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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Nakia Perry-Goffney v. Cedarpeak Management, LLC

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-2164-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2164-24

NAKIA PERRY-GOFFNEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CEDARPEAK MANAGEMENT,
LLC,

Defendant-Appellant.

---

Submitted November 18, 2025 – Decided March 20, 2026

Before Judges Sumners and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Docket Nos. SC-001182-23
and DC-001735-24.

O'Hanlon Schwartz, PC, attorneys for appellant (Israel
A. Schwartz and Noah A. Schwartz, of counsel and on
the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM
In this tenant-landlord dispute, defendant Cedarpeak Management, LLC

appeals the Special Civil Part, Small Claims Section, orders of: October 25,

2024 denying its motion to vacate default, reinstate its counterclaim, and

transfer the matter to the Special Civil Part; and February 21, 2025 entering

judgment in favor of plaintiff for $4,419.75.1 We reverse and remand for trial

on the complaint and counterclaim.

On November 17, 2023, self-represented plaintiff Nakia Perry-Goffney

filed a small claims complaint against defendant, her former landlord, seeking

return of her security deposit. A November 20 court mailing to plaintiff stated:

"A SUMMONS WAS ISSUED 11-22-23 AND A NON-JURY TRIAL HAS

BEEN SCHEDULED FOR THIS CASE ON 01-10-2024 AT 08:45 AM."

On January 4, 2024, the court mailed a notice to defendant addressed to

"1391820 Swarthmore Avenue," stating that "A NON-JURY TRIAL HAS

BEEN SCHEDULED FOR THIS CASE ON 01-31-2024 AT 8:45 AM."

Plaintiff was mailed a similar notice. 2

1
Defendant's notice of appeal also states that it is appealing orders of March
26, 2024 and September 28, 2024. However, there are no orders for those dates,
but merely Special Civil Part case summary entries.
2
Another court notice––which is undated––stated: "Your trial scheduled for
1/10/2024 at 08:45 AM has been rescheduled. A trial has been scheduled in this

A-2164-24
2
On January 30, defendant's then counsel electronically filed (e-filed) his

appearance and defendant's counterclaim for unpaid rent in excess of the

jurisdictional limit of the small claim. Counsel included his certification stating,

among other things, that the counterclaim was filed "in good faith, and not for

the purposes of delay." Counsel also e-filed a letter that day stating plaintiff

provided the court with defendant's incorrect address, 1391820 Swarthmore

Avenue Lakewood, NJ 08701, rather than the correct address of 1820

Swarthmore Avenue, P.O. Box 139, Lakewood, NJ 08701. Counsel also

requested an adjournment because defendant never received the notice

rescheduling trial on January 31 and stated he would be filing a counterclaim

which should transfer the matter from the Small Claims Section to the Special

Civil Part.

On January 31, the Judiciary eCourts System (court docket) showed that:

"The 'Trial' Proceeding for CAM-SC-001182-23 scheduled for 01/31/2024 has

been: 'Cancel [sic].'" Plaintiff, however, was in court that afternoon at 12:26

p.m. when the matter was called for trial. The court transcript indicates the court

clerk informed the judge that a counterclaim had been filed and that the case

case to take place on 1/10/2024 at 1:30 PM." There is no record of what, if
anything, happened on January 10, 2024 regarding plaintiff’s complaint.

A-2164-24
3
was moving to the Special Civil Part. However, the judge stated: "Defendant

Cedarpeak Management? Anybody? No appearance by the defendant. Default

in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant entered default." No notice of

default was sent to defendant or noted on the court docket.

Following the issuance of a summons for defendant's counterclaim under

the Small Claims Section docket, the matter was assigned to the Special Civil

Part docket, and trial was scheduled for March 26 at 8:45 a.m.3 All parties

appeared at trial. After discussing the procedural case history with the court

clerk on the record and without seeking the parties' positions, the judge sua

sponte dismissed the counterclaim because defendant did not appear for trial on

January 31. The judge refused to change the ruling despite defendant's counsel's

plea that the January trial date was adjourned and a request for default on the

counterclaim had been filed but not decided. Defendant then moved to vacate

the default and proceed to trial. After plaintiff advised the judge she objected

to reopening the matter and proceeding to trial, the judge said: "So, basically

you made your motion on the record. That's denied. Okay." A subsequent court

3
After plaintiff failed to answer the counterclaim, defendant moved for default.
However, for reasons that are unclear in the record, the court did not respond to
default request.
A-2164-24
4
docket entry on April 5, noted that the March 26 trial date had been "scheduled

in error." There is no order memorializing the judge's decisions that day.

After unsuccessfully moving for default judgment in June and July, the

court determined plaintiff's August submission was sufficient and scheduled a

proof hearing for September 25. Prior to the entry of default judgment,

defendant's new counsel moved to vacate default and reinstate the counterclaim.

Plaintiff did not oppose the motion.

On October 25, the judge denied the motion with prejudice following

argument. In an oral decision, the judge reasoned that he did not authorize the

cancellation of the January 31 trial date and criticized defendant's counsel for

"taking advantage of this improper docket entry that was clearly made by

mistake." The judge then addressed the merits of the counterclaim, stating it

was filed "without leave of [c]ourt, it's not even clear, and there is no real prima

facie showing, good faith showing, that the damages claimed exceeded the

$5,000" small claims threshold.

On February 21, 2025, the judge entered a $4,419.75 judgment in favor of

plaintiff.

Defendant appeals, contending the judge erroneously denied its motion to

vacate default and vacate dismissal of its counterclaim, on the basis that it did

A-2164-24
5
not appear for trial on January 31, despite the fact the trial date was cancelled

based on the court docket. We agree.

There was good cause for why defendant did not appear at trial on January

31, 2024, which resulted in the entry of default. The judge mistakenly applied

his discretion in denying defendant's unopposed motion to vacate default, which

was filed before default judgment was entered. See R. 4:43-3 (providing that a

judge may vacate the entry of default upon a showing of "good cause"); Estate

of Semprevivo ex rel. Semprevivo v. Lahham, 468 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div.

2021) (quoting Ghandi v. Cespedes, 390 N.J. Super. 193, 196 (App. Div. 2007))

(finding good cause requires the trial judge to exercise "sound discretion in light

of the facts and circumstances of the particular case considered in the context of

the purposes of the [c]ourt [r]ule being applied"). Defendant filed an appearance

the day before trial and requested an adjournment because it filed a counterclaim

exceeding the jurisdictional limit of the Small Claims Section and removed the

matter to Special Civil Part.

On the day of trial, the court docket stated the trial was cancelled.

Therefore, defendant had good cause not to appear in court that day. In fact, no

notice of default was entered against defendant, and the court relisted the trial

for March 26, 2024, where both parties appeared but the judge ruled that

A-2164-24
6
defendant defaulted for not appearing on January 31. On the other hand, we can

surmise that plaintiff appeared at court that day because she did not view the

court docket prior to going to the courthouse, which is understandable given that

she was self-represented.

We discern no reasonable basis for the judge to find that defendant's

counsel took advantage of a docket entry made by mistake to not appear on

January 31. Defendant did not appear for trial because it requested an

adjournment the day before trial and the court docket stated the next day that the

trial date was cancelled. Such occurrences are not unusual.

Moreover, the judge does not cite any court rule or case law to support

sua sponte dismissing the counterclaim because defendant did not file a motion

to obtain permission to assert the counterclaim. See R. 1:7-4 (requiring a trial

judge provide "conclusions of law" in making decisions). That aside, we

recognize that the counterclaim is short on factual assertions, merely stating that

"[p]laintiff vacate[d] [defendant's apartment] owing a large sum of money" and

demanding "damages in an amount over $5,000 but not to exceed $20,000,

interest, costs and reasonable attorney's fees." However, at that stage of the

proceedings, defendant sufficiently asserted a meritorious defense that plaintiff

owed it unpaid rent to warrant setting aside the default judgment that was

A-2164-24
7
eventually entered. See R. 4:50-1; O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 129 (1975)

(establishing a meritorious defense is necessary for setting aside both a default

and a default judgment).

Whether defendant prevails at trial is not the issue before us, but this

matter "should be resolved on the merits rather than on procedural violations."

Tr. Co. of N.J. v. Sliwinski, 350 N.J. Super. 187, 192 (App. Div. 2002). The

trial judge should have exercised his discretion differently and granted

defendant's motion to vacate default. In turn, the judge should not have

dismissed defendant's counterclaim on its own motion. Consequently, the final

judgment in favor of plaintiff is vacated.

Finally, given the trial judge's prior findings and orders, we direct on

remand that the matter be considered by a different judge to avoid any claim of

partiality. See Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 349 (App. Div. 1999)

(explaining a remand to a different judge may be appropriate "when there is a

concern that the trial judge has a potential commitment to [their] prior

findings"); Carmichael v. Bryan, 310 N.J. Super. 34, 49 (App. Div. 1998)

(noting that a judge's expression of opinion might evidence a "commitment to

[their] findings"). We again express no views regarding the outcome on remand.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-2164-24
8