Jump To

Top Caption Disposition Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Monnie Loveless v. Gsh Investments, LLC

Court of Appeals of Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A26A0113

• Disposition: Affirmed In Part/Reversed In Part

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (96.9K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed In Part/Reversed In Part

Combined Opinion

FIRST DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
MARKLE and HODGES, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 26, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0113. LOVELESS v. GSH INVESTMENTS, LLC.

BARNES, Presiding Judge.

After she was injured when an exterior staircase collapsed at an apartment

complex, Monnie Loveless brought this premises liability action against the owner of

the complex, GSH Investments, LLC (“GSH”). The trial court denied two of

Loveless’ motions to compel additional discovery and granted GSH’s motion for

summary judgment. On appeal, Loveless contends that genuine issues of material fact

precluded the grant of summary judgment in favor of GSH. She also challenges the

trial court’s denial of her motions to compel. For the reasons discussed below, we

reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to GSH and affirm the court’s

denial of the motions to compel.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of
summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable
conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.

Pollard v. Deloach, 372 Ga. App. 303, 304(1) (903 SE2d 329) (2024). See OCGA § 9-

11-56(c).

So viewed, the evidence shows that in July 2020, GSH purchased the Drew

Lane Apartments located in Walker County, Georgia. The complex included

apartment buildings and duplexes. Several duplexes were designed with a set of

wooden stairs that ascended from the ground to a covered landing where the entrances

to two rental units were located.

While GSH was in the process of securing financing for the purchase of the

apartment complex, the bank underwriting the loan obtained an appraisal report for

the complex that was shared with GSH. At the time of the appraisal, approximately

50 percent of the rental units were occupied. The appraisal report described the

condition of the buildings as “below average” in light of “deferred maintenance” and

noted that the units needed “remodeling/updating.” The report further specified that

2
GSH “plan[ned] to update units and correct deferred maintenance prior to re-leasing

units.”

GSH was also provided with a survey report prepared for its insurer. The

survey report included an evaluation of one of the duplexes and noted “maintenance

concerns” with the “[e]xterior [f]acade,” the gutters and downspouts, and the roof.

The report also indicated that the “[r]oof has algae streaking, lifting shingles, and

granular loss on all slopes,” and that there was “[d]ebris in the gutters on the rear.”

After receiving the appraisal and survey reports, GSH did not perform an

inspection of the exteriors of the buildings or of the stairways to the duplexes as part

of its renovations to the rental units. GSH did not establish a formal inspection

process for the premises and instead relied on tenants and prospective tenants to

identify and report any problems that needed correction.

After purchasing the apartment complex, GSH began renovating the rental

units so that they could be leased to new tenants and began advertising units for lease.

Because of the ongoing renovation work, GSH required prospective tenants to get

approval before viewing any of the rental units. However, the leasing office was

located approximately 30 minutes away from the apartment complex, and GSH

3
sometimes allowed prospective tenants to view unlocked rental units unaccompanied

by and without the supervision of any employees.

In early August 2020, Loveless’ adult daughter, Amanda Loveless,1 saw an

online advertisement for the apartment complex and submitted a rental application.

After Amanda was approved to rent an apartment, she visited the apartment complex

four times. GSH allowed Amanda to visit the rental units as they were being renovated

so that she could choose which unit she wanted to rent, left the units unlocked, did not

require her to schedule a particular time for a visit, and did not supervise or meet with

her at the complex when she visited. GSH representatives never restricted Amanda

from bringing friends or family with her during the visits. During her second and third

visits to the apartment complex, Amanda brought a friend, and on her fourth visit she

brought Loveless, her children, and her niece.

Before her first and second visits, Amanda spoke with a GSH representative

and was given permission to go to the apartment complex and look at the different

units that were in the process of being renovated. Before her third visit, Amanda

learned that unit 11, one of the duplex units, would be the first to have its renovations

1
We will refer to Amanda Loveless by her first name for clarity.
4
completed and was available to rent, and she spoke with a GSH representative about

visiting it. The representative gave her permission to visit the unit.

Unit 11 had several wooden stairs that led up to a landing that it shared with

another unit, and Amanda did not notice any problems with the staircase when she

traversed it during her third visit. After visiting unit 11, Amanda texted with a GSH

representative about additional renovations to the interior of the unit. On September

1, 2020, Amanda paid a rental deposit for unit 11, and the parties scheduled September

11 as the date for her to sign the lease and move in.

On September 4, 2020, Amanda visited the apartment complex for a fourth

time. Amanda took Loveless with her to unit 11 so that Loveless could “check out”

the unit as “security” before Amanda moved into the unit. Amanda did not speak

again with a GSH representative before the fourth visit, believing that she had

permission to revisit unit 11 in light of their prior conversations.

After Amanda and Loveless arrived at unit 11, Amanda successfully walked up

the staircase to the landing in front of the unlocked unit door. However, as Loveless

ascended the staircase, it collapsed suddenly and without warning, and she fell

backwards, suffering a severe laceration to her right leg.

5
A licensed professional engineer retained by Loveless evaluated the exterior of

the duplex and photographs of the collapsed staircase to unit 11, and she concluded

that the collapse of the stairs was caused by wood rot, that the wood rot was caused

by water damage, and that the water damage was caused by improper gutter

maintenance. The engineer further noted that photographs of the collapsed staircase

showed that the stairs had visible dark discoloration, which, she opined, was a “sign

that there [was] something wrong” and was indicative of concentrated roof runoff and

potential wood rot.

Loveless commenced this premise liability suit against GSH,2 asserting that she

was an invitee of GSH at the time of the staircase collapse, that GSH had actual

and/or constructive knowledge of the hazard posed by the stairs, and that GSH was

liable for failing to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe as required by

OCGA § 51-3-1. GSH answered, denying liability. As the litigation progressed, several

discovery disputes arose between the parties, and while the trial court partially granted

Loveless’ first motion to compel, the court denied her second and third motions.

2
Loveless also initially sued GSH Properties Corporation and several John Doe
defendants, but the trial court later entered a consent order dismissing those parties
from the case without prejudice.
6
GSH moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion.

The trial court concluded that the uncontroverted evidence showed that GSH did not

grant Amanda or Loveless permission to visit unit 11 on September 4 and, as a result,

Loveless was a trespasser rather than an invitee or licensee as a matter of law. The

court further concluded that GSH owed no duty of care to Loveless as a trespasser

because the evidence showed that it did not know of her presence on the premises,

and that even if Loveless was an invitee, there was no evidence that GSH had actual

or constructive knowledge of the hazard posed by the staircase. Loveless now appeals

from the trial court’s summary judgment order.3

1. Loveless contends that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law

that she was a trespasser. According to Loveless, there was evidence from which a jury

could find that she occupied the status of an invitee when she accompanied Amanda

3
The trial court vacated its original summary judgment order and re-entered
it because the parties were not given proper notice of the original order. Loveless then
filed a timely notice of appeal from the re-entered order, as allowed by Cambron v.
Canal Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 147, 148–49(1) (269 SE2d 426) (1980) (disapproved in part on
other grounds by Wright v. Young, 297 Ga. 683, 684 n.3 (777 SE2d 475) (2015)). See
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A. v. Whitaker, 376 Ga. App. 254, 262(2) (918 SE2d 425)
(2025).
7
to unit 11 and was injured on the staircase. We conclude that a genuine issue of

material fact exists as to Loveless’ status on the premises at the time of her injury.

The duty owed by a landowner to keep its premises safe for visitors varies to a

certain degree depending on whether the person entering the premises is a trespasser,

invitee, or licensee. See OCGA §§ 51-3-1, 51-3-2, 51-3-3; Cham v. ECI Mgmt. Corp.,

311 Ga. 170, 173 (2)(a) (856 SE2d 267) (2021).4 If the person is an invitee, the

landowner owes her a duty “to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and

approaches safe.” OCGA § 51-3-1. See Cham, 311 Ga. at 173 (2)(a). A landowner

generally owes a lesser duty to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring a licensee or

trespasser. See OCGA §§51-3-2(b), 51-3-3(b); Brazier v. Phoenix Grp. Mgmt., 280 Ga.

App. 67, 73 (2) (633 SE2d 354) (2006).

4
“The statutory source of a landlord’s liability rests on the location of the
alleged cause of the plaintiff’s injury. If the alleged cause of the injury is in an area
possessed by a tenant, then OCGA § 44-7-14 governs. If it is in an area possessed by
the landlord, then OCGA § 51-3-1 et seq. governs.” Pollard, 372 Ga. App. at 305(2)
(citation modified). See Cham, 311 Ga. at 177–80(2)(b). Loveless was injured on an
exterior staircase that led to a landing shared by unit 11 and another unit, and there is
no evidence that GSH as the landlord “had fully parted with [its] possession and the
right of possession of that staircase and landing.” Pollard, 372 Ga. App. at 305(2)
(citation modified). The principles of premises liability set out in OCGA § 51-3-1 et
seq. therefore govern GSH’s liability. Id.
8
“A trespasser is one who, though peacefully or by mistake, wrongfully enters

upon property owned or occupied by another.” Jones v. Barrow, 304 Ga. App. 337,

338 (1) (696 SE2d 363) (2010) (citation modified). “An invitee is someone whom a

landowner, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads to come upon his

premises for any lawful purpose,” while a licensee “is a person who is neither a

customer, a servant, nor a trespasser, who does not stand in any contractual relation

with the landowner, and who is permitted to go on the premises merely for her own

interests, convenience, or gratification.” Howard v. Gram Corp., 268 Ga. App. 466,

467 (602 SE2d 241) (2004). See OCGA §§ 51-3-1, 51-3-2(a). “When there is

conflicting evidence as to the legal status of the injured party, the question is rightfully

left to the jury.” Ga. Dept. of Corr. v. Couch, 312 Ga. App. 544, 546 (1)(a) (718 SE2d

875) (2011). Mindful of these principles, we turn to the trial court’s summary

judgment ruling.

In concluding that Loveless was a trespasser, the trial court found that the

uncontroverted evidence showed that GSH did not invite or grant permission to

Amanda, or by extension Loveless, to visit unit 11 on September 4. The trial court

relied on the undisputed fact that a GSH representative never gave Amanda and

9
Loveless express permission to enter the premises on that specific date and on the

affidavit of a GSH representative averring that GSH had a policy of requiring visitors

to get authorization before any visit to the apartment complex in light of the ongoing

renovations. The trial court also found that there was no evidence that “GSH took any

action to induce or lead [Loveless] to come to the premises.” In reaching these

conclusions, however, the trial court did not take into account evidence from which

a jury could find that Amanda had an implied invitation from GSH to revisit unit 11

before signing her lease agreement and to bring a friend or family member with her.

“An implied invitation is one which is held to be extended by reason of the

owner doing something or permitting something to be done which fairly indicates to

the person entering that his entry and use of the property is consistent with the intents

and purposes of the owner.” Sanderson Farms v. Atkins, 310 Ga. App. 423, 425 (1) (713

SE2d 483) (2011) (quotation marks omitted). “An invitation may arise from known

customary use, and it may be inferred from conduct or from any state of facts upon

which it naturally and necessarily arises.” Frazier v. Godley Park Homeowners Ass’n,

342 Ga. App. 608, 609 (804 SE2d 176) (2017) (quotation marks omitted).

10
Amanda and Loveless’ deposition testimony reflect that while Amanda

admittedly did not speak again with the GSH representative before her return visit to

unit 11 on September 4, she had previously been granted permission from the

representative to view unit 11; she was engaged in discussions with the representative

about the status of the renovations to unit 11; she had paid a deposit on the unit and

had a date scheduled for signing her lease and moving in; and the representative had

never expressed any restrictions on how many times she could visit. Amanda further

testified that unit 11 had been left unlocked, that GSH representatives did not require

her to schedule a particular time for visits, and the GSH representatives did not

supervise or meet with her at the premises whenever she visited. Additionally,

Amanda testified that GSH had never expressed any restrictions on her bringing

someone else with her to the premises, and she had brought a friend with her for two

prior visits without incident. Construed in the light most favorable to Loveless as the

non-movant on summary judgment, Amanda and Loveless’ deposition testimony

would support a finding that Amanda had an implied invitation from GSH to revisit

unit 11 on September 4 and to bring a family member such as Loveless with her. See

11
Frazier, 342 Ga. App. at 609; Sanderson Farms, 310 Ga. App. at 425 (1). The trial court

therefore erred in finding that Loveless was a trespasser as a matter of law.

A genuine issue of material fact also exists as to whether Loveless was an invitee

or a licensee. As our Supreme Court has explained, “the determining question as to

whether a visitor is an invitee by implication or a licensee is whether or not the owner

or occupant of the premises will receive some benefit, real or supposed, or has some

interest in the purpose of the visit.” Cham, 311 Ga. at 174 (2)(a) (quotation marks

omitted). Put another way, “a person may be deemed an invitee if his presence on the

property is of mutual benefit to both him and the landowner”; in contrast, “a licensee

falls between an invitee and a trespasser and is one who is permitted, either expressly

or impliedly, to go on the premises of another, but merely for his own interest,

convenience, or gratification.” Id. (citation modified).

At her deposition, Amanda testified that she took Loveless with her to view unit

11 on September 4 so that Loveless could “check out” the renovated unit as

“security” before Amanda moved into the unit. Amanda’s testimony, construed in

the light most favorable to Loveless as the non-moving party, reflects that Loveless

accompanied Amanda to the premises to look over unit 11 and confirm whether

12
Amanda should go through with signing the lease. A commercial landlord clearly has

an interest in the purpose of a visit when a potential tenant brings a guest to help them

check out or inspect the premises before closing on a lease, and the landlord directly

benefits from the visit if it helps induce completion of the lease transaction.

Accordingly, there is evidence from which a jury could find that Loveless was an

invitee when she visited unit 11 and was injured on the staircase. See Cham, 311 Ga.

at 183 (3) (jury could conclude that individual was an invitee, where his presence on

the premises benefitted the landlord by inducing someone else to lease an apartment

there); Etheridge Motors v. Haynie, 103 Ga. App. 676, 680 (3) (120 SE2d 317) (1961)

(friend who accompanied an invitee to a business to inspect repair work done there

also was an invitee). Alternatively, however, a jury could find from the evidence that

Loveless was on the premises simply to accompany Amanda there and to view the

rental unit for her own gratification and thus was more properly considered a licensee.

See Howard v. Gram Corp., 268 Ga. App. 466, 468 (602 SE2d 241) (2004) (holding

that a plaintiff who was on the premises “just to be with her” daughter was a

licensee). Given the record in this case, a jury must resolve Loveless’ status on the

premises when she sustained her injury. See Couch, 312 Ga. App. at 546 (1)(a).

13
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law

that Loveless occupied the status of a trespasser. Rather, there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Loveless was a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.

1. GSH urges us to affirm the trial court’s order as right for any reason on the

ground that it did not breach any duty owed to Loveless. In granting summary

judgment to GSH, the trial court found that even if Loveless was an invitee to whom

GSH owed a higher duty, GSH did not breach its duty to her because there was no

evidence that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard posed by the

staircase. As discussed in Division 1, there remain factual questions about Loveless’

status on the property, making it premature to resolve what specific duty was owed

to her. But even if we assume that Loveless was an invitee to whom GSH owed a

higher duty, we cannot affirm the trial court’s order on the alternative ground because

there are factual questions regarding GSH’s knowledge of the hazard.

If Loveless was an invitee, GSH owed her a duty to exercise ordinary care in

keeping unit 11 and its approaches safe pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-1. See Cham, 311 Ga.

at 173 (2)(a). To recover on her claim under OCGA § 51-3-1, Loveless must establish,

among other things, that GSH “had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard.”

14
Pollard, 372 Ga. App. at 306(3) (quotation marks omitted). Issues regarding knowledge

“are generally not susceptible of summary adjudication, and summary judgment is

granted in a premises liability case only when the evidence is plain, palpable, and

undisputed.” Id. (citation modified).

Loveless presented evidence, through the licensed professional engineer, that

the staircase collapsed as the result of wood rot, which in turn was caused by water

damage resulting from improper gutter maintenance. Because there is no evidence

that GSH had actual knowledge of the wood rot and water damage to the stairs, the

determinative question is whether there is evidence of GSH’s constructive

knowledge.

The duty of an owner or occupier of property to exercise ordinary
care in keeping the premises safe includes inspecting the premises to
discover possible dangerous conditions of which the owner/occupier
does not have actual knowledge. So an owner/occupier is generally on
constructive notice of what a reasonable inspection in the exercise of
ordinary care would reveal. A property owner’s constructive knowledge
of a hazard may be inferred when there is evidence that the owner lacked
a reasonable inspection procedure.

15
Pollard, 372 Ga. App. at 306(3) (citation modified). Furthermore, the burden does not

shift to Loveless to show that a reasonable inspection would have revealed the defect

that caused the staircase to collapse “unless [GSH] first demonstrates that there is an

absence of evidence to support the claim that a reasonable inspection would have

discovered this defect.” Id. at 307(3) (citation modified).

GSH has not met that burden. The evidence, construed in favor of Loveless,

showed that the stairs to unit 11 had visible dark discoloration indicative of water

damage and wood rot, and that GSH had received appraisal and survey reports

indicating that there were roof, gutter, and other deferred maintenance issues at the

apartment complex that needed to be addressed before re-leasing units. “[T]he

appearance or character of the premises may impose on the owner a duty to inspect

for defects.” Pollard, 372 Ga. App. at 307(3) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover,

it is undisputed that GSH did not have an inspection procedure in place for the

apartment complex and never inspected the staircase before its collapse, relying

instead on tenants and prospective tenants to inform it of any hazards. Under these

circumstances, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether GSH had

constructive knowledge of the hazard posed by the staircase, and the trial court erred

16
in concluding otherwise. See id. (factual issues existed that precluded summary

judgment on issue of property owner’s constructive knowledge of defect in exterior

stair that broke, where “there were indications that the staircase’s fasteners were

failing,” and the property owner and manager did not “engage in any sort of regular

or systematic inspection of the staircase”); Gaskin v. Berry’s Boat Dock, 334 Ga. App.

642, 645 (780 SE2d 83) (2015) (genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether

property owners had constructive knowledge that collapsed pipe posts had been

attached to rotten wood, where the owners “did not establish as a matter of

undisputed fact that they had a reasonable inspection procedure or that the procedure

was carried out at the time of the accident”).

For all of the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment to GSH.

1. Loveless contends that the trial court erred in denying her second motion to

compel in which she sought additional deposition testimony from GSH’s OCGA § 9-

11-30(b)(6) representative. In support of her contention that she was “entitled to

depose a competent witness,” Loveless cites to OCGA § 9-11-30(b)(6) and then seeks

17
to incorporate into her appellate brief five pages of legal argument set out in her

motion to compel filed in the trial court.

Incorporating by reference arguments made in the court below

is not approved by this Court and we decline to look in the record for
matters which should have been set forth in the brief. Moreover, if we
were to permit this practice a party could evade entirely the page
limitations on briefs established in our Rules. See Court of Appeals Rule
24(f). Accordingly, we have limited our review of [Loveless’] arguments
to those actually made in her appellate brief.

Ellison v. Burger King Corp., 294 Ga. App. 814, 815 (1) (670 SE2d 469) (2008). We

therefore are left with Loveless’ single citation to OCGA § 9-11-30(b)(6) as support

for her contentions. “But an assertion of error followed by a legal citation is not legal

argument, which requires, at a minimum, a discussion of the appropriate law as

applied to the relevant facts.” Vick v. State, 376 Ga. App. 716, 722(2) n.5 (920 SE2d

733) (2025) (citation modified). Loveless’ argument therefore is deemed abandoned.

See Court of Appeals Rule 25(d)(1) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported

in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”); Arnold

v. Fairway Mgmt., 376 Ga. App. 34, 44-45(2)(b)(iii) (918 SE2d 56) (2025).

18
4. Loveless also argues that the trial court erred in denying her third motion to

compel in which she sought to have GSH produce additional tenant information. The

only record citation included in connection with her argument is a citation to one page

of her motion to compel filed in the trial court. However, assertions made in motions

are not evidence. Tahamtan v. Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp., 228 Ga. App. 485, 486

(491 SE2d 918) (1997).

It is axiomatic that the burden is on the appellant to establish error from
the record and this burden is not satisfied by mere assertions in [a] . . .
brief. Given the appellant’s burden of proving error by the appellate
record, where, as here, insufficient information was cited in the record
for appellate review, the trial court ruling must be upheld. [Loveless] has
failed to meet [her] burden to demonstrate error by the record.

Benchmark Rehab. Partners v. SDJ Logistics, 367 Ga. App. 203, 205(4) (885 SE2d 224)

(2023) (citation modified).

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Markle and Hodges, JJ., concur.

19