NCA v GKC (No.2): Court Discharges Interim Anonymisation in UWO Proceedings

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National Crime Agency v GKC (No.2) [2026] EWHC 929 (Admin) (24 April 2026)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2026/929.html
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[2026] EWHC 929 (Admin) |
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| Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 929 (Admin) |
| Case No: AC-2025-LON-002288 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
SITTING IN LONDON

| 24th April 2026 |
B e f o r e :

MR JUSTICE FORDHAM

Between:
| | NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY | Applicant |
| | - and – | |
| | GKC (No.2) | Respondent |
| | - and - | |
| | (1) BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
(2) TIMES MEDIA LTD
(3) ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS LTD
(4) TELEGRAPH MEDIA GROUP LTD | Interveners |

**Andrew Sutcliffe KC and Fiona Jackson (NCA Legal) for the Applicant
Tim Owen KC (Gherson LLP Solicitors) for the Respondent
Claire Overman (BBC Legal) for the Interveners
Jonathan Browning of Bloomberg LP, in person

Hearing date: 25.3.26
Further written submissions: 27.3.26 to 1.4.26
Draft judgment: 13.4.26**

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

1. FORDHAM J
3. This Judgment was handed down remotely at 10am on 24.4.26 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and by release to the National Archives.
5. FORDHAM J:
6. PART 1: INTRODUCTION
7. This judgment is about the application of the open justice principle to contested High Court proceedings about an unexplained wealth order ("UWO") and interim freezing order ("IFO"). It is about how Article 8 privacy rights, discussed in ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2022] UKSC 5 [2022] AC 1158 (see §17 below), fit with the legal framework governing derogations from open justice, when applied to legal proceedings which interweave the High Court into a civil recovery investigation by a state entity.
9. I have already given Judgment No.1 [2026] EWHC 573 (Admin). The National Crime Agency ("NCA") had applied for an UWO and IFO. That was a without-notice application, pursuant to s.362I(1) and s.362J(5) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. It was granted by Bourne J, for reasons set out in a private judgment [2025] EWHC 1908 (Admin), after a hearing which was conducted in private pursuant to §11.1 of the Practice Direction on Civil Recovery Proceedings ("the CRP Practice Direction") and NCA v Hussain [2020] EWHC 432 (Admin) [2020] 1 WLR 2145 (see §20 below). The Respondent applied to set aside the UWO and IFO. I dismissed that application for the reasons given in Judgment No.1.
11. I now have to decide whether to discharge orders which I had made for interim anonymisation of the Respondent with reporting restrictions. We convened a separate public hearing, with notice to the media and several media organisations have intervened. Mr Owen KC for the Respondent says my interim orders should be maintained. Ms Overman for the Interveners says the orders should be discharged. Mr Sutcliffe KC and Ms Jackson for the NCA agree with the Interveners. So do I. My conclusion is that the individualised Article 8/ Article 10 balancing exercise comes down decisively in favour of discharging the interim anonymisation and reporting restrictions. My reasons are in Part 5 below. To get to them, I will need to describe some building blocks (Part 2), to set out the Respondent's argument (Part 3), and to analyse some key topics (Part 4).
13. Uncontroversial points
14. I saw the following points as uncontroversial. First, that if anonymity were to be discharged: (a) the redacted Glossary from Judgment No.1 (§3) would be published unredacted; (b) Bourne J's private judgment would be published; but (c) I would need to adopt a holding position to protect the Respondent's appeal rights. Second, that the following contents from the Glossary have, in any event, proved over-inclusive and should be unredacted now, because doing so involves no risk of identification of the Respondent:
16. | Annotated term: | Meaning: (now unredacted) | | residential apartment (GL): | | | seller's solicitors (GL) | Clyde & Co LLP | | buyer's solicitors (GL) | Spencer West LLP | | tenanted apartment (GL): | | | seller's solicitors (GL) | Howard Kennedy LLP | | buyer's solicitors (GL) | Chan Neill Solicitors LLP | | transferor's solicitors (GL) | Chan Neill Solicitors LLP | | transferee's solicitors (GL) | Chan Neill Solicitors LLP |
18. UWOs and open justice
19. The issue which I have to decide is forward-looking. But I am going to pause to look backwards. As I explained in Judgment No.1 at §2, I heard the Respondent's application to set aside the UWO and IFO at a public hearing with interim anonymity. I declined her request for a hearing and determination in private. I was concerned that this would place the proceedings "below the radar of open justice". I was satisfied that interim anonymisation and reporting restrictions would protect any legitimate interests.
21. In the end, everyone agreed that this had been appropriate. But it turned out that I was in good company. The discussion in R (Javadov) v Westminster Magistrates' Court [2021] EWHC 2751 (Admin) [2022] 1 WLR 1953 (DC, 29.9.21) at §§46-48 (see §51 below) alerted me to NCA v A (Ruling on Anonymity) [2018] EWHC 2603 (Admin) [2018] ACD 132. The substantive judgments in that case were about UWOs and politically exposed persons (PEPs): see NCA v Hajiyeva [2018] EWHC 2534 (Admin) [2018] 1 WLR 5887 and [2020] EWCA Civ 108 [2020] 1 WLR 3209. But in NCA v A (Ruling on Anonymity) Supperstone J was dealing with open justice and Mrs Hajiyeva's application to set aside a UWO and IFO. He refused Mrs Hajiyeva's request for a private hearing, making an interim anonymity order: see [2018] EWHC 2534 (Admin) at §6. Having dismissed her application to set aside the UWO and IFO, he discharged the anonymity order (see [2018] EWHC 2603 (Admin)), a decision from which the Court of Appeal (Sales LJ) later refused permission to appeal (see [2020] EWCA Civ 108 at §8).
23. NCA v Baker [2020] EWHC 822 (Admin) (see Judgment No.1 at §1) was a judgment on a successful application to set aside UWOs obtained without notice by the NCA, where there was no anonymisation. Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Schools [2025] EWHC 1146 (Admin) was a judgment on an on-notice application for an UWO and IFO, where Pepperall J refused to sit in private and declined anonymisation. Mr Owen KC told me his researches indicate up to 10 other UWO cases where respondents were not publicly identified. To the UWO cases can be added the account freezing order case of Javadov (§28 below), and the disclosure order case of Hao (§53 below), where hearings were in public without anonymisation.
25. The NCA made its without-notice application to Bourne J on 18 July 2025. The transcript begins with the words "IN PRIVATE". But, in fact, it starts with an exchange between Counsel and the Judge "in public". Mr Sutcliffe KC said this:
27. Before I address you on the substantive matters, could I first address the question of whether this hearing should be in public or in private. At the moment, it is in public, so anybody could walk in, and we are conscious that sometimes journalists like to appear and to make submissions on these matters. It doesn't look as though there is anyone intending to do that, but could I take your Lordship to the case of NCA v Hussain, which is in the authorities bundle at tab 10, because Mr Justice Murray addressed in detail the issue of whether this sort of hearing, an application for an unexplained wealth order, should be heard in public or in private …
28. … the NCA submits that, given the early stage of its investigation, the need for privacy arises not just because of the potential impact of the Respondent being on notice of the NCA's investigation in terms of the risk of property being dissipated, but also because of the potentially disproportionate personal and reputational impact on a respondent of the fact that a UWO has been obtained, if that fact is publicised. In this context, the court may want to have particular regard to the fact that the respondent is a 23-year-old student, currently residing in London with leave to remain in the UK until 30 September of this year…
29. The Judge then made this decision:
30. I am satisfied that we should sit in private in accordance with the presumption in the Practice Direction, which hasn't been rebutted by any information available to me so far. I will say a little more about that when I give judgment …
31. There was a pause for the usher to do the "necessary to ensure that we are in private".
32. Within the private judgment, the Judge said this:
34. The application has been made without notice in accordance with s.362I(1) of POCA and §§8.2 and 18.6 of the [CRP] Practice Direction, and has been heard in private in accordance with §11.1 of the Practice Direction. In that regard, I have also been referred to NCA v Hussain [2020] 1 WLR 2145 at §§72 to 92, and to CPR 39.2(3)(a), (c), (e) and (g), and I was and am satisfied, as the court was in Hussain, that a private hearing was necessary to secure the proper administration of justice. The reasons are the same as in that case, in particular the fact that the NCA's investigation is at a very early stage, that assets may be dissipated if the application comes to the respondent's attention, and that the case involves serious allegations against the respondent, which engage her right to privacy …
35. NCA v Hussain is the leading case on UWO/IFO applications being without-notice and heard in private (see §§20-25, 48-53 below). But one feature of Hussain is that the press were alerted, and initially challenged the decision to hear the application in private (Hussain at §13). Another feature of Hussain is that the Court at the outset made an anonymity order (see §1). By contrast, the present case involves these three reference-points: (1) Mr Sutcliffe KC told Bourne J (see §8 above) that the NCA was "conscious that sometimes journalists like to appear and to make submissions on these matters", adding that it did not "look as though there is anyone intending to do that". But how was the press supposed to have been in a position to do so? (2) Mr Owen KC submitted to me (9.2.26) that: "No application has been made by the media to lift the privacy order made by Bourne J". But there was no such order. (3) Mr Sutcliffe KC and Ms Jackson submitted to me (9.2.26) that the Respondent did not include, in her application to set aside the UWO and IFO, any application for a private hearing or anonymisation. Nor was there notification to the press, under best practice (cf. R (Marandi) v Westminster Magistrates' Court [2023] EWHC 587 (Admin) [2023] 2 Cr App R 15 at §§69, 85iv).
37. The Interveners say questions relating to transparency and UWO/IFO applications are worthy for consideration by the Civil Justice Rules Committee. They refer to developments in criminal proceedings (Criminal Procedure Rules 6.4(3)(b)(ii)) and SIAC appeals (SIAC Practice Note on Anonymisation Orders and Related Measures §§24-28). The NCA says that it would have no objection. I confine myself to these observations about three features of what happened at the start of this case. (1) First, the Court's published Cause List listed the NCA's without-notice application as "BOM v BMR". This was an impediment. No member of the public or press would have had a clue who "BOM" was, or what application was being made. The Interveners accept that there is good reason for an administrative cipher for the Respondent. But they object to a cipher for the enforcement authority. The NCA says it was not consulted by the Court and would want to consult with other authorities as to "whether the listing of all hearings in UWO proceedings should identify the relevant enforcement authority by name". I have been unable to see any reason for obscuring the identity of the NCA. I think an appropriate entry in the Cause List would be National Crime Agency v BMR; or, even better, National Crime Agency v BMR (Unexplained Wealth Order). (2) Second, the hearing began in public (§8 above). I think that was a course which could promote open justice. But there was already the listing impairment. (3) Third, at the end of the hearing, the Judge was not invited to take or consider any further step in public. Under CPR 39.2(5) (see §15 below), where the Court sits in private, or where the Court orders anonymity, the Court's order "shall be published" on the judiciary website "unless and to the extent that the court otherwise directs". This was not raised with the Judge. Nor was the Judge invited to consider announcing in public that a UWO/IFO application had been granted, albeit on terms which were private and for reasons delivered in private. I think this was another impediment.
39. PART 2: BUILDING BLOCKS
40. UWOs
41. UWOs are discussed in Judgment No.1 at §§4-9. They are "part of an investigative regime" (Hajiyeva CA at §11), being part of a "civil recovery investigation" (2002 Act s.341(2)). Part 8 comprises "a 'toolkit' of investigative powers" and UWOs are within it as "one of a number of investigation tools available to the NCA" (Baker at §§10, 61). UWOs are obtained by satisfying the Court as to applicable criteria (s.362B) and residual discretion (Baker at §§21-22). The associated IFO (see Judgment No.1 at §13) must be necessary to avoid the risk of any subsequent "recovery order" being frustrated (s.362J(2)). If ordered on a without-notice application, the respondent's right to apply to set aside the UWO means the Court applies the criteria afresh (Baker §60). The UWO requires the recipient to explain their interest in property and how they obtained it (s.362A(3)). Failure to comply can trigger a rebuttable presumption (s.362C(2)) of "recoverable property" in Part 5 civil recovery proceedings. After a response to an UWO, the enforcement authority has to decide what enforcement or investigatory proceedings, if any, are to be taken in relation to the property under Parts 2, 4, 5 or 8 (Baker at §18iv).
43. Regulatory landscape
44. Part 8 is part of a "broader regulatory landscape" (see Javadov at §14) – with related provisions governing multiple aspects of the investigation, preservation and recovery of the proceeds of crime – having these principal areas: (a) civil freezing and recovery of criminal property in the High Court (Part 5); (b) taxation of criminal profits (Part 6); (c) search, seizure and summary forfeiture of cash, listed assets and bank balances (Part 5, Chapters 3, 3A and 3B); (d) powers of investigation (Part 8, with the High Court having jurisdiction over orders which are part of a civil recovery investigation or an exploitation proceeds investigation, along with UWOs; otherwise, orders that are part of any other form of investigation may be granted by a Crown Court judge); (e) criminal restraint orders (Part 2, exercisable by a Crown Court judge); (f) seizure of realisable property other than cash or exempt property (Part 2, by an appropriate officer with appropriate approval); and (g) post-conviction confiscation.
46. Open justice
47. The contours of the open justice principle were set out in Marandi at §43 (see §42 below). These three points were identified as applicable "across the board" (see R (Rai) v Winchester Crown Court [2021] EWCA Civ 604 [2021] 2 Cr App R 20 at §§22-23):
49. [1] The general rule is that the administration of justice must be done in public. The public and the media have the right to attend all court hearings and the media is able to report those proceedings fully and contemporaneously. [2] Any restriction on these usual rules will be exceptional. It must be based on necessity. [3] The burden is on the party seeking the restriction to establish it is necessary on the basis of clear and cogent evidence.
50. CPR 39.2
51. CPR 39.2 applies to High Court proceedings, including UWOs. It provides:
53. 39.2 General rule – hearing to be in public. (1) The general rule is that a hearing is to be in public. A hearing may not be held in private, irrespective of the parties' consent, unless and to the extent that the court decides that it must be held in private, applying the provisions of paragraph (3). (2) In deciding whether to hold a hearing in private, the court must consider any duty to protect or have regard to a right to freedom of expression which may be affected. (2A) The court shall take reasonable steps to ensure that all hearings are of an open and public character, save when a hearing is held in private. (3) A hearing, or any part of it, must be held in private if, and only to the extent that, the court is satisfied of one or more of the matters set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (g) and that it is necessary to sit in private to secure the proper administration of justice – (a) publicity would defeat the object of the hearing; (b) it involves matters relating to national security; (c) it involves confidential information (including information relating to personal financial matters) and publicity would damage that confidentiality; (d) a private hearing is necessary to protect the interests of any child or protected party; (e) it is a hearing of an application made without notice and it would be unjust to any respondent for there to be a public hearing; (f) it involves uncontentious matters arising in the administration of trusts or in the administration of a deceased person's estate; or (g) the court for any other reason considers this to be necessary to secure the proper administration of justice. (4) The court must order that the identity of any person shall not be disclosed if, and only if, it considers non-disclosure necessary to secure the proper administration of justice and in order to protect the interests of that person. (5) Unless and to the extent that the court otherwise directs, where the court acts under paragraph (3) or (4), a copy of the court's order shall be published on the website of the Judiciary of England and Wales (which may be found at www.judiciary.uk). Any person who is not a party to the proceedings may apply to attend the hearing and make submissions, or apply to set aside or vary the order.
54. The CRP Practice Direction
55. Section II of the Practice Direction: Civil Recovery Proceedings deals with civil recovery proceedings under Part 5 of the 2002 Act, including a "claim … for a recovery order" (§4.1). An application for a property freezing order may be made without notice (§5.3), and the person affected can apply to set it aside (§7.1). Section III deals with applications under Part 8 of the 2002 Act. An application for an UWO and IFO can be made without notice (§§8.2, 18.6) and the person affected can apply to set it aside (§12.1A). Bespoke provisions govern access to court documents (§9). Under §11.1, a UWO/IFO application:
57. … will be heard and determined in private, unless the judge hearing it directs otherwise.
58. Section IV makes further provision, including as to production orders (§13), warrants for search and seizure (§14) and disclosure orders (§15).
59. ZXC
60. ZXC was decided by the Supreme Court in February 2022. The case was about whether an online newspaper had committed a civil wrong, by publishing details of a criminal investigation, derived from a confidential letter. It was a decision about "the limit imposed by the law on the ability to report … police suspicion prior to charge" (§104). Bloomberg had published a news article, revealing that the claimant, a corporate CEO, had been interviewed as part of a criminal investigation into fraud and corruption. That information was derived from a confidential letter requesting inter-agency cooperation. The claimant brought a tort claim for misuse of private information (MPI), winning in the High Court (17.4.19), the Court of Appeal (15.5.20) and Supreme Court (16.2.22). The tort of MPI has two stages (see §47): (i) whether the claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the relevant information; and if so (ii) whether that expectation is outweighed by the countervailing interest of the publisher's right to freedom of expression. ZXC decided that, at MPI stage (i), a "legitimate starting point" is that a person under criminal investigation has, prior to being charged, a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of information relating to that investigation (§146).
62. These are some further features of ZXC:
64. i) First, that the "reasonable expectation of privacy" arises in conjunction with ECHR Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life). MPI is a cause of action designed to reflect the values of Article 8 and Article 10 (freedom of expression) (ZXC at §46iii). The "touchstone of private life is whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy" (§46iv). The reasonable expectation of privacy is linked to whether Article 8 is "engaged" (§55). Its strength is linked to the weight to be attached to Article 8 rights (§70). A reasonable expectation of privacy generally applies, for example, to information concerning an individual's physical or mental health (§72).
65. ii) Second, that the "legitimate starting point" was not a new discovery. It was traced through judgments of the Courts, back to 2014-2016 (§§91-94).
66. iii) Third, that the "legitimate starting point" was supported by strong public policy considerations, concerning unfair reputational damage (§§80-99). Relevant "concerns" had been voiced by judges, inquiry reports, the College of Policing, the Met Police, the Independent Office of Police Conduct, the DPP, the Home Affairs Select Committee, and the Government (§80). These were the strong themes (§81):
67. > First, the growing recognition that as a matter of public policy the identity of those arrested or suspected of a crime should not be revealed to the public has now resulted in a uniform general practice by state investigatory bodies not to identify those under investigation prior to charge. Second, the rationale for this uniform general practice is the risk of unfair damage to reputation, together with other damage. Third, the practice applies regardless of the nature of the suspected offence or the public characteristics of the suspect. To be suspected by the police or other state body of a crime is damaging whatever the nature of the crime. The damage occurs whatever the characteristic or status of the individual. Fourth, there is uniformity of judicial approach, at first instance in a series of cases and in the Court of Appeal in this case, based on judicial knowledge that publication of information that a person is under criminal investigation will cause damage to reputation together with other damage, irrespective of the presumption of innocence. This has led to a general rule or legitimate starting point that such information is generally characterised as private at [MPI] stage [i].
68. iv) Fourth, that the "legitimate starting point" was not undermined as unsound, by claiming that it underestimated "the public's ability to observe the legal presumption of innocence" (§§100, 108). Although in Guardian News (§26 below) at §66, Lord Rodger had said "the law proceeds on the basis" that "most members of the public understand" that "you are innocent unless and until proved guilty in a court of law", Khuja (§27 below) had identified "the public's understanding" as a question of fact (§107) and had cast doubt on whether judicial confidence in public perception was "a realistic reflection of the position" (§106). The legal presumption of innocence applies to juries given legal directions in criminal trials, but here there was "only one answer", "namely" that "publication of information that a person is under criminal investigation" means "the person's reputation will ordinarily be adversely affected causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life" (§108), the degree of which harm "can be profound and irremediable" (§109).
69. ZXC was about the press publishing information about an individual being the subject of a criminal investigation. It was not a case about the open justice principle. There were these three ways in which open justice featured in ZXC:
71. i) First, there was a question about anonymising the claimant, because of the nature of the claim: see [2019] EWHC 970 (QB) [2019] EMLR 20 at §3.
72. ii) Second, there was an identifiable horizon. It was common ground that, if a person was charged with a criminal offence, there could from that point no longer be the reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of being under criminal investigation (SC at §77). At that point "the information is of an essentially public nature". This is "the point at which the process of the court has been engaged", where "the suspect (now defendant) will appear in a criminal court" (§§98-99). This identifiable horizon had a rationale which was directly concerned with the applicability of the open justice principle. Here is how it was put (§77):
73. > it was common ground that if someone is charged with a criminal offence there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy. We consider, generally, that to be a rational boundary, as the open justice principle in a free country is fundamental to securing public confidence in the administration of justice: Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417. Consequently, whenever a person is charged with a criminal offence the open justice principle generally means that the information is of an essentially public nature so that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to it.
74. iii) Third, there was recognition of another open justice setting, where the relevant individual had been investigated and not charged, but where the press was reporting the administration of justice. This was Khuja (§27 below), which raised a "different issue" about "permissible reporting of evidence given in public during a criminal trial" (ZXC at §§103-104). The Supreme Court did not discuss other open justice scenarios, such as suspicion-based asset freezing orders in Javadov (§28 below). That is unsurprising. Bloomberg could not invoke the open justice principle as a basis for denying or defeating the reasonable expectation of privacy.
75. Hussain
76. Hussain was the High Court case about UWO/IFO applications being without notice and heard in private (§88). It was decided in February 2020. Mansoor Mahmood Hussain was a 39 year old Leeds-based businessman involved with property development companies. In May 2019, the NCA made a without-notice application to the High Court for an UWO and IFO, explaining that Mr Hussain was suspected of involvement in serious criminality in connection with Bradford-based crime groups involved in drugs, firearms, fraud and money-laundering offences. After a without-notice hearing conducted in private on 12 July 2019, Murray J made the UWO and IFO. On 20 February 2020 he gave full reasons for the orders, and for why the hearing had been conducted in private: [2020] EWHC 432 (Admin) [2020] 1 WLR 2145. The judgment in Hussain decided (see §22 below) that the "presumptive starting point" is that a UWO (and any associated IFO) application will be made "without notice" and "heard in private" (§88), in accordance with §11.1 of the Practice Direction (§16 above), given the likely engagement of CPR 39.2(3) limbs (a), (c), (e) and (g) (§15 above).
78. By the time Murray J's judgment was given, Supperstone J had made a Part 5 (s.245A) property freezing order against Mr Hussain, after a public hearing on 12 February 2020. That meant the fact of the UWO and IFO had ceased to be confidential, and on that basis it was held appropriate to discharge anonymisation (see §18). A property freezing order is granted based on the Court being satisfied that there is "a good arguable case" that there is "recoverable property" (s.245A(5)). This can be compared to the non-anonymisation in the account freezing order (s.303Z1) in Javadov: see §28 below.
80. In Hussain, the NCA strongly submitted that the hearing should be in private; that no balancing exercise arose; and that there was no conflict with open justice. A raft of points were advanced. Mr Owen KC says, with force, that what the NCA was saying in Hussain contrasts with what it is now saying in urging the discharge of anonymity in the present case. The NCA in Hussain emphasised this potent trilogy: (i) the very early investigative stage; (ii) the threshold of suspicion; and (iii) the reputational impact for the individual. It was a potent trilogy embodied in Murray J's conclusions at §88:
82. in light of the nature and purpose of the UWO application, CPR r 39.2(3) is highly likely to be engaged, requiring the court to hold the hearing in private to secure the proper administration of justice. Given, in particular, (i) the very early stage of an investigation at which a UWO application will be sought by an enforcement authority, (ii) the relatively low threshold for obtaining a UWO under section 362B of POCA and (iii) the potentially disproportionate personal and reputational impact on a respondent of the fact that a UWO has been obtained if that fact is publicised, several sub-paragraphs of CPR r 39.2(3) are likely to be engaged, most notably, sub-paragraphs (a), (c), (e) and (g), particularly in a case such as this where the UWO application involves consideration of the Serious Crime Requirement. This was anticipated by the statutory framework and guidance applicable to UWOs, which makes it clear that, while close and careful regard must be had to the specific circumstances of each case, the presumptive starting point is that a UWO application will be made without notice and that the hearing of the UWO application and any related IFO application will be in private.
83. Here are further points which the NCA was making in Hussain – and which the Court indicated it substantially accepted (see §88) – relating to "sensitive information, both confidential and personal, about the respondent" (at §84i to vi):
85. (i) The considerable media interest in UWOs is undeserved. A UWO is merely a tool designed to assist with information-gathering during the early preliminary stages of an investigation, where there is a dearth of information available to the NCA. Consequently, the threshold tests for the application are relatively low. The Holding Requirement and the Value Requirement are not difficult to satisfy. As to the Income Requirement and the Serious Crime Requirement, each depends on there being reasonable grounds for suspicion and no more. The test for suspicion is fairly low, and may be established by reference to evidence that would fall short of that necessary to establish actual involvement in crime …
86. (ii) Consequently, a UWO application is designed (a) to assist the NCA at the very early stages of its investigation, at a time when it has relatively little information and (b) to be an information-gathering tool. The obtaining of a UWO does not mean that the NCA will necessarily proceed with a civil recovery investigation or proceed to take advantage of any further or more intrusive investigative measures available to it.
87. (iii) The result is that a UWO application necessarily sets out in detail the fact that the NCA suspects that: (a) if the PEP Requirement applies, the respondent is a politically exposed person who has been involved in (most likely) embezzlement and corruption; or (b) if the Serious Crime Requirement applies, as in this case, the respondent is a person who has been involved in very serious criminality …
88. (iv) The UWO application sets out the foregoing detail, together with detailed information about the respondent's income and finances, yet this is done at a stage where the investigation, and underlying evidence, is embryonic. Some of the information will be from public sources, but much of it will be likely to have come confidentially from other authorities and agencies … and other third parties.
89. (v) Plainly the content of that confidential information, if made public, is likely to have a personal and reputational impact on the respondent. The notion that the press or any other member of the public should be able to hear of the NCA's suspicions as to the respondent's character and criminal involvement, and details of the amount and suspected source of the respondent's wealth, in circumstances where the respondent is not even aware of the fact that the hearing is happening, let alone has the opportunity to seek to protect his confidentiality and reputation, is obviously unfair to the respondent, not to mention contrary to the interests of justice. Plainly, therefore, sub-paragraph (e), as well as sub-paragraph (c), of CPR r 39.2(3) is engaged.
90. (vi) Indeed, even if the application is on notice, for similar reasons sub-paragraph (g) of CPR 39.2(3) would also almost certainly be engaged. There is no justification for a respondent's character being put forward for the type of public trial by media that often follows any media interest, at such an early stage of the investigation. Indeed, were that invariably a risk, then proportionality might require in practice that the NCA would have to apply a far higher threshold test as to the evidence and certainty of guilt than the statute requires before proceeding to make an application. That outcome would undermine the intended function of the UWO jurisdiction.
91. Here are "supplementary" points which the NCA was making in Hussain (§91(iii) and (iv)), which the Court indicated it accepted (see §92):
93. (iii) The UWO Application and the IFO Application involved consideration of detailed personal and confidential information about [Mr Hussain], his finances, and his wealth, engaging sub-paragraph (c) of CPR r 39.2(3).
94. (iv) As detailed in the NCA's submission regarding satisfaction of the Serious Crime Requirement, Mr Hussain is suspected of involvement in serious crime. It would plainly be an intrusion into his privacy for those suspicions to be aired in public, at a stage where they are no more than suspicions. A UWO offered Mr Hussain the chance satisfactorily to explain his wealth and to maintain his good character. Publicity of the NCA's interest would severely undermine that. For these reasons, sub-paragraphs (c), (e) and (g) of CPR r39.2(3) were engaged.
95. These are some features of Hussain: (1) The points which were made by Mr Sutcliffe KC in Hussain chime with points which he made to Bourne J in the present case (see §8 above). (2) The Court in Hussain was being encouraged by the NCA to address the position where an application is made on-notice (§84vi: see §23 above). The NCA was arguing (see §82) that a "presumption of privacy" applies to a UWO application "on notice", being concerned with the respondent's "rights". (3) The Court in Hussain (at §§58-60) discussed the PEP Requirement (politically exposed person) and the substantive judgments, on that aspect of UWOs, in Hajiyeva [2018] EWHC 2534 (Admin) and [2020] EWCA Civ 108. But there was no discussion of NCA v A (Ruling on Anonymity) (§6 above), which judgment was not even cited (see [2020] 1 WLR 2145 at 2145H-2156C). (4) The Court in Hussain was being asked by the NCA to disfavour the lesser derogation of using anonymisation and reporting restrictions, on the basis (see §87) that reporting restrictions would be insufficient, including as to the potential impact on Mr Hussain from "any publicity". The Court agreed that reporting restrictions "would be insufficient" (at §90). (5) The Court in Hussain referred to two different "starting points" (see §§73, 88). First, there was a description of the CPR 39.2(1) "general rule" that a hearing be open and in public (§72), so that "open justice is … the starting point and the default position" (§73). Second, there was the description of the "presumptive starting point" of a hearing of a UWO application without notice and in private (§88). (6) The Court in Hussain was persuaded that no balancing exercise was needed. The NCA addressed "whether the court needed to undertake a balancing exercise, considering the respondent's rights under article 8 … and weighing them in the balance against the rights of … any … relevant news organisation … under article 10", arguing that "such an exercise was unnecessary in this case, given the clear application of CPR 39.2(3), which required the court to hold the hearing in private", and given "other potential rights of the respondent, for example, under articles 2 and 6" (see §86). The Court agreed, "particularly bearing in mind that other ECHR rights of the respondent are also potentially engaged and would need to be considered, most notably, his rights under articles 2 and 6 of the ECHR" (§90).
97. Guardian News
98. In re Guardian News and Media Ltd [2010] UKSC 1 [2010] 2 AC 697 was a Supreme Court judgment about anonymisation in applications to set aside asset-freezing directions imposed by the executive on grounds of suspected involvement in terrorism. It was decided in January 2010. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed, Mohammed Azmir Khan, Michael Marteen, Hani El Sayed Sabaei Youssef and Mohammed Al-Ghabra were each the subject of asset-freezing directions imposed by HM Treasury, pursuant to Article 4 of the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006. The basis of each direction was reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in facilitating terrorism (Art 4(2)). Each individual exercised their statutory right (in Art 5(4)) to apply to the High Court to set aside the direction. Anonymity orders were made in those proceedings. But these were successfully challenged by the press when the cases reached the Supreme Court, based on a powerful general interest in identifying the individual claimants, which outweighed their Art 8 rights. HM Treasury had changed its position on anonymity (§10). The Supreme Court recognised Art 8 reputational impacts (§§37-42); and the irrelevance of names to the legal issues (§§67-68). But also the shortcomings for the press of disembodied reporting (§§64-65); the legitimate interest in knowing identities and making connections with public domain information (§§68-69); the public purpose of asset-freezing orders (§73); and the public debate which some of the claimants had entered (§§70-71). There was, within the judgment, an expression of judicial confidence in public perception (§66): that "the law proceeds on the basis that most members of the public understand that, even when charged with an offence, you are innocent unless and until proved guilty in a court of law".
100. Khuja
101. Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd [2017] UKSC 49 [2019] AC 161 was a Supreme Court case about whether to restrict press reporting of matters aired in a criminal trial. It was decided in July 2017. Tariq Khuja had been named in an Oxford crown court trial of 9 men for organised child sex grooming and child prostitution, 7 of whom were convicted. What featured in the trial was that Mr Khuja had been investigated and arrested, albeit then released without charge. He brought a High Court application for an injunction to restrain the press from identifying him in their reporting of the Oxford trial. Mr Khuja's claim failed in the High Court (22.10.13), the Court of Appeal (1.8.14) and then (by a majority of 5-2) in the Supreme Court (19.7.17). The expression of judicial confidence in public perception (Guardian News at §66) was not a "presumption" and there was in fact a "real risk" of a perception of guilt (Khuja at §§8, 33-34). But, in derogating from public scrutiny in the administration of justice, "necessity" was the "touchstone" (§14). Article 8 protected reputation but Mr Khuja had "no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to proceedings in open court" (§34(3)). His identity had not been withheld at the trial (§§34(1), 35), there was a right of the public to be informed about a significant public act of the state (§34(5)), and avoiding disembodied reporting of court proceedings was a legitimate media response (§§29, 34(5)).
103. Javadov
104. Javadov was a case about the magistrates' court hearing in public an on-notice NCA application for an account freezing order (s.303Z1 of the 2002 Act). It was decided in September 2021, before ZXC was argued in the Supreme Court. But the Article 8 reasonable expectation of privacy point – recognised by the High Court and Court of Appeal in ZXC – featured in Javadov, with the citation of authority later approved by the Supreme Court in ZXC: see Javadov at §§51-52 (see §46 below) and ZXC at §§95 and 97. Suleyman Javadov and Izzat Khanim Javadov had held bank accounts, in respect of which the NCA made applications in the magistrates' court under Part 5 chapter 3B of the 2002 Act, for account freezing orders (see §§1-2, 18). The district judge had to be satisfied that there were "reasonable grounds for suspecting" that the money was "recoverable property" or intended for use in unlawful conduct (see s.303Z3(2)). The Javadovs unsuccessfully claimed judicial review of the district judge's failure to sit in private. They claimed a reasonable expectation of privacy (§52), emphasising the potent trilogy of the early investigative stage, low threshold of suspicion and harmful reputational impact (§§51-52). Rejecting the claim for judicial review, the Divisional Court applied to on-notice account freezing order applications the ordinary rule that the court proceedings be in public and reportable (§53). Reliance was placed on the Guardian News judicial confidence in public discernment (§55). A parallel can be drawn between the suspicion-based account freezing order in Javadov and the "good arguable case"-based property freezing order which was the end of the anonymity in Hussain (see §21 above).
106. Marandi
107. R (Marandi) v Westminster Magistrates' Court [2023] EWHC 587 (Admin) [2023] 2 Cr App R 15 (DC, 16.5.23) was a case about the magistrates' court discharging anonymity after hearing an NCA civil recovery claim under Part 5 chapter 3B of the 2002 Act, for forfeiture of assets (see §1). It was decided after ZXC had been decided in the Supreme Court. To make the forfeiture order, the district judge had to be satisfied (see §11) that £5.6m was "recoverable property" (see s.304), meaning property "obtained through unlawful conduct" or "intended to be used in unlawful conduct" (s.240), where "unlawful conduct" means "unlawful under the criminal law" (s.241). Javad Marandi was a third party who featured in the forfeiture proceedings, because of his role in connection with companies said to be part of money laundering (see §10). He claimed a ZXC reasonable expectation of privacy (see §24). He was unsuccessful in his claim for judicial review of the decision discharging his protective anonymity. The starting point was the open justice principle, with justice administered in public and relevant individuals being named and reportable (§§29, 43(1)-(2)), and with clear and cogent evidence being needed for a derogation (§§16-17, 43(6), 45(4)). Marandi at §43 (see §42 below) summarised well settled principles of open justice. Marandi at §46 said: " ZXC … has no bearing on the balance to be struck between privacy rights and the public interest in transparency and open justice when a person features in a public trial".
109. I pause there, to record the following. The Supreme Court's decision in ZXC featured in Marandi. It supported the recognition of an interference with Mr Marandi's Article 8 rights (see §§38a, 43(4), 44(1)). But the Divisional Court said ZXC referenced an open justice horizon (at §46) for "public trial". Mr Owen KC says Marandi "proceeded on the basis that ZXC was engaged but that the judge's application of the balancing exercise was faultless". Ms Overman's position (citing Marandi §46) is that ZXC forms "no part" of the legal framework governing the assessment of derogations from open justice. But she recognises (citing Marandi at §44(1)) that allegations of involvement with criminality, including within a court judgment, can constitute an interference with the individual's Article 8 rights.
111. PART 3: THE RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
112. I will now set out the essence, as I saw it, of Mr Owen KC's argument for maintaining anonymisation in this case:
114. In deciding how to apply the open justice principle to UWO/IFO proceedings, the authoritative reference-point is the Supreme Court's decision in ZXC. That decision postdates Guardian News, Khuja and Javadov. It shows how the Court, exercising its inherent jurisdiction, should now determine how the open justice principle is to be applied. ZXC authoritatively establishes three things: (1) First (see §17 above), the general Article 8 right to protection of privacy over the information that an individual is under criminal investigation by a state entity. This makes publication a serious interference with the individual's Article 8 rights. It makes publication a violation of Article 8 unless this serious interference is demonstrably outweighed by some compelling public interest in favour of publication. (2) Second (see §18iii above), the strong public policy support for this position, derived from a wide range of compelling sources, across many years. These recognise the practical, real-world serious reputational harm likely to flow, warranting protection. (3) Third (see §18iv above), the decisive rejection of the idea of judicial confidence in public discernment, as articulated at §66 of Guardian News (§26 above).
116. The ZXC analysis must be read across to cases where a court is itself involved in making decisions and making orders. Marandi at §21 recognises the significance of ZXC. So did R (Simms-Davies) v Southwark Crown Court [2026] EWHC 337 (Admin) at §51, in leaving open the question of how – in the context of deferred prosecution agreements – to balance open justice against the interests of a person suspected but not charged. True, ZXC is about the tort of MPI. But the design of that tort is deliberately infused with Article 8 and 10 rights. So is the open justice principle. This means the ZXC reasonable expectation of privacy stands as a proper, reasoned basis to depart from the principle of open justice, wherever an individual under investigation has not been charged with any crime. In the present case, Bourne J rightly recognised that when he said that this case "involves serious allegations against the respondent, which engage her right to privacy" (see §9 above). It is self-evident that associating a person with money laundering is inherently likely to cause serious reputational harm (see Marandi at §44(1)).
118. ZXC stands as strong vindication for the points made in Hussain (§§22-24 above). The NCA's point about no justification for a UWO respondent being put forward for public trial by media at such an early stage (Hussain at §84vi), accepted in Hussain (at §88), now commands the strongest support of the unanimous Supreme Court. With or without Supreme Court endorsement, the NCA in Hussain was rightly urging points (see §§22-24 above) – which Murray J was right to accept – which were powerful, principled and well-founded. It was cogently explaining why there is a strong presumption of privacy built into the UWO regime (§79). All of the points apply with equal force to an on-notice UWO application or inter partes hearing of that application (see §25(2) above). The Divisional Court in Javadov (at §28) rightly noted Hussain, in the context of an intrusion into privacy. That shows that Hussain was treated in Javadov as supporting sitting "in private to determine an application" for an asset freezing order.
120. True, the ZXC analysis involves a horizon point for criminal proceedings: the Article 8 reasonable expectation of privacy endures until the point in the criminal process where the individual is charged with a crime (§19ii above). This means that what is needed, in the particular regulatory landscape (§13 above) regarding the proceeds of crime, is an equivalent rational boundary. The principled parallel is this. The Article 8 reasonable expectation of privacy applies throughout a civil recovery investigation, until the point where the enforcement authority decides to issue a Part 5 civil recovery claim (2002 Act s.243 and CRP Practice Direction section II). At that point, the open justice principle "kicks in with full force" and would provide a justification for the lifting of anonymity, by analogy with a decision to lay a criminal charge. There are these key points. (1) First, the Part 5 commencement of civil recovery proceedings is identifiable (see s.341(3)(a)). The purposes of civil recovery relate to "property obtained through unlawful conduct" or property "intended to be used in unlawful conduct" (s.240). That means "unlawful under the criminal law" (s.241). It constitutes "recoverable property" (s.304). A court must be satisfied that there is recoverable property, in order to make a recovery order (s.266(1)). (2) Second, the decision to make a civil recovery claim is a decision to put a case as to "unlawful conduct" for determination by a court of law. An affected individual will have the chance to defend themselves. That is a proper parallel with a "trial". (3) Third, this fits with Marandi (§29 above). There, the horizon point – the principled parallel – had been passed. There were substantive proceedings akin to the bringing of a substantive civil recovery claim. The NCA had made a claim in the magistrates' court under Part 5 chapter 3B of the 2002 Act, for forfeiture of assets (§1). The district judge had to be satisfied that £5.6m was "recoverable property" (see §11). That was a finding of "unlawful conduct". This means Mr Marandi's position in the Part 5 civil recovery proceedings was like Mr Khuja's position in the Oxford criminal trial (§27 above). It explains the reference to "a public trial" (Marandi at §46). (4) Fourth, insofar as this principled parallel does not fit with the analysis in Javadov (§28 above), that flawed analysis predated ZXC and cannot stand in light of ZXC. The Divisional Court in Javadov did not discuss the ZXC reasonable expectation of privacy, even though the Court of Appeal in ZXC had by then affirmed it. The Divisional Court in Javadov relied (at §55) on the judicial confidence in public discernment (Guardian News §66), which was later decisively rejected by the Supreme Court in ZXC. All of which means Javadov is unsound. So is the reasoning in DPP v Briedis [2021] EWHC 3155 (Admin) at §8, a decision concerning a property freezing order (s.245A), which followed Javadov.
122. A protective approach must apply where court powers are statutorily interwoven into criminal investigation by a state entity. Forfeiture orders (see Marandi) are substantive coercive powers of the state. So are freezing orders (see Javadov, Guardian News and Briedis). But orders which relate only to investigative steps (Part 8 of the 2002 Act) are very different. They occupy a special place on the regulatory landscape (§13 above). The public policy insights in ZXC must apply to them with full force. That is for these key reasons: (1) First, Parliament has been careful and clear in identifying those applications to courts and orders made by courts which are within "investigations" (Part 8). (2) Second, where it is interwoven into the criminal investigation of an individual by a state entity, the court is being placed squarely into the very area where the strong themes apply (see §18iv above). (3) Third, this is why anecdotal experience shows that courts exercise powers privately, when they are interwoven with criminal investigations. Statistics are not available, and the NCA has declined to provide any. (4) Fourth, the essence of all of this is found in the potent trilogy of points endorsed in Hussain (see §22 above), and in the raft of other powerful points being made by the NCA itself in that case (see §§23-24 above). It is also reflected in the CRP Practice Direction (see §16 above). (5) Fifth, the policy rationale for interweaving courts into criminal investigations is protective. These are judicial safeguards. They are intended to protect the individual under investigation. It would seriously undermine that policy rationale if a safeguarding interweaving of courts exposed the individual to the peril of damaging publicity. That would be a wholly undesirable, counterproductive consequence. The very opposite of a safeguarding protection. (6) Sixth, unless a strong and principled line is drawn, invidious dilemmas are introduced and chilling consequences follow. An individual on the receiving end of a UWO has legal rights or access to justice and effective protection of the law. They are entitled to apply for criteria to be applied afresh, and issues of insufficiency of inquiry or material non-disclosure ventilated, prior to having to comply. They will stand disarmed and deterred, if the price of effective judicial protection is exposure in the public domain.
124. The application to UWO proceedings of the open justice principle, and the balancing exercise which arises, does call for a fact-specific evaluation. There can be circumstances justifying discharging anonymity. The property freezing order against Mr Hussain (§21 above) was part of Part 5 civil recovery. NCA v A (Ruling on Anonymity) (§6 above) involved a PEP (politically exposed person), which does not mean "being involved in criminal activity". Schools (§7 above) was a case where the husband had been tried and convicted, and the wife was not a criminal suspect.
126. The circumstances of the present case strongly support the maintenance of the orders for anonymity and reporting restrictions. There is no compelling public interest justification to displace the reasonable expectation of privacy starting point. There is no cogent countervailing justification. The orders for interim anonymity and reporting restrictions were rightly made because they were necessary. They remain necessary. The key points are these. (1) The Respondent is a 24 year old student. She is a person of good character. She has no role in public life. (2) The civil recovery investigation is at a very early stage. It is about information gathering only. The Respondent is not even at the point of having to answer questions about her assets. (3) The NCA has described confidential details about the Respondent's finances. (4) The NCA has described suspicions based both on the conduct of the Respondent's uncle and parents, but also the Respondent's own conduct. Part of the NCA's case is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that her own conduct itself constitutes the serious crime of money laundering (Judgment No.1 at §31v). (5) It would be highly damaging – indeed catastrophic – for the fact of the investigation to be disclosed and published. The Respondent has career aspirations which she has described in a witness statement, which include the ambition of working in the banking sector. Her reputation and career prospects would be devastated by being named in the context of these proceedings (6) It would be extremely unfair for the seriously damaging consequences to arise, out of what is supposed to be – for her – a judicial safeguarding. The Court is involved so as to protect her interests, not undermine them. (7) The anonymity order is a minimum derogation. It reconciles the legitimate interests. The media are able fully to understand the issues in the case, the nature of the orders made, and the basis on which they have been made and upheld. There is no distinct public interest in reporting the Respondent's identity. The inability to do so does not undermine in any way the ability of the press to scrutinise the judicial process for UWOs/IFOs, to be aware of the invocation of the statutory powers and the utilisation of this type of order. (8) The ability to make reporting more vivid by including names and personal details comes nowhere close to being a countervailing justification to outweigh the seriously damaging reputational impacts. The Respondent is in no way a public figure. There is no public interest in identifying her, and therefore identifying private financial information relating to her and her resources. (9) It is true that the Respondent's uncle has been publicly identified as convicted in Singapore of criminal offences, and her father has been named in media articles as a criminal suspect, and the reporting restrictions apply to naming them too. But that is only reporting of this case. And it is only because that is necessary to protect the Respondent. (10) In all the circumstances, the balancing exercise must come down decisively in favour of maintaining the protective position which the Court rightly identified, through the anonymity order and reporting restrictions. They should be maintained. They have been demonstrated as necessary.
128. That, as I saw it, is the essence of the Respondent's argument. I have, however, been unable to accept it. Before I turn to the balancing exercise (Part 5 below), I will analyse the position as to some key themes which have arisen out of the Respondent's argument.
130. PART 4: KEY THEMES
131. The uninverted starting-point
132. The first theme is a responsive point which was powerfully made by Ms Overman. She pointed to a number of submissions made and maintained by Mr Owen KC. He argues that there needs to be a "compelling public interest justification to displace the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' starting point". He argues that ZXC relevantly "establishes" that there must be "some compelling public interest in favour of publication". This, says Ms Overman, is to start in the wrong place and put things the wrong way round. The starting point is the very well-established framework where the open justice principle applies. It has its touchstone of necessity. It requires a cogent justification for derogating from open justice. I think she is right.
134. The starting point for the analysis is the constitutional principle of open justice. Murray J was right first time (see §25(5) above) when he said in Hussain (at §73): "Open justice is … the starting point". In a case where the open justice principle applies, ZXC does not invert that starting point. ZXC was not a case about the open justice principle. Indeed, the ZXC horizon, for the reasonable expectation of privacy and media organisations reporting criminal investigations, arrives because it encounters "the open justice principle … fundamental to securing public confidence in the administration of justice" (ZXC at §77). This echoes the observation which applied to Mr Khuja – a person who was investigated but never charged – that "there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to proceedings in open court": Khuja at §34(3). ZXC was not rewriting the open justice principle. It was agreeing with a long line of cases going back to 2014-2016 (see ZXC at §§91-94). It was not inverting the starting point, in a case where the open justice principle applies. That does not mean the reasoning in ZXC loses all force, just because open justice has come into play. But it does mean the reasoning in ZXC must fit into the open justice analysis with care. And it does mean putting things the right way round, when the open justice principle is engaged, and not inverting them.
136. I think the importance of putting things the right way round is illustrated by Marandi. There, the Divisional Court discussed the Supreme Court's decision in ZXC. Warby LJ described ZXC as a case about the Convention analysis "in cases where no legal proceedings have begun", having "no bearing on the balance to be struck" (§46). He treated ZXC as relevant to the question of Article 8 interference (see §§21, 38a, 43(4)). But, importantly, there was no ZXC -based inversion of the familiar framework where the open justice principle was applicable. That uninverted framework, which he said had been rightly recognised by the district judge in Marandi, had the following features which began with "the starting point" (Marandi at §43):
138. (1) The starting point is the common law principle of open justice, authoritatively expounded in Scott v Scott and subsequent authorities at the highest level. The judge was right to begin here…
139. (2) The general principles [are] that (a) justice is administered in public and (b) everything said in court is reportable both encompass the mention of names. As a rule, "[t]he public has a right to know, not only what is going on in our courts, but also who the principal actors are": R (C) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 2 [2016] 1 WLR 444 at §36 (Baroness Hale)…
140. (3) When considering the application for derogation in this case the judge was right to identify and apply a test of necessity. Under the common law as it existed prior to the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, anonymity could only be justified where this was strictly necessary "in the interests of justice": see Khuja §14… The claimant's case rests on the common law privacy right derived from Article 8, to which the Supreme Court referred in Khuja. But in that context too the applicant for anonymity has to show that this is necessary in pursuit of the legitimate aim on which he relies.
141. (4) The threshold question is whether the measure in question – here, allowing the disclosure of the claimant's name and consequent publicity – would amount to an interference with the claimant's right to respect for his private and family life. This requires proof that the effects would attain a "certain level of seriousness": ZXC (SC) §55, Javadov §39. It was the very essence of the claimant's case – as to which the judge was in no doubt – that the reputational impact of disclosure would amount to a very serious interference with his Convention rights. In my view it is clear that the judge accepted throughout that the threshold test was satisfied. His reasoning cannot be understood in any other way.
142. (5) The next stage is the balancing exercise. Both the judge's decisions expressly turned on whether it was "necessary and proportionate" to grant anonymity. That language clearly reflects a Convention analysis and the balancing process which the judge was required to undertake. The question implicit in the judge's reasoning process is whether the consequences of disclosure would be so serious an interference with the claimant's rights that it was necessary and proportionate to interfere with the ordinary rule of open justice. It is clear enough, in my view, that he was engaging in a process of evaluating the claimant's case against the weighty imperatives of open justice.
143. (6) It is in that context that the judge rightly addressed the question of whether the claimant had adduced "clear and cogent evidence". He was considering whether it had been shown that the balance fell in favour of anonymity. The cases all show that this question is not to be answered on the basis of "rival generalities" but instead by a close examination of the weight to be given to the specific rights that are at stake on the facts of the case. That is why "clear and cogent evidence" is needed. This requirement reflects both the older common law authorities and the more modern cases. In Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 at 438 Viscount Haldane held that the court had no power to depart from open justice "unless it be strictly necessary"; the applicant "must make out his case strictly, and bring it up to the standard which the underlying principle requires". R (Rai) v Winchester Crown Court [2021] EWCA Civ 604 [2021] 2 Cr App R 20 (CA) is authority that the same is true of a case that relies on Article 8…
144. (7) … the closing passage of the judgment under review reflects the conclusion arrived at by the judge after conducting the necessary balancing process. This was that, in the light of all the facts and circumstances that were apparent to him at that time, the derogation from open justice that anonymity would represent was no longer shown to be justified as both necessary for the protection of the claimant's Article 8 rights and proportionate to that aim.
145. Another example of the uninverted starting-point is Simms-Davies. In that case, the judge in the crown court decided to lift anonymity in a judgment approving deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), pursuant to Sch 17 §8 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Robb Simms-Davies was a director of the company which entered into the DPA with the SFO. He was tried in the crown court on bribery charges and acquitted. When the judge decided to lift the anonymity, Mr Simms-Davies unsuccessfully claimed judicial review of that decision. He accepted that the judge's decision was unimpeachable, if her approach was right (§36). But, he said, her approach was wrong. There was, he said, no need to "establish that it was necessary to derogate from the principle of open justice in order to safeguard his rights" (§34). Instead, relying on the Supreme Court in ZXC, he said (at §39): that the "starting point was not open justice"; that "it was not for the individual to demonstrate that continued anonymisation was necessary to protect the interests of the individual and that outweighed the interest in open justice"; and that "the test was whether it was necessary to name the individual". The Divisional Court disagreed. The crown court's function of approving a DPA was "a judicial process" and "part of the system of the administration of justice, so that the "concept of open justice applies" (§§41, 45). That meant the question was whether it was "necessary to depart from the principle of open justice" (§45). The attempted inversion failed.
147. Linked to this topic about an uninverted starting-point, Ms Overman submits – based on Lawrence v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2025] EWHC 3237 (KB) at §§22a-b – that: (a) the balancing of competing rights (Marandi at §43(5)) follows a structured approach which considers whether there is an interference prescribed by the law, whether it pursues a legitimate aim, and whether it is necessary in a democratic society; and (b) the scales in this balancing exercise do not start evenly balanced, but rather "the balance starts with a very clear presumption in favour of open justice unless and until that is displaced and outweighed by a sufficiently countervailing justification". I accept that submission. The insights in ZXC illuminate the question of whether there is an Article 8 interference, and as to the seriousness of that interference. But the Article 8 interference and its impact and implications still need, in the end, to be a cogent justification for a necessary derogation.
149. The civil recovery claim horizon
150. The next theme is Mr Owen KC's argument (see §35 above) that there is a principled parallel between the horizon described in ZXC (see §19ii above) and the point at which a civil recovery investigation becomes civil recovery proceedings. I accept that this is a discernible point within the statutory scheme (see the 2002 Act ss.243, 341(3)(a)). I accept that Part 8 (investigations) are a distinct part of the regulatory landscape (see §13 above and Javadov at §§14d, 18). I accept that where the High Court is concerned with the "information-gathering tool" of a UWO, during the "very early stages" of an investigation (Hussain §84ii), an interference with the individual's Article 8 rights is likely to be the clearer, the more serious and the weightier. I accept that having crossed, or not crossed, the line to civil recovery action would be a relevant feature in the balancing exercise. But I am unable to accept that there is a direct parallel between the ZXC charging-point to the civil recovery claim point.
152. The ZXC horizon point – at which an investigated individual is charged with a criminal offence – was a "boundary" at which, in general, "there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy", because "the open justice principle is fundamental to securing public confidence in the administration of justice" (ZXC at §77: §19ii above). Marandi illustrates that an NCA claim for forfeiture of assets is a context where the open justice principle is fundamental to securing public confidence in the administration of justice (see §§1, 11 and 43). But Javadov powerfully illustrates that an on-notice NCA application for account freezing orders (AFOs), made at "an early investigative stage" and on the basis of "reasonable grounds for suspicion", also constitutes proceedings where the open justice principle is fundamental to securing public confidence in the administration of justice. And Javadov took that approach, notwithstanding the pre-charge reasonable expectation of privacy, already found within the very line of authorities subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in ZXC. Here is what Fulford LJ said about on-notice applications for AFOs, in Javadov at §§51-53:
154. 51… [The Claimant's Counsel] emphasised that the grant of an AFO will occur at an early investigative stage, which may well be before any substantive allegation has crystalised. It is suggested that the threshold for granting an AFO is low (reasonable grounds for suspicion: section 303Z3). The claimants rely on Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch) [2019] Ch 169 as authority for the proposition that in general there is no need for anyone outside an investigating force to know of an investigation. In this regard, [Counsel] contends that AFOs are an investigative tool and a "holding process", and given the allegations are likely to "stick", the hearings should, if requested, be in private. It is argued that the open justice principle is not engaged merely because there is a court hearing, given many kinds of without notice hearings are heard in private.
155. 52. In a similar vein [Counsel] relied on Sicri v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 3541 (QB) [2021] 4 WLR 9 as a basis for the proposition that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of information that they had come under suspicion by the state, given the disclosure of such information was likely to have a seriously harmful impact on the persons reputation and thus their private life.
156. 53. Contrary to [Counsel]'s erudite submissions, and particularly the suggestion that the presumptive starting point is that applications of this kind should be held in private, the ordinary rule is that court proceedings take place in public, a rule which can only be displaced in unusual or exceptional circumstances. In this regard there is a significant distinction to be drawn between court proceedings and an investigation such as in the Richard case. As Warby J in Sicri observed at §103, court proceedings are, as a rule, open to the public and reportable since "the court is exercising the judicial power of the state, determining rights and obligations; its workings need to be transparent and open to scrutiny and criticism"…
157. Richard and Sicri – discussed in Javadov at §§51-52 – were pre-charge investigation "reasonable expectation of privacy" cases in the line of authority which the Supreme Court was endorsing in ZXC (see §§95, 97). I can find no traction in Mr Owen KC's criticism of Javadov as involving "no argument about the engagement of the ZXC principle" even though by then the Court of Appeal in ZXC had endorsed it. It was not new. It featured explicitly in Javadov, as the Sicri point (§52), within Counsel's erudite submissions (§53). Conversely, I can see nothing in the judgment of the Supreme Court in ZXC whose logic would undermine the recognition in the proceedings in Javadov, about the open justice principle being fundamental in that case to securing public confidence in the administration of justice. Nor did the Divisional Court in Marandi discern any post- ZXC difficulty with Javadov. Marandi (see §43(4)) illustrates the continued relevance of ZXC alongside Javadov, on the question of Article 8 interference, notwithstanding that a civil recovery claim has been made.
159. Hussain revisited
160. The next theme is Mr Owen KC's reliance (see §34 above) on the reasoning and conclusions of Murray J in Hussain, agreeing with submissions which Mr Sutcliffe KC made in that case (§§88, 92), in particular: that although the facts and circumstances of each case need careful consideration, "the presumptive starting point" is that a UWO application "will be in private" (§§83, 88); that this is "particularly" so where the Court is considering the Serious Crime Requirement (§88); that this is underpinned by the potent trilogy of points (see §22 above), being (i) the very early stage of an investigation (§§84ii, 88i), (ii) the relatively low threshold (§§84i, 88ii), and (iii) the potentially disproportionate personal and reputational impact on the individual (§§84v, 88iii); that the media interest in UWOs is "undeserved", since they are merely a tool to assist with information-gathering during early preliminary stages of an investigation (§§84i-84ii); that a UWO offers a chance for a satisfactory explanation of wealth and maintenance of good character (§91iv); that the UWO application sets out detailed information about the individual's finances (§§84iv, 91iii); that publicity could drive the NCA to distort the threshold (§84vi); that the statutory scheme (§§76-77) indicates a strong presumption of privacy is "built-in" (§§79, 85); that multiple limbs of CPR 39.2(3) are applicable (§§74, 85, 88); that anonymity and reporting restrictions would not suffice (§87); that the "presumption of privacy" specifically concerns "the need for privacy" and "thus applies equally to applications made on notice" (§82).
162. In my judgment, the position is as follows. I accept that Hussain gathers together a series of valuable considerations for a judge to take into account when deciding whether to discharge orders for anonymity and reporting restrictions after a full inter partes hearing of an application to discharge a UWO and IFO. I accept that these are features which can inform the ultimate balancing exercise, when the open justice principle is applied. I do not accept that Hussain is authority for a presumption in favour of anonymisation, applicable to contested inter partes hearings in UWO/IFO cases. Here are my reasons:
164. First, Hussain was a case about a without-notice application for an UWO and IFO. It was the same situation as was encountered in the present proceedings on 18 July 2025, when the application was made to Bourne J. It is right that the NCA was making points about "applications made on notice" (§82) and Murray J "substantially" agreed with all "these submissions" (§88). But the application of the multiple limbs of CPR 39.2(3) (see §§74, 85, 88-89) – namely 39.2(3)(a), (c), (e) and (g) – could only be because it was a without-notice case. The reliance on CPR 39.2(3)(a) (publicity would defeat the object of the hearing) was about avoiding notice to Mr Hussain leading to information and documentation being moved (§§81, 83i, 91i). The reliance on CPR 39.2(3)(e) (injustice where application not on notice) was necessarily about the fact that Mr Hussain was not being heard (§§83ii, 84v, 91ii). The "starting point" of a hearing in private matched the CRP Practice Direction §11.1 (§77), for an application for a UWO/IFO (see too Schools at §7). Murray J was talking about the start of the UWO/IFO proceedings, when he spoke of the various limbs of CPR 39.2(3) which were "likely to be engaged" (Hussain at §88). His key finding was this (§88):
166. the presumptive starting point is that a UWO application will be made without notice and that the hearing of the UWO application and any related IFO application will be in private.
167. This expressly linked an application "made without notice" to a "hearing … in private". Murray J said "any related IFO application", meaning an IFO sought in the application "made without notice" and "in private". He did not say "any related hearing". I do not think his general substantial agreement with the wide ranging submissions (§88) was an endorsement of the specific submission that "the presumption of privacy … applies equally to applications made on notice" (§82).
168. Second, this reflects the treatment of Hussain found in Javadov. That was the case (see §28 above) about whether the magistrates were wrong to hear on-notice applications for account freezing orders (AFOs) in public. In a section of the judgment in Javadov specifically discussing "without notice" applications (§§25-34), the Court cited Hussain as being a case "of note" (Javadov at §27). I think Mr Owen KC is trying to get more from that reliance than is present. The Divisional Court was careful to distinguish applications made on-notice (Javadov at §§35, 51). Within its discussion, in that on-notice context, of the Article 8/10 balancing exercise (§§35-55), the Court did not include any discussion or endorsement of Hussain. Instead, the Court discussed (see §§46-48) the approach of Supperstone J in NCA v A (Ruling on Anonymity) (§6 above). That was the case in which the inter partes application to discharge the UWO/IFO was in public, and orders for anonymity and reporting restrictions were discharged.
170. Third, the position can be tested by reference to the hearing being in private, and the Article 8/10 balancing exercise. Hussain favoured a hearing in private (§§88-89), which is matched by Javadov (at §§26, 35), so far as a without-notice application is concerned. But Mr Owen KC recognised that he could not support this approach – the hearing being in private – for the application to set aside the UWO/IFO. Hussain also suggested the Article 8/10 balancing had not been reached (at §§86, 90), which also has an echo in Javadov (at §35), again so far as a without-notice application is concerned. But, again, Mr Owen KC recognised that he could not support this approach – the Art 8/10 balancing not being reached – for the application to set aside the UWO/IFO being in private. These points reinforce the limitations of Hussain as a governing framework on inter partes hearings relating to UWOs/IFOs.
172. Fourth, all of this fits with NCA v Hao [2024] EWHC 2240 (Admin) (Murray J, 2.5.24). In that case, a 2002 Act Part 8 (investigation) application for a disclosure order (s.357) had been made without notice, and granted, at a private hearing (Hao at §§9, 14, 17, 42i). That is consistent with Hussain, as discussed in Javadov. Jiangbao Hao and Wenjun Tian then applied to set aside the disclosure order. One aspect only warranted hearing in private (§9). Otherwise, the inter partes application was heard in public (by Murray J, who had decided Hussain), and there were no anonymity or reporting restrictions.
174. Courts interwoven into state investigation
175. The next theme I address is what Mr Owen KC says (§36 above) about courts being statutorily interwoven into criminal investigations by state entities, with a safeguarding rationale, which should not be undermined by visiting investigated individuals with serious harm. This is how I see the position, based on the submissions which have been made and the materials marshalled.
177. First, I think Mr Owen KC has made powerful and relevant points about why courts are given functions linked to criminal investigations, and about the implications of exposing affected individuals to harm. I think these call for caution and circumspection. They are relevant, in my judgment, within the ultimate balancing exercise.
179. Second, I have been unable to accept that Mr Owen KC has substantiated his claims about routinely private proceedings – week in week out – where courts are interwoven with investigations. I was struck by this submission. It was given particular emphasis in Mr Owen KC's oral reply. He told me he was making the point "anecdotally" and based on experience. I decided to invite the Respondent's representatives to provide any materials which supported the description. The further submissions which were filed focused on Part 8 of the 2002 Act, reminded me of the regulatory landscape and Javadov, repeated the point about anecdotal experience, indicated that respondents may have been named in 6 out of up to 16 UWO cases, and told me that the NCA had declined an invitation to provide statistics. I would have been very interested in any commentary or case-law which described a practice involving a conscious recognition of a need for courts to act in private (or using anonymisation), when making orders which are interwoven into state criminal investigation. No such sources were forthcoming. If this picture can be shown, I was not shown it. I am left with the materials and case-law which was provided. Javadov is not a case which supports the contention made. In that case the judicial interweaving was in making account freezing orders. Those orders "occur at an early investigative stage", as "an investigative tool" (§51). But they mean there are "court proceedings", with "the judicial power of the state" (§53). Open justice applied. The hearing was in public. The Javadovs were named. Nor does NCA v Hao support the contention made. Ms Hao and Mr Tian had the safeguard of the High Court needing to be satisfied of the reasonable grounds for suspicion (s.358) to justify the disclosure order. Ms Hao and Mr Tian also had the right of effective judicial protection by applying to discharge the disclosure order, with the statutory criteria applied afresh (§55). But the open justice principle applied and they were named. That was a Part 8 (investigation) case. Nor does a case like R (Virdee) v NCA [2018] EWHC 1119 (Admin) [2018] 1 WLR 5073. That case is about the lawfulness of searches and seizures of the premises of those under criminal investigation, and the lawfulness of production orders issued by crown court judges to financial institutions. There, judicial review was the safeguarding route for access to the court. But the claimants were not anonymised. I add this. Guardian News comes from a very different context. But it too involved the safeguarding protection of access to the Court, to challenge the lawfulness of a suspicion-based measure, where anonymisation was discharged in the interests of open justice.
181. Judicial confidence in public discernment
182. A final theme to address is what Mr Owen KC says (see §§32(3) and 35(4) above) about the Supreme Court in ZXC decisively rejecting the idea of placing reliance on the public being expected to understand the distinction between suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and guilt. This was an idea relied on in Guardian News at §§60, 66 (see §26 above), when discharging anonymisation in legal challenges to suspicion-based asset freezing directions. It was revisited by the split Court in Khuja at §§8, 33-34 (with majority observations about there being no legal presumption; that it is a question of fact not law; and that there is a real risk of harm); and at §§56, 58 (with minority observations that Guardian News at §66 was a baseless presumption; and that there is a clear risk of profound reputational harm). Then came ZXC at §§107-109 (there is no presumption; there is a clear answer; there is likely to be harm, including reputational harm, which may be profound and irremediable). See §18iv above.
184. In Javadov (§28 above), the district judge had granted on-notice applications for account freezing orders, based on reasonable grounds for suspicion. That was lawfully done at a public hearing, with no anonymity or reporting restrictions. Part of the analysis of the Divisional Court was the assessment (at §55) that: "The public can be expected to understand that simply because an individual has been made the subject of an order of this kind, that does not justify reaching sinister conclusions about him or her". I followed that approach in DPP v Briedis at §8. I agree with Mr Owen KC that it is appropriate to revisit these observations in the light of what was said by the Supreme Court in ZXC. In my judgment, the position is this:
186. First, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in ZXC resoundingly tells us that it is necessary for a Court to confront the real-world implications of allowing the press to name an individual who is under criminal investigation. It also shows us that there is "only one answer" (see §108): a person's reputation will ordinarily be adversely affected causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life such as the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings. The harm can be profound and may be irremediable (see §109). None of this can properly be characterised as an overstatement, in light of the "public's ability and propensity to observe the presumption of innocence" (ZXC at §108). A Court should consider the adverse effect on the individual, as a question of fact in each case (ZXC at §107).
188. Second, in approaching this case-specific factual assessment, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, there can be room for the assessment that: (a) an informed understanding can serve to mitigate or counterbalance the real-world harm for the reputation of the individual; (b) especially where the Court is in a position to promote an informed understanding, by promulgating a clear judgment in the public domain. This includes where a suspicion-based measure is imposed in "court proceedings", to which the open justice principle applies, when "exercising the judicial power of the state" (Javadov at §53). I add this. In ZXC, there was no judicial act in court proceedings, unlike Javadov and Briedis. The Supreme Court was identifying the civil law obligation applicable to a media organisation when publishing the fact that an individual is under police investigation. There are other illustrations of why it can matter that the Court is in a position to promote an informed understanding, by promulgating a clear judgment in the public domain. Take NCA v A (Ruling on Anonymity), where Supperstone J approached open justice on this basis: "As I have made clear in my judgment, the requirements relating to PEPs are of a preventive and not criminal nature, and should not be interpreted as stigmatising PEPs as being involved in criminal activity". Take Schools, where Pepperall J approached the open justice principle on the basis that Mr Schools had been convicted of fraud and (see §10) that the SFO was not alleging "that Ms Schools was herself involved in her former husband's criminal activity". Mr Owen KC emphasises these features of these cases. But they are seen from what the Court spelled out in its judgment.
190. Third, it is helpful for the Court to encapsulate the following objectively true features of the present case. (1) The Respondent is an overseas student here who is said to have acquired a £4m flat in 2021 aged 19, and a £1.173m flat aged 21. She is also said to have £799.3k in 6 bank accounts. (2) She and these assets have come within a civil recovery investigation by the NCA, with a view to finding out whether or not they are recoverable as property obtained through unlawful conduct, here or overseas. (3) The NCA has rightly acknowledged the possibility that there were benign sources of wealth behind the assets, wholly independent of any potential shadow of money laundering. (4) As reported in BBC News and the Straits Times in 2024, a criminal investigation in Singapore has seen ten people prosecuted and convicted (with $944m in assets forfeited) and fifteen others pursued and dealt with (surrendering $1.85bn in assets). The Respondent's uncle is identified as one of ten convicted. So is a business associate of the Respondent's father. The Respondent's father is identified as one of the fifteen dealt with. (5) The NCA suspects that the uncle and the father have been involved in money laundering, or that the father has been involved in facilitating the uncle's money laundering, or that the Respondent has facilitated the uncle or father's money laundering, or that the Respondent's assets are criminal property, derived from the criminal activities of the uncle or father. (6) Based on those as reasonable grounds for suspicion, the Respondent has been made the subject of a UWO and associated IFO by the High Court. The UWO is an information-gathering order which requires her to provide information in a statement about specified property and how she obtained it. The Respondent has unsuccessfully challenged the UWO.
192. Fourth, it is appropriate to make findings. My findings are as follows:
194. i) The encapsulation (§61 above) was objectively clear from Judgment No.1 and has been emphasised here in Judgment No.2. That is a judicial act in the public domain, which serves to promote an informed understanding. Responsible media reporting of the court proceedings in the present case would include the essence of the encapsulation. Objective and fair readers of that reporting would not equate the making of the UWO/IFO with the Respondent being guilty of a criminal offence.
195. ii) The Court is not in a position to control reporting or secondary use of information. Not every writer will report responsibly. Not every reader will be objective and fair. There are clear risks that media and other reporting of the court proceedings will occur in a way which is not responsible; and that information derived from discharging anonymisation will be communicated and heard in ways which are not objective, balanced and fair. It is likely that a significant number of readers and writers of information about or from these proceedings would take an unfair adverse view of the Respondent's conduct or knowledge. This is likely to cause unfair harm to the Respondent's character and reputation, from which continued anonymisation would protect her.
196. iii) A responsible future employer of the Respondent – and especially a bank or financial institution – is highly likely to be interested in the objective truth of what has happened, and what happens next. They are highly likely to seek an objective, fair and informed understanding. This would be assisted by the Court's clear judgments in the public domain, by responsible reporting, and by what the Respondent is able to show happened next when she responded to the UWO.
197. PART 5: BALANCING EXERCISE
198. I now turn to conduct the case-specific evaluative exercise which the law requires of me. My analysis, in conducting that balancing exercise, is as follows. I start with the common law principle of open justice. I am conscious that my decision in this case is part of the administration of justice. The orders which I have maintained are an exercise of the judicial power of the state. I remember that the general principles of open justice are that justice is administered in public and that everything said in court is reportable; that the public has the right to know, and the press has a right to report, what is going on in court, and who the principal actors are. I remind myself that derogation from open justice can be justified; that the test and touchstone is necessity; and that it is for the Respondent to show that the derogation is necessary.
200. Next, I turn to the basis for the derogation from open justice. It is the common law privacy right derived from Article 8. I remember that the Court has the responsibility of deciding whether or not to allow the unanonymised reporting of these UWO/IFO proceedings. I ask myself what are the key features which weigh in support of the derogation, and what is my evaluation of those features. This is what emerges:
202. First, I accept that to allow unanonymised reporting would, seriously and significantly, interfere with the Respondent's Article 8 right to respect for her private life. I do not downplay this. The Respondent is a young adult. She is here as a student. She is a person of good character. She has her life, including her working life and career, ahead of her. She has told me in witness statement evidence that she is still a student here, that she has career aspirations to employment in the financial sector, perhaps by a bank, and that she fears the implications of reporting of this case in which she is identified. The Court would be allowing her to be identified as a person who and whose assets are the subject of a criminal investigation, by the NCA, in the context of money laundering. There is a clear risk of damage and harm. Viewed in terms of her inner circle, her associates and the general public, the Respondent's reputation is likely to be adversely affected by the likely reaction to the publication of information that she is a person under investigation, causing prejudice to her enjoyment of the right to establish and develop relationships with others. I recall, and incorporate, the findings which I have made (§62 above). I evaluate the interference as serious and significant. It weighs heavily in the balance. The discussion and reasoning in ZXC strongly inform the identification of all of this, and my evaluation of it.
204. Second, I take full account of the fact that the derogation which is sought is limited to the identification of the Respondent and the reporting of information which would allow her to be identified. The fact of these UWO/IFO proceedings can be reported. As is seen in the contents of Judgment No.1, there can be informed reporting of the nature of the NCA's application and underlying investigation, the issues, the nature of the arguments, and the Court's reasoning. These are at the heart of the administration of justice, and the exercise of the judicial power of the state, in making and maintaining the UWO/IFO.
206. Third, I take full account of the investigative nature of UWO/IFO proceedings. They are proceedings directly related to – interwoven into – state powers of criminal investigation. The Court's powers are within Part 8 of the 2002 Act – headed "investigation" – because they are concerned with civil recovery investigation. A UWO/IFO is part of early stage information gathering. The threshold is low: reasonable grounds for suspicion. The questions at issue necessarily arise prior to the question of whether the Respondent should be being required to provide information at all, as to her wealth and how she came to acquire it. It is in response to the UWO – if it is made and not discharged – that the Respondent would then have the chance satisfactorily to explain her wealth. That stage has not yet been reached.
208. Fourth, I also take full account of the safeguarding nature of the High Court's role, in the context of the Part 8 investigation, when dealing with the UWO/IFO proceedings. The Court is given a safeguarding function, as protection for the individual being investigated. The safeguard involves the High Court giving an independent judicial application of statutory criteria, before allowing the intrusive step of requiring an individual to provide information about their wealth and how they came to acquire their wealth. In contesting a UWO/IFO, and in applying to set aside an UWO/IFO, the Respondent is exercising her rights to effective judicial protection, by access to the court, in a manner intended by Parliament. She is doing so in relation to a safeguarding function at an investigative stage. Unanonymised reporting, exposing in the public domain the fact of being under a criminal investigation, risks undermining of the safeguarding rationale of the High Court's statutory function. It risks having a chilling effect as to the exercise of the right of effective judicial protection by access to the court.
210. These are powerful features. They weigh heavily, in favour of anonymisation as a limited derogation from open justice. They weigh individually and cumulatively. But they are not sufficient, in my judgment, to demonstrate a necessity for this derogation from open justice. In my judgment, the balance comes down decisively in favour of non-anonymisation; and the Article 8 interference is justified as necessary and proportionate. I ask myself what are the key features which weigh against the derogation, and what is my evaluation of those features. This is what emerges:
212. First, there is a clear public interest in the Court publishing a full report of the judgment. That is to promote the public fully understanding the basis for the application for an UWO/IFO and the basis on which the High Court has made the orders in this case (see NCA v A (Ruling on Anonymity): §6 above). It enables media reporting of the case being vivid and embodied, not dehumanised and disembodied. That affords respect for editorial latitude in how a responsible media most effectively reaches an audience. But it also entails the Court promoting the widest and most effective scrutiny of the judicial process. I agree with Ms Overman's submission that the orders in this case lead to austere, abstract reporting. I accept how Mr Browning of Bloomberg put it in his helpful written submissions (24.3.26):
214. … from the media's perspective, covering the UWO brought against the [Respondent] without naming that person leaves a major gap in our coverage. It leaves readers guessing and unsure as to the importance and impact of the case. It downplays the reporting of the case, making it appear less newsworthy than it actually is.
215. Second, the case-specific context is, in my assessment, very important. This case has arisen out of significant and high profile proceedings in Singapore, which relate to money laundering. The scale is known to be vast. As Mr Browning put it, the case "appears to stem from one of the largest money laundering scandals to ever hit Singapore". It has been reported in the public domain, that $944m in assets were forfeited from ten people who were prosecuted and convicted, and the $1.85bn in assets were then surrendered from fifteen others who were dealt with. The proceedings in Singapore, with the ten prosecutions and convictions, and the fifteen people pursued and dealt with, have all already been widely reported, by the press, without anonymisation, and are already in the public domain. I assess that there is a very strong public interest in full reporting of High Court proceedings which are linked to those fully-reported overseas proceedings; and a very strong public interest in recognising the bigger picture. Viewed in purely domestic terms, this is nothing but a civil recovery investigation at an early information-gathering stage. But that is not the reality, when the position is viewed globally. In looking at the wider picture, I bear in mind that there are applicable public policy based criteria as to "dual criminality", which I have held in Judgment No.1 have been satisfied. Looking at the wider picture, there have been criminal proceedings in a public court in Singapore, through to convictions. That includes the Respondent's uncle, and an associate of her father. Each has been convicted, in a criminal court, at a public hearing. Each has been named. Then there has been the pursuit by the Singapore authorities of the Respondent's father, dealt with by the surrender of assets. The father has also been named in public domain press reporting. The relevant, known and publicised backcloth includes a criminal process that has run its course, where recovery steps have been successful, and where the Respondent's relevant and close family members have been named. If those linked events had taken place in the territory of the UK, pursued by UK enforcement authorities, they would plainly be weighty features. The fact that they have taken place overseas and have involved the authorities of another country does not, in my judgment, substantially undermine their potency. I accept Ms Overman's emphasis on the fact that:
217. this is a case in which the underlying subject-matter (namely, the largest money laundering operation in Singapore's history, and the possibility that proceedings from that operation have found their way into this jurisdiction) is of undoubted and significant public interest. Moreover, the Respondent's father and uncle have already been publicly identified in connection with the money laundering operation. The consequences of this are that: (i) the Media Organisations' ability to report on these individuals (and the fact that efforts to recover assets linked to their activities have resulted in a UWO granted by an English court against their relative in England) is also restricted …
218. Third, it is relevant, in my assessment, that there has been interim protection and anonymisation would be being discharged only after a full inter partes hearing at which the Respondent has been heard on all aspects, and has had a full and fair opportunity to argue for continued anonymisation. The interim protection has also enabled me to see the implications of anonymisation. The anonymisation of Judgment No.1 discloses the fact of links, but then precludes the identification of the uncle or the father, and even the description of a relevant press report. Lifting anonymity will enable members of the press to report, and the public to receive, relevant information and make connections between items of information in the public domain.
220. Fourth, in my assessment it is relevant that the Court's judicial acts serve to promote an informed understanding of the true position, by promulgating clear judgments in the public domain. I proceed with caution and circumspection. I recall, and incorporate, the findings which I have made (§62 above).
222. In light of my evaluative assessment of all of these features – and what I have said earlier in this judgment about building blocks and key themes – the Respondent's argument, which I earlier set out in detail, has failed to demonstrate that the continuation of the derogations from open justice are justified as necessary. The presumption in favour of open justice stands. It stands undisplaced by – and not outweighed by – any sufficiently cogent countervailing justification. The serious and significant Article 8 interference is prescribed by the law, pursues a legitimate aim, and is necessary in a democratic society. What prevail, ultimately, over the interference with the Respondent's Article 8 rights, are the interlinking interests of a constitutional principle, Article 10 rights and related public interest considerations.
224. PART 6: CONSEQUENTIALS
225. And so, for all these reasons, I have decided to discharge the orders for anonymity and reporting restrictions; to publish the unredacted Glossary; and to direct the release to the public domain of the private judgment [2025] EWHC 1908 (Admin). I will, however, need to act to protect the Respondent's appeal rights. To allow for the possibility of her appealing my decision, I have prepared a short confidential draft Judgment No.3, made available to the NCA and the Respondent but not to the Interveners. This names the Respondent and contains the unredacted Glossary from Judgment No.1. It would be released to the Interveners and into the public domain, only if the Respondent were to reach the end of her appeal rights without my decision being overturned.
227. The parties were agreed that the appropriate Order, to give effect to the judgment of the Court circulated in draft, has the following components: (1) The anonymity order shall be revoked. (2) The private judgment [2025] EWHC 1908 (Admin) shall be released into the public domain. (3) Judgment No.3 shall be provided to the Interveners and released into the public domain. (4) Paragraphs (1) to (3) are suspended until any appeal to the Court of Appeal is finally determined or otherwise resolved. The private judgment and Judgment No.3 shall, therefore, not be released into the public domain until any such appeal is determined or resolved. (5) The Respondent do pay the NCA's costs of the hearing on 25 March 2026, summarily assessed by consent in the sum of £57,926.10. (6) There shall be no order in respect of the Interveners' costs.
229. The one contested consequential matter is the Respondent's application for permission to appeal. Two grounds of appeal are advanced, whose essence is this. First, that my approach to the law was wrong, as to the interplay between the open justice principle and Article 8 in the context of UWO proceedings. Second, that my application of the law was wrong, in concluding that the derogation from open justice was not necessary in this case. This judgment sets out what – for my part – I consider to be legally and evaluatively correct, and why. The question now changes. I ask whether – for my part – I can see a realistic prospect of the Court of Appeal overturning my decision. My confidence in the correctness of my approach, and the permissibility of my evaluation, does not extend to my assessing as unrealistic the prospect of the Court of Appeal finding that my approach was wrong, or my evaluative judgment impermissible. That being so, the Respondent has my permission, on both grounds, to pursue an appeal if she wishes to do so.

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