobrow claims for
paying Mother’s health insurance and car insurance. The court, however,
did not err in denying Father’s motion to alter or amend as to the other
arguments discussed, supra Sections I, II.A, IV, V, and VI.

VIII. Holiday Parenting Time Order

¶42 Mother’s birthday is on December 25. Father argues the
superior court’s order is unclear as to Christmas Day parenting time in the
years in which the court awarded Mother parenting time with Child on her
birthday. The court later corrected the parenting time order to state that “in
years that Petitioner has the First Segment of Winter Break, her parenting
time extends until 6:00 p.m. on Christmas Day,” despite Father being the
Petitioner. It is unclear whether the court intended to award this time to
Father or Mother. Nor did the court amend its award of parenting time on
the parties’ birthdays. The order is therefore inconsistent regarding
parenting time on Christmas Day and Mother’s birthday. We therefore
remand for the superior court to clarify the parties’ Christmas Day and
birthday parenting time.

IX. Attorneys’ Fees

¶43 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on
appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. After considering the parties’ financial
resources and the reasonableness of their positions, we decline to award
attorneys’ fees to either party. We also decline to award costs because
neither party fully prevailed. Valento v. Valento, 225 Ariz. 477, 484, ¶ 25
(App. 2010) (declining to award costs to either party because both parties
prevailed in part).

10
MACNEIL v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶44 We affirm the decree except for the rulings related to Father’s
Bobrow claims and the parties’ Christmas Day and birthday parenting time,
see supra Sections II.B and VIII, which we vacate and remand for
proceedings consistent with this decision.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

11