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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

H.Z. v. Department of Human Services

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1310-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.6K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1310-24

H.Z.,1

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES,

Respondent-Respondent.

---

Submitted March 9, 2026 – Decided March 20, 2026

Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human
Services, Office of Program Integrity and
Accountability, Docket No. DRA-23-004.

Richard Q. Hark, attorney for appellant.

Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Barkha Patel, Deputy Attorney General, on
the brief).

1
To protect the privacy of the individuals, we refer to them by their initials. R.
1:38-3(f)(8).
PER CURIAM

This appeal of a final agency decision arises out of the overnight escape

(referred to by the parties as "an elopement") of an adult resident from Devereux

Advanced Behavioral Health ("Devereux"), a private regulated facility for

developmentally disabled persons. Police found the resident a few hours after

his elopement, having traveled by foot over three miles away from Devereux,

barefoot, partially clothed, frostbitten, and injured. Appellant H.Z., who was

employed at the facility as a worker licensed by the New Jersey Department of

Human Services ("the DHS"), was fired by his employer, as well as the two other

workers who were on duty with him that evening.

The DHS brought administrative proceedings against H.Z. to place him

on a Central Registry that bars his employment in certain caregiver positions.

After a hearing in the Office of Administrative Law ("OAL") at which H.Z. was

represented by counsel, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that DHS

had met its burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, of showing that H.Z.

had committed a substantiated act of neglect against the resident. The DHS

adopted the ALJ's decision and this counseled appeal ensued.

Applying the deference we owe to the agency's regulatory role and to the

ALJ's fact-finding, we affirm.

A-1310-24
2
I.

Before we describe the pertinent facts and circumstances, we provide the

following overview of the statutory and regulatory context.

The Legislature has declared: "[i]t is in the public interest for the State to

provide for the protection of individuals with developmental disabilities by

identifying those caregivers who have wrongfully caused them injury ." N.J.S.A.

30:6D-73(a) (emphasis added). A "caregiver," as defined in N.J.S.A. 30:6D-74,

is "a person [receiving] State funding, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part,

to provide services [to] or supports . . . an individual with a developmental

disability." 2

To better protect developmentally disabled persons, a "Central Registry

of Offenders Against Individuals with Developmental Disabilities in the [DHS]"

became effective on October 27, 2010, with its stated purpose being "to prevent

caregivers who become offenders against individuals with developmental

disabilities from working with [developmentally disabled persons]." N.J.S.A.

30:6D-73(d). The expressed policy rationale of establishing the Central

Registry was to "assure that the lives of innocent individuals with developmental

2
Appellant does not dispute that, at the relevant time, he was employed by
Devereux as such a "caregiver."
A-1310-24
3
disabilities are immediately safeguarded from further injury and possible death

and that the legal rights of such individuals are fully protected." N.J.S.A. 30:6D -

73(c) (emphasis added). "[E]mployers are prohibited from hiring individuals

whose names appear on [the Central] Registry to care for people with

developmental disabilities." Davis v. Devereux Found., 209 N.J. 269, 295

(2012) (citing N.J.S.A. 30:6D-77).

Pursuant to the statutory scheme, the DHS Commissioner is required to

"adopt rules and regulations that define the procedures and standards for

inclusion of an offending caregiver on the [C]entral [R]egistry . . . ." N.J.S.A.

30:6D-77(b). One of those regulations requires the DHS Office of

Investigations to "investigate incidents occurring in . . . facilities licensed,

contracted, or funded by the [DHS], or State-operated developmental centers

that serve individuals with developmental disabilities." N.J.A.C. 10:44D-3.1(a).

In particular, "[t]he [DHS] investigating unit shall evaluate the available

information and . . . determine whether abuse, neglect or exploitation has

occurred, attempt to identify the perpetrator or perpetrators thereof and then

make a finding either substantiating or not substantiating each allegation ."

N.J.A.C. 10:44D-3.2(a) (emphasis added). "The findings of substantiation shall

A-1310-24
4
be based upon the preponderance of the evidence found during the

investigation." N.J.A.C. 10:44D-3.2(b) (emphasis added).

"Neglect" is defined by statute at N.J.S.A. 30:6D-74 as any of the

following conduct "by a caregiver on an individual with a developmental

disability: willfully failing to provide proper and sufficient food, clothing,

maintenance, medical care, or a clean and proper home; or failing to do or permit

to be done any act necessary for the well-being of an individual with a

developmental disability." (Emphasis added); see also N.J.A.C. 10:44D-1.2

(comparably defining "neglect" almost identically to N.J.S.A. 30:6D-74).3

"For inclusion on the [C]entral [R]egistry in the case of a substantiated

incident of neglect, the caregiver shall have acted with gross negligence,

recklessness, or in a pattern of behavior that causes or potentially causes harm

to an individual with a developmental disability." N.J.S.A. 30:6D-77(b)(2)

(emphasis added). Under an associated regulation, N.J.A.C. 10:44D-4.1(c)(1),

the concept of "acting with gross negligence" is defined as "a conscious,

3
The definitions of neglect are essentially the same, with one very minor
linguistic difference that does not affect our analysis. N.J.S.A. 30:6D-74 refers
to "failing to do or permit to be done any act necessary for the well-being [of a
developmentally disabled individual]," whereas N.J.A.C. 10:44D-1.2 refers to a
"failure to do, or permit to be done, any act necessary for the well-being [of a
developmentally disabled individual]." (Emphasis added).
A-1310-24
5
voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a duty and of the consequences

to another party." (Emphasis added).

If the DHS investigating unit "has determined that any or all of the

elements in N.J.A.C. 10:44D-4.1 subsections, (c) or (d) . . . are present, the

investigating unit shall refer the matter to the Commissioner . . . who shall

determine whether the perpetrator will be considered for inclusion on the Central

Registry . . . [.]" N.J.A.C. 10:44D-4.1(g) (emphasis added). However, even if

an individual's name is placed onto the Central Registry, "[a] person may apply

for removal of his name to the [C]ommissioner after a period of five years" by

"affirmatively demonstrat[ing] . . . clear and convincing evidence of

rehabilitation . . . [.]" N.J.S.A. 30:6D-77(c)(4).

II.

The record reflects the following relevant facts and procedural history.

Appellant's Job Duties

In October 2021, appellant H.Z. was hired by Devereux to serve as what

is termed a "direct support professional" ("DSP") at one of its facilities in New

A-1310-24
6
Jersey. As described by the ALJ, Devereux "is a residential care center for

people with disabilities who need assistance with daily living." 4

Appellant's role at Devereux required that he assist individuals with

developmental disabilities carry out their everyday activities. He primarily

worked in a "group home" setting referred to internally by Devereux staff as

"longhouse two." 5 Tammy McLean, a Behavior Specialist and former Program

Manager at Devereux, testified at the OAL hearing about the organization's

protocols and procedures. McLean explained that at the time appellant was

employed by Devereux, there "should have been . . . at least three people on the

shift" for all overnight shifts taking place in longhouse two.

Resident P.C., His Needs, and Past History of Elopement

In February 2022 when the underlying events of this case took place,

longhouse two housed four developmentally disabled residents. One of these

residents was P.C., who was assigned a "Positive Behavior Support Plan"

4
See also Davis, 209 N.J. at 278 ("Devereux is a non-profit organization whose
mission is to provide 'services around the nation for persons with emotional,
developmental and educational disabilities'").
5
The record refers to several of these group homes operated by Devereux next
to or otherwise nearby longhouse two, and that each of these group homes was
referred to internally by Devereux staff as "longhouse number (one, two, etc.) ."

A-1310-24
7
Restriction Level of III by Devereux based upon the following exhibited

behaviors: (1) pica ("[p]lacing non-edible items or items not intended for

mouthing . . . to/in mouth, with or without ingesting the item"); (2) self-injurious

behavior; (3) physical aggression; (4) elopement ("[a]ny occurrence of leaving

a building without a staff member"); and (5) incontinence. P.C. received

services from the DHS's Division of Developmental Disabilities. He was

additionally described by staff witnesses as being largely non-verbal.

It is undisputed that P.C. had an extensive history of elopement. Given

that history and the harm he was capable of inflicting upon himself, P.C. needed

to be checked on by DSP staff members "every [fifteen] minute[s]" and remain

within one's "visual field" or "line of sight" at all times, including while he was

sleeping or using the bathroom.

P.C.'s Elopement from Longhouse Two During Appellant's Shift

Beginning at approximately 11:00 p.m. on February 13, 2022, appellant

began working an overnight shift in longhouse two alongside two other DSP

staff members, "C.O." and "K.A."

At some unknown point in time before 3:00 a.m. on the morning of

February 14, P.C. successfully eloped from longhouse two. Although the events

of what exactly transpired on this night are heavily disputed, the record

A-1310-24
8
conclusively shows that P.C.'s elopement went unnoticed by DSP staff until they

were notified of his recovery by police later that morning.

At 2:51 a.m. on February 14, four West Milford police officers responded

to a third-party call regarding "a male party running South in the middle of Lake

Shore Road towards [a deli] on Warwick Turnpike." P.C. was later found by

police inside of the deli, a location approximately "3.2 miles away from

[longhouse two]." He was discovered wearing a green sweatshirt, boxer briefs,

and no shoes.

In addition to P.C. appearing generally "agitated and confused," officers

observed that his boxer briefs "looked as if he had urinated [on] himself as well

as defecated [on] himself from his boxers to the backs of his thighs." P.C.'s feet,

fingers, left elbow, and knees appeared to have blood on them as well. The

recorded temperature that night was well below freezing, noted by the ALJ to

have been 9° Fahrenheit.

Soon thereafter, West Milford Patrol Officer Suzanne Novakowski was

sent to longhouse two "to attempt to make contact with [Devereux] staff to

confirm that [P.C. was] in fact a resident of th[at] facility." Appellant was the

first DSP staff member to respond to Officer Novakowski's arrival at the group

home. According to the officer, appellant, upon learning of P.C.'s elopement,

A-1310-24
9
"immediately went to do a bed check of [longhouse two's] residents." After

appellant discovered that P.C. was not in bed or elsewhere in the group home,

P.C.'s belongings were gathered by DSP staff.

Officer Novakowski transported appellant to the deli to meet with P.C.

From there, appellant accompanied P.C. by ambulance to a local hospital, where

P.C. was evaluated for cold exposure.

At the hospital, P.C. was diagnosed with "a closed head injury and a

periorbital ecchymosis [6] of the left eye." Though initially discharged from that

hospital on February 14, P.C. was later taken to another hospital on February 15

to have his feet evaluated by medical professionals due to discoloration and

blisters. He was later diagnosed with frostbite on his left and right feet, which

were wrapped with bandages.

Appellant's Suspension and Central Registry Designation

In the aftermath of these events, DHS Investigator Lauren Koval prepared

an investigation report, which was later admitted into evidence at the OAL

6
While not defined in the record, "periorbital ecchymosis" refers to bruising
around the eyes "where blood pools underneath [the] skin. The bruises are
darker than [one's] natural skin tone and are often blue to purple." The condition
is "usually a sign of an injury, like a skull fracture." Raccoon Eyes, Cleveland
Clinic (Jan. 24, 2024), https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/symptoms
/raccoon-eyes.

A-1310-24
10
hearing. Appellant, C.O., and K.A. were all interviewed as part of Koval's

investigation.

Koval concluded that, "[b]ased on a preponderance of the testimonial and

documentary evidence obtained, the allegation that [P.C.] . . . was neglected by

former Devereux New Jersey [DSPs, C.O., H.Z., and K.A.], [wa]s

substantiated." (Emphasis added). Consequently, Koval recommended that

appellant, along with C.O. and K.A., have their names placed on the Central

Registry.

Appellant worked one additional shift as a DSP for Devereux the night of

February 15. He was informed the next day, February 16, that he had been

"suspended until further notice."

In addition to being interviewed by Koval, appellant submitted a written

statement to the DHS in March 2022 describing what had transpired on the night

of P.C.'s elopement from longhouse two. Soon thereafter, Devereux notified

appellant by letter that he had been terminated from his job as a DSP.

Appellant was subsequently informed in a separate letter from DHS that

his name had been placed on the Central Registry. He administratively contested

that placement. DHS accordingly transmitted the contested matter to the OAL.

A-1310-24
11
The OAL Hearings

The ALJ presided over hearings on two nonconsecutive days in October

2023 and January 2024. At these hearings, DHS elicited testimony from

Investigator Koval, Officer Novakowski, and former Devereux Program

Manager McLean. Appellant testified on his own behalf, and also presented

testimony from a former Devereux DSP staff member, J.O.

Appellant's Accounts of the Events

In defending his conduct, appellant has stressed that he and his two co-

workers were outnumbered by the four residents they were assigned to cover

that night. He has claimed he was unable to monitor P.C. because he was

diverted by having to attend to the needs of another resident who was engaging

in violent behavior, and that it was his co-worker K.A. who should have been

watching over P.C. the night of February 14. Given those circumstances,

appellant contends that his response to the situation was neither grossly

neglectful nor reckless.

More specifically, appellant testified that, towards the start of his shift that

began the night of February 13, a resident identified as "A.C." began to hurt

himself by repeatedly hitting his head against a wall while screaming. Appellant

explained that, as he had been trained to do, he then "quickly rushed to calm

A-1310-24
12
[A.C.] down and put his helmet on him," proceeding to take this helmet off and

placing it back on A.C. every fifteen minutes while the behavioral incident was

ongoing. According to appellant, the incident with A.C. lasted from

approximately 11:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m., concluding right before Officer

Novakowski arrived at longhouse two the morning of February 14.

Appellant further testified that, around the same time that he was assisting

A.C., K.A. had taken P.C. to his bedroom to go to sleep. As professed by

appellant, K.A. had been "in charge" of P.C. that night, because:

[K.C.] took him in and he's supposed to be with him
because I have somebody [A.C.] that has totally
occupied me which [K.C.] is aware of.

....

. . . So that's why when I'm occupied with that person
I couldn't be by myself to be with the other person. So
the next staff is supposed to immediately take charge of
the other person because . . . it's one on one. These . . .
residents [like P.C. and A.C.] are one on one.

[(Emphasis added).] 7

7
To the extent that his testimony in this regard implied that Devereux had
imposed specific "one-to-one" resident assignments to DSP staff members,
appellant appears to have abandoned that position in this appeal.

A-1310-24
13
Appellant recalled that his other co-worker, C.O., had initially tried to

help him with A.C. around 12:00 a.m., but after talking to A.C. for "some time[,]

[C.O.] said okay, that she's going downstairs to continue" the laundry she had

been doing for the group home's residents earlier that night.8 Appellant further

claimed that K.A. came into A.C.'s bedroom around 1:30 a.m. to assist him,

prompting appellant to immediately ask K.A. "where is P.C. the person you're

in charge of? Where is P.C.? And [K.A.] said that P.C. was sleeping."

Appellant acknowledged on cross-examination that he had not told K.A.

"to go back and watch [P.C.]," despite having knowledge that no other staff

member was doing so throughout the time that he was attending to A.C. At

some disputed point in time, K.A. left A.C.'s room to use the bathroom.

Competing Testimony by DHS Witnesses About the Night's Events

Appellant's account of what had transpired was substantially refuted by

the testimony of Officer Novakowski and Investigator Koval.

8
When asked on cross-examination why "[i]f [A.C.] was having a behavioral
episode for the next three hours until [3:00 a.m.,] why didn't you call [C.O.]
back up to help you?" appellant responded "I couldn't call [C.O.] to help me
because she was downstairs and there is a generator by the side of [A.C.'s] room
. . . I don't have to call all of them [to] come assist me while they have to do
other jobs. I felt I could stand and take care of [A.C.]."

A-1310-24
14
Officer Novakowski testified that, upon arriving at longhouse two the

morning of February 14, the entire group home was completely "dark," with no

lights visible from the exterior of the home appearing to have been turned on

anywhere inside. After ringing the doorbell and knocking for "[a]t least ten to

fifteen minutes," Officer Novakowski further testified that it was appellant who

had first answered the door, appearing notably disoriented, as if he had just

woken up from sleep. The officer additionally recalled that, upon getting a good

look inside the home, she noted that there were "chairs that were basically

positioned in a way to block anybody from going down the stairs," as well as "a

bunched up blanket on one of the couches and a mattress on the floor."

Based in part upon Officer Novakowski's observations, documented in a

police report and provided to the DHS as part of its investigation into the

incident of P.C.'s elopement, Investigator Koval testified that she regarded

appellant's narrative to be "[v]ery unlikely because if a client was having that

loud of a behavioral incident every other client in the house would've been

awake, [and] all the lights would've been on in the house." Koval added

that,"[i]f the client was having a behavioral incident like that[,] 911 should be

called for his safety, as well as [appellant's] safety." She additionally

emphasized that "[i]f the client is banging his head against the wall you should

A-1310-24
15
call 911 immediately so they do not harm themselves or others, and [appellant]

did not do any of those things."9

Koval further contradicted appellant's testimony about the allocation of

responsibility for residents among DSP staff members working in longhouse

two, testifying that the three co-workers that night–appellant, K.A., and C.O.–

each had "[a] responsibility to all of the clients. Not one staff in that home was

assigned one client. At no point during my investigation did [appellant] say that

he was assigned to [A.C.], at any point. . . . [N]o one in the investigation,

whether they worked for Devereux or other staff in the home said that [appellant]

was assigned to [A.C.] and could not leave him."

McLean likewise testified that "all the staff [in longhouse two] should

have been accountable for [P.C.]," as no specific DSP was typically assigned to

any one individual resident at the time that she had been Program Manager at

Devereux.

9
McLean similarly testified that "[s]o with . . . a violent behavior we always
tell the staff if . . . they're doing like head banging[,] being like really aggressive
you're always supposed to call 9-1-1. Like that's our main thing. You always
call 9-1-1 if you can't control it. You always call 9-1-1."
A-1310-24
16
The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ issued an eleven-page initial decision on November 14, 2024,

denying H.Z.'s appeal of his placement on the Central Registry. Addressing first

the issue of whether appellant H.Z. had neglected P.C., the ALJ found that:

. . . DHS has established that all staff were responsible
for the safety of all of the residents on February 14,
2022. H.Z. knew that P.C. required direct supervision
at all times, that P.C. had multiple medical conditions,
including pica, and leaving him alone could lead to
substantial harm. H.Z. knew that K.A. left P.C. alone
for over an hour while K.A. assisted H.Z. with A.C.
H.Z. asked K.A. about P.C.[,] but did nothing to
provide sufficient care to P.C. when H.Z. learned that
P.C. was not being supervised.

Given these findings, the ALJ concluded that appellant "failed to do an act

necessary for the well-being of an individual with a developmental disability,"

and likewise concluded that the "DHS ha[d] met its burden by a preponderance

of the evidence that H.Z.'s finding of substantiated neglect was proper."

The ALJ recognized the challenging situation appellant had faced on the

night in question, but nevertheless concluded that appellant had been remiss in

his duties:

The testimony offered by H.Z. that he provided
line of sight supervision to A.C. during the relevant
time period and therefore could not have provided that
same level of supervision to P.C. seems, on its face, to
have some merit. It would clearly be impossible for

A-1310-24
17
H.Z. to be in P.C.’s bedroom and A.C.’s bedroom at the
same time. However, setting aside the specific duty
that H.Z. had to provide line of sight supervision to
A.C., H.Z. also had a general duty to care for the well-
being of all the residents of Longhouse #2. This general
duty of care was described by Ms. Koval when she
testified that no staff member was ever assigned to any
client at any specific time and that P.C.’s supervision
was the responsibility of all staff at the nursing home.

[(Emphasis added).]

The ALJ further elaborated on this point, as follows:

In the incident report, H.Z. stated that at
approximately 1:30 am while A.C. was engaged in his
behavioral episode, K.A. left P.C. unattended in his
room and came to assist H.Z. with A.C. from
approximately 1:30 am until 3:00 am. Assuming his
statement was true, H.Z. knew that P.C. was left alone
for at least 1.5 hours without any supervision, yet he
did nothing to make certain either K.A. or the other
DSP (C.O.) who had been doing laundry, was checking
on P.C. His failure to do so was clearly intentional
because he asked K.A. about P.C., and K.A. responded
that he was asleep. H.Z. stated in the incident report
and in his testimony that he did not tell K.A. to go back
to P.C.’s room or to get help from another staff
member.

[(Emphasis added).]

In light of these findings, the ALJ concluded that: (1) appellant's "general

duty to care for the well-being of all residents required him at the very least to

instruct K.A. or C.O. to stay with P.C."; (2) his "failure to do so was a knowing

A-1310-24
18
and voluntary act in reckless disregard of his duty and result[ed in]

consequences to P.C."; (3) appellant "knew of P.C.’s serious conditions and high

needs and left him alone despite knowing this"; and (4) his placement on the

Central Registry was therefore "appropriate." (Emphasis added).

The DHS Final Agency Decision

Director Deborah Robinson of the DHS issued a final agency decision on

December 10, 2024, adopting the ALJ's findings. Her decision noted:

. . . I concur with the Administrative Law Judge’s
findings and conclusions. The ALJ had the opportunity
to assess the credibility and veracity of the witnesses; I
defer to the ALJ’s opinions concerning these matters,
based upon the reasoned observations, as extensively
described in the Initial Decision. I CONCLUDE AND
AFFIRM that H.Z. failed to maintain line-of-sight
supervision of P.C., knowing full well that if left
unsupervised, P.C. would engage in harmful behaviors.
H.Z. was correctly found to have been substantiated of
neglect, as defined in N.J.A.C. 10:44D-1.2. H.Z.’s
inadequate provision care for the well-being of the
group home residents was neglect, pursuant to the
Central Registry regulations. I CONCLUDE AND
AFFIRM that H.Z. acted intentionally in failing to
maintain line-of-sight supervision, knowing full well
that if left unsupervised, P.C. would engage in harmful
behaviors. H.Z.’s failure to supervise all of the home’s
residents was a knowing and voluntary act in reckless
disregard of his duty and resulted in consequences to
P.C. I CONCLUDE AND AFFIRM that H.Z.’s actions
were intentional, reckless, and constituted neglect and
mistreatment of P.C.

A-1310-24
19
I CONCLUDE AND AFFIRM that DHS has
sustained its burden of proving, by a preponderance of
the credible evidence, that the actions of H.Z. rose to
the level of neglect as defined in N.J.A.C. 10:44D-1.2.
I CONCLUDE AND AFFIRM that H.Z. acted with
careless disregard for the well-being of P.C. and the
other residents of the group home; thereby, justifying
that H.Z.’s name be entered onto the Central Registry.

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.6(d), it is the Final
Decision of the Department of Human Services that I
ORDER the placement of H.Z.’s name on the Central
Registry of Offenders against Individuals with
Developmental Disabilities.

[(Emphasis added).]

This appeal ensued.

III.

On appeal, H.Z. argues we should reverse the final agency decision

because, as he had contended below, (a) the DHS failed to meet its evidentiary

burden; and (b) the undisputed facts do not meet the statutory definition of abuse

or neglect. Appellant also presents two arguments not raised below, namely

that: (c) the decision rests primarily on hearsay and thus lacks the required

residuum of competent proof; and (d) revocation and summary suspension are

grossly disproportionate to his alleged lapse.

As case law of our state has long made clear, our scope of review of an

administrative agency's final decision is limited. Parsells v. Bd. of Educ. of

A-1310-24
20
Borough of Somerville, 254 N.J. 152, 162 (2023); In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19,

27 (2007). The "final determination of an administrative agency . . . is entitled

to substantial deference." In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to RN Bridge Program, 225

N.J. 533, 541 (2016); see also In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.

2001) (finding a "'strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to the actions

of the administrative agencies'" (internal citation omitted)).

Appellate courts generally review agency decisions "under an arbitrary

and capricious standard." Parsells, 254 N.J. at 162 (citing Zimmerman v. Sussex

Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019)). To that end:

[A]n appellate court ordinarily should not disturb an
administrative agency's determinations or findings
unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did
not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not
supported by substantial evidence.

[In re Virtua-W. Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a
Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).]

"The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious

or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action." In

re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006).

Further, insofar as the DHS statutes and regulations of caregivers are to

be applied here, "[i]t is settled that '[a]n administrative agency's interpretation

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of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility

is ordinarily entitled to our deference.'" Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles,

337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting In re

Appeal by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div. 1997)).

Courts "'"must be mindful of, and deferential to, the agency's 'expertise and

superior knowledge of a particular field.'"'" Parsells, 254 N.J. at 162 (internal

citations omitted). That being said, "[w]hile we must defer to the agency's

expertise, we need not surrender to it." N.J. Chapter of Nat'l. Ass'n of Indus.

and Off. Parks v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 241 N.J. Super. 145, 165 (App. Div.

1990). In addition, we review strictly legal questions de novo. Bowser v. Bd.

of Trs., Police, and Firemen's Ret. Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 165, 170-72 (App. Div.

2018).

Having applied these standards, we affirm the final agency decision

determining that appellant engaged in conduct constituting "neglect" of P.C.,

which enabled P.C.'s elopement and severe exposure to harm on a sub-freezing

night. N.J.S.A. 30:6D-74; N.J.A.C. 10:44D-1.2. We uphold the agency

decision, and appellant's placement on the Central Registry, substantially for the

reasons expressed in the ALJ's initial decision and the Director's adoption of the

ALJ's ruling. We add only a few comments.

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There was substantial credible evidence in the record—conveyed through

both testimony and the admitted documents—that supports the finding of

neglect. The proofs substantiated that, by ignoring P.C.'s needs and not

arranging for others to monitor P.C.'s behavior, appellant failed "to do, or permit

to be done, any act necessary for the well-being of an individual with a

developmental disability." N.J.A.C. 10:44D-1.2.

We recognize that appellant contends that he was diverted to attend

instead to another resident, A.C., who was engaging in violent, head-banging

behavior. Even so, as the agency's witnesses explained, appellant should have

called 9-1-1 to intervene with A.C., or otherwise have made sure that one of his

co-workers was watching P.C. during the period that he was otherwise occupied

with A.C. The ALJ reasonably found the agency's witnesses concerning the

events more persuasive than appellant. We must defer to the ALJ's assessment

of those witnesses. Burlington Cnty. Bd. of Soc. Servs. v. G.W., 425 N.J. Super.

42, 47 (App. Div. 2012).

We reject appellant's first-time argument that the decisions below unduly

rested on hearsay. The investigatory reports were admitted into evidence

without objection. Moreover, the live testimony of the DHS witnesses amply

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provided a "residuum" of corroboration, in compliance with N.J.A.C. 1:1-

15.5(c).

We decline to set aside the agency's placement of appellant's name on the

Central Registry. His substantiated neglect met the criteria for Registry

placement under N.J.S.A. 30:6D-77(b)(2). The submissions further suggest that

appellant's two co-workers were also placed on the Registry, meaning he alone

was not singled out for sanctions by the DHS. We are obligated to defer to the

DHS's expertise and regulatory role in imposing such sanctions. In re Herrmann,

192 N.J. at 27. That said, we appreciate that appellant and his co-workers were

confronted with a challenging situation on the night of P.C.'s elopement, and

acknowledge the fact that the residents of longhouse two outnumbered the DSP

staff members four to three that night. We also are cognizant of the inherent

difficulty that likely stems from any individual DSP being made to monitor more

than one resident at a time, depending on the needs and level of care required

for each resident in question. Even so, any regulatory issues pertaining to under-

staffing or managerial deficiencies are best addressed by the DHS in its role as

the state agency that licenses group homes such as Devereux. See N.J.S.A.

30:11B-4; N.J.A.C. 10:44A-1.3 to -1.8.

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To the extent we have not addressed them, all other issues raised on appeal

lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D)-(E).

Affirmed.

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