Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

O.H. v. T.E.H.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1475-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (30.2K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1475-24

O.H.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

T.E.H.,

Defendant-Appellant.

---

Submitted January 13, 2026 – Decided March 19, 2026

Before Judges Rose and Torregrossa-O'Connor.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
Docket No. FV-04-0556-25.

Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podolsky, PA,
attorneys for appellant (Kristofer B. Chiesa, on the
briefs).

Einhorn, Barbarito, Frost, Botwinick, Nunn &
Musmanno, PC, attorneys for respondent (Matheu D.
Nunn and Jessie M. Mills, on the brief).

1
We use initials to protect the parties' privacy. R. 1:38- 3(d)(12).
PER CURIAM

Defendant T.E.H. appeals from a December 13, 2024 final restraining order

(FRO) entered against her and in favor of plaintiff O.H. under the Prevention of

Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Because we conclude

the Family Part issued the FRO based upon predicate offenses not identified in the

domestic violence complaint without sufficient notice to defendant, we vacate and

remand for a new hearing in accordance with this decision.

I.

A. The Temporary Restraining Orders

The parties were in the throes of a contentious divorce when plaintiff

obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant on August 11,

1. The TRO alleged, on August 11, 2024, "defendant did endanger plaintiff's

life, health or well[-]being," claiming, "defendant threatened physical harm

to . . . plaintiff by unknown means." Plaintiff identified only "terroristic threats"

as the predicate offense, and under "prior history of domestic violence," the TRO

stated only: "Multiple documented incidents which police responded to."

On August 20, 2024, plaintiff amended his TRO. The amended TRO again

indicated a predicate offense of terroristic threats, and again alleged "defendant

did endanger plaintiff's life, health or well[-]being" on August 11, 2024 when

A-1475-24
2
"defendant threatened physical harm to . . . plaintiff by unknown means."

However, the amended TRO included the following details:

I am the plaintiff in the above matter, and I am
requesting to only amend my complaint for a domestic
violence restraining order dated 08/11/2024 to include
the below:

I would like to provide additional information about the
act of domestic violence described in the original
complaint. The information is provided here:

On or about August 12[], 2024[,] . . . defendant and her
mother who is her supervisor came to pick up our
children from the marital home, and against the consent
order she walked into the garage picking up items while
I was not home without her mother coordinating the
time and date with me first. . . . Defendan[t']s behavior
is stressful to the children.

On or about August 5[], 2024[,] defendant's mother
messaged my partner on LinkedIn in a harassing
manner. On July 3[], 2024[,] defendant reached out to
my partner's former husband, and has researche[d] my
partner, seemingly all to obtain information, which is
particularly alarming given her history of vandalism of
my vehicle and her mental health concerns.

On or about July 28[], 2024, . . . defendant returned our
children with her mom, who is her supervisor, [twenty-
five] min[utes] after the return time. . . . Defendant
entered the marital hom[e']s garage and started taking
photos. I repeatedly asked her to leave, she refused and
continued taking photos. I asked defendan[t']s mother
if she was supervising, to which she responded, in front
of the children do[n']t talk to me, you cheate[r].

A-1475-24
3
On or about July 25[], 2024[,] on a cam*s2 BBQ
event, . . . defendant showed up with her mother and sat
down at the same table I sat with our children. I left the
table and walked away. When it was time to leave at 7
[p.m.], I reached for our so[n']s hand and . . . defendant
aggressively pushed my hand away.

Defendan[t']s actions have caused stress and anxiety to
both me and our children, including at parenting
exchanges.

Under "prior history of domestic violence," the amended TRO listed the

following additional acts:

Multiple documented incidents which police responded
to.

In the past, . . . defendant committed the following
additional act(s) of domestic violence that was either
reported or unreported to law enforcement and was not
included in my original complaint:

A. May 28[], 2024 there was an event at our kid['s]
school. Before she left the event, defendant vandalized
my car in the parking lot. Defendan[t']s actions caused
damage exceeding $1[,]700.

B. May 14[], 2024 - defendant was hospitalized on May
12[], 2024 for self-harm. After she was
released, . . . defendant returned back to the marital
home while me and my [twelve-year-old child] were
there. Defendant screamed and cursed at me as well as
punched me in chest and kicked me multiple times.
Defendant reached for a knife during the incident.

2
We include this text verbatim, but note the meaning of "cam*s" is unclear.
A-1475-24
4
C. On or about Oct[ober] 16[] 2023, . . . defendant
threw my personal belongings outside the house in front
of our children while cursing at me and making threats
like this is going to be a World War III. If you think
what the Hamas did to Israel was bad, wait until you
see what I will do to yo[u].

D. In or about March 2023, defendant held a knife to
her stomach and said is this what you want me to do. I
moved toward her and she turned the knife toward me.

Defendant has a history of mental health treatment
through 2024.

B. The FRO Hearing

One month later, the trial court held a hearing during which plaintiff and

two police officers testified.

1. Prior History

Before testimony commenced, the court defined plaintiff's allegations and

the parameters of the hearing. The court first read the language of the initial

and amended TROs, noting, "these are prepared generally by law enforcement."

The court added, "So it sometimes includes everything; sometimes it doesn't

include everything; sometimes it's correct; sometimes it's not correct."

Indicating "the . . . proof" would be "the testimony," the court noted it read the

allegations "just to begin to frame the issue."

A-1475-24
5
The court then clarified plaintiff's "contention is fairly straightforward.

That on August 11, 2024 at 8:25 p.m., the [TRO] reads, 'Defendant threatened

physical harm to plaintiff by unknown means.'" As the court read the amended

TRO, it distinguished between the alleged facts underpinning the predicate

terroristic threats offense, and those constituting allegations of past acts of

domestic violence.

A review of the hearing record demonstrates defendant repeatedly

objected to plaintiff's broad reliance on testimony regarding defendant's past

instances of conduct and mental health history, asserting the alleged past

conduct, while relevant for context, could not substitute for evidence of a new

and independent predicate act. Notably, at the outset of plaintiff's testimony

regarding certain prior acts of alleged domestic violence by defendant, including

allegations from October 2023 regarding defendant's threatening plaintiff and

throwing his possessions in the garbage and on the front lawn, defendant moved

to bifurcate the proceeding to avoid blurring lines between new allegations and

prior conduct.

Although defense counsel acknowledged the prior history generally was

relevant to the FRO proceedings, counsel expressed concern the history had

A-1475-24
6
become the focus of the hearing, particularly in view of defendant's mental

health history.

The trial court denied defendant's motion, reasoning testimony regarding

prior acts of domestic violence need not be limited. The court clarified it could

"consider these past acts relative to the contentions that bring us here, or [that]

brought this TRO about."

Plaintiff then testified concerning defendant's prior conduct. He described

and played a video recording of an October 2023 argument during which

defendant threw plaintiff's clothes on the front lawn. A separate recording

captured plaintiff warning defendant not to "touch [his] stuff," and defendant

responding, "this has now become World War III. You think it 's bad in Israel

with Hamas, I am going to be way worse than Hamas." Plaintiff testified he

believed defendant's statement was "a threat." He explained his concern because

"since [they] started the divorce, and even before that, . . . [defendant] became

more aggressive."

Plaintiff testified, months earlier in March 2023, he told defendant he

would like to "proceed with the divorce" just as his children were "about to leave

for school." He claimed "[defendant] walked into the room with a sharp knife,

lift[ed] her shirt up, and put the blade on her stomach. . . . And [she] said to

A-1475-24
7
[him], 'Is this what you want me to do?'" Plaintiff testified, "when [he] tried to

stop her, she raised the knife against [him]." Plaintiff described taking "three

steps back" and pleading with defendant not to "do it" because the kids were

nearby, at which point defendant left the room. Plaintiff testified defendant

again threatened him with a knife almost one year after the March 2023 incident,

causing him to obtain the October 2023 TRO. However, plaintiff later conceded

he did not allege defendant threatened him with a knife in that TRO. Plaintiff

testified on various occasions, when the topic of divorce was mentioned,

defendant reacted by "threatening to hurt herself," "bang[ing] her head on the

wall in the master bedroom," or "punch[ing] the wall in the laundry room."

Defendant again objected to plaintiff's testifying concerning past conduct

including defendant's past threats of self-harm, arguing, "[t]he issue is what

occurred between these parties[,] [a]nd any conduct, acts of domestic

violence . . . prior acts of domestic violence to [plaintiff]." The court overruled

this objection and allowed the testimony, noting, "threat of self-harm is an

element, potentially, of domestic violence. So I need to hear about it."

Regarding plaintiff's detailed testimony about defendant's mental health

diagnoses over defendant's objection, the trial court noted, "I can filter [that]

out . . . . I certainly am not considering [plaintiff] an expert. I'm certainly not

A-1475-24
8
considering a diagnosis or being bound by anything." Plaintiff then testified

defendant had previously been diagnosed as bipolar and schizophrenic.

Plaintiff also testified he dismissed the October 2023 TRO against

defendant because he "wanted [defendant] . . . to get better, to take care of

herself, to take care of her mental health." He admitted defendant had obtained

a TRO against him at the time as well. Plaintiff indicated "[t]hings have gotten

worse," and testified he lives in fear because he "doesn't know what [defendant

is] capable of doing."

Plaintiff described a May 2024 incident when plaintiff dropped the

children off, and defendant raised a dispute regarding child support. He claimed

he told defendant to "leave it to the attorneys," but defendant became aggressive

and threatened he would not see his children anymore. He then presented a text

message from defendant in which she claimed as a result of his cheating she was

"crushed" and "[could] not be a part of this world any longer where everything

[plaintiff did was] to break [her] down until there is nothing left [of her]. " He

claimed he notified defendant's mother and went to their home to be with the

children where he found her "heavily medicated" with a "bottle of pills that

w[as] laying next to her." Plaintiff testified police arrived and "took her to a

mental institut[ion]."

A-1475-24
9
Plaintiff also presented testimony from the responding police officer, who

testified defendant made "suicidal statements." The officer explained police

determined defendant required crisis evaluation and recounted defendant's

stating, "I am not suicidal; I'm homicidal. If that's what you want to know. I

want to murder him. Okay. I want him to get the hell out of my life and stay

away from me and the kids." The officer testified defendant, while in the

ambulance and out of plaintiff's presence, made additional statements including:

"I threatened to cut my ex-husband's throat," "I hope my ex-husband gets

shipped back to Israel and gets blown to a million pieces by Hamas," and

"[w]hen I get out, I'm going to overdose on pills."

When plaintiff testified, he acknowledged defendant accused him of

assaulting her. He denied causing bruising on defendant's wrists, instead

suggesting the bruising resulted from police restraints when transporting her for

evaluation.

Plaintiff explained, while defendant was hospitalized, plaintiff secured an

emergent order suspending defendant's parenting time with the children. Two

days after her release, according to plaintiff, defendant entered the marital home

and "punched" and "kicked" him. Plaintiff explained, although he did not

include the allegation in the TRO, he and defendant moved to the kitchen, where

A-1475-24
10
defendant "reached her hand to grab the knife behind [him]." Plaintiff claimed

he then left the home as defendant cried. Plaintiff played a video recording

allegedly capturing the incident.

Plaintiff testified about a prior incident in May of 2024 when the parties

were present at the children's school. He claimed upon leaving the school he

found his car had been "keyed" leaving a scratch. He played a video recording

from the parking lot and identified what he alleged to be defendant reaching an

arm out while passing plaintiff's car. Plaintiff explained criminal charges related

to this incident were dismissed after he failed to appear for the court date.

1. Defendant's Alleged Conduct in July through August 2024

Relevant to the discrete time period plaintiff alleged for the predicate act

of terroristic threats, plaintiff testified the parties had entered a consent order in

June 2024. The agreement provided plaintiff "temporary exclusive possession

of the marital residence" and allowed for the transfer of the children between

the parties at the home. The consent order did not prohibit contact between the

parties. Plaintiff explained he entered the agreement because he was "in

fear . . . that [defendant] c[ould] attack [him] again." The consent order

provided defendant's time with the children be supervised by either defendant's

parents or her brother.

A-1475-24
11
According to plaintiff, during this period, defendant sent an email to his

therapist and a Facebook message to his partner's ex-husband. Plaintiff asserted

defendant used the name of his prior girlfriend in the email which plaintiff's

therapist forwarded to him. Plaintiff postured his prior girlfriend never would

have sent the message. The content of the message inquired if the therapist

specialized in treating clients "who deny they are narcissists," "refuse to pay

child support or alimony to his wife of seventeen years," and "spend $50,000 on

international vacations." Plaintiff indicated his therapist forwarded the message

to alert him of the communication.

Plaintiff testified his partner received a message purportedly from

defendant's mother via LinkedIn, but plaintiff alleged defendant actually sent

the message. The message pertained to plaintiff, his failure to pay child support

or alimony, his infidelity, and some of his financial information. Plaintiff also

testified regarding an anonymous post in August to a Facebook group called

"The Israeli Cherry Hill Community," referencing specific details of the divorce

and plaintiff's infidelity, and "badmouthing" him.

Plaintiff further claimed, in July of 2024, "[defendant] walked into the

garage" of the marital home, while defendant's mother waited in a car. Plaintiff

indicated defendant was "taking pictures . . . inside the garage," and plaintiff

A-1475-24
12
threatened to call the police if defendant remained in the garage. Plaintiff

explained that, shortly after this incident, two police officers appeared at his

house because defendant claimed plaintiff assaulted her, and asked plaintiff if

he "attacked [defendant]" or "talked badly to her," which he denied.

According to plaintiff, the parties attended a barbecue on July 25, 2024.

Plaintiff indicated he stayed away from defendant, but when he began to leave

with the children, defendant was hugging their son. Plaintiff described

approaching defendant and their son and claimed defendant "pushed [his] hands

away aggressively."

Plaintiff admitted another judge, on August 6, denied plaintiff's emergent

application in the divorce matter seeking exclusive possession of the marital

home and to bar "exchanges" between the parties. Plaintiff then sought and

obtained the initial TRO five days later. Plaintiff testified defendant entered the

marital home the next day, when plaintiff was admittedly not at home. Plaintiff

presented a video recording showing defendant's car and defendant "briskly"

approaching the home. Plaintiff explained defendant entered the garage and

began "removing" items from the house. He testified defendant came to the

home when he was not there, but the children were home with the nanny.

A-1475-24
13
Plaintiff testified he feared defendant. He explained he believed he

needed protection as defendant "can kill [him]." He explained his fear is based

on defendant's past threats and "all the elusive incidents, of [defendant]

contacting . . . [his] partner, [his] partner's ex-husband, [and his] therapist."

1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint at the close of plaintiff's case.

She asserted plaintiff failed to prove the singular predicate act of terrorist ic

threats alleged in the complaint, and thus, under Silver, failed to establish the

essential first requirement for entry of an FRO.

Defense counsel again argued plaintiff could not seek to rely upon prior

threats to cure his lack of proof of any alleged terroristic threat within the period

alleged in plaintiff's complaint. Specifically, counsel asserted:

[T]his domestic violence complaint alleges a single
predicate act of terroristic threats. The TRO lays out in
the section about the predicate acts, Judge, the dates
we're dealing with. And those dates are in essence July
25[] up through August 11[]. Everything else, and
Judge, admittedly there was quite a bit of focus about
what is prior history in this case. The
May . . . allegations, the October allegations, that's all
prior history as alleged in this complaint. But with
respect to the sole predicate act of terroristic threats, it's
our position, Judge, that there is not a single iota of
evidence that one threat was made during any of the
dates alleged in the domestic violence complaint.

A-1475-24
14
Addressing the facts alleged in support of the terroristic threats allegation,

defense counsel argued:

[T]here is no predicate act. What is happening here is
that . . . plaintiff is trying to take a single incident, the
one thing that he can grab onto from months ago and
turn it into something that it is not. But what we can't
do Judge, is we can't go back and essentially
create . . . a predicate act where there isn't one.

Although acknowledging plaintiff's complaint contained a "blanket

statement that he felt a threat of physical harm," the court denied the motion to

dismiss. The court also noted plaintiff's "references again to numerous past

incidence of domestic violence," stating these past acts such as "the May 28[]

car scratching incident, [and] the May 14 hospitalization of the defendant as a

result of allegations of threats of self-harm" were offered to show defendant's

conduct "leading up to the request on August 11." The court summarized

plaintiff's argument he established "the consent order was violated when

defendant entered the garage," "[defendant messaged] plaintiff's partner in a

harassing manner" and "contact[ed] plaintiff's partner's ex in a harassing

manner; not necessarily harassing toward those persons themselves, but with

intention to, I guess, harass plaintiff."

Citing H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 327 (2003), the court recognized,

"'the parties' history, when properly presented, helps to inform the court

A-1475-24
15
regarding defendant's purpose, motive, and intentions, or intended use of

particular information' in that case."

Referencing the parties' divorce, the court noted "there are certainly

contretemps here." The court then framed "the question" as "whether those

allegations amount to the contentions of, again, harassment or terroristic

threats." The court noted there were also "complaints about the history of mental

illness; . . . contentions of a use of a knife, turning the knife toward plaintiff."

Recognizing the "low bar" standard for motions to dismiss, and indicating it

addressed "the court's use of the current complaints versus the past contentions,"

the court denied the motion.

1. Arguments and Court's Decision

Defendant did not present witnesses or evidence and, after the court

admitted the electronic messages and social media posts over defendant's

objection, arguments followed. Defense counsel argued plaintiff failed to meet

its burden to establish the predicate offense of terroristic threats. Counsel

asserted plaintiff's amended TRO alleged specific dates and acts for the

predicate acts and argued plaintiff presented "no evidence of terroristic threats

on any single one of those dates." Defendant's counsel argued,

"What . . . plaintiff is attempting to do here, Judge, knowing that they don't have

A-1475-24
16
any evidence of terroristic threats as a predicate act, is they're trying to backfill

their case." As to the May incident when defendant was hospitalized, counsel

argued "[t]hat's prior history. It's not a predicate act."

After defense counsel's closing argument, the court asked, "The

restraining order checks off a box, there's terroristic threats. Does that limit

me?" Defense counsel argued plaintiff was required to amend, and never

amended, the restraining order to include additional predicate acts. Defendant's

counsel then speculated, "I think probably what Your Honor is getting to

is . . . whether harassment can be considered here. And . . . my position is that

it can't." Plaintiff's counsel responded, "procedurally, Your Honor, you

absolutely can, if you hear testimony that rises to the level of any of the other

boxes, right, you absolutely can choose harassment." The court replied it

"believe[d] that[ was] true."

The court then immediately rendered its oral decision, finding "numerous

predicate acts were laid out," including defendant placing plaintiff's belongings

in trash bags and throwing them on the lawn, "defendant threaten[ing] herself

with a knife" and "wield[ing] a knife at [plaintiff]," and threatening to

"slit . . . [p]laintiff's throat." The court also cited the May incident when

defendant was hospitalized after threatening suicide, and her statement to police

A-1475-24
17
that "it's not suicide, it's homicide." Based on those events, the court concluded

"there were threats from [defendant] to kill [plaintiff]." The court also

referenced as predicate acts, "[d]efendant disparaging [plaintiff] on social

media" and "contacting . . . [p]laintiff's current paramour." The court also cited

the school parking lot incident as a predicate act, concluding that "[d]efendant,

wife, damaged . . . [p]laintiff's vehicle."

The court then stated, "The [TRO], I guess even as amended . . . provides

for certain boxes under the question, . . . 'which constitutes the following

criminal offenses, check all applicable boxes.'" The court noted,

the box that's checked is "terroristic threats" and not
other potential predicate acts. The issue for the court
is, does that limit . . . plaintiff in the allegations and
what might be predicate acts and what predicate
criminal code charges would be involved? I
specifically find, no. I think as I stated previously,
these matters are prepared by law enforcement officers,
generally, and not, certainly, the parties themselves, nor
the attorneys, nor even the judge that's issuing it. So, I
do not find that I am limited in the context of a final
restraining order hearing in determining the conduct
and what might appropriately apply to any particular
predicate act.

The court then found plaintiff sufficiently proved three predicate offenses—

harassment, criminal mischief, and terroristic threats.

A-1475-24
18
As to harassment, the court found "plaintiff testified credibly" and

identified the following "acts of contended harassment":

[T]he bags on the lawn; the knife on the stomach; the
threat to slit the throat; the upsetness exhibited when
defendant was released from the hospital; . . . the
disparaging nature of the social media posts; the
punching a hole in the laundry room wall; the banging
the head; the comments of threats to harm and
kill . . . plaintiff; stating that she was going to do things
worse than Hamas did to Israel; that she wielded a
knife, she was threatening herself with the
knife. . . . [C]ontentions of . . . cursing and yelling;
again, could very well be contretemps. However, there
is credible testimony that . . . defendant
punched . . . plaintiff in the chest and that there were
signs of injury.

The court "f[ou]nd that defendant made communications to . . . plaintiff in a

manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm." The court also found defendant

"violated . . . the consent order when she went to the house, went into the garage,

[and] was taking pictures" because "[t]he consent order gave exclusive

possession of the property to . . . plaintiff."

Regarding terroristic threats, the court noted, "the terroristic threats really

relate to the wielding of the knife" because "there was a threat to kill another

with the purpose to put him in imminent fear of death under the circumstances

reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy of the threat and

likelihood that it would be carried out." The court also found plaintiff credible

A-1475-24
19
in his belief in the immediacy of the threat because "plaintiff[] testified that he

had to lock the door" out of fear of "defendant entering and doing [him] harm."

Accordingly, the court found plaintiff proved "a violation of the terroristic

threats criminal statute." Citing "[t]he instances with the police officers," the

court noted, while the threat made in the ambulance "wasn't a threat made

directly to . . . plaintiff, . . . it [wa]s evidence of the

intent . . . of . . . defendant." In addition, the court indicated there were still

"threats of death made directly to . . . plaintiff."

As to criminal mischief, the court found "in purposely damaging

[plaintiff's] car, . . . defendant committed criminal mischief."

After finding three predicate acts, the court then addressed the necessity

of a permanent restraining order. The court considered all relevant factors and

questioned "whether there is escalating conduct" or "difficulties between the

parties," and found both. The court also acknowledged "a substantial history of

domestic violence between the parties" and "prior [TROs] making allegations,

individually or by each against the other of domestic violence." The court

concluded defendant had "an intent to harm [plaintiff]" and found "an existence

of immediate danger . . . to person or property," necessitating an FRO.

A-1475-24
20
II.

A.

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court improperly entered the FRO

based on predicate acts neither alleged in the complaint nor proven and, instead,

impermissibly relied on past alleged acts of domestic violence in finding

predicate acts. Defendant also contends the court erred in denying her motion

to dismiss because plaintiff failed to prove the single predicate offense alleged

in the complaint—terroristic threats. Plaintiff counters the court correctly based

its findings, specifically as to the predicate act of harassment, on the "course of

alarming conduct" in this case. Although conceding the complaint did not allege

harassment as a predicate act, plaintiff contends the court found harassment

based on defendant's violation of the consent order and contacting plaintiff's

partner and therapist, all of which was included in the narrative of the predicate

acts section of the amended TRO.

B.

Our review of a trial court's grant of an FRO is limited. See C.C. v. J.A.H.,

463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). Indeed, its findings "are

binding . . . when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."

A-1475-24
21
Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). This court reviews legal

conclusions de novo. T.B. v. I.W., 479 N.J. Super. 404, 412 (App. Div. 2024).

When determining whether to issue an FRO pursuant to the PDVA, courts

must engage in a two-step analysis. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. First,

the court must determine "whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance

of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. Second, upon finding a

predicate act of domestic violence, the court must then determine whether an

FRO is required to protect the party seeking restraints from future acts or threats

of violence. Id. at 126-27. "[T]here [must] be a finding that 'relief is necessary

to prevent further abuse.'" J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011) (quoting

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)).

Due process and notice concerns extend to PDVA matters requiring

"notice defining the issues and an adequate opportunity to prepare and respond."

H.E.S., 175 N.J. at 321 (quoting McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel &

Casino, 132 N.J. 546, 559 (1993)). To be sure, "[t]here can be no adequate

preparation where the notice does not reasonably apprise the party of the

charges, where the issues litigated at the hearing differ substantially from those

outlined in the notice." Id. at 322 (alteration in original) (quoting Nicoletta v.

A-1475-24
22
N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 77 N.J. 145, 162 (1978)). PDVA

defendants must be afforded a "meaningful opportunity to defend against a

complaint in domestic violence matters." D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592,

606 (App. Div. 2013).

Although allegations need not be meticulously exact, they must be

specific enough to provide defendants with meaningful notice of the claims

against them, and a finding of domestic violence must be based upon the act or

acts alleged in the complaint. See H.E.S., 175 N.J. at 324-25. "[I]t constitutes

a fundamental violation of due process to convert a hearing on a complaint

alleging one act of domestic violence into a hearing on other acts of domestic

violence which are not even alleged in the complaint." Id. at 325 (quoting J.F.

v. B.K., 308 N.J. Super. 387, 391-92 (App. Div. 1998)).

Importantly, to ensure liberal protection is afforded to domestic violence

victims seeking relief under the PDVA, courts afford plaintiffs ample latitude to

supplement and amend the allegations set forth in the original PDVA

complaints. See J.D., 207 N.J. at 478-79. However, "[t]hat reality is not

inconsistent with affording defendants the protections of due process to which

they are entitled." Id. at 479. "[E]nsuring that defendants are not deprived of

their due process rights requires our trial courts to recognize both what those

A-1475-24
23
rights are and how they can be protected consistent with the protective goals of

the Act." Ibid.

Thus, a court permitting expansion of the allegations in the complaint

"must recognize . . . it has permitted an amendment to the complaint and must

proceed accordingly." Id. at 479-80. Our review of the record does not persuade

us the court provided adequate notice to defendant it had functionally amended

the complaint to now include two additional predicate acts, harassment and

criminal mischief, or that it would rely upon threats, previously identified as

past acts of domestic violence, to anchor its finding defendant committed the

predicate act of terroristic threats.

As detailed, defendant raised a nearly standing objection to the court's

conflating prior alleged acts of domestic violence with the singular allegation

that, in the discrete period between July 25 and August 11, 2024, defendant

committed an act of terroristic threats. Although the court repeatedly responded

to motions and objections by appearing to clarify it would confine its

consideration of prior acts to contextualizing the new terroristic threats

allegation in the complaint and to determine the need for permanent restraints,

acts consistently defined as past conduct permeated the court's findings as to

each of the three predicate acts it found. Although we recognize we need only

A-1475-24
24
find plaintiff proved one predicate act to meet the first requirement under Silver,

387 N.J. Super. at 125 (noting courts need only find a single predicate act has

occurred), the court's terroristic threats finding cannot ground the FRO because

the court itemized and relied exclusively upon multiple past incidents to support

its finding. Likewise, the court's harassment findings were laden with instances

of past conduct.

Cognizant that PDVA complaints are not drafted with surgical precision,

and recognizing amendments to those original pleadings are fluid and should be

liberally granted when necessary, we nonetheless cannot agree the vital and

delicate balance of the PDVA victim's and defendant's rights was properly struck

in these circumstances. The precise predicate acts and prior acts were never

sufficiently defined, creating, however unintentionally, the possible impression

the past acts outlined in plaintiff's complaint and in the testimony would serve

only to color the predicate acts and to determine whether future restraints were

warranted to ameliorate risk of further domestic violence.

Accordingly, we vacate the FRO, reinstate the TRO, and remand for a new

hearing to be conducted after any amendments are carefully defined so

defendant understands the precise allegations against her and plaintiff can

meaningfully prepare to fulfill his burden. As the trial court made explicit

A-1475-24
25
credibility findings, we direct this matter be heard by a different judge on

remand. See J.L. v. J.F., 317 N.J. Super. 418, 438 (App. Div. 1999) (directing

a different judge conduct a plenary hearing on remand as "the [original] judge

determined plaintiffs' position was not credible," noting, "this reflects a policy

of the courts, and not on the professional manner in which this m atter was

handled" by the court). Further, as we vacate the FRO on independent grounds,

we need not reach defendant's additional arguments.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1475-24
26