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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Matter of the Appeal of the Denial of the Application for Firearms Purchaser Identification Card, Etc.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1257-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1257-24

IN THE MATTER OF THE
APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF
THE APPLICATION FOR
FIREARMS PURCHASER
IDENTIFICATION CARD AND
PERMITS TO PURCHASE A
HANDGUN TO VINCENT P.
CASSARINO.

---

Submitted December 10, 2025 – Decided March 19, 2026

Before Judges Paganelli and Jacobs.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Ocean County, Docket No. GPA-005-24.

Zohn & Zohn, LLP, attorney for appellant Vincent P.
Cassarino (Edward J. Zohn, on the briefs).

Citta, Holzapfel & Zabarsky, attorneys for respondent
Borough of Seaside Park (Barry A. Stieber and Steven
A. Zabarsky, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Vincent P. Cassarino appeals from a November 21, 2024 order upholding

a municipal police chief's denial of his application for a New Jersey Firearms
Purchaser Identification Card (FPIC) and a Handgun Purchase Permit (HPP).

We affirm, substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge David M. Fritch's

well-reasoned decision.

I.

We derive the following facts from the hearing and other portions of the

record. On March 14, 2022, Cassarino applied to the Seaside Park Police

Department (SPPD) for an FPIC and HPP. A SPPD officer conducted a

background investigation, uncovering a twenty-year history of law enforcement

encounters, including:

• A 2003 conviction for disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a), from an
arrest in Toms River for "creating a loud and profanity[-]filled disturbance
in [an] emergency room, and refusing to leave when asked to do so by
security."

• A 2004 conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.

• A 2004 arrest in Ocean Township for possession of controlled dangerous
substance (CDS), prescription legend drugs without a prescription,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.5(b); possession of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1);
possession of prescription drugs not in original container, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
24; and disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(1), disposed by way of
pre-trial intervention (PTI) in 2006.

• A 2018 DWI arrest in Seaside Heights, resolved by guilty plea to refusal
to submit to breath testing, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2.

• A 2021 conviction for violation of a municipal ordinance, public nuisance,
in Seaside Heights, stemming from an arrest for defiant trespass, N.J.S.A.
2C:18-3(b).

A-1257-24
2
On August 1, 2024, the SPPD Chief denied the application, citing N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3(c)(5) ("[I]ssuance would not be in the interest of the public health,

safety or welfare."). Cassarino appealed to the Law Division.

Judge Fritch conducted a plenary hearing on November 20, 2024. The

officer who performed the background check and the SPPD Chief testified for

the Borough of Seaside Park (Borough). Their testimony encompassed incidents

involving Cassarino's contact with law enforcement agencies besides SPPD.

Cassarino testified on his own behalf.

On November 21, the judge affirmed the denial in an eleven-page written

opinion and accompanying order. In his decision, Judge Fritch considered both

testimonial evidence and documentary exhibits, including the police

investigation file, court records, and incident reports. He found by a

preponderance of the evidence that Cassarino's criminal history demonstrated a

lack of self-control, poor judgment, and "disregard for public safety," and that

granting the permits would be contrary to the public interest.

On appeal, Cassarino argues the judge erred in upholding the denial. He

maintains his criminal history is "minimal" and non-violent, consisting largely

of arrests or incidents that did not lead to convictions. He disputes the factual

basis for several of those incidents, asserting they were misunderstandings or

A-1257-24
3
otherwise benign. Cassarino further contends the judge improperly relied on

hearsay contained in police reports, preventing his counsel from cross-

examining the relevant witnesses. As a result, Cassarino asserts, "we shall never

know which parts of the evidence the SPPD believes should be admitted under

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6)."

The Borough defends the denial, emphasizing the number and nature of

Cassarino's offenses and law enforcement contacts. It argues that under New

Jersey law, disorderly persons convictions and evidence of substance abuse,

even in the absence of indictable convictions, may support denial under the

"public health, safety or welfare" provision. The Borough maintains the court

properly considered the totality of the evidence, including live testimony,

standardized records, and Cassarino's credibility.

II.

"We review a trial court's legal conclusions regarding firearms licenses de

novo." In re N.J. Firearms Purchaser Identification Card by Z.K., 440 N.J.

Super. 394, 397 (App. Div. 2015) (citing In re Sportsman's Rendezvous Retail

Firearms Dealer's License, 374 N.J. Super. 565, 575 (App. Div. 2005)).

However, appellate review of a trial court's factual findings on such matters is

"limited." In re Z.L., 440 N.J. Super. 351, 355 (App. Div. 2015). "Ordinarily,

A-1257-24
4
an appellate court should accept a trial court's findings of fact that are supported

by substantial credible evidence." In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J.

108, 116-17 (1997) (citing Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 607

(1989)). Even so, the record should be sufficiently complete and definitive to

support such factual findings. See id. at 117.

Because of the importance of developing an appropriate record to generate

factual findings, the statutory scheme has been interpreted to call for evidentiary

hearings in the Law Division to prove or disprove the critical facts bearing on a

contested permit application. See In re Dubov, 410 N.J. Super. 190, 200 (App.

Div. 2009) (noting "the informality of a chief of police's initial consideration of

an application for a gun permit requires an evidentiary hearing when an

applicant appeals a denial to the [Superior] Court"); see also Weston v. State,

60 N.J. 36, 45 (1972). "The court may consider hearsay but may not base its

decision upon hearsay alone." Matter of M.U.'s Application for a Handgun

Purchase Permit, 475 N.J. Super. 148, 173 (App. Div. 2023) (citing Weston, 60

N.J. at 50-52).

The police chief bears the burden of proving good cause for denial by a

preponderance of the evidence. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c), (d); In re Osworth, 365

N.J. Super. 72, 77 (App. Div. 2003).

A-1257-24
5
N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) permits denial if "issuance would not be in the

interest of the public health, safety, or welfare [,]" even absent specific statutory

bar. Osworth, 365 N.J. Super. at 79 (quoting Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 91

(1968)). This standard includes cases of "individual unfitness" where the

applicant's background demonstrates a risk to the community. Ibid. (quoting

Burton, 53 N.J. at 91).

Judge Fritch found Cassarino's testimony to be self-serving and not

credible throughout. He wrote:

Having had the opportunity to hear the
[a]pplicant's testimony and evaluate his demeanor
during his testimony, this [c]ourt finds the [a]pplicant's
self-serving testimony, denying culpability for the
indictable narcotics charge he completed a twenty[-
]four[-]month PTI program for on July 12, 2006, not to
be credible. See Bustam[a]nte v. Borough of Paramus,
413 N.J. Super. 276, 290 ([App. Div. 2010]) (finding
resolution of charges through PTI not considered a
"favorable disposition" of the underlying charges in
evaluating § 1983 claims). . . . Matter of Gauthier, 461
N.J. Super. 507, 516 ([App. Div.] 2019) (PTI, like other
diversionary programs, are not considered favorable
determination of an underlying criminal charge);
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 comment c (successful completion
of PTI does not preclude denial of a firearms permit).
The [c]ourt also does not find the [a]pplicant's self-
serving accounts of the 2003 incident at Community
Medical Center where the [a]pplicant contends he was
in a verbal argument with his girlfriend outside when
the police were called rather than the account in the
summons which alleges he was in the [e]mergency

A-1257-24
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[r]oom creating a disturbance, interfering with the
nurses' ability to care for patients, and resisting
security's efforts to remove him . . . or the [a]pplicant's
version of events from the 2021 incident at the Atlantic
Motel where he disavows any wrongdoing to be
similarly not credible, particularly where both of these
prior incidents resulted in the [a]pplicant being found
guilty of criminal offenses or municipal court
violations for his conduct.

The judge found that Cassarino had a demonstrated pattern of poor

judgment and limited self-control, along with "a recognizable history of

substance abuse." In short, the judge found Cassarino's extended history of

substance-related offenses, disorderly conduct, and repeated negative law

enforcement interactions—spanning over two decades—supported a conclusion

that issuance of an FPIC and HPP would be contrary to the public's health,

safety, and welfare.

After careful review of the record, we are satisfied the judge applied the

correct standard and based his decision on substantial credible evidence. The

ruling relied on sworn testimony and admitted records and not solely hearsay.

The judge's credibility determinations are sound and entitled to deference.

Affirmed.

A-1257-24
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