Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Deer Valley v. Olson

Utah Supreme Court

• Citations: 2026 UT 5

• Docket Number: Case No. 20240922

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (45.9K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2026 UT 5

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEER VALLEY RESORT COMPANY,
Appellant and Cross-appellee,
v.
WILLIAM OLSON,
Appellee and Cross-appellant,
and
LARK PYPER,
Appellee.

No. 20240922
Heard September 5, 2025
Filed March 26, 2026

On Appeal of Interlocutory Order

Third District Court, Summit County
The Honorable Richard E. Mrazik
No. 200500522

Attorneys:
Adam Strachan, Kevin J. Simon, Park City,
for appellant and cross-appellee
Robert B. Sykes, C. Peter Sorensen, Salt Lake City,
for appellee and cross-appellant

---


As of January 31, 2026, “The Supreme Court consists of seven
justices.” UTAH CODE § 78A-3-101(1). Pursuant to Utah Supreme
Court Standing Order No. 18, this court sat and rendered judgment
in this matter as a division of five justices.

Additional attorneys: Brian A. Birenbach, Breckenridge, Colo.,
Meghan A. Sheridan, Salt Lake City, for amicus curiae National Ski
Areas Association and Utah Ski and Snowboard Association, in
support of appellant and cross-appellee.
DEER VALLEY RESORT v. OLSON
Opinion of the Court

Mark Taylor, Ryan Christensen, Salt Lake City, for appellee

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE HAGEN,
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE POHLMAN, and JUDGE NEIDER joined.
Due to his retirement, JUSTICE PEARCE did not participate herein;
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CAMILLE L. NEIDER sat.
JUSTICE NIELSEN became a member of the Court after oral
argument in this matter and accordingly did not participate.

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 William Olson and Lark Pyper worked as lift operators at
the Deer Valley Ski Resort during the 2019–2020 ski season. As part
of their employment, Deer Valley required seasonal employees to
sign a waiver releasing Deer Valley from liability for any injuries
they might incur while participating in certain “activities” on Deer
Valley property, even if the injury was caused by Deer Valley’s
negligence. In the release agreement, “activities” was defined to
include many of the things an employee might do at the ski resort—
whether on the job or off—from skiing and riding ski lifts to
generally making use of restaurants, retail stores, and resort
property. Deer Valley provided employees with a free ski pass,
which the release agreement identified as the consideration for the
employee signing the release. Both Olson and Pyper signed the
release.
¶2 The ski season was cut short in March 2020 by the COVID-
19 pandemic. Most Deer Valley employees, including Olson and
Pyper, were laid off on March 15. Two days later, on St. Patrick’s
Day, Olson and Pyper went back to the resort to return their
uniforms. While there, they learned that a few other terminated
employees had organized a get-together on the mountain. They got
a ride up the mountain from one of the few employees still working
that day. The employee, Olson, and Pyper piled onto a Deer Valley-
owned snowmobile and headed up the mountain. Unfortunately,
they never made it to their destination. The employee lost control
of the snowmobile and all three of them were thrown off. Both
Olson and Pyper were seriously hurt.

2
Cite as: 2026 UT 5
Opinion of the Court

¶3 They both sued Deer Valley. They alleged that Deer Valley
was vicariously liable for the negligence of the employee and
directly liable for its own negligence. Deer Valley moved for
summary judgment, arguing that it was not vicariously liable for
the employee’s negligence because he was not acting within the
course and scope of his employment when he gave Olson and
Pyper the snowmobile ride. And it argued that it could not be held
directly liable for its own negligence because Olson and Pyper had
waived any such claim by signing the release agreement. The
district court agreed that Deer Valley was not vicariously liable for
the employee’s negligence and dismissed Olson and Pyper’s
vicarious liability claims. But the court rejected Deer Valley’s
argument that the release agreement precluded the direct liability
claims against it. The court relied on a 1907 case, Pugmire v. Oregon
Short Line Railroad Co., 92 P. 762 (Utah 1907), which held that an
agreement between an employer and employee that waives the
employer’s liability for its own negligence is void as against public
policy. Deer Valley petitioned for interlocutory review of that
decision. And Olson petitioned for interlocutory review of the
court’s decision on his vicarious liability claims.
¶4 We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Olson’s
vicarious liability claims because we agree that there was no
evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could find that
the employee was acting within the course and scope of his
employment when the employee drove Olson and Pyper up the
mountain. But we reverse the court’s decision on the direct liability
claims, which was based entirely on Pugmire. We conclude that
Pugmire must be confined to its facts, which involved work-related
injuries to an employee. Thus, we do not extend Pugmire to the
circumstances here, where two former employees were injured
outside of work. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s
decision as to the Plaintiffs’ direct liability claims, and we remand
for the district court to consider any remaining arguments about
the application of the release agreement in this case.
BACKGROUND1
¶5 Deer Valley hired William Olson and Lark Pyper as ski lift
operators for the 2019–2020 winter season. Deer Valley required all

---

1 In reviewing a summary judgment decision, “we view the facts

and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
(continued . . .)

3
DEER VALLEY RESORT v. OLSON
Opinion of the Court

seasonal employees to sign a waiver titled “Release of Liability,
Waiver of Claims, Warning, Assumption of Risk and Indemnity
Agreement” (release agreement, release, or agreement). The
agreement released Deer Valley from liability for any injuries
sustained by an employee while participating in “activities” at the
ski resort, including injuries caused by Deer Valley’s negligence.
“Activities” was defined to include, among other things, skiing;
riding ski lifts; and generally using resort property, restaurants,
rental equipment, sidewalks, stairways, and parking lots. As
consideration for the waiver, Deer Valley gave employees a free ski
pass that allowed them to ski at Deer Valley and several other
resorts while they were off duty. During the onboarding process,
both Olson and Pyper signed the release agreements and Deer
Valley issued them free ski passes.
¶6 The 2019–2020 ski season ended abruptly due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, Deer Valley closed the resort
and laid off nearly all its staff, including Olson and Pyper.
¶7 Two days after being laid off, Olson and Pyper came back
to the resort to return their uniforms. While there, they discovered
that some of their former coworkers were hosting a St. Patrick’s
Day party on the mountain. Olson and Pyper got a ride on a Deer
Valley-owned snowmobile from one of the few Deer Valley
employees who had not yet been laid off. Earlier that day, this
employee had safely driven another group of recently-terminated
employees to the meeting point. But while driving Olson and
Pyper, he took an unfamiliar shortcut and lost control of the
snowmobile. The group crashed, and Olson and Pyper were
seriously injured.
¶8 Both Olson and Pyper sued Deer Valley to recover
damages for their injuries. Their cases were assigned to the same
judge, who ordered joint discovery.
¶9 During discovery, the parties deposed the employee.
Because both Plaintiffs had asserted claims that Deer Valley should
be held vicariously liable for the employee’s negligence, an
important topic during the deposition was whether the employee
had been acting within the scope of his employment when he gave
Olson and Pyper the snowmobile ride.

---

nonmoving party.” UMIA Ins., Inc. v. Saltz, 2022 UT 21, ¶ 65, 515
P.3d 406 (cleaned up). We state the facts accordingly.

4
Cite as: 2026 UT 5
Opinion of the Court

¶10 The employee testified that during the 2019–2020 ski
season, he was one of four “mountain supervisors” and was
responsible for between thirty to fifty employees at any given time.
He did not directly supervise Olson or Pyper, but he thought they
were “loyal,” “good employees,” and “hard workers.”
¶11 As part of his job, the employee was authorized to drive a
company snowmobile. He said that he used the snowmobile “very
little” during the ski season. But when he did, “the purpose of the
snowmobile . . . was to transport employees or to take guests up at
the end of the day if they’[d] missed their lift.”
¶12 On the day of the accident, he was on duty and was
wearing his Deer Valley uniform. He didn’t yet know that most of
his coworkers, including Olson and Pyper, had been laid off. But
he did know that “people were upset” about the ski season ending
early due to the pandemic. And he agreed that keeping up
employee morale was related to his work.
¶13 When asked why he gave Olson and Pyper a ride that day,
the following exchange took place:
Q. So just in your own words . . . what are the
reasons why you did it?
A. They’re my friends and
Q. Coworkers?
A. Coworkers, and I consider them my friends.
...
Q. What’s that?
A. I consider them my friends. Not real close
friends but they’re my coworkers. You know, we’re
compatible. We got along. I just wanted to help them
out. They asked me for a ride and I gave them one.
Q. Any other reasons?
A. No.
(Emphases added.)
¶14 Olson’s counsel continued to press the employee as to why
he provided the ride, and the employee added to his answer:
Q. As a mountain supervisor, if someone had
asked you . . . should we invite [Olson and Pyper]

5
DEER VALLEY RESORT v. OLSON
Opinion of the Court

back next year, what would your response have
been?
A. Yes.
Q. Because they were good employees?
A. They’re good employees and they know what
they’re doing.
Q. Competent?
A. Yes, very much.
...
Q. Very much so. Okay. So are those the reasons
you took them up the hill?
...
A. Yes.
Q. Any other reasons you took them up?
...
A. Yeah, they just wanted to go up, so I took them
up. I trusted them. I knew that they know what
they’re doing.
¶15 The employee went on to testify that he knew giving Olson
and Pyper a ride was “leaving his job duties” and against Deer
Valley policy. When asked if he would have given the ride if his
supervisors had been watching him, he said he would not have
because “it’s a no-no. It’s breaking resort policy.” He
acknowledged, “I didn’t want to get caught towing my friends up
because I’m leaving my job duties,” and that “I knew I was doing
something against resort policy and basically just trying to help
some friends out.”
¶16 After the conclusion of discovery, Deer Valley moved for
summary judgment. As to the Plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claims,
Deer Valley argued that it was not vicariously liable for the
employee’s negligence because the employee had not been acting
within the course and scope of his employment when he gave the
Plaintiffs a ride and crashed the snowmobile. The district court
agreed, stating that the Plaintiffs had not “provide[d] a non-
speculative basis by which a jury could reasonably find that [the
employee] was motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving
Deer Valley’s interests . . . when he shuttled [the Plaintiffs] up the

6
Cite as: 2026 UT 5
Opinion of the Court

hill on that day.” Accordingly, the district court dismissed the
vicarious liability claims against Deer Valley.2
¶17 With respect to the direct negligence claims, Deer Valley
argued that the Plaintiffs had waived any claims they might have
had when they signed the release agreements. The district court
rejected this argument based on this court’s holding in Pugmire v.
Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 92 P. 762 (Utah 1907), that an
agreement between an employer and an employee waiving liability
is “void [as] . . . against public policy.” (Quoting id. at 765).
Accordingly, the court refused to dismiss Olson and Pyper’s
negligence claims against Deer Valley.
¶18 Deer Valley petitioned this court for interlocutory review
of the district court’s refusal to dismiss the direct liability claims
against it. And Olson petitioned for interlocutory review of the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on his vicarious
liability claims. We granted the petitions and consolidated the
appeals.
¶19 We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-
102(4)(a)(vi).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶20 “When reviewing a district court’s summary judgment
ruling, we review the court’s legal conclusions and ultimate grant
or denial of summary judgment for correctness.” Huitron v. Kaye,
2022 UT 36, ¶ 15, 517 P.3d 399 (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
¶21 We first address the district court’s dismissal of Olson’s
vicarious liability claims. We agree with the court that there was no
evidence creating a genuine dispute of fact that the employee was
acting within the scope of his employment when he gave the
Plaintiffs a ride on the snowmobile. So, we conclude the court’s
dismissal of the claims was correct.

---

2 In the record, the court expressed concern that we might not

“care” about the reasoning underlying its decision and that we
“may not even read the transcript” of its oral ruling. That concern
is misplaced. It is our regular practice to carefully consider the
reasoning supporting the rulings we review, whether found in
written orders or relevant transcripts. A district court’s explanation
of its ruling meaningfully assists the appellate process.

7
DEER VALLEY RESORT v. OLSON
Opinion of the Court

¶22 We then move to the district court’s rejection of Deer
Valley’s argument that the Plaintiffs’ direct liability claims fail
because of the release agreements they signed. The district court
rested its ruling on the holding of Pugmire v. Oregon Short Line
Railroad Co., 92 P. 762 (Utah 1907), which stated broadly that an
agreement between an employer and employee that waives the
employer’s liability for its own negligence is void as against public
policy. But we conclude that Pugmire’s holding cannot be extended
to the facts here. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial
of Deer Valley’s summary judgment motion on this basis and
remand for the court to consider any remaining arguments related
to the application of the release agreements.
I. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
¶23 Olson claims that the employee was negligent, and that
Deer Valley should be held vicariously liable for his negligence
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The district court ruled
otherwise, and we agree with the court’s decision.
¶24 Under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, an
employer can be held responsible for an employee’s torts. Burton v.
Chen, 2023 UT 14, ¶ 15, 532 P.3d 1005. This doctrine promotes
“fairness to injured parties” because an employer is more likely
than an employee to be able to satisfy a judgment and is better
positioned to insure against liability. M.J. v. Wisan, 2016 UT 13,
¶¶ 50–51, 371 P.3d 21. Respondeat superior also aims to incentivize
employers to hire, train, and monitor employees in a way that
reduces tortious conduct. See id. ¶ 51.
¶25 Under this doctrine, we have recognized that “an
employer should be liable for an employee’s actions that occur
within the scope of employment when performing work assigned
by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the
employer’s control.” Burton, 2023 UT 14, ¶ 15 (cleaned up). In
contrast, if the tort occurs when an employee is engaging in “an
independent course of conduct,” the employer is not liable. M.J.,
2016 UT 13, ¶ 52 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 7.07(2) (A.L.I. 2006)).
¶26 Thus, to determine whether Deer Valley could be held
vicariously liable for any negligent conduct of the employee, we
must decide whether there are facts from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that the employee was acting within the
course and scope of his employment. To guide that analysis, our
caselaw articulates two relevant questions. First, we ask “whether

8
Cite as: 2026 UT 5
Opinion of the Court

the agent’s conduct is of the general kind the agent is employed to
perform.” Burton, 2023 UT 14, ¶ 16 (cleaned up). And second, we
ask “whether the agent’s acts were motivated, at least in part, by
the purpose of serving the principal’s interest.” Id. (cleaned up).
The answer to both questions must be “yes” for a plaintiff to
establish vicarious liability.
¶27 With respect to these inquiries, the district court concluded
that Olson had identified facts sufficient to withstand summary
judgment on the first question, but had failed to create a “non-
speculative” dispute of fact as to the second question. We agree
with the district court’s conclusion.
¶28 First, there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the
employee’s conduct that day—giving Olson and Pyper a ride on
the snowmobile—was of the general kind he was employed to
perform for Deer Valley. The employee stated that he used the
snowmobile “very little” during the ski season. But “the purpose of
the snowmobile, when [he] used it, was to transport employees or
to take guests up at the end of the day if they’[d] missed their lift.”
Thus, while it wasn’t the primary activity he did on the job, there
were times when he gave employees rides on a company
snowmobile. At the summary judgment stage, this is sufficient to
create a dispute of fact as to whether this conduct was of the kind
he performed for Deer Valley, at least on occasion.
¶29 However, we conclude that there is not a genuine dispute
of fact as to the second inquiry—whether the employee was acting,
at least in part, to serve Deer Valley’s interests. During his
deposition, the employee was asked numerous questions about his
reasons for giving Plaintiffs a ride to the gathering on the mountain.
He explained that it was because “they’re [his] friends” and he “just
wanted to help them out.” When asked if there were any other
reasons why he gave them a ride he answered in the negative.
¶30 Olson points to other portions of the employee’s
deposition that he contends show the employee was at least partly
motivated to serve Deer Valley’s interest. The employee said he
believed that “people were upset” about the ski season ending
early due to COVID-19, and he agreed that maintaining employee
morale was related to his work. He also testified that Olson and
Pyper were “competent” employees and “hard workers.” He said
he would have “invite[d] them back next year” to work because
“[t]hey’re good employees and they [knew] what they’re doing.”
He agreed that their competency was one of the reasons he gave

9
DEER VALLEY RESORT v. OLSON
Opinion of the Court

them a ride and added, “Yeah, they just wanted to go up, so I took
them up. I trusted them. I knew that they know what they’re
doing.” From this, Plaintiffs argue that an inference can be drawn
that the employee drove Olson and Pyper to the gathering to “keep
up morale, maintain goodwill toward [Deer Valley], and ensure
[employee] retention.”
¶31 But we agree with the district court that this evidence does
not create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the employee was
trying to serve Deer Valley’s interests, rather than just helping his
friends. Throughout the deposition, the employee consistently
maintained that he gave the Plaintiffs a ride because they were
friends and he “just wanted to help them out.”
¶32 True, he agreed with Olson’s counsel’s statements that
Plaintiffs were competent employees and that employee morale
was important. But the employee never indicated that he thought
giving his coworkers a ride up the mountain would improve
morale or convince Plaintiffs to come back to work for Deer Valley
the following year. In fact, he admitted that he knew what he was
doing was “against resort policy.” Yet he drove them anyway
because he was “just trying to help some friends out.”
¶33 We agree with the district court that there is no “non-
speculative basis by which a jury could reasonably find that [the
employee] was motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving
Deer Valley’s interests.” For this reason, Deer Valley cannot be held
vicariously liable for the employee’s negligence under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.
¶34 We now turn to Plaintiffs’ direct liability claims against
Deer Valley.
II. DIRECT LIABILITY AND PUGMIRE
¶35 Both Plaintiffs have brought claims alleging that Deer
Valley is directly liable for their injuries because it negligently
hired, trained, supervised, retained, and entrusted a vehicle to its
employee. In its motion for summary judgment in the district court,
Deer Valley argued that Plaintiffs had waived any negligence
claims against it when they signed the release agreement. The
district court denied the motion based on Pugmire v. Oregon Short
Line Railroad Co., 92 P. 762 (Utah 1907). Deer Valley argues that
Pugmire does not control here. We agree.
¶36 In Pugmire, William Pugmire was hired by the Oregon
Short Line Railroad Company to manage one of its “outfit, or hotel,

10
Cite as: 2026 UT 5
Opinion of the Court

cars.” Id. at 763. To fulfill his role, Mr. Pugmire was required to
supply a cook. Id. at 764–65. The railroad approved his wife,
Christine Pugmire, to serve as the cook and to live in the outfit car
with him. Id. As a condition of the couple’s employment, they were
required to sign a release waiving “any and all rights they might
otherwise have to sue [the railroad] and recover for damages on
account of any injury . . . during the continuance of such
employment and residence on said cars.” Id. at 763.
¶37 Unfortunately, Mrs. Pugmire was seriously injured when
an engine car crashed into the outfit car. Id. The Pugmires sued the
railroad for negligence and won a favorable jury verdict. Id. at 764.
On appeal, the railroad pointed to the waiver the couple had signed
and argued it prevented any recovery. Id. at 765. This court
concluded that Mrs. Pugmire could recover because the release was
void, holding:
The law is well settled that a master cannot, by
contract in advance, absolve himself from liability
(which would exist if no contract were made) for
injuries to his servant caused by the master’s own
negligence. The ground upon which such contracts
are held to be void is that they are against public
policy.
Id.
¶38 However, beyond this, the Pugmire court did not offer
additional analysis or explain the scope of its holding. It is not clear
whether its holding applies only to releases of liability between
employers and employees for injuries sustained while working, or
whether it applies more broadly to such releases of liability for
injuries sustained at any time.
¶39 And that distinction matters in this case, because if we
interpret Pugmire as applying to releases for work-related injuries
only, it has no application here. After all, the parties agree that
Plaintiffs’ injuries are not work related. Plaintiffs had been
terminated by Deer Valley two days prior, and they were making
their way to a gathering with friends on their personal time. But if
we interpret Pugmire as applying to all releases of liability between
employers and employees, regardless of when the injury occurs,
then it would apply.
¶40 Although the scant analysis in Pugmire does not provide
us with a clear answer to that question, it does leave hints that its

11
DEER VALLEY RESORT v. OLSON
Opinion of the Court

holding applies to releases of liability between employers and
employees for only work-related injuries. The opinion does not
describe Mrs. Pugmire as cooking during the accident, but it does
appear that the Pugmire court viewed her as having been engaged
in her employment when she was injured. Specifically, it explained
that at the time of the accident, she “was rightfully in the car doing
work for the defendant.” Id. at 765 (emphasis added). Further, the two
cases on which Pugmire relied for its holding were cases where the
plaintiffs were working at the time they were injured. See id. (citing
Stone v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 89 P. 715, 716 (Utah 1907) (describing
injury to employee incurred while he was “rendering services for
[his employer] in the handling of and caring for baggage of
passengers carried and transported by the defendant”); Lake Shore
& Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Spangler, 8 N.E. 467, 469–70 (Ohio 1886)
(describing injury to a brakeman caused by the negligence of the
train’s conductor)).
¶41 Given these clues and the lack of analysis suggesting that
Pugmire could apply outside the workplace, we conclude that
Pugmire’s holding must be confined to the facts of that case—
releases of liability between employers and employees for work-
related injuries.3 And for that reason, we conclude it does not apply
here.
¶42 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of Deer
Valley’s motion for summary judgment, for which it relied
exclusively on Pugmire. And we remand for the court to consider
any remaining arguments related to that motion.

---

3 We note that Pugmire was issued before the Workers
Compensation Act was enacted. See Industrial Commission of
Utah, ch. 100, 1917 Utah Laws 306 (current version located at UTAH
CODE §§ 34A-2-101 to -1005). So it may have been superseded
entirely by that statute. See Graham v. Albertson’s LLC, 2020 UT 15,
¶¶ 13–14, 462 P.3d 367 (explaining that a statute can explicitly
preempt existing common law with “a clear expression of
[legislative] intent” or implicitly preempt the common law “in two
ways: (i) the statute’s regulatory scheme is so pervasive that the
common law doctrine can no longer function, or (ii) the statute is in
irreconcilable conflict with the common law” (cleaned up)).
However, that issue is not before us, so we do not address it further.

12
Cite as: 2026 UT 5
Opinion of the Court

CONCLUSION
¶43 We conclude that the district court correctly determined
that Deer Valley is not vicariously liable for its employee’s
negligence as a matter of law, and we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Olson’s vicarious liability claims. However, we reverse
the district court’s denial of Deer Valley’s motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs’ direct liability claims against Deer Valley.
And we remand for the court to consider any remaining arguments
related to that motion.

13