Naeini v. Leuchter - Appeal on $6,000 fees affirmed

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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Naeini v. Leuchter CA2/7

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B341481

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.2K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/26/26 Naeini v. Leuchter CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

AVA NAEINI, B341481

Petitioner and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24STRO02473)

MICHAEL LEUCHTER,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Melanie Ochoa, Judge. Affirmed.
Ava Naeini, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Appellant;
Michael Leuchter, in pro. per., for Respondent.

---

Ava Naeini appeals from an order awarding her neighbor,
Michael Leuchter, $6,000 in attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil
Procedure section 527.61 as the prevailing party with respect to
Naeini’s request for a civil harassment restraining order (CHRO)
against him. Naeini contends the trial court was biased and
hostile toward her, refused to consider the evidence she
presented, and unfairly awarded attorneys’ fees to Leuchter.
Naeini did not appeal from the court’s order denying her request
for a CHRO, which is now final. Naeini’s contentions with
respect to the order granting attorneys’ fees lack merit. We
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Naeini’s Request for a Civil Harassment Restraining
Order
On April 9, 2024 Naeini, representing herself, filed a
request for a CHRO against Leuchter, who lived directly above
her condominium unit. Naeini asserted that Leuchter had
refused to repair leaks in the patio of his unit, causing water
damage to her unit. Toxic black mold grew in her unit, and the
unit became uninhabitable. Naeini also claimed Leuchter
interfered with her ability to remediate the damage.
On May 15, 2024 Leuchter filed a response (submitted by
his attorney, Louis Shapiro), in which Leuchter stated his wife
was the owner of the condominium building in which he and his
wife lived above Naeini’s unit. In 2022 Naeini informed
Leuchter’s wife that there was a leak in Naeini’s unit. Although
an initial inspection did not find a leak, an inspection in
April 2023 found a leak affecting Naeini’s bedroom, which was

1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
caused by a pipe in the building, not Leuchter’s unit. In
response, the homeowners’ association (HOA) was in the process
of repairing the leak. Leuchter added that Naeini was
incessantly contacting him and his wife over the leak and
accusing them of trying to kill her by causing mold to form in her
unit. In April 2024 counsel for the HOA sent Naeini a “cease and
desist” order to stop threatening and harassing the HOA’s
representatives. Leuchter requested the trial court order Naeini
to pay his attorneys’ fees in the amount of $6,000. Leuchter
submitted, among other documents, letters showing he was a
psychiatry resident at the University of California, Los Angeles
and a copy of the HOA’s notice to cease and desist mailed to
Naeini.
On May 21, 2024 the trial court held a hearing on Naeini’s
request. Naeini represented herself; Leuchter was represented
by Shapiro. Naeini stated that Leuchter had harassed her by
interfering with her efforts to repair the leak in her unit. The
court asked her to explain what Leuchter had done to interfere.
Naeini responded that as of March 7, 2025 she had become sick
from the mold in her unit, and she went outside to get some fresh
air. Leuchter started walking toward her, and he was laughing
at her and making a “mockery” of her situation. On other
occasions he talked to the repair people and inspectors working to
repair the damage to her unit and interfered with their work.
Further, he failed to take responsibility for the situation.

3
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied
Naeini’s request, finding she had not met her burden to show by
clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment had
occurred. Shapiro inquired about his request for attorneys’ fees,
and the court responded that attorneys’ fees would be addressed
at a future hearing.

B. Leuchter’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees
On May 31, 2024 Leuchter served Naeini with notice of a
July 8 hearing on his request for $6,000 in attorneys’ fees.
Leuchter submitted an income and expense declaration showing
he had average monthly earnings of about $8,000 per month and
outstanding student loans on which he owed approximately
$265,000 and made monthly payments of about $1,500 per
month. Shapiro submitted a supporting declaration stating he
had charged Leuchter a “discounted rate of $6,000 as a flat fee for
case representation.” Shapiro “had to respond to [Naeini’s
request], prepare witnesses to testify, prepare client to testify,
prepare written responses to [the request], and finally prepare
this brief, to try and get Mr. Leuchter his attorney fees
reimbursed.” Between April 9 and May 21, 2024, Shapiro had
been “available, all five days per week, at all hours of the day, to
address Mr. Leuchter[’s] concerns.” Shapiro added, “This case
should not have been filed and it would [be] unfair for
Mr. Leuchter to be out of pocket for it.”
Shapiro stated as to his background and fees incurred: “I
have been exclusively practicing criminal law and restraining
order proceedings since 2005. I am a former LA County Public
Defender, and certified criminal law specialist. My billing rate is
generally $650.00 per hour. At $650.00 per hour, I have spent

4
well over 13 hours on this matter. The trial alone didn’t conclude
until around 2:30 p.m.” Leuchter stated in his declaration that
he had paid Shapiro $6,000. Shapiro stated in a second
declaration that Naeini’s allegations “were ultimately
unfounded,” and further, any issues Naeini had with Leuchter
“should have been handled through the HOA process, which is
what [Naeini] was already utilizing.”2
At a hearing on July 8, 2024, Naeini was present in person;
Leuchter appeared with Shapiro by videoconference. At the
outset of the hearing, the trial court3 inquired about Naeini’s
income and expense declaration, noting the court could not order
attorneys’ fees if the fees would “impose[] an unreasonable
financial burden on her.”4 The court asked Naeini how she paid
for her living expenses, and Naeini responded that she was
behind on her mortgage, and her home (the condominium unit)

2 In his declaration Shapiro requested the trial court award
attorneys’ fees to Leuchter as the prevailing party under Family
Code section 6344, which “provides authority for courts to award
attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in actions brought pursuant
to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act.” (Dragones v. Calkins
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1079.) It is not clear why Shapiro
filed the notice of hearing and supporting documents on family
law forms or why he cited Family Code section 6344. In any
event, as we will discuss, we review the trial court’s order under
the standard for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under the
statute governing the issuance of a CHRO (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 527.6, subd. (s)), as did the superior court.
3 A temporary judge presided over the July 8, 2024 hearing.
4 The case docket reflects that on June 13, 2024 Naeini filed
an income and expense declaration; the declaration is not in the
record on appeal.

5
was in foreclosure. However, she stated her home was valued
between $650,000 and $690,000, and she owed $316,000 in loan
payments. After Naeini answered additional questions about her
income and expenses, the court ordered her to file a revised
income and expense declaration, and the court continued the
hearing on attorneys’ fees to September 4, 2024.
On July 29, 2024 Naeini filed an income and expense
declaration stating her average monthly income was $900, she
received $281 per month in public assistance, and her home was
valued at $655,000. She listed her monthly expenses and the
balance she owed on her debts.
At the hearing on September 4, 2024 the parties appeared
by videoconference. Naeini represented herself, and Leuchter
was represented by Shapiro. The trial court clarified at the
outset of the hearing that section 527.6 provided that a prevailing
party in a CHRO proceeding may recover attorneys’ fees, which
the court had discretion to award. Naeini argued the court
should not award attorneys’ fees because she had a fee waiver
and could not afford to pay the fees. The court inquired how she
could have an income of only $900 per month but pay monthly
expenses of $4,500, including her home loan payments (as
reported on her income and expense declaration). She responded,
“I’m behind on my payments,” but she added that she was able to
pay for her basic needs with the help of her family. The court
then asked why she should not be required to pay Leuchter’s
attorneys’ fees, to which she responded, “I believe justice is not
served here,” referring to the court’s denial of her request for a
restraining order.

6
Shapiro argued that Naeini should pay Leuchter’s
attorneys’ fees because he was a part-time student (as a
psychiatry resident) and was making $80,000 a year before taxes
with $200,000 in student debt. Leuchter had no connection to
Naeini (because Leuchter’s wife owned the condominium unit),
but as a result of Naeini’s request for a CHRO, Leuchter had to
defend the case to avoid losing his medical license. Shapiro
discounted his rate to assist Leuchter and did not charge for the
prior and current hearing. Further, Naeini owned the
condominium unit in which she lived and had equity in it, so she
could get a loan against her property to pay Leuchter’s fees.
The trial court granted the motion for attorneys’ fees,
explaining, “So given that Mr. Leuchter was the prevailing party,
and I agree with counsel that . . . this was not an issue that
should have been brought as . . . a restraining order, and
that . . . I think there were HOA processes that they attempted to
use to resolve this issue to avoid litigation. I think that it is
reasonable to allow Mr. Leuchter to recover his fees that were
incurred.· Given Ms. Naeini’s representations that she has
limited income, I would require that it would be set over an
extended period of time . . . at the requested amount of 6,000,
which I find to be reasonable, at $200 a month.” The court’s
order required payments of $200 per month to start on October 1,
2024, continuing on the first day of each month until fully paid.
Naeini timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has
suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order

7
and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in
this section.” Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a
credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate
purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) Section 527.6, subdivision (s),
provides that “[t]he prevailing party in an action brought
pursuant to this section may be awarded court costs and
attorney’s fees, if any.”
A postjudgment order awarding or denying attorneys’ fees
is separately appealable. (LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar
Coastal Collection Community Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050,
1081; see § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) [authorizing appeal of “order made
after [appealable] judgment”].) The decision whether to award
attorneys’ fees under section 527.6, subdivision (s), “is a matter
committed to the discretion of the trial court.” (Krug v.
Maschmeier (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 796, 802; accord, Wash v.
Banda-Wash (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 561, 568.) The court
likewise has discretion to determine the amount of attorneys’
fees. (Wash, at p. 568; Krug, at p. 802.) We review the court’s
decision in awarding attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion.
(See Adler v. Vaicius (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777.) “A
ruling that constitutes an abuse of discretion has been described
as one that is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person
could agree with it.’” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of
Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.)

8
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding
Attorneys’ Fees to Leuchter
Naeini makes multiple arguments for why the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to Leuchter.
Most of her arguments focus on the merits of her request for a
CHRO, but the underlying CHRO is not at issue in this appeal of
the attorneys’ fees award. Naeini’s other contentions, including
alleged judicial bias, that the fee award was excessive, and that
the court failed to consider her inability to pay, also lack merit.
Naeini contends Leuchter engaged in misconduct, including
“perjury and bad faith,” which should bar his recovery of
attorneys’ fees. But Naeini does not cite to the record to support
her argument, stating simply that Leuchter’s “obstruction and
failure to take responsibility for his actions” support reversal of
the fees award. For an appellant to meet his or her burden on
appeal, the appellant must overcome the presumption that the
trial court’s order is correct and “affirmatively establish
prejudicial error by providing an adequate record, citing to the
record, and presenting a persuasive argument with citations to
supportive legal authorities.” (LNSU#1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar
Coastal Collection Community Assn., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1070; accord, Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721
[appellant’s “burden on appeal ‘includes the obligation to present
argument and legal authority on each point raised’”].) Where, as
here, the appellant “makes contentions unsupported by proper
record citations or cogent legal arguments, we may treat the
contentions as forfeited.” (LNSU#1, at p. 1070; accord, Coziahr v.
Otay Water Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 785, 799 [“Points must
be supported by reasoned argument, authority, and record
citations, or may be deemed forfeited.”].) Naeini has not met her

9
burden to show error with respect to alleged misconduct by
Leuchter.5
To the extent Naeini is arguing that Leuchter’s alleged
harassment constitutes misconduct, the trial court found to the
contrary in its May 21, 2024 order denying her request for a
CHRO. That order is long since final because Naeini failed to
appeal from it. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1) [setting
deadlines of 60 and 180 days for appealing judgments],
(e) [applying deadlines to appealable orders]; see Van Beurden
Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Ins. Agency, Inc.
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56 [“The time for appealing [an appealable
order] is jurisdictional; once the deadline expires, the appellate
court has no power to entertain the appeal.”].)6
Naeini also argues the trial court showed bias and hostility
toward her by “repeated incidents of muting [her] microphone,
yelling at her, and dismissing her attempts to explain her
position before she could complete her statements.” The record
does not show the court exhibited any bias or hostility toward
Naeini. Naeini is correct that at times the court muted Naeini’s

5 In her reply brief, Naeini additionally contends Shapiro
“engaged in harassment, advanced false claims, and withdrew
from representation.” She provides no citations to the record to
support her argument, thereby forfeiting the contention.
(LNSU#1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community
Assn., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.)
6 Naeini’s contention that the trial court failed to consider
the “substantial evidence” she submitted of Leuchter’s
harassment likewise fails because the CHRO order is now final.
Naeini’s small claims case against Leuchter is similarly outside
the subject of this appeal, and we do not consider her arguments
regarding Leuchter’s conduct in that case.

10
microphone during her remote appearances to direct Naeini to
address matters relevant to the hearing or to request Naeini
speak more slowly or loudly to ensure there was an adequate
record. This conduct was fully consistent with the court’s “duty
and the discretion to control the conduct of the [hearings].”
(People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78.)
Naeini points to one instance during the hearing on
attorneys’ fees in which the trial court muted Naeini’s
microphone on the videoconference as an example of where her
“responses were abruptly shut down” and she was “scolded
publicly.” Our review of the transcript shows otherwise. During
the cited excerpt, Naeini asked Leuchter questions relating to
Naeini’s underlying allegations of harassment. The court asked
Naeini to state her reasons for asking the questions, and Naeini
answered that she wanted information on Leuchter’s “false
statements about the fact that he did not cause harassing
activities,” an explanation for why her ceiling would get wet
when it rained, and to address the depreciation in her
condominium unit’s value from the water damage. At this point
the court interrupted and tried to stop Naeini from continuing,
saying “Ma’am, stop,” then “Ma’am, please,” then, as Naeini
continued, “Stop. Stop, please.” Naeini continued to talk, and
the court muted her microphone, stating she could not relitigate
whether there had been harassment. Rather, “the only things
that are relevant here [are] the amount of fees and if there’s an
argument that the court should exercise its discretion not to
grant the request for fees. . . . So please, I want you to move
forward from what you argued in the original hearing with
respect to what you believed was harassing by Mr. Leuchter
[b]ecause this court has already held that that was not

11
harassment under the law.” The court unmuted the microphone,
and Naeini reiterated that she was unable to pay the fees and
could not get a loan on the property.
Naeini’s other examples of alleged misconduct pertain to
the hearing on the CHRO, which, as discussed, is not at issue in
this appeal. In any event, we observe that on page 12 of the cited
transcript pages, the judge explained during Naeini’s remote
appearance that she had put her hand up to request Naeini stop
talking “because we cannot understand you. So I want to make
sure that we pause you and give you a chance to say what it is
more clearly so that it’s on the record.” The court added, “I’m
trying to make sure that . . . we are able to hear you so that you
can tell your story.” In no way did the court “shut [Naeini]
down,” “scold[]” her, “treat[] her with contempt,” or “silence[] and
humiliate[]” her.7

7 Naeini also argues in a single sentence that the temporary
judge who presided over the July 8, 2024 hearing did not allow
her to use her own interpreter, which hindered her “ability to
participate meaningfully.” Although Naeini testified at the
May 21, 2024 hearing without an interpreter, the court provided
a court-certified Farsi interpreter for the July 8 hearing, who
translated for Naeini. Naeini brought her own interpreter, but
she did not object to use of the court-certified interpreter. Naeini
later testified at the September 4 hearing without an interpreter,
and she did not bring or request an interpreter. Naeini has failed
to show how she was prejudiced by use of the court-certified
interpreter at the July 8 hearing.

12
Naeini also contends the $6,000 award of attorneys’ fees
was excessive given Shapiro’s “minimal” involvement with the
case. With respect to the amount of the award, “‘[t]he
“experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of
professional services rendered in his court, and while [the trial
court’s] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be
disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly
wrong.”’” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084,
1095; accord, Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
Contrary to Naeini’s contention, Shapiro performed a significant
amount of work in defending Leuchter. As described in his
declaration, Shapiro drafted Leuchter’s response to Naeini’s
request, prepared Leuchter to testify at the CHRO hearing, and
prepared Leuchter’s request for attorneys’ fees. He also
represented Leuchter at the hearing on the CHRO (as well as the
two hearings on the request for attorneys’ fees, for which he did
not charge). Shapiro’s billing rate was $650 per hour, and he
spent “well over” 13 hours on the case (totaling $8,450).
However, he discounted his fees to a flat payment of $6,000,
which Leuchter had paid. Naeini does not challenge any specific
work performed by Shapiro that should not have been
compensated, nor does she question his hourly rate or the total
number of hours he spent on the case. On these facts, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding $6,000 was a
reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees.
Finally, Naeini argues the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to consider Naeini’s inability to pay the fees award. As
a threshold matter, section 527.6, in contrast to Family Code
section 6344 (regarding issuance of a domestic violence
restraining order), does not require consideration of a party’s

13
ability to pay an attorneys’ fees award. (Compare § 527.6,
subd. (s) [“The prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to
this section may be awarded court costs and attorney’s fees, if
any.”]; with Fam. Code, § 6344, subd. (c) [“Before a court awards
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section, the court shall
first determine . . . that the party ordered to pay has, or is
reasonably likely to have, the ability to pay.”].)
Although the trial court was not required to consider
Naeini’s ability to pay, it did. After reviewing Naeini’s income
and expense declaration and eliciting information on how Naeini
was able to pay her bills, the court concluded she had the ability
to pay the attorneys’ fees over time, ordering payment of $6,000
but allowing her 30 months to pay at a rate of $200 per month.
The court also found that Naeini placed herself in the situation
where she was liable for attorneys’ fees because she never should
have sought a CHRO for harassment instead of resolving her
concerns through the HOA (given that her principal complaint
related to damage to her unit). Naeini has not shown the court’s
decision to award attorneys’ fees under a lengthy payment plan
was an abuse of discretion.8

8 Although we agree with Leuchter that Naeini’s appellate
briefs improperly relitigated the trial court’s denial of the CHRO
and failed to provide adequate citations to the record or legal
authority, we cannot say Naeini’s appeal was “frivolous or taken
solely for delay.” We therefore deny Leuchter’s request for
sanctions. (See § 907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276.)

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DISPOSITION

The September 4, 2024 order granting Leuchter’s request
for attorneys’ fees is affirmed. Leuchter is entitled to recover his
costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

STONE, J.

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