Norman Richardson v. United States - FTCA Negligence Appeal

4th Circuit Daily Opinions

Filed March 30th, 2026

Detected March 31st, 2026

Summary

The Fourth Circuit vacated the magistrate judge's summary judgment order in Richardson v. United States and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that both parties erroneously argued Maryland law applied to Richardson's Federal Tort Claims Act negligence claim when D.C. law should have governed because the underlying events occurred in the District of Columbia. The appellate court declined to apply D.C. law for the first time on appeal, instead ordering the lower court to address the choice-of-law issue in the first instance.

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What changed

The Fourth Circuit vacated the District of Maryland's summary judgment order (No. 24-2100, Case No. 8:22-cv-01625-AAQ) in Norman Richardson's negligence claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. The parties conceded on appeal that they incorrectly argued Maryland law should apply when D.C. law governs because the tortious events occurred in the District of Columbia. Citing Raplee v. United States, 842 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2016), the court held it is "a court of review, not of first view" and declined to apply D.C. law for the first time on appeal.\n\nThe case is remanded to the magistrate judge to consider D.C. law arguments in the first instance. The court expressed no opinion on the merits of Richardson's underlying negligence claim. No compliance deadlines or penalties are implicated by this procedural remand. Parties and their counsel should ensure they correctly identify the jurisdiction where events occurred when arguing choice-of-law issues.

Source document (simplified)

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-2100

NORMAN RICHARDSON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Ajmel Ahsen Quereshi, Magistrate Judge. (8:22-cv-01625-AAQ) Submitted: March 26, 2026 Decided: March 30, 2026 Before RICHARDSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge. Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Monique L. Lee, CHASENBOSCOLO, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.

Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Kelly M. Marzullo, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Norman Richardson appeals the magistrate judge’s order granting summary judgment to the United States on Richardson’s claim of negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. On appeal, Richardson argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding there was not a genuine dispute of material fact as to the United States’ assumption of the risk defense. The parties agree, however, that they erroneously argued below that Maryland law applied to Richardson’s claim, and the magistrate judge followed suit. Because Richardson’s claim arose from events that occurred in the District of Columbia, the parties agree on appeal that D.C. law applies to this claim. See Raplee v. United States, 842 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Because the FTCA merely waives sovereign immunity to make the United States amenable to a state tort suit, the substantive law of the state where the tort occurred determines the liability of the United States.”). The parties now ask this court to apply D.C. law to Richardson’s claim in the first instance. But we are “a court of review, not of first view.” Pub. Int. Legal Found. v.

Wooten, 164 F.4th 362, 366 (4th Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because it

is not immediately apparent that applying D.C. law would not alter the outcome of this case, the parties should present their arguments in the district court and permit the magistrate judge to consider them in the first instance.

Accordingly, we vacate the magistrate judge’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the * facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.