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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Nan N. v. Rex R.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: AC 25-P-524

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.4K)

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Combined Opinion

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

25-P-524 Appeals Court

NAN N. vs. REX R.1

No. 25-P-524.

Essex. January 9, 2026. – March 20, 2026.

Present: Rubin, Grant, & Hodgens, JJ.

Abuse Prevention. Protective Order. Electronic Mail. Witness,
Cross-examination. Words, "Coercive control."

Complaint for protection from abuse filed in the Essex
Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on March 26,
2025.

A hearing to extend the abuse prevention order was had
before Caryn R. Mitchell-Munevar, J.

Michael Pabian for the defendant.
Robert B. Setterbo, II, for the plaintiff.

GRANT, J. After an evidentiary hearing at which both

parties were represented by counsel, a judge of the Probate and

Family Court extended a G. L. c. 209A abuse prevention order

1 The parties' names are pseudonyms.
2

(209A order) which had been issued ex parte by a different

judge, finding that the order was necessary to protect the

plaintiff, Nan N. (wife), from the likelihood of "abuse" as

defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1, both in the form of "coercive

control" by the defendant, Rex R. (husband), and because she was

in reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm from the

husband. The husband appeals, arguing that the evidence was

insufficient; that the judge improperly applied the definition

of "coercive control" to the husband's conduct before September

18, 2024, the effective date of the amendment adding coercive

control to the statutory definition of abuse, G. L. c. 209A,

§ 1 (d), St. 2024, c. 118, § 4 (2024 amendment); and that the

judge erred by failing in several places to use the word

"serious" in her written findings concerning the fear of

imminent physical harm faced by the wife. We conclude that the

evidence was sufficient to support the judge's finding that the

husband committed abuse by placing the wife in reasonable fear

of imminent serious physical harm. We therefore do not address

the husband's arguments about proof of abuse defined as coercive

control.

The husband also argues that, in determining whether the

husband abused the wife within the meaning of the statute, the

judge improperly considered an e-mail message from the husband's

divorce lawyer to the wife's divorce lawyer. Even assuming that
3

the judge should not have attributed the contents of the e-mail

message to the husband, we conclude that the error was not

prejudicial. We also reject the husband's argument that, at the

evidentiary hearing at which he was represented by counsel and

testified, the judge did not sufficiently safeguard his rights

to cross-examine the wife and to present evidence.

However, the parties agree -- and we concur -- that the

extension of the 209A order for a duration of two years went

beyond what was permitted by the statute. On February 25, 2026,

we entered an order vacating so much of the 209A order as

extended beyond April 2, 2026, and remanded the case to the

Probate and Family Court for an extension hearing on or before

that date. The 209A order was otherwise affirmed. This

decision sets forth our reasoning, including the grounds for our

February 25 order.

Background. We summarize the facts found by the judge

based on the evidence at the hearing after notice. Because the

judge credited the wife's affidavit in its entirety, we include

some details from it.

The husband and the wife were married in 1996 and have four

children, the youngest of whom are twins who were eighteen years

old at the time of the issuance of the 209A order. During the

marriage, the wife was "mostly a stay-at-home mom" and the

primary parent to their children; she worked "off and on," but
4

the husband controlled the parties' finances. In December 2022,

due to his work as an attorney, the husband moved from their

home in Massachusetts to Florida. In August 2023, the wife and

the twins joined the husband in Florida.

In December 2023, while waiting in line at a store, the

wife asked if she could use the husband's cell phone, reaching

for it. The husband smacked the wife's hand, causing her pain

and fear, and yelled at her. On the drive home, the husband

berated the wife for having "invaded his personal space."

In their Florida home, the husband routinely followed the

wife into the laundry room, the smallest space in the house, and

shut the door. The husband chased the wife there when he was

angry. The wife cried and begged him to leave, but he pushed

his body against hers, blocking her exit. The husband was six

feet, one inch tall, and the wife was five feet, three inches

tall. After the wife raised this issue in marriage counseling,

the husband's cornering the wife in the laundry room increased

in intensity and frequency.

In January 2024, the husband moved out of the Florida home

and the parties never lived together again. On February 20,

2024, the wife informed the husband by text message that she was

filing for divorce. Later that day, the husband burst into the

house and cornered the wife in the kitchen, using his body to

pin her against the lit stove. Yelling in her face, the husband
5

said, "[she] could have a divorce, but [she] couldn't have [her]

own lawyer, [they] would use one lawyer." The wife could feel

the heat of the stove flames just inches from her back and was

afraid that the husband would force her into the flames or that

her clothing would catch fire. After the wife inched sideways

away from the stove, the husband pinned her against the counter.

Crying, the wife begged the husband to leave, but he refused and

kept pushing her and screaming. When the husband learned that

their child was home, he backed off and the wife went outdoors

and telephoned her lawyer. The husband followed her and

demanded to speak to the lawyer, and the wife put the call on

speakerphone. The lawyer managed to placate the husband, who

agreed to leave, but as soon as the husband ended the call, he

told the wife that "he wasn't going anywhere," and "he could

come in and get [her] day or night because it's his house." The

husband screamed at the wife outdoors until she dialed 911, when

he left. That night, the wife had the locks changed. The wife

later learned that the husband was watching her on the home's

security camera.

The day after the husband learned that the wife was filing

for divorce, he removed over $100,000 from the parties' joint

checking account and canceled her as an account holder from

several of their joint credit cards.
6

On multiple occasions, the husband verbally abused the

wife, calling her names including "psycho bitch." The husband

said that because he was a lawyer he understood how the court

system works, and the wife did not because she was "so stupid."

The husband repeatedly demanded that the wife fire her divorce

lawyer, and said that if she did not, he would "destroy" her.

He said if she did not agree to engage in a collaborative

divorce process, he would have her "put in jail for changing the

locks" and "take the kids from [her]." The husband said that

the only way that she and the twins could leave Florida was if

she agreed to that process.

The parties engaged in the collaborative divorce process in

Florida. During the process, both the wife's lawyer and the

mental health neutral expressed concern for the wife's safety

and arranged that one of them would escort her from and to her

car. On one occasion, the husband pushed past the wife's lawyer

and followed the wife to her car, yelling that she needed to

talk to him without lawyers. The wife managed to reach her car

and drive away.

On March 18, 2024, the husband came to the Florida house,

begging to talk to the wife and sobbing. He sat at the kitchen

table and expressed thoughts of killing himself. The next day,

the wife contacted him saying she was concerned about him, but

he denied the conversation had happened. The wife feared for
7

her safety because the husband "refuse[d] to acknowledge

reality, and if he is capable of killing himself then [she was]

afraid he is capable of killing [her]."

In April 2024, at their children's athletic event, the

husband followed the wife around, demanding that she fire her

divorce lawyer. The husband followed the wife to her car,

backed her up against the car door, and screamed in her face

that she would "never see a fucking penny of his money," he

would "bankrupt" her, and he would show everyone how "fucking

stupid" she was. The husband was bent over the wife and was so

close that his spit was flying onto her face.

The husband sent the wife an e-mail message stating that he

was going to sell the Massachusetts home. In the collaborative

divorce process, the husband agreed that the wife and the twins

could live in that home, but when the wife began arranging the

move the husband said that if she left Florida with the twins,

he would have her arrested. In May 2024, the husband signed a

parenting plan agreeing that he would not enter the

Massachusetts home unless invited.

On June 1, 2024, the wife and the twins moved back into the

Massachusetts home. The wife noticed that whenever she or one

of the children arrived home, soon afterwards the husband would

contact them by text message. Realizing that the husband was

watching them by means of the doorbell camera, the wife put duct
8

tape over its lens, but the husband's monitoring continued, and

she realized he was still alerted to their movements by

notifications from the camera.

In January 2025, the husband sent frequent text messages to

the wife that they could resolve their differences without

lawyers. During a January 6 telephone call, the wife told the

husband that she needed to feel safe in the Massachusetts home

and she did not want him to come there unless previously agreed

to and scheduled. The husband replied that he could enter that

home "at any time, day or night," and that he was letting the

wife and children stay there "as a courtesy." The husband told

the wife "that he will come into the home if he wants to and

[she] cannot stop him."

In early March 2025, the husband sent text messages to the

wife nearly every day, sometimes multiple times a day, demanding

to speak with her. He told her he was coming to Massachusetts

on March 27 and would stay in the Massachusetts home. The wife

was afraid for her safety from his threats to stay in the

Massachusetts home and believed that he made them to instill

fear in her. The husband had a Massachusetts firearms license

and access to firearms.

On March 26, 2025, the day before the husband was due to

arrive, the wife filed the complaint for protection from abuse,

alleging that the husband had caused her physical harm,
9

attempted to cause her physical harm, placed her in fear of

imminent serious physical harm, and engaged in coercive control

by a pattern of behavior as described in G. L. c. 209A,

§ 1 (d) (a).2 The ex parte 209A order issued, commanding the

husband, among other things, to stay away from the Massachusetts

home; not contact the wife; and not abuse the wife, including by

coercively controlling her as defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1 (d).3

A hearing after notice, G. L. c. 209A, § 3, was scheduled for

April 2. On March 31, the husband's divorce lawyer sent the

wife's divorce lawyer an e-mail message, discussed below.

At the hearing after notice, the only definition of abuse

argued by the wife's counsel was that she was in fear of

imminent serious physical harm. The judge considered the wife's

affidavit, the husband's testimony, the March 31 e-mail message,

and arguments of both counsel. The judge extended the order for

two years. The next day, the husband filed a notice of appeal.

2 The husband did not include the complaint in the record
appendix, although he relies on it in his brief, including by
arguing that the wife's affidavit did not prove her allegations
of abuse. As appellant, the husband had the burden to provide
us with a complete record. See Mass. R. A. P.
18 (a) (1) (A) (v) (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019).
See also G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 397 n.13 (2018).

3 The 209A order also required the husband to surrender to
the local police department all guns and ammunition, and
suspended any license to carry and firearms identification card.
10

About three weeks later, the judge issued written findings of

fact.4

Discussion. 1. Extension of 209A order. a. Standard of

review. We review the extension of a 209A order "for an abuse

of discretion or other error of law" (citation omitted).

Vanna V. v. Tanner T., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 552 (2023). "[A]

judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of

discretion where [the reviewing court] conclude[s] the judge

made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant

to the decision, . . . such that the decision falls outside the

range of reasonable alternatives." Constance C. v. Raymond R.,

101 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 394 (2022), quoting L.L. v.

Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). We accord the

"utmost deference" to the credibility determinations made by the

judge who "heard the testimony of the parties . . . [and]

observed their demeanor" (citation omitted). Noelle N. v.

Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664 (2020).

4 The husband argues that we should decline to consider the
judge's findings of fact, issued after the husband filed his
notice of appeal but before the Probate Court record was
assembled for appeal, because they were not authorized by Mass.
R. Dom. Rel. P. 52 (a), which allows parties to request
additional findings after trial. He cites nothing that
prohibits the judge from issuing such findings or an appellate
court from considering them.
11

At the hearing after notice, the wife bore the burden to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was suffering

from abuse as defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1, and that "an

extension of the order [was] necessary to protect her from the

likelihood of 'abuse.'" Vera V. v. Seymour S., 98 Mass. App.

Ct. 315, 317 (2020), quoting Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734,

739 (2005). See Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse

Prevention Proceedings § 5:04 (Oct. 2025) (Judicial Guidelines).

b. Definitions of abuse. As relevant to our analysis in

this case, the statute defines abuse to include "attempting to

cause or causing physical harm," "placing another in fear of

imminent serious physical harm," and "coercive control."5 G. L.

c. 209A, § 1.6 The 2024 amendment added "coercive control" to

the definition of abuse, and defines coercive control to

include:

5 The definition also includes "causing another to engage
involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress,"
G. L. c. 209A, § 1 (c), and a plaintiff may seek protection from
past physical abuse under § 1.

6 Until the 2024 amendment, the definition of abuse in G. L.
c. 209A, § 1, required proof of "the occurrence of one or more
of the following acts between family or household members"
(emphasis added). G. L. c. 209A, § 1, as amended by St. 1996,
c. 450, § 232. The 2024 amendment changed that language to "the
occurrence of any of the following acts between family or
household members" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 209A, § 1, as
amended by St. 2024, c. 118, § 4. The husband does not argue
that the change from "one or more" to "any" made a difference
here.
12

"(a) a pattern of behavior intended to threaten,
intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce or compel
compliance of a family or household member that causes that
family or household member to reasonably fear physical harm
or have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy,
including, but not limited to:

". . .

"(ii) depriving the family or household member of basic
needs;

"(iii) controlling, regulating or monitoring the family or
household member's activities, communications, movements,
finances, economic resources or access to services,
including through technological means; . . . ."

G. L. c. 209A, § 1 (d).

Often the theory of abuse that a judge considers in

deciding whether to issue a 209A order is whether the defendant

placed the plaintiff in reasonable fear of imminent serious

physical harm. See Iamele, 444 Mass. at 739-740. In evaluating

whether a plaintiff met the burden of proving a reasonable fear

of imminent serious physical harm, a judge is required to

"consider the totality of the circumstances of the parties'

relationship." Id. at 740. Indeed, we have referred to the

totality of the circumstances of the parties' relationship as

"[t]he touchstone of an analysis as to whether a plaintiff has

met her burden in a 209A proceeding." G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass.

App. Ct. 389, 394 (2018). The totality of the circumstances is

not limited to a defendant's conduct that constitutes physical

abuse. Conduct that constitutes verbal, emotional, or economic
13

abuse may exacerbate a plaintiff's fear of imminent serious

physical harm. See C.R.S. v. J.M.S., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 561, 563

(2017) (plaintiff met burden with evidence of "at least two

separate incidents of physical assault . . . in the course of a

deteriorating and stressful relationship . . . characterized by

the defendant's controlling behavior as well as verbal and

emotional abuse"); Schechter v. Schechter, 88 Mass. App. Ct.

239, 241-242 & n.5 (2015) (discussing "numerous instances of

emotional and economic abuse").

c. Application to this case. At the hearing, before

discussing coercive control, the judge said, "[H]is behavior

towards her is abusive." In her written findings, the judge

found that the wife proved that the husband's conduct met three

of the statutory definitions of abuse: attempting to cause the

wife physical harm, placing her in fear of imminent serious

physical harm, and coercive control. In her written findings,

the judge also found that the wife needed protection from both

coercive control and fear of imminent physical harm.

i. Coercive control. The husband's arguments revolve

primarily around the judge's conclusion that the wife was

subject to the husband's coercive control and needed protection

from it. In particular, the husband contends that the evidence

at the hearing after notice was insufficient to prove abuse,

because the judge improperly applied the definition of abuse
14

that included coercive control to his conduct before the

effective date of the 2024 amendment, i.e., September 18, 2024.

The husband also argues that in determining whether he engaged

in coercive control, the judge wrongly attributed to him what

the judge determined were threats contained in the e-mail

message from the husband's Florida divorce lawyer to the wife's

Florida divorce lawyer, despite the absence of any evidence that

the husband read it or authorized its transmission in advance.7

We need not and do not decide whether the judge could apply

retroactively the coercive control provision of the 2024

amendment or consider the e-mail message. Even assuming the

husband is correct, and that the findings of abuse by coercive

control and risk of coercive control cannot stand, the extension

order is independently supported on the ground that the wife

suffered abuse through reasonable fear of imminent serious

physical harm and required protection because of such abuse.

ii. Fear of imminent serious physical harm. Contrary to

the husband's argument, there is adequate support for the

judge's finding of reasonable fear of imminent serious physical

7 The judge found that the e-mail message was "threatening
the [wife]'s financial security, an attempt at intimidating a
witness and an attempt to negotiate her safety." Then, in her
written findings, based on the husband's testimony, the judge
concluded that the husband "was more concerned about his
reputation and how he would be affected by the [209A] order as
opposed to his threatening abusive behavior towards the [wife]."
15

harm. Although, as the judge correctly stated in her written

order, "[t]he [wife] did not need to offer evidence of physical

violence or overt threats to prove that her fear was

reasonable," the judge found that the wife credibly described

"specific incidences of physical abuse" and "physical violence"

perpetrated by the husband. The husband chased the wife into

the laundry room, pushed his body against hers, and blocked her

from leaving. Just after learning that the wife had filed for

divorce, the husband "assaulted the [wife] by pushing her

against a lit stove." After their children's sports event, the

husband backed the wife up against her car, screaming and

projecting spit onto her face. See Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67

Mass. App. Ct. 139, 141-142 (2006) (defendant followed plaintiff

and screamed in her face so closely she could feel his spit on

her face). Passing over whether that evidence proved the

husband committed abuse defined as "attempting to cause or

causing physical harm," we conclude that it proved that the

husband abused the wife by "placing [her] in fear of imminent

serious physical harm." G. L. c. 209A, § 1 (b).

The judge properly considered the husband's psychological

and verbal abuse of the wife. See C.R.S., 92 Mass. App. Ct. at

563. The day after the wife filed for divorce, the husband cut

off her access to funds. The husband repeatedly demanded that

the wife fire her divorce lawyer and threatened to have her
16

evicted from the Florida home and arrested for changing its

locks. The husband sent the wife text messages "almost every

day, sometimes multiple times a day demanding that she speak

with him." He tracked her movements with the security camera in

the Florida home and the doorbell camera in the Massachusetts

home. See Constance C., 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 397 (evidence of

abuse included "defendant's nonstop attempts to contact [the

plaintiff], his escalating anger, his terrifying and

increasingly aggressive behavior"). Here, the husband told the

wife "that he felt like killing himself and later denied that

the conversation ever took place." See id. at 396 & n.11

(defendant's suicide threat relevant to reasonableness of

plaintiff's fear of physical harm).

In determining the reasonableness of the wife's fear, the

judge also considered her demeanor in the court room, finding

that "[t]he [wife] was visibly shaking throughout the

proceeding, she had her arms folded curling into herself, [she]

avoided eye contact with the [husband] and was tearing [up]."

See Iamele, 444 Mass. at 740 (judge should consider "parties'

demeanor in court").

The judge concluded that the 209A order was necessary to

protect the wife from the likelihood of future abuse. After

having signed a parenting plan agreeing that he would not come

to the Massachusetts home without permission, the husband
17

announced that he was coming to stay there beginning March 27,

1. The husband said that the wife could not stop him and he

could enter that home "at any time, day or night." See

Vanna V., 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 553-554 (2023) (in context of

long history of abuse during nearly thirty-five year marriage,

targeted vandalism of ex-wife's car supported reasonable fear of

imminent serious physical harm).

The husband contends that the judge did not apply the

correct definition of abuse as "fear of imminent serious

physical harm," G. L. c. 209A, § 1 (b), because a few times in

the "Rational[e]" section of her findings of fact, the judge

misquoted the standard as "fear of imminent physical harm,"

omitting the word "serious." At another point in her findings,

the judge did include the word "serious" when she described the

standard as "imminent fear of serious bodily harm."8 The judge

had before her the complaint, which she referred to in her

findings, and it correctly recited the standard as "fear of

imminent serious physical harm." The judge also found that the

8 We note that the judge used the word "bodily" instead of
"physical," and placed the adjective "imminent" so that it
modified "fear" instead of "harm." Cf. Commonwealth v. Gupta,
84 Mass. App. Ct. 682, 685-686 (2014) (judge misquoted stalking
statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43 [a], as requiring intent to cause
"imminent fear of death or bodily injury," but "imminence
properly refers not to fear but rather to physical harm"). We
remind judges when drafting findings to quote the legal standard
directly from the applicable statute.
18

husband abused the wife by attempting to cause her physical

harm. In that context, the judge's findings leave no doubt that

she credited the evidence that what the wife feared was physical

harm that was serious and imminent. Contrast G.B., 94 Mass.

App. Ct. at 396 (although judge did not make findings of fact,

appellate court could discern reasonable basis for 209A order

from judge's ruling extending it), with Iamele, 444 Mass. at 741

(remanding for further hearing where judge found that plaintiff

was "genuinely frightened," but did not state whether he

credited her testimony "relating to the reasonableness or

imminence of her fear").

We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's extension

of the 209A order based on the plaintiff's reasonable fear of

imminent serious physical harm. In those circumstances, we do

not reach the question whether proof of abuse would have been

sufficient solely on the theory of coercive control. See

Judicial Guidelines § 1.00A commentary (noting that "reasonable

fear of physical harm or reduced sense of physical safety"

required for coercive control provides lower threshold than fear

of imminent serious physical harm).

1. Opportunity to cross-examine wife. The husband argues

that his due process rights were violated at the hearing after

notice because the judge deprived him of the opportunity to
19

cross-examine the wife and did not give him a sufficient

opportunity to present his case. We disagree.

At the hearing after notice, the wife's counsel presented

her affidavit and told the judge, "obviously my client would

reassert and reaffirm her statements in the affidavit today."

Neither the husband nor his counsel ever sought to cross-examine

the wife.

Instead, when the judge questioned the husband's counsel

about the factual allegations in the wife's affidavit, the

husband interrupted and answered the judge. The transcript of

the hearing spanned just over twenty-three pages, of which the

husband testified in narrative form for six pages without

interruption. The judge did not curtail the husband or his

counsel from presenting the case as they saw fit, as occurred in

Idris I. v. Hazel H., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 790 (2022). See

Judicial Guidelines § 5:01.

1. Extension for two years. Finally, both parties assert

that the judge erred by extending the 209A order for a period of

two years. We agree.

At the initial hearing after notice, "[a]ny relief granted

by the court shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed

one year." G. L. c. 209A, § 3. See MacDonald v. Caruso, 467

Mass. 382, 386 (2014). It is only at a subsequent hearing that

the judge may decide "to extend the order for any additional
20

time reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff or to enter a

permanent order." G. L. c. 209A, § 3. See Crenshaw v. Macklin,

430 Mass. 633, 636 (2000); Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App.

Ct. 479, 486 (2005). See also Judicial Guidelines § 6:02 &

commentary. At the hearing after notice, it was premature for

the judge to extend the order beyond one year, and thus we are

constrained to remand the case to the Probate and Family Court.

Conclusion. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, on

February 25, 2026, we entered an order vacating so much of the

April 2, 2025 209A order as extended beyond April 2, 2026, and

remanded the case to the Probate and Family Court for an

extension hearing on or before April 2, 2026. The 209A order

was otherwise affirmed.