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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

John Schmirsky v. Township of Winslow

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-0917-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (29.3K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0917-24

JOHN SCHMIRSKY and
KIMBERLY SCHMIRSKY,
husband and wife,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TOWNSHIP OF WINSLOW and
GARRISON ARCHITECTS, PC,
jointly, severally, and in the
alternative,

Defendants-Respondents.

---

Argued January 12, 2026 – Decided March 19, 2026

Before Judges Sabatino and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-1460-22.

Anthony Granato argued the cause for appellants (Jarve
Granato Starr, LLC, attorneys; Anthony Granato, on the
briefs).
Karyn Dobroskey Rienzi argued the cause for
respondent Township of Winslow (Post & Schell, PC,
attorneys; Karyn Dobroskey Rienzi, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs John and Kimberly Schmirsky 1 appeal a trial court order

granting summary judgment to defendant, Township of Winslow, ("the

Township") finding the Township did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff

surrounding his fall from a ladder while performing work on Township property.

After our de novo review of the record and application of the relevant legal

principles, we affirm.

I.

On March 20, 2020, the Township executed a contract with Aliano

Brothers General Contractors, Inc. ("Aliano") to construct a one-story addition

and renovations to the Township Senior Center in Atco. Plaintiff was employed

as a carpenter for Aliano. The contract provided the Township the right to attend

all project meetings which included discussions about job safety. The contract

also included a provision requiring Aliano's equipment to be "unused" and in

1
"Plaintiff" hereinafter refers to John Schmirsky as Kimberly Schmirsky's
claims are per quod only.
A-0917-24
2
safe condition. Notably, it provided the Township the right to stop work deemed

unsafe, and the right to take corrective action.

In the morning of July 6, 2020, plaintiff fell from an extension ladder

while working on the Township Senior Center sustaining injuries. Plaintiff

claims the accident occurred because the rubber shoe on the foot of the ladder

allegedly dislodged, exposing the metal bottom of the ladder, containing several

screw heads, to the smooth concrete floor, causing the ladder to slip or "kick"

out. No witnesses observed plaintiff falling from the ladder. Other employees

reported they heard a loud noise and saw plaintiff hit the concrete floor headfirst.

In June 2022, plaintiff initiated a complaint against the Township and

defendant Garrison Architects. The Township filed its answer denying liability

shortly thereafter. Garrison Architects was later dismissed from the litigation.

At his deposition, plaintiff testified he was assigned to the Township

Senior Center project. He stated the extension ladder he used was owned by

Aliano and had been on the construction site approximately ten weeks before

the accident. Plaintiff stated he performed daily inspections of equipment

including ladders as part of his practice as a carpenter. Plaintiff testified he

inspected the extension ladder he was using prior to his accident and at no point

A-0917-24
3
saw anything wrong with it, although he noticed the ladder was not new because

it was not "shiny and neat."

Plaintiff's liability expert John Whitty, P.E.'s report, opined a dangerous

condition existed on the project site during the course of work that went

unaddressed by the Township and resulted in a serious injury to plaintiff. He

determined that adequate fall protection was not provided, in violation of OSHA

regulations. Further, Whitty opined that the Township did not properly exercise

control over the work at the site and did not enforce provisions of the contractual

relationship with Aliano as required, particularly supervision of safety on the

work site and inspection of the equipment. Plaintiff's other liability expert,

David Schoenard, AIA, opined defendant failed to recognize and act upon an

imminent safety risk while plaintiff was performing his work, which resulted in

a serious injury. Schoenard also opined the Township failed to meet contractual

obligations and failed to ensure industry standards, including OSHA safety

requirements.

Following the close of discovery, defendant moved for summary

judgment, which plaintiff opposed. After oral argument, the trial court issued

an oral decision along with a written order granting defendant's motion for

summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice against

A-0917-24
4
the Township. The following notable portions of the record demonstrate the

court's rationale and basis for its decision.

THE COURT: [W]hat the plaintiff is seeking to do in
this case is in essence, and probably because of some
of the language in the contract. Is to impose a duty on
Winslow Township to actively supervise every aspect
of the work. Because if I rule, I favor of the plaintiff
on this motion, the only way a municipality could avoid
this result, is if they in essence – if they become the
general contractor in the case.

....

THE COURT: I wanted to discuss now the second issue
under 59:4-2 just to use that as the issue. "[Is] this a
dangerous condition of the property?["] It's not a
classic dangerous condition. It was basically a ladder
was used on the project on Winslow Township
property. Anybody have any published decision that
basically deals with -- it doesn't have to be a ladder . . .
where somebody brings some object onto a property
and that somehow then -- and uses it, and that somehow
then makes the property itself a dangerous condition
under 59:4-2.

The court ultimately concluded:

There['s][] probably at least two separate theories. One
is [N.J.S.A.] 59:4-2. The other one is ordinary
negligence. And ordinary negligence would kick in if
I determine that the conduct of Winslow Township in
terms of the contract provisions, attending safety
meetings . . . in essence created the duty to supervise
this project identically to that of the general contractor.
That's where . . . I'm drawing the line. And to comment
on [counsel]'s comment about the contract requiring

A-0917-24
5
good, non-used ladders . . . . That's another good
example of the paradox where . . . if a municipality said
in the contract, you're to use the cheapest, oldest ladders
because we want to sa[v]e taxpayer money. And in
order for us to get the lowest bid for this project, we are
requiring the general contractor use the oldest most
decrepit ladders in the project. I think [that is] a
stronger argument perhaps for liability. [] But to say
they ought to use the best stuff and we're willing to pay
for it because that's go[ing to] be reflected in the
contract price, I think it's perverse to then say that's the
reason why you're in the lawsuit. Anyway, we're going
in circles. I'm granting the motion for the reasons that
I discussed. And that will conclude the matter.

Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment

dismissing his complaint against the Township with prejudice. To the best we

can discern from the several points listed in plaintiff's appeal, he is asserting the

Township as a "joint entity" and co-contractor had a contractual duty to ensure

Aliano's equipment was safe and to provide a safe workplace. Plaintiff asserts

the Township breached this duty by permitting a defective ladder to be used by

plaintiff and not properly supervising safety aspects of the work site. Plaintiff

further contends he has overcome the presumption of immunity under the New

Jersey Tort Claims Act ("TCA"), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3, because issues of

material fact existed showing the defective ladder was a dangerous condition at

the time of the accident, the Township created the dangerous condition or had

actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition, it was foreseeable the

A-0917-24
6
condition of the ladder could cause an injury to its user, and the Township was

palpably unreasonable by not remediating the dangerous condition of the ladder.

II.

Our review of a trial court's summary judgment decision is de novo.

DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc., 256 N.J. 172, 180 (2024).

"Summary judgment should be granted . . . 'against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'"

Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

"The court's function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth

of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Rios

v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). That standard requires us to "determine

whether 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244

N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). We do not defer to the trial court's

A-0917-24
7
legal analysis or statutory interpretation. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins.

Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018); Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 209 (2014).

If there is no genuine issue of fact, we then decide whether the trial court's ruling

on the law was correct. Walker v. Atl. Chrysler Plymouth, 216 N.J. Super. 255,

258 (App. Div. 1987).

We first address plaintiff's contention that the Township as a "joint entity"

and "co-contractor" had a contractual duty to ensure Aliano's equipment was in

a safe condition and to provide a safe workplace and breached this duty by

allowing plaintiff to use a defective ladder. Plaintiff specifically contends the

contract between the Township and Aliano contained specifications that

provided the Township with a right to inspect the equipment and the

responsibility to ensure on-site safety. Plaintiff argues the Township should

have been aware of safety issues through its attendance at the "daily construction

meetings" that addressed work site safety. Most importantly, plaintiff contends

the Township had a duty to plaintiff because it was responsible for the manner

and means of construction for the project and negligently perform ed its

ministerial functions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(d). Based upon our thorough

review of the record, we are not persuaded by plaintiff's arguments.

"To sustain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish four

A-0917-24
8
elements: '(1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and

(4) actual damages.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (quoting Polzo

v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008)). "[T]he question of whether a duty

exists is a matter of law properly decided by the court." Strachan v. John F.

Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 529 (1988).

Here, plaintiff stresses the Township was a general contractor or a "co-

contractor" with Aliano to support its argument the Township had a direct duty

of care to plaintiff. Ordinarily, a general contractor "is not liable for injuries to

employees of [a] subcontractor resulting from either the condition to the

premises or the manner in which the work is performed." Wolczak v. Nat'l Elec.

Prods. Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 64, 71 (App. Div. 1961); see also Muhammad v.

N.J. Transit, 176 N.J. 185, 199 (2003). "The premise underlying that approach

is that a general contractor 'may assume that the independent contractor and [its]

employees are sufficiently skilled to recognize the dangers associated with their

task and adjust their methods accordingly to ensure their own safety.'"

Tarabokia v. Structure Tone, 429 N.J. Super. 103, 113 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting

Accardi v. Enviro-Pak Sys. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 457, 463 (App. Div. 1999)).

Nonetheless, exceptions to the general principle have come to be accepted.

Therefore, "a general contractor may be liable for a subcontractor's [or

A-0917-24
9
independent contractor's] negligence where [the general contractor] retains

control of the manner and means of doing the work contracted for." Ibid. "A

general contractor may also be liable where [they] knowingly engage[] an

incompetent subcontractor or where the work contracted for constitutes a

nuisance per se, namely, is inherently dangerous." Ibid.

"Although a foreseeable risk is the indispensable cornerstone of any

formulation of a duty of care, not all foreseeable risks give rise to duties."

Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 108 (1994). "Ultimately, [determining] whether

a duty exists is a matter of fairness," ibid., and involves a complex analysis that

"weigh[s], and balance[s] several factors—the relationship of the parties, the

nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the

public interest in the proposed solution." Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 157 N.J.

221, 230 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hopkins v. Fox &

Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993)). "The analysis is both very fact-

specific and principled; it must lead to solutions that properly and fairly resolve

the specific case and generate intelligible and sensible rules to govern future

conduct." Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439.

Plaintiff's singular contention is that the Township controlled the

"methods and means" of the project thereby satisfying the exception in

A-0917-24
10
Tarabokia to impose a duty of care on the Township for plaintiff's safety. We

reject this contention as no evidence in the record supports plaintiff's argument

that the Township retained control over any aspects of the project or provided

the safety equipment and materials used for the project, including the ladder

from which plaintiff fell. Additionally, no evidence exists in the record that the

provision of the contract permitting the Township to visit the site and stop the

project, if necessary, was sufficient to create a duty of care to the Township for

the safety of Aliano's employees such as plaintiff.

We conclude the Township's authority constituted a general right to

supervision over the project, not control over the manner and means of same

that would create a duty. A general contractor's immunity, "[is not] disturbed

by the exercise of merely such general superintendence as is necessary to insure

that the subcontractor performs his agreement." Muhammed, 176 N.J. at 199.

No factual issue exists in the record that Aliano, not the Township, was

responsible for the methods and means for the construction project, including

its responsibility to provide a safe worksite to its employees.

We note, plaintiff has not argued that the Township satisfied either of the

two other exceptions in Tarabokia, as there are no allegations the Township

A-0917-24
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engaged an incompetent co-contractor/subcontractor by awarding Aliano the

contract or that the work contracted for was inherently dangerous.

We further reject plaintiff's contention that the Township's attendance at

safety meetings was sufficient to create factual issues to support plaintiff's

assertions that the Township exercised control over the manner and means for

the project. No evidence exists that the Township ever exercised control over

any construction or safety aspect of the project during the approximate ten weeks

from the start of the project to the time of plaintiff's fall, clearly showing its

contract with Aliano did not intend for the Township to exercise control over

the manner and means of the project. The record clearly supports that plaintiff's

employer, Aliano, not the Township, controlled the manner and means for the

project, was responsible for its employees' safety and owned and supplied the

ladder from which plaintiff fell on the date of the incident.

Additionally, there is no duty of care based solely on a finding that OSHA

regulations had been violated. Alloway, 157 N.J. at 236; Costa v. Gaccione, 408

N.J. Super. 362, 372-73 (App.Div.2009). Rather, a general contractor's duty of

care is determined under "general negligence principles." Alloway, 157 N.J. at

230. OSHA violations are only a factor in that analysis.

A-0917-24
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Because we have determined the Township did not owe a duty of care to

plaintiff surrounding the condition of the ladder—a necessary element of

plaintiff's negligence claim against the Township—plaintiff's contention he has

overcome the Township's presumptive immunity from liability under the TCA

is moot.

To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiff's remaining

arguments, we conclude those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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