P K Varun vs Punjab National Bank - Disciplinary Action Challenge

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P K Varun vs Punjab National Bank on 25 March, 2026

Author: Sanjeev Narula

Bench: Sanjeev Narula

• IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on: 20th February, 2026. Pronounced on: 25th March, 2026. Uploaded on: 25th March, 2026. + W.P.(C) 7894/2018 & CM APPL. 30275/2018 P K VARUN .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Rajinder Gulati and Mr. I. P. Singh, Advocates with Petitioner in person. versus PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK .....Respondent Through: Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, Ms. Likivi K. Jakhalu and Mr. Deepanjal Choudhary, Advocates. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA JUDGMENT SANJEEV NARULA, J.:

1.     This petition challenges the disciplinary order dated 31st October,
   

   2017 imposing the major penalty of "dismissal which shall ordinarily be a
   disqualification for future employment" under the Punjab National Bank
   Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977, and the
   appellate order dated 28th March, 2018 affirming it. Consequentially, the
   Petitioner seeks directions for release of terminal dues, including gratuity
   beyond the statutory ceiling, leave encashment and pensionary benefits.
   Facts

2.     The Petitioner joined the Bank on 29th December, 1980. At the
   

   relevant time from 21st May, 2012 to 21st April, 2015, he was serving as
   Assistant General Manager and incumbent-in-charge at Branch Office1:
   1
   "BO"
   Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 1 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 MCB, Brady House, Mumbai.

1.   On 26th July, 2017, the Petitioner was served with a charge-sheet
                     under Regulation 6 initiating major penalty proceedings. The article of
                     charge was framed as a single, omnibus head: while sanctioning credit
                     facilities to various borrowers, the Petitioner allegedly failed to exercise due
                     diligence, departed from the Bank's guidelines, did not ensure a proper pre-
                     sanction appraisal, and did not ensure effective post-sanction monitoring and
                     follow-up, thereby jeopardising the Bank's interest. The statement of
                     imputations then enumerated the allegations by cataloguing a series of
                     asserted lapses across five borrower accounts: Plymouth Multiventure Pvt.
                     Ltd., Gopal Masterbatch Pvt. Ltd., Vision Machines Pvt. Ltd., K.V. Alloys
                     and Basil Resources Pvt. Ltd.
   

2.   A departmental enquiry followed. The Enquiry Officer submitted the
                     report on 18th October, 2017. This report recorded a mix of "proved", "partly
                     proved" and "not proved" findings across several sub-items of the
                     imputations. The Petitioner furnished a representation to the report.
   

3.   On 31st October, 2017, the Disciplinary Authority awarded the major
                     punishment of dismissal. The impugned order is account-wise and detailed.
                     It records, among other things, failures attributed to the Petitioner at the
                     sanction stage (such as accepting projections, not ensuring specified
                     documents, not drawing or considering certain reports) and failures at the
                     monitoring stage (such as stock verification, routing of sales, QMS/PMS
                     related financial monitoring, and follow-up on adverse visit reports). The
                     same order also recorded that two other charge-sheets dated 31st July, 2017
                     and 27th October, 2017 would be kept in abeyance, with liberty reserved to
                     reopen if considered necessary.
   

Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 2 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 6. The Petitioner's departmental appeal came to be rejected by order
dated 28th March, 2018. While affirming the penalty, the Appellate Authority
declined to accept the plea that several lapses were merely "operational" and
attributable to processing officials. It confirmed the findings that as the
incumbent-in-charge, the Petitioner remained responsible for ensuring
compliance with the Bank's applicable guidelines.

1. The dismissal order was made on the very date of the Petitioner's superannuation, with the consequence that his terminal benefits have been withheld.

Petitioner's submissions:

1. Mr. Rajinder Gulati, counsel for the Petitioner, has mounted a multi- pronged challenge, directed both at the integrity of the enquiry process and at the sustainability of the punishment. In substance, the submissions are these:

8.1. The case is one of "no evidence", or at least findings so perverse that
no reasonable enquiry officer could have arrived at them. The Bank chose
not to examine any management witness even though the imputations
traverse disputed factual terrain across multiple borrower accounts. The
enquiry was reduced to marking documents through the Presenting Officer
without proving them through any competent witness. The documents were
neither proved nor admitted, yet were treated as evidence to sustain serious
findings across multiple accounts.

8.2. The enquiry report contains several contradictions demonstrating
perversity. The Enquiry Officer acknowledged, in substance, that the
Presenting Officer had not produced evidence in support of certain
imputations, yet proceeded to hold those imputations proved or partly Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 3 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 proved. Such findings constitute "no evidence" conclusions warranting
interference even within the limited scope of Article 226. 8.3. On procedure, it is argued that the enquiry violated the Bank's
statutory framework, particularly Regulation 6(3) of the PNB Officer
Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977. The charge-sheet
did not supply the list of relied-upon documents along with copies thereof,
nor the list of witnesses with copies of their statements as mandated. The
proviso permitting inspection cannot justify non-supply, and a charge-sheet
lacking the documentary and witness details undermines the defence at
inception.

8.4. Invoking Regulation 6(21), it is contended that the enquiry report
does not record clear findings on the article of charge itself but instead
moves through various sub-items without clearly determining what precisely
stood proved. Given that the charge framed is an omnibus allegation of lack
of diligence and monitoring across several accounts, it is argued that the
enquiry report and disciplinary order were required to record clear findings
linking proved material to the ingredients of the charge.
8.5. Reliance was also placed on Regulation 6(17). Since the Petitioner
neither examined himself nor led defence evidence, the Inquiring Authority
was required to question him generally on the circumstances appearing
against him so as to afford an opportunity of explanation. The failure to do
so deprived the Petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to respond.
8.6. The disciplinary and appellate orders are non-speaking and lacking
meaningful engagement with the defence. The disciplinary order proceeds
on a general narrative of lapses without addressing his principal defence
regarding the division of responsibilities in a specialized credit branch. The Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 4 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 appellate order largely affirms the conclusions in summary fashion without
addressing specific objections raised in appeal.

8.7. On the question of responsibility, reliance is placed on the Bank's
staff accountability framework, particularly IAD Circular No. 24/2013.
Petitioner's argument is that where proposals are processed by desk officers
and thereafter recommended by the designated recommending authority, the
sanctioning authority is entitled to act on those inputs within their proper
remit. Many of the alleged lapses relate to post-sanction operational
monitoring, including stock verification, DP workings, QMS data, routing of
transactions and follow-up on statements, which ordinarily fall within the
responsibilities of the credit department and portfolio officials at the branch.
8.8. The impugned disciplinary action effectively penalizes commercial
judgement. Reliance was placed on the principle in Union of India v. J.
Ahmed2 that misconduct cannot be established merely based on errors of
judgement or negligence short of culpable delinquency. Even assuming
certain deficiencies existed, those would amount at most to procedural
lapses or bona fide commercial judgement, particularly in the absence of any
finding of dishonesty, personal gain, or moral turpitude.
8.9. Delay is an independent infirmity in the impugned action. The alleged
lapses relate to the Petitioner's tenure between 21st May, 2012 and 21st April,
2015, whereas the charge-sheet was issued on 26th July, 2017, shortly before
his retirement. This belated action caused serious prejudice. Reliance was
placed on Inspection and Control Circular No. 23/99, which envisages that
the successor incumbent should identify and report irregularities within a
stipulated period. Reviving old matters after that period is contrary to the Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 5 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 Bank's own control and inspection regulatory framework.
8.10. The Petitioner further submits that, having regard to his grade and the
nature of the allegations, the matter bore a vigilance angle and attracted the
discipline of consultation contemplated under Regulation 19. According to
him, the procedure adopted fell short of the safeguards ordinarily associated
with such cases, including consultation with the Central Vigilance
Commission before major penalty proceedings were set in motion.
8.11. The impugned action is also assailed on grounds of proportionality
and parity. The Petitioner submits that he alone was visited with the severest
penalty, while other officials involved in processing and recommending the
same proposals were, at least in some instances, visited only with minor
penalties such as censure. According to him, this disparity is left
unexplained by any rational distinction. He further points out that he was
dismissed on the last day of service, with the foreseeable consequence of
denying of depriving him of pensionary and other terminal benefits. That
cascading civil consequence is a relevant factor while judging whether the
penalty is excessive in relation to the nature of proved misconduct.
8.12. On terminal benefits, it is argued that the Bank's approach proceeds
on the erroneous assumption that dismissal automatically extinguishes all
post-service entitlements. Gratuity is governed by the Payment of Gratuity
Act, 1972, and forfeiture is permissible only in the limited circumstances
contemplated under Section 4(6), none of which is alleged or proved in the
present case. Further, leave encashment is an accrued monetary right
protected from arbitrary deprivation under Article 300A. 8.13. Pension is pressed as a deferred entitlement earned by long service, 2 (1979) 2 SCC 286.

Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 6 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 invoking the property principle and placing reliance on State of Jharkhand
v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava.3 At the very least, the Bank must justify
denial by pinpointing the precise enabling regulation and by passing a
reasoned decision.

Respondent's submissions:

1.    Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, counsel for the Respondent Bank,
                     opposes the writ petition principally on the ground that it invites this Court
                     to sit as an appellate forum over a departmental enquiry. Relying on the
                     settled limits of judicial review in disciplinary matters, it is urged that the
                     enquiry was conducted by a competent authority in accordance with the
                     D&A Regulations and that the findings rest on material on record, rendering
                     reappreciation impermissible. Mr. Gautam also contends that the petition
                     does not plead any specific breach of mandatory regulations with
                     demonstrated prejudice, and that allegations of mala fides are legally
                     untenable in the absence of impleadment of concerned officials in personal
                     capacity. It is further submitted that several objections now raised by the
                     Petitioner were never urged during the course of the departmental enquiry
                     and therefore cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in writ
                     proceedings.
   

2.   On merits, Mr. Gautam submits that the proved lapses span five
                     borrower accounts, involve serious failures in credit appraisal and
                     monitoring, and have resulted in substantial exposure and an apprehended
                     loss quantified at approximately INR 31.84 crore. It is urged that the defence
                     of "operational lapses" attributable to processing officials was considered
                     and rightly rejected by the disciplinary and appellate authorities as the 3 (2013) 12 SCC 210.
   

Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 7 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 Petitioner, being incumbent-in-charge and sanctioning authority, carried an
overarching responsibility to ensure compliance with applicable guidelines.

1. Mr. Gautam further argues that disciplinary action had also been taken against other officials involved in the concerned accounts, and therefore the allegation of discriminatory treatment is unfounded. Further, it is stated that vigilance consultation was duly undertaken and that terminal benefits were released strictly to the extent admissible under the governing statutory and service-regulatory framework, the Petitioner having been paid gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act while other benefits, including pension, were not admissible consequent upon dismissal from service. Discussion and analysis:

The limits of judicial review
12. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 does not convert the High
Court into an appellate forum over disciplinary proceeding. A departmental
enquiry is not re-tried, nor is the evidence re-weighed as if the Court were
hearing a statutory appeal. Judicial review against disciplinary decisions
remains directed to the legality of the decision-making process, not to the
merits of the conclusion as such. Interference is warranted where the enquiry
is vitiated by jurisdictional error, where the prescribed procedure is violated
in a manner causing prejudice, where principles of natural justice are
breached, or where findings are based on no evidence or are so irrational
that no reasonable authority could have reached them.4

1. The same restraint extends to the penalty imposed. The Court does not supplant the disciplinary authority's discretion merely because another 4 B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749; Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava (2021) 2 SCC 612.

Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 8 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 punishment might also have been possible on the same facts. Judicial
interference is justified only where the penalty is so disproportionate to the
misconduct proved that it shocks the conscience. Even then, the usual course
is to remit the issue of penalty for reconsideration, while leaving findings
undisturbed.5
"No evidence" challenge and the complaint that documents were proved
only through the Presenting Officer

1. The Petitioner's primary attack on the findings is that the case is one
                     of "no evidence". That contention requires careful scrutiny, for even within
                     the narrow limits of judicial review, a disciplinary finding cannot be
                     sustained if it rests on no material at all or on material so insubstantial that
                     no reasonable enquiry authority could have acted upon it.
   

2. The charge-sheet dated 26th July, 2017 is structured as an umbrella
                     article of charge, supported by a detailed statement of imputations across
                     five borrower accounts. The imputation statement itself is fact-heavy and
                     documentary-centric. The disciplinary order dated 31st October, 2017 and
                     the appellate order dated 28th March, 2018 show that the case against the
                     Petitioner was evaluated through the Bank's internal records and account
                     conduct, including sanction notes and stipulations, stock statements and their
                     absence, visit reports, QMS and PMS compliance and follow-up, CIBIL and
                     other CIC reports, MCA extracts, collateral and legal documentation, and
                     transaction trails bearing on routing of sales and end-use monitoring.
   

3. A departmental enquiry is not governed by the strict rules of the [Evidence Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1953529/). The test is whether there is material which a reasonable 5 [Jai Bhagwan v. Commissioner of Police](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/173699115/) (2013) 11 SCC 187; [Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism
                     Development Corpn. Ltd.](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/155010/) (2003) 8 SCC 9.
   

Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 9 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 person may act upon and whether fair opportunity is afforded. A finding is
vitiated for want of evidence only where it rests on mere suspicion,
conjecture, or a complete absence of supporting material. On the record
here, the findings are not of that kind. The enquiry proceeded on a defined
documentary trail. The defence of the Petitioner, as noted in the proceedings
and noticed in the disciplinary and appellate orders, is not founded on a plea
that the record was altogether non-existent. His case, rather, is that several of
the matters now treated as lapses were routine operational decisions and fell
within the remit of processing officials or credit portfolio functionaries, and
that certain other requirements had either been complied with or were not
obligatory in the manner alleged. The dispute, therefore, is not about a
vacuum of material, but about the conclusions sought to be drawn from that
material, the attribution of responsibility, and the sufficiency of compliance.

1. The Petitioner has emphasized that the Presenting Officer examined no management witnesses and that documents were "not proved" because they were marked through the Presenting Officer. That submission, in the abstract, has force in cases where disputed primary facts can only be established by oral testimony and the enquiry proceeds solely on untested papers. The present record, however, reflects an enquiry grounded in Bank records, account operation, inspection material, and contemporaneous internal documentation. In Banking disciplinary matters, the evidentiary foundation often lies in records rather than in viva voce accounts of events. The absence of management witnesses does not, by itself, render the findings unsupported, unless the delinquent demonstrates that essential facts could not have been established without oral testimony and that the denial of such testimony caused prejudice.

Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 10 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 18. The Petitioner's grievance that the documents were only exhibited
through the Presenting Officer must likewise be assessed in proper context.
The Respondent is correct in principle in submitting that any objection to the
admissibility of a document, or to the mode of its proof, ought to have been
taken at the stage when the document was introduced into the enquiry
record, so that the enquiry authority could rule upon it in the course of
proceedings. In the absence of a demonstrated contemporaneous objection
and a demonstrated refusal to consider it, the writ court does not ordinarily
set aside the enquiry by treating all exhibited records as non-existent. A
departmental enquiry is tested by fairness, not by the rigid evidentiary rules
applicable to a criminal trial.

1. The enquiry must also be viewed in its correct juridical setting. This Court does not function as an appellate forum to reclassify each imputation as proved or not proved on a fresh appreciation of the record. The question is narrower: whether there existed some material capable of supporting the conclusions reached, and whether those conclusions lie within the permissible range of reason. Judged on that standard, the findings returned in the present case cannot be condemned as findings based on "no evidence", nor can they be said to be so unreasonable that no fair-minded disciplinary authority could have reached them.

The Petitioner's procedural objections under the D&A Regulations

1. Regulation 6(3): The Petitioner also alleges non-supply of documents
   and the list of witnesses contemplated by Regulation 6(3). The Respondent
   controverts this by asserting that the charge-sheet was accompanied by the
   relevant annexures, including the list of supporting documents and
   witnesses. Even assuming some arguable deficiency in supply, that Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 11 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 circumstance would not, by itself, vitiate the enquiry unless real prejudice is
   shown. In service jurisprudence, procedural lapses are not treated as self-
   executing nullities; the Court must see whether the delinquent was in fact
   disabled from effectively meeting the case against him.6 In the present
   matter, the pleadings do not identify, with the necessary specificity, any
   particular document relied upon for an adverse finding that was withheld
   from the Petitioner, nor do they show that any request for inspection or
   copies was refused in a manner that impaired the defence. The objection,
   therefore, remains general and detached from demonstrated prejudice, and
   cannot, on that basis alone, unsettle the concluded enquiry.

2. Regulation 6(21): The challenge based on Regulation 6(21) is
   likewise unpersuasive. Although the charge-sheet is cast in the form of a
   single overarching article of charge, the enquiry report does not stop at a
   bare conclusion. It examines the supporting imputations item-wise, classifies
   them as proved, partly proved, or not proved, and then records that the
   article of charge stands established to that extent. The disciplinary order
   proceeds on the same footing. The form of expression may not be ideal, and
   a more neatly structured formulation would certainly have been preferable.
   However, Regulation 6(21) is concerned with the existence of findings, not
   with elegance of draftsmanship. Where the report and the final orders
   sufficiently disclose what was held against the delinquent, and to what
   extent, it cannot be said that there was a failure to return findings in law.

3. Regulation 6(17): The challenge based on Regulation 6(17) also does
   not merit acceptance. The Petitioner submits that the Enquiry Officer was
   bound to generally question the charged officer on the circumstances 6 Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727.

Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 12 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 emerging from the evidence. Even if the provision is read literally, its breach
does not automatically invalidate the enquiry. As noted before, the crucial
question remains whether any real prejudice ensued. For that purpose, the
Petitioner was required to identify the specific incriminating circumstance
that called for explanation, state what clarification he was prevented from
offering, and show how the omission affected the fairness of the
proceedings. No such foundation has been laid. Conversely, the record
shows that the Petitioner submitted a written defence, participated in the
enquiry, and filed a representation to the enquiry report. In those
circumstances, the alleged omission complained of cannot, by itself, be
treated as a denial of opportunity sufficient to vitiate the enquiry.
Delay and the reliance on Inspection and Control Circular No. 23/99

1. The Petitioner's tenure at the branch ended on 21st April, 2015. The
   charge-sheet issued on 26th July, 2017. A time gap exists, but delay is not
   fatal per se. To invalidate proceedings, delay must be oppressive and
   demonstrably prejudicial. The Petitioner's prejudice plea remains general.

2. Circular No. 23/99, as relied upon, concerns internal inspection
   architecture and successor responsibility. It cannot be read as a limitation
   provision that extinguishes disciplinary jurisdiction after six months. The
   circular itself contemplates that serious irregularities may surface later. The
   Petitioner's argument on this circular therefore does not furnish a ground to
   strike down the proceedings.

Regulation 19 and the Central Vigilance Commission angle

1. The Petitioner further relies on Regulation 19 and the Central Vigilance Commission framework to contend that the disciplinary process was procedurally defective. The Respondent, however, maintains that Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 13 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 vigilance consultation was obtained at the requisite stages and that the appointment of a Commissioner for Departmental Enquiries lay within the discretion of the CVC, which did not, in the present case, advise adoption of that course. The record, as it stands, does not disclose any violation of a mandatory statutory prescription on this count. Equally, no real prejudice is shown to have resulted to the Petitioner by reason of the course adopted. The objection, therefore, does not furnish a ground to invalidate the enquiry or the orders passed thereon.

Whether the punishment warrants interference on proportionality

1. The petition, even if it fails on the "findings" challenge, still raises a
   distinct question on penalty. The proportionality question turns on whether
   the penalty of dismissal, on these findings, is so excessive that it crosses the
   "shock the conscience" threshold.

2. Several features of the case bear on that assessment. The misconduct
   found established is framed as lapses in credit appraisal, due diligence, and
   monitoring across five accounts. The record does not proceed on allegations
   of bribery, personal gain, or moral turpitude. The Bank emphasises
   seriousness, and it is right to do so because failures in credit discipline can
   imperil public money. Still, the character of misconduct remains relevant
   while weighing penalty.

3. The Petitioner has long service since 29th December, 1980. Dismissal
   was imposed on 31st October, 2017, the last day of service, with an
   acknowledged cascading impact on terminal benefits under the Bank's
   regime. That consequence is a relevant consideration in proportionality.

4. The plea of parity also cannot be brushed aside as irrelevant.
   Annexure R-3, filed by the Respondent, shows that Shri Raushan Saraf, Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 14 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 Senior Manager (Credit), connected with the K.V. Alloys credit episode,
   was proceeded against under minor penalty proceedings and ultimately
   visited only with "censure". No doubt, parity in service law is not a matter
   of mechanical equivalence, and the sanctioning authority may stand on a
   different footing from a processing official. But that does not absolve the
   disciplinary authority of the duty to explain why, within the same cluster of
   credit transactions, one officer is visited with the ultimate penalty of
   dismissal while another is dealt with far more lightly. The requirement is not
   of identical punishment, but of rational and reasoned differentiation. The
   appellate order's observation that the Petitioner, as incumbent-in-charge,
   was "equally responsible" may justify sustaining the finding of misconduct;
   it does not, by itself, furnish a satisfactory answer to the separate question
   why dismissal, with all its grave civil consequences, was warranted in his
   case despite the comparative penalty material on record.

5. The Respondent also highlights the apprehended loss to the Bank. The
   seriousness of financial exposure is undoubtedly a relevant factor,
   particularly in the disciplinary framework of a public sector bank. Even so,
   proportionality is not determined by the quantum of loss in the abstract.
   What matters is whether the penalty order reflects an application of mind to
   the misconduct actually found proved, the degree and level of responsibility
   attributable to the delinquent officer, and the comparative treatment of
   others involved in the same transaction set. Here, the enquiry did not return
   an across-the-board finding of guilt; it recorded a combination of proved,
   partly proved, and not proved imputations. In that backdrop, imposition of
   penalty required a closer calibration than the impugned orders presently
   reveal.

Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 15 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 31. At the same time, a writ court does not sit to impose what it considers
the more appropriate penalty. The choice of punishment remains primarily
for the disciplinary authority. Judicial intervention is confined to cases
where the punishment appears so disproportionate as to call for correction
within the narrow limits of review. The accepted course in such a situation is
to remit the matter for reconsideration of penalty, while leaving the findings
of misconduct intact.

1. Counsel for the Petitioner stated during oral hearing that the Petitioner would accept any lesser major penalty of "Compulsory Retirement", if that course were considered appropriate by the competent authority, so that the controversy may be brought to a close. This Court is not suggesting any particular punishment. Nonetheless, this submission is noted only to underscore that, at the stage of reconsideration, the competent authority must bear in mind the Petitioner's aforesaid statement, and shall also take into account his advanced age, length of service, and the absence of any prior record of misconduct. The authority must also give due weight to the fact that the penalty of dismissal was imposed on the last day of his service, carrying severe consequences, including the forfeiture of his entire retiral benefits, thereby leaving him without financial support at this stage of his life.

Conclusion

1. In light of the above discussion, the competent authority shall reconsider the punishment afresh, keeping in view the Petitioner's role vis-à- vis other officials in the same credit chain, and shall pass a fresh, reasoned order within a period of six weeks from today. If the Petitioner remains aggrieved by the decision so taken, he shall be at liberty to avail remedies in Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 16 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31 accordance with law.

Consequential consideration of terminal benefits

1. Since the matter is being remitted on penalty, the entitlement position
   on terminal benefits under the Bank's service framework must follow the
   final outcome on penalty. The Respondent's present stance rests
   substantially on the proposition that the Petitioner has not superannuated and
   is dismissed from service. If the penalty changes, the consequential
   entitlements would require fresh determination under the applicable
   regulations and circulars.

2. So far as statutory gratuity is concerned, the field is occupied by the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Any forfeiture must answer to Section 4(6) of that Act and cannot be assumed as a routine incident of dismissal. Since
   the present judgment does not undertake an adjudication of that statutory
   claim on merits, it is left open to the Petitioner to avail of such remedies as
   may be open in law in respect thereof. It is clarified that no concluded
   opinion is being expressed on that issue.

3. Accordingly, the petition, along with pending application(s), if any, is
   disposed of.

SANJEEV NARULA, J
MARCH 25, 2026/hc Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ANITA BAITAL W.P.(C) 7894/2018 Page 17 of 17 Signing Date:25.03.2026 18:53:31