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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

CPC Parts Delivery, L.L.C. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp.

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 1058
• Docket Number: 25AP-403; 25AP-406; 25AP-408

• Judges: Dingus

• Opinion

• Authorities (19)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (20.6K)

• PDF

Syllabus

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's motions for summary judgment. Because appellants cannot show that they were treated differently than a party similarly situated in all relevant respects, their equal protection claims fail. Judgments affirmed.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as CPC Parts Delivery, L.L.C. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., 2026-Ohio-1058.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CPC Parts Delivery, LLC, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 25AP-403
(Ct. of Cl. No. 2022-00515JD)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

Mahle Behr Dayton, LLC, et al., :

Plaintiffs-Appellants, : Nos. 25AP-406 and 25AP-408
(Ct. of Cl. No. 2021-00706JD)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on March 26, 2026

On brief: Poling Law, Jennifer L. Myers, and John B. Bauer,
for appellant, CPC Parts Delivery, LLC.
On brief: Reminger Co., L.P.A., Ronald Fresco, Evan M.
Schantz, and Brianna M. Prislipsky, for appellant, Mahle
Behr Dayton, LLC. Argued: Brianna M. Prislipsky.
On brief: Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, James D. Abrams,
and Lauren A. Kemp, for appellee. Argued: James D.
Abrams.

APPEALS from the Court of Claims of Ohio

DINGUS, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, CPC Parts Delivery, LLC (“CPC”) and Mahle Behr
Dayton, LLC (“Mahle”) (collectively “appellants”), appeal from a decision of the Court of
Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 2

Claims of Ohio granting the motions for summary judgment of defendant-appellee, Bureau
of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} This is the second appeal before this court in these consolidated cases. In the
prior appeal, this court summarized the procedural history of these matters as follows:
These consolidated appeals arise from two cases filed in the
Court of Claims by appellants against BWC. The first case (No.
2021-00706JD) involves both CPC and Mahle, wherein
appellants challenged the methodology utilized by BWC to
calculate the amounts of premium rebates issued to certain
employers participating in the Ohio Bureau of Workers’
Compensation Fund (the “State Fund”) established to
compensate workers injured on the job for the policy years
ending June 30, 2012, 2013, and 2016. That case was originally
filed in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas but
was ultimately dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Mahle Behr Dayton,
LLC v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2021-Ohio-145 (2d
Dist.). Therein, the appellate court held that
appellants’ suit against BWC was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Ohio Court of Claims and not within the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the common pleas court. Id.
The second case (No. 2022-00515JD) was filed by CPC only. In
that case, CPC alleges it is entitled to a larger dividend than it
received for the policy year ending June 20, 2020. Both the first
and second cases involve essentially the same facts and causes
of action and were eventually consolidated in the Court of
Claims. (See Oct. 14, 2022 Jgmt. Entry.) In both cases,
appellants claim BWC was unjustly enriched and violated equal
protection by allegedly calculating rebates due to employers
participating in the large deductible program differently from
rebates due to employers participating in the individually
retrospectively rated program.
...
On October 3, 2022, the trial court issued a decision and
concurrent judgment entry in which the trial court granted
BWC’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment
in favor of BWC on appellants’ unjust enrichment claims. The
trial court dismissed appellants’ equal protection claims,
without prejudice, finding that the Court of Claims lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges.
(Oct. 3, 2022 Decision; Oct. 3, 2022 Jgmt. Entry.) As noted
Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 3

previously, on October 14, 2022, the trial court consolidated
the two cases and granted summary judgment in favor of BWC
in the second case for the same reasons given in the first case.
(Oct. 14, 2022 Jgmt. Entry.)
CPC Parts Delivery, L.L.C. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2024-Ohio-18, ¶ 2-3, 11 (10th
Dist.) (“CPC I”).
{¶ 3} In CPC I, this court concluded that although the Court of Claims did not err
in granting summary judgment in favor of BWC on appellants’ claims for unjust
enrichment, it erred in holding that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
appellants’ equal protection claims. Id. at ¶ 26, 32. Consequently, this court affirmed in
part, and reversed in part, the judgments of the Court of Claims, and remanded the matters
to that court for further proceedings as to the equal protection claims. Id. at ¶ 34.
{¶ 4} On remand, the Court of Claims concluded that BWC did not violate
appellants’ equal protection rights because appellants and the identified comparators were
not similarly situated in all relevant respects to appellants and, even if they were, there was
a rational basis for the disparate treatment. Finding that no genuine issue of material fact
existed, and that BWC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court of Claims
awarded summary judgment in favor of BWC as to appellants’ equal protection claims.
{¶ 5} Mahle and CPC each filed timely appeals.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 6} In their respective appeals, Mahle and CPC each assigns the same sole
assignment of error for our review:
The Court of Claims erred in granting the BWC’s motions for
summary judgment.
III. Discussion
{¶ 7} Mahle and CPC both allege the Court of Claims erred in granting BWC’s
motions for summary judgment. We are unpersuaded.
{¶ 8} An appellate court reviews summary judgment under the de novo standard.
Estate of Sample v. Xenos Christian Fellowship, Inc., 2021-Ohio-3898, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). De
novo review means the reviewing court independently analyzes the record while giving no
deference to the trial court’s decision. Johnson v. Am. Italian Golf Assn. of Columbus,
2018-Ohio-2100, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.).
Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 4

{¶ 9} Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party
demonstrates: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion
and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment
is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in its favor.
Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 1997-Ohio-221.
{¶ 10} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the moving party bears the initial burden of
informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the
record demonstrating the absence of a material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 1996-Ohio-107.
However, the moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under this rule with a
conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case; the
moving party must specifically point to evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C)
affirmatively demonstrating that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s claims. Id.; Vahila v. Hall, 1997-Ohio-259. Once the moving party
discharges its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party
does not respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, with specific facts
showing that a genuine issue exists for trial. Dresher at ¶ 17; Vahila at ¶ 19; Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶ 11} Appellants claim that, in connection with BWC’s rebate distribution, BWC
violated appellants’ equal protection rights by treating them, as employer participants in
the large deductible program, differently and without any rational basis than employers
participating in the individual retrospective rating program. The Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Ohio Constitution contains a
“functionally equivalent” Equal Protection Clause. Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent.
State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 1999-Ohio-248, ¶ 15; Ohio Const., art I, § 2.
{¶ 12} Generally, equal protection requires that similarly situated persons be treated
similarly under the law. State v. Lawson, 2013-Ohio-2111, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.); see GTE North,
Inc. v. Zaino, 2002-Ohio-2984, ¶ 22 (“The comparison of only similarly situated entities is
integral to an equal protection analysis.”). The “aim is to keep governmental
decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”
Tonti v. Tonti, 2007-Ohio-2658, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 5

Commonwealth of Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). “But the Equal Protection Clause
‘does not require things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they
were the same.’ ” GTE North, Inc. at ¶ 22, quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
Conversely, if an asserted distinction between parties is not relevant to the challenged
action, a government actor will not be able to defeat an equal protection claim on the
grounds that the two groups are not similarly situated. Sherman v. Ohio Pub. Emps.
Retirement Sys., 2019-Ohio-278, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), citing MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. Limbach, 1994-Ohio-489.
{¶ 13} Thus, to prove an equal protection violation, the plaintiff first must establish
that it was treated differently than another person similarly situated. Conley v. Shearer,
1992-Ohio-133, ¶ 16; State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich, 2017-Ohio-5528, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). If
the plaintiff and the party being treated differently are similarly situated, and the matter
does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, the plaintiff also must establish the
government action is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. GTE
North, Inc. at ¶ 22; Shockley v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2005-Ohio-4674, ¶ 21
(10th Dist.); Angerbauer v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2017-Ohio-7420, ¶ 51 (10th Dist.)
(“Once a showing of discriminatory treatment is made, the plaintiff next must demonstrate
the government action against him lacks a rational basis.”). If a plaintiff alleging an equal
protection violation fails to identify any similarly situated party that was treated differently,
it is unnecessary to analyze the purported rational basis of any action. Pung v. Kopke, 2025
U.S. App. LEXIS 2149 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025).
{¶ 14} Therefore, at issue in this appeal is whether appellants, as participants in
BWC’s large deductible program, are similarly situated in all relevant respects to
participants in BWC’s individual retroactive rating program. Because appellants’ equal
protection claims relate to BWC’s rebate of premiums, to review these claims, we must set
forth an overview of the Ohio workers’ compensation system. As quoted in CPC I, the
Supreme Court of Ohio has explained this system as follows:
“Ohio requires public employers that are not self-insured
employers to contribute to the public insurance fund “the
amount of money determined by the administrator of workers’
compensation.” R.C. 4123.38. Employers can choose from a
range of plans. The BWC offers both individual-and group-
rated plans.
Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 6

Pursuant to R.C. 4123.29(A), the administrator of the BWC,
with the approval of the board of directors, classifies
occupations or industries with respect to degree of hazard and
risks and sets the premiums that employers must pay into the
state insurance fund for workers’ compensation coverage each
year. The BWC deposits these premiums into a single state
insurance fund (it does not maintain a separate account for
each employer), and it pays compensation benefits associated
with work-related accidents from that fund. With the exception
of a required surplus to maintain solvency, R.C. 4123.321
requires the BWC to establish a procedure for returning excess
premiums to participating employers in order to maintain a
revenue-neutral fund.”
CPC I at ¶ 4, quoting Cleveland v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2020-Ohio-337, ¶ 3-4.
{¶ 15} And, as directly pertinent to this appeal, in CPC I, this court detailed the
factual and legal framework of appellants’ equal protection claims against BWC as follows:
The State Fund is intended to be revenue neutral—i.e., the
BWC charges Ohio employers only those premium amounts
that the BWC actuarially determines are necessary to pay for
projected claims costs and other related expenses. (May 2,
2022 Michael Sendelbach Aff. at ¶ 3.) Nevertheless, because of
the timing of premium payments and claims made, revenue
neutrality does not equate to cash flow neutrality. Id. Any
excess cash flowing in is invested for the benefit of the State
Fund. Id. Thus, a surplus may be generated in excess of what is
required to maintain the solvency of the State Fund. Id. When
such an excess surplus exists, BWC’s Board of Directors (the
“BWC Board”) is authorized to issue rebates to participating
Ohio private employers. (Id. at ¶ 5; R.C. 4123.321.)
In recent history, the BWC Board has approved and issued
three separate rebates, each individually totaling
approximately $1 billion. (Sendelbach Aff. at ¶ 7.) The most
recent such rebate, and the one at issue in this appeal, was
issued for the policy year beginning July 1, 2015 and ending
June 30, 2016 (the “2015 Policy Year”). Id. The BWC Board
determined the total dollar amount of rebates to be distributed
based on actuarial recommendations, then calculated the
rebate amounts. Id. at ¶ 6.
The Ohio Administrative Code sets forth several programs in
which private employers can participate, depending on
eligibility requirements. See Ohio Adm.Code 4122-17, et seq.
Two such programs are relevant to this case: the Individual
Retrospective Rating Program (“Individual Retro Program”)
under Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-41 and the Large Deductible
Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 7

Program (“Large Deductible Program”) under Ohio Adm.Code
4123-17-72. Both CPC and Mahle participated in the Large
Deductible Program during the 2015-2016 policy year. (James
Tompkins Aff. at ¶ 2; Terri Case Aff. at ¶ 2.)
The Individual Retro Program applies a retrospective premium
whereby an employer pays an initial policy premium to BWC,
which is recalculated at the end of each policy year based on
claims incurred during that policy year. (Sendelbach Aff. at
¶ 13.) In this program, “[t]he employer assumes a portion of the
risk in exchange for a reduction in premium. The exact cost of
a retrospective premium for any policy year cannot be
determined until the end of the policy’s term when claims
experience can be tallied.” Id.
Under the Large Deductible Program, employers pay a
guaranteed premium. (Sendelbach Aff. at ¶ 10.) “A guaranteed
premium policy is prospective, calculated prior to the policy
taking effect . . . [and] is unaffected by claims experience during
the coverage period.” Id. Claims experience during the
coverage year may, however, affect the premium charge in
subsequent policy years. Id. The Large Deductible Program
“offers an up-front premium discount since program
participants agree to take on a per claim deductible.” Id. The
maximum amount of the per claim deductible is $200,000.
(Tom[p]kins Aff. at ¶ 3; Case Aff. at ¶ 3.)
When the BWC Board approved the rebate for the 2015 Policy
Year, individual rebates were calculated based on a defined
percentage of the actual premiums paid by eligible employers.
(Sendelbach Aff. at ¶ 6, 8.) Employers participating in the Large
Deductible Program—including appellants—did not receive a
rebate for claim payments made up to the deductible amount
they agreed to pay under that program “[b]ecause deductibles
are not defined as premiums.” Id. In comparison, under the
Individual Retro Program, claim costs are specifically defined
as premiums; thus, these claim costs were included in the
rebate calculation for employers participating in this program.
Id. at ¶ 13; Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-52 and 4123-17-41. Thus,
the crux of appellants’ claims is that it was both unfair and
unlawful for BWC to use different formulas to calculate the
individual rebates for employers participating in the two
different programs, and that appellants are entitled to larger
rebates than those that were issued to them.
CPC I at ¶ 5-10.
{¶ 16} We find that, under these facts and circumstances, appellants cannot show
that, as employers participating in the large deductible program, they are similarly situated
Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 8

in all relevant respects to employers participating in the individual retrospective rating
program. If certain eligibility requirements are met, an employer can choose to participate
in either of these elective BWC programs that shift some workers’ compensation claims risk
to the employers. Although these BWC programs both offer potential financial savings to
employers, the programs shift claims-loss risk in a substantively different manner.
{¶ 17} BWC’s individual retrospective rating program offers participating
employers a lower initial premium obligation that is recalculated at the end of each policy
year. This premium adjustment is “based on the incurred losses [during that policy year]
and on the audited payrolls of the employer.” Adm.Code 4123-17-46(A). Additionally, in
this program, the “[p]remiums are subject to minimum and maximum premium
limitations as selected by the employer,” and the claim costs ultimately borne by the
participant are limited to a ten-year period. Adm.Code 4123-17-46(F); Adm.Code 4123-17-
52(A).
{¶ 18} Alternatively, BWC’s large deductible program—the program selected by
appellants—offers participating employers up-front premium discounts, with a selected
per-claim deductible, in exchange for assuming some risk. For this program, the
participating “employer shall continue to be liable beyond any deductible program period
for billings [for claim costs] covered under a deductible program for injuries that arose
during any period for which a deductible is applicable, regardless of when payment was
made by the bureau.” Adm.Code 4123-17-72(J)(4). Also, a large deductible program
participant may request an annual aggregate stop-loss limit option in combination with
choosing large deductible levels. Adm.Code 4123-17-72(F).
{¶ 19} Thus, the large deductible and individual retrospective rating programs have
different features and means to shift some claims-loss risk to employer participants,
including differences in the timing and calculation of the premiums that BWC charges.
And, significantly, these differences are relevant to the government action that appellants
allege violated their equal protection rights—BWC’s rebates that were based on the
premiums that employers paid. As such, appellants cannot show that, for the purpose of
their equal protection claims, they, as participants in the large deductible program, are
similarly situated in all relevant respects to employers participating in the individual
retrospective rating program.
Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 9

{¶ 20} Because appellants, as employers participating in the large deductible
program, are not similarly situated in all relevant respects to employers participating in the
individual retrospective rating program, their equal protection claims fail. And because
appellants’ equal protection claims fail on this basis, it is unnecessary to review whether
appellants presented evidence that BWC’s actions were not rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.
{¶ 21} For these reasons, we overrule CPC’s sole assignment of error and Mahle’s
sole assignment of error.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 22} Having overruled CPC’s sole assignment of error and Mahle’s sole
assignment of error, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Claims of Ohio.
Judgments affirmed.
BOGGS, P.J., and JAMISON, J., concur.