Lin v. Zhong - Motion to Vacate Default Judgment Denied

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March 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jiewen Lin v. Binglin Zhong, Ant Bicycle Inc., Seabusiness Inc., Couree Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-10510

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.3K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

JIEWEN LIN,

          Plaintiff,                                                 
                          No. 21-cv-10510-GAO                        
               v.                                                    

BINGLIN ZHONG, ANT BICYCLE

INC., SEABUSINESS INC.,

COUREE INC.,

Defendants.

         ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE                       

CABELL, U.S.M.J.

Introduction                                                         
On March 25, 2021, plaintiff Jiewen Lin brought suit against         

Binglin Zhong to confirm and enforce a 2020 arbitration award

rendered against Zhong in China. On June 14, 2021, the court

defaulted Zhong for failure to appear and, on August 17, 2021,

entered default judgment against Zhong in the principal amount of

a little over three and a half million dollars. (D. 25).

Approximately four years later, on July 2, 2025, Zhong filed

a motion to vacate the default judgment. He contends that he does

not know the plaintiff, does not know of the arbitration award

entered against him in China, and asserts he promptly moved to

vacate the default upon learning of Lin’s claim against him. (D.

46, 47). The plaintiff opposes the motion. (D. 50). For the

reasons explained below, the motion to vacate will be denied.1

Legal Standard

Zhong moves to vacate the default judgment pursuant to “Fed.         

R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b).” Rule 55(c) authorizes a court to set

aside a final default judgment under Rule 60(b), which in turn

provides that a court may vacate a default judgment for the

following six reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with

reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to

move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether

previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the

judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based

on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or

applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other

reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6).

Zhong’s counsel clarified at the hearing on his motion that he

1 On March 6, 2026, the defendant filed a notice of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. (D.
59). Among other things, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a
stay to “the enforcement, against the debtor. . .of a judgment obtained before
the [bankruptcy filing].” 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(2). That provision does not apply
here because the motion to vacate does not seek to advance the enforcement of
the plaintiff’s judgment against the defendant, but rather seeks to defeat it.

2

moves specifically pursuant to subsection (b)(1) (mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect).

Critically, “a motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a

reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a

year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the

proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); Kemp v. United States, 596

U.S. 528, 533 (2022). A movant may not use the concept of

“reasonable time” available for motions filed for reasons (4)

through (6) to extend the one-year limit. United States v. Marin, 720 F.2d 229, 231 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[Expiration of the one-year

period] is an absolute bar to relief from the judgment.”);

Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197 (1950) (“It is

immediately apparent that no relief on account of ‘excusable

neglect’ was available to this petitioner” for a judgment more

than four years old).

Discussion                                                           
The defendant argues that his default was the result of a            

language barrier and his unfamiliarity with the U.S. legal system.

He effectively concedes that he received mail correspondence

alerting him to the present case but contends he did not know what

it was because his English skills are “severely limited”, and he

relied upon his child to help him navigate daily life in America.

(D. 47, pg. 5). He contends that “without an understanding of the

3

U.S. legal system and the ability to minimally read and write

English, [he] did not have full knowledge of the claims against

him until after he found an attorney who can communicate with him

in Cantonese.” (Id.). Moreover, the defendant contends that he

has a potentially meritorious defense to the underlying suit, which

arises from a contract dispute, because there is evidence

suggesting that he did not reside where the contract alleged he

did, and the signature on the contract purporting to be his does

not match the signature on his Massachusetts driver’s license.

(Id., pgs. 5-6).

However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the

defendant’s assertions, if credited, could constitute excusable

neglect and suggest the possibility of a non-frivolous defense, it

still would not entitle him to relief on his motion. That is

because he did not file the motion to vacate until almost four

years after the entry of judgment, well past Rule 60(b)(1)’s strict

one-year deadline. Under the well-established case law noted

above, the motion must accordingly be denied as untimely. See

United States v. Marin, 720 F.2d at 231 (Rule 60(b) motion alleging

newly discovered evidence and fraud was time barred where it was

filed 28 months after judgment was entered); Gonzalez v. Walgreens

Co., 918 F.2d 303, 305 (1st Cir. 1990) (motion time barred where

filed 14 months after judgment was entered).

4

But to be clear, the motion to vacate would fail on the merits

even if timely, because the defendant cannot show his failure to

defend the suit was the result of excusable neglect. A court’s

“evaluation of what constitutes excusable neglect is an equitable

determination, taking into account the entire facts and

circumstances surrounding the party's omission, including factors

such as the danger of prejudice to the non-movant, the length of

the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether the movant acted

in good faith.” Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad

Central del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2001).

Here, the defendant acknowledges that he received notice of

the present litigation but explains that he did not understand the

import of the materials based on his unfamiliarity with the

American legal system and limited English skills. These assertions

ring somewhat hollow when considered in light of other information

in the record, however. Among other things, the defendant avers

that he has resided in the United States since 2014, and the

plaintiff has submitted a filing from a 2019-2020 Massachusetts

Superior Court lawsuit reflecting that the defendant was operating

Ant Bicycle as early as November 2018.2 (D. 47-1; 50-3 ¶¶ 2-6).

These facts at a minimum suggest that the defendant, even if

2 The defendant apparently defaulted in that case as well.

5

hampered by a language barrier, was sophisticated enough and

sufficiently connected to the local community and world of commerce

to understand how to create and operate his own business in

America. The court also credits the plaintiff’s assertion that

Zhong was a defendant in a civil commercial lawsuit in 2020 in

California. Again, even if these facts do not totally refute the

defendant’s assertion that he was not completely well versed in

American commercial and legal affairs, they show that he

nonetheless had considerable exposure to these facets of daily

life and would or should have appreciated the need to monitor

rather than ignore official-looking correspondence.

Significantly, the court also credits the plaintiff’s

assertion that the defendant in February 2024 was contacted by and

interacted with a representative of the plaintiff in this lawsuit,

Yongyuan Li. (D. 50-1). Although the defendant apparently refused

to acknowledge the validity of the judgment entered against him,

he did acknowledge receiving document requests relating to post

judgment collection efforts. This alone demonstrates that the

defendant was aware of the underlying lawsuit and the default

judgment more than a year before he moved to vacate the judgment

in July 2025, and it thus refutes his contention that he moved to

vacate the default judgment as soon as he became aware of it.

                           6                                         
In sum, the defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment        

fails because it is untimely and would fail on the merits if

reached because he cannot show the default judgment was the result

of excusable neglect.3

Conclusion                                                           
For  the  foregoing  reasons,  “Defendant,  Binglin  Zhong’s,        

Motion to Vacate Default Judgment” (D. 46) is DENIED.

                              /s/ Donald L. Cabell                   
                              DONALD L. CABELL, U.S.M.J.             

DATED: March 23, 2026

3 The same would be true even were the defendant to recast his motion as one
filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). That catch-all provision authorizes courts to
grant relief from judgments for “any other reason that justifies relief.” To
prevent circumvention of Rule 60(b)(1)’s one-year time limit, a party may use
Rule 60(b)(6) only when the other five subsections do not apply. Ungar v. Pal.
Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 2010). In other words, “[t]he reason
for relief set forth under 60(b)(6) cannot be the reason for relief sought under
another subsection of 60(b).” Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 643
(5th Cir. 2005); Waterfall Victoria Grantor Trust Series II, Series G v.
Blodgett, 2022 WL 20726190, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2022). The defendant
argues that the default judgment should be vacated because he was “not familiar
with the [U.S.] legal system” and had limited English skills, but these are the
exact same reasons he argued at the hearing as warranting relief under
subsection (b)(1), and they therefore cannot constitute separate grounds for
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Moreover, the First Circuit has held in an
analogously similar case that a defendant moving for relief on the grounds that
he was a foreigner unfamiliar with the American legal system could not avail
himself of Rule 60(b)(6), but rather was “limited to seeking relief from
judgment on grounds of excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1),” under which
he was barred by the one-year time limitation. See Claremont Flock Corp. v.
Alm, 281 F.3d 297 (1st Cir. 2002).

                           7