Migration Protection Visa Refusal Appeal Dismissed

Original Word Document (84.7 KB) Federal Court of Australia

ZNKS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 522

| Review of: | ZNKS and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) (unreported, Administrative Review Tribunal, 2024/7513, Member R. West, 6 May 2025) |

| File number: | VID 746 of 2025 |

| Judgment of: | ROFE J |

| Date of judgment: | 27 April 2026 |

| Catchwords: | MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal to affirm decision of delegate of the Minister to refuse the grant of a protection visa to the applicant on the basis that he fails to satisfy ss 36(1C) and 36(2C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal misunderstood extrinsic material before it – whether the Tribunal failed to properly consider representations made by the applicant – held: application dismissed |

| Legislation: | Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)

Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic) |

| Cases cited: | ECE21 v Minister for Home Affairs (2023) 297 FCR 422

EUD24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2025) 311 FCR 155

GBV18 v Minister for Home Affairs (2020) 274 FCR 202

Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo (2018) 267 FCR 320

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160

Navoto v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 135

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582

XKTK v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2025) 311 FCR 539

ZNKS and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2022] AATA 4223

ZNKS and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) (unreported, Administrative Review Tribunal, 2024/7513, Member R. West, 6 May 2025) |

| Division: | General Division |

| Registry: | Victoria |

| National Practice Area: | Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights |

| Number of paragraphs: | 55 |

| Date of last submissions: | 19 November 2025 |

| Date of hearing: | 26 November 2025 |

| Solicitor for the Applicant: | L Bayly of Victorian Legal Aid |

| Counsel for the First Respondent: | J Barrington |

| Solicitor for the First Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |

| Counsel for the Second Respondent: | The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice. |
ORDERS

| VID 746 of 2025 |

| BETWEEN: | ZNKS

Applicant | |
| AND: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent | |

| order made by: | ROFE J |
| DATE OF ORDER: | 27 APRIL 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The amended originating application for review of a migration decision dated 29 October 2025 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be taxed in the absence of an agreement.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROFE J:

1. Introduction

1 By an amended originating application for review of a migration decision dated 29 October 2025 (the amended application), the applicant seeks judicial review of the following decision of the second respondent (Tribunal): ZNKS and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) (unreported, Administrative Review Tribunal, 2024/7513, Member R. West, 6 May 2025) (T). By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse the grant of a protection visa to the applicant on the basis that he failed to satisfy ss 36(1C) and 36(2C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

2 For the reasons set out below, the amended application should be dismissed with costs.

1. Background

3 The applicant is a 37-year-old citizen of the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria). On 28 September 2017, the applicant was granted a Refugee and Humanitarian (Offshore) (Class XB) (Subclass 201) visa (the Class XB visa), along with his former wife. The applicant later arrived in Australia on 21 November 2017.

4 On 21 October 2021, the applicant was convicted of four charges of sexually assaulting a child under the age of 16, contrary to s 49D(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) in the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court. The charges related to his then 8-year-old niece, the child of the applicant’s then wife’s sister. The applicant pleaded guilty to the offending after receiving a sentence indication from the sentencing Magistrate. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of five months’ imprisonment.

5 On 3 November 2021, the applicant’s Class XB visa was mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act. The applicant made representations seeking revocation of the cancellation decision. However, a delegate of the Minister decided not to revoke the cancellation decision.

6 On 22 February 2022, the applicant was taken into immigration detention.

7 The applicant applied to the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for merits review of the delegate’s non-revocation decision on 22 September 2022 and the AAT subsequently affirmed the non-revocation decision on 9 December 2022: ZNKS and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2022] AATA 4223.

8 The applicant then applied for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa in late December 2022 (the protection visa). A delegate of the Minister refused the application for the protection visa on 26 September 2024 (the Refusal Decision). In the Refusal Decision, the delegate accepted that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Syria due to his imputed political opinion as a Syrian returnee and was therefore a refugee for the purposes of s 5H(1) of the Migration Act. However, the delegate found that the applicant did not satisfy ss 36(1C) and 36(2C)(b), having been convicted by final judgment of a particularly serious crime and being a danger to the Australian community.

9 On the same date, the applicant was granted a Bridging (Removal Pending) (Subclass 070) visa (BVR) and released from detention. He was granted a second BVR on 6 November 2024.

10 On 30 September 2024, the applicant applied to the AAT for merits review of the delegate’s refusal of the protection visa. The Tribunal (which has since replaced the AAT) heard the application over two days, on 9 and 10 April 2025. Both parties were represented by solicitors and counsel. The applicant gave oral evidence before the Tribunal and called upon oral evidence from Dr Nina Zimmerman, a forensic psychiatrist.

11 On 6 May 2025, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision, following which, on 10 June 2025, the applicant commenced proceedings in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

12 The Tribunal has filed a submitting notice in this proceeding, reserving its right to be heard on costs.

1. Legislative framework

13 The Tribunal set out the applicable legislative framework at T [18]–[28], which I adopt here.

14 The statutory criteria for the grant of protection visas are set out at s 36 of the Migration Act. Relevantly, sub-s 36(1A) provides that an applicant for a protection visa must satisfy both criteria in sub-ss 36(1B) and 36(1C) and at least one of the criteria in sub-s 36(2).

15 It was not in dispute before the Tribunal that the applicant meets the criterion in sub-s 36(1B), which provides that an applicant is not assessed by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to be directly or indirectly a security risk, and at least one of the criteria in sub-s (2): T [20].

16 Subsection 36(1C) of the Migration Act provides the following:

(1C)    A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is not a person whom the Minister considers, on reasonable grounds:

(a)    is a danger to Australia’s security; or

(b)    having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, is a danger to the Australian community.

Note: For paragraph (b), see section 5M.

17 It is not disputed that the applicant meets sub-s 36(1C)(a), and as such, the relevant consideration turns on sub-s 36(1C)(b): T [22].

18 Section 5M(a) of the Migration Act provides that, for the purposes of the application of the Migration Act and the regulations to a particular person, sub-s 36(1C)(b) has effect as if a reference in that paragraph to a “particularly serious crime” included a reference to a crime that consists of the commission of a “serious Australian offence” or a “serious foreign offence”. A serious Australian offence is defined by s 5 as the following:

serious Australian offence means an offence against a law in force in Australia, where:

(a)    the offence:

(i)    involves violence against a person; or

(ii)    is a serious drug offence; or

(iii)    involves serious damage to property; or

(iv)    is an offence against section 197A or 197B (offences relating to immigration detention); and

(b)    the offence is punishable by:

(i)    imprisonment for life; or

(ii)    imprisonment for a fixed term of not less than 3 years; or

(iii)    imprisonment for a maximum term of not less than 3 years.

19 The Tribunal recognised at T [27] that an offence under s 49D of the Crime s Act of sexual assault of a child is by its nature an offence involving violence against a person and is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years. It is a serious offence and a “particularly serious crime” for the purpose of sub-s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act. Before the Tribunal, the applicant did not dispute that he has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime: T [28].

1. Grounds of review

20 The primary question before the Tribunal was whether the applicant, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, was a danger to the Australian community under sub-s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act.

21 The applicant advances the following two grounds of review:

Ground 1: The Tribunal erred by engaging in a path of reasoning that was illogical, irrational or legally unreasonable in its reliance on an article canvassing the efficacy of public and non-public sex offender registries and/or in its characterisation of the applicant’s ordinary interactions in society; and

Ground 2: The Tribunal failed to perform its statutory task by failing to meaningfully engage with the applicant’s submission and evidence that he would comply with the obligations imposed on him under the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic) (SORA) and would not therefore be exposed to a “risk scenario” in which he could reoffend.

22 There is significant overlap between the grounds as they both concern the protective effect of the applicant’s sex offender registration, which I discuss below.

1. Ground 1

23 Ground 1 makes two separate complaints of illogicality, irrationality or unreasonableness. The first complaint concerns the Tribunal’s reliance upon a paper published by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC P aper), which the applicant submits involved a misreading or a misunderstanding of the paper. The second complaint concerns the Tribunal’s reasoning with respect to the applicant’s risks arising from “ordinary interactions in society”. This second complaint also forms the basis of Ground 2.

24 In order to show illogicality, irrationality or unreasonableness in the Tribunal’s reasoning, the applicant must demonstrate that the relevant finding was a “critical fact” in the review: EU D 24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2025) 311 FCR 155 at [35]–36. The mere fact that a statement is made in a decision-maker’s statement of reasons does not signify that the finding was a fact critical to the decision: Navoto v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 135 at 68.

25 Moreover, in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160, the Full Court summarised the relevant principles concerning illogicality as follows at 45 that:

[…] An illogical or irrational administrative decision, or an illogical or irrational finding of fact or reasoning along the way to making the decision, may establish jurisdictional error if, for example, the decision or finding is not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn. Making a finding on a fact or issue in the application by drawing an inference or a conclusion which lacks a logical connection with the evidence might also be described as failing to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the fact or issue. However, any such decision or finding will not involve jurisdictional error if a reasonable decision-maker could reach that decision or finding on the same material: SZMDS at [130]-[132] and [135] per Crennan and Bell JJ and at [78] per Heydon J. As Allsop CJ observed in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1 at [21] the question is “whether a decision-maker could reasonably come to the conclusion” reached. If the conclusion is one upon which reasonable minds can differ, it will not be legally illogical, irrational or unreasonable.

26 At [91] in XKTK v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2025) 311 FCR 539, Stewart and Needham JJ distilled the following principles on the “quality of unreasonableness”, as expressed by the High Court:

That quality of unreasonableness has been expressed in different ways by the High Court including:

• that the relevant decision was not “reached by reasoning which is intelligible and reasonable and directed towards and related intelligibly to the purposes of the power”;

• that the relevant decision “lacks an evident and intelligible justification”;

• there is an absence of “justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process”; and

• it is “not possible to comprehend how the [decision-maker] made its findings”.

(Citations omitted.)

5.1 The AIC Paper

27 Relevant to Ground 1 are the following impugned remarks of the Tribunal where it observed at T [101] that although various matters would operate as a deterrent to reoffending, “…a recent study referred to by the [a]pplicant suggests that as a first-time offender his inclusion on the Sex Offenders Register may have only a small deterrent effect”. To provide context, it is helpful to set out the following segment of the abstract to the AIC Paper from which the comments of the Tribunal are derived:

[…]

This paper reviews the latest empirical evidence from Australia and overseas regarding the effectiveness of public and non-public sex offender registries. Results show that while public sex offender registries may have a small general deterrent effect on first time offenders, they do not reduce recidivism. Further, despite having strong public support, they appear to have little effect on levels of fear in the community.

While the evidence is limited to a small number of US studies, non-public sex offender registries do appear to reduce reoffending by assisting law enforcement.

[…]

(Emphasis added.)

28 Relying on the emphasised passage above, the applicant submits that the Tribunal’s statement at T [101] misconstrues the AIC Paper. In particular, it is said to be a paraphrase of a passage concerning public sex offender registries and “first-time offenders”, neither of which applied to the applicant.

29 On that basis, the applicant contends that the Tribunal relied upon observations concerning an irrelevant cohort and drew a conclusion for which there was “no logical connection” to his circumstances. It is further submitted that this error was material because the deterrent effect of the SORA regime was central to his case.

30 The applicant emphasises the specificity of the Tribunal’s language—in particular, the references to “first-time offender” and “small deterrent effect”—and submits that the source of the statement is apparent. He submits that the deterrent effect of registration was not peripheral but central to the assessment of risk. The applicant highlights that the Victorian regime established a non-public registry that worked by assisting law enforcement, rather than a public registry that depended on the possibility of public shaming to dissuade undetected would-be offenders. The applicant therefore contends that the Tribunal’s reasoning was infected by reliance on an irrelevant cohort of persons who had never offended, and on the limited deterrent effect of public sex offender registration, which was likewise an irrelevant consideration.

31 In the applicant’s view, there was no logical connection between his circumstances and the Tribunal’s stated basis for its apparent doubts about his likely compliance with the SORA obligations. Further, it is said that the Tribunal did not advert to any matter specific to the applicant to explain those doubts. Thus, the Tribunal’s impugned misunderstanding of the article was therefore a matter of real importance, because it was critical to its adverse finding on the second element of the “two-factor” assessment of danger it had been urged it to undertake.

32 On the other hand, the Minister resists the applicant’s contention, submitting that it is apparent the Tribunal had regard to the AIC Paper in its entirety, rather than confining itself to the impugned statement at T [101]. Drawing attention to the conclusions of the AIC Paper, the Minister highlights that the authors observed that, in the context of non-public sex offender registries, there is “some evidence that sex offender registration may reduce reoffending through specific deterrence”. The AIC Paper expressly compared this deterrent effect as being “similar” to that of public registries, on the basis that the “real and perceived risk of arrest is likely to be higher, which in turn is expected to deter reoffending”. Further, the Tribunal did not rely solely on the page identified by the applicant but rather referred to the AIC Paper as a whole. Nor did the Tribunal refer to a general deterrent effect, suggesting that it was not proceeding under a misunderstanding that the applicant would be placed on a public registry.

33 In the Minister’s submissions, the Tribunal’s reference to the AIC Paper did not relate to a “critical fact”. Rather, it only concerned the attribution of weight given to only a part of one of the factors bearing upon the applicant’s risk of re-offending. Put differently, all the Tribunal did was reduce the weight given to the deterrent effect of being on the sex offenders register, in circumstances where the Tribunal otherwise accepted at T [101] that there were other factors that would act as a deterrent, including:

(a) remaining on the sex offenders register for life and being subject to the conditions imposed on him under that scheme;

(b) remaining subject to an “AVO”; and

(c) having an incentive to commit further offending because of the effect on his visa.

34 Therefore, the Minister contends that the weight attributed to the deterrent effect of one factor was not a “critical fact” in the review.

35 Even assuming, in the applicant’s favour, that the Tribunal drew upon the passage identified and did so imprecisely, the impugned statement was directed to the extent of the deterrent effect of registration, not to its existence. The Tribunal expressly accepted that a number of matters would operate as deterrents, including the applicant’s ongoing inclusion on the sex offenders register, the reporting obligations imposed by the SORA regime, the existence of an intervention order, and the potential consequences for his visa status.

36 Read in that context, the reference to the AIC Paper qualified the weight to be attributed to one aspect of that broader deterrent framework. It did not supply the foundation for the Tribunal’s conclusion as to risk. In those circumstances, it cannot be characterised as a finding of a “critical fact” or jurisdictional fact of the kind required to establish jurisdictional error. The Tribunal’s reasoning does not disclose any absence of logical connection..

5.2 “Ordinary interactions in society”

37 The applicant next challenges the Tribunal’s conclusion that the risk scenario identified by Dr Nina Zimmerman, a forensic psychiatrist, involving access to children in an unsupervised setting. Specifically, the applicant draws attention to the following portion of the Tribunal’s reasons at T [98]–[98]:

Dr Zimmerman postulated that the most likely situation that may lead to the Applicant re offending [sic] in the future would involve one where he had easy access to female children in an unsupervised environment, most likely a family member who was well-known to him and with whom he had developed a relationship over time. In such a scenario the Applicant would be likely to be motivated by a desire for sexual gratification and the conduct would be likely to involve non-penetrative touching of genitals.

The scenario postulated by Dr Zimmerman is not fanciful and might reasonably be anticipated from the Applicant’s ordinary interactions in society. The fact that he currently lives in a shared house with two other men does not preclude him from the kind of contact described by Dr Zimmerman and it is always open for him to change his living arrangements in the future.

(Emphasis added.)

38 The applicant relies on the emphasised text above to submit that the Tribunal’s characterisation of his “ordinary interactions in society” as including the possibility of forming a relationship with a child through ongoing contact “simply makes no sense”, having regard to his evidence that he does not presently know any children, would avoid contact with them, and understood himself to be subject to restrictive reporting obligations. The applicant contends that any such contact would not be “ordinary”, and that, in the absence of a finding that he would engage in “surreptitious contact” in breach of those obligations, the Tribunal’s reasoning is “essentially incomprehensible”. The applicant further contends that the reporting regime itself renders such interactions non-ordinary, and that meaningful engagement with his case required consideration of the practical effect of those obligations.

39 The Minister submits that this ground, as alleged by the applicant, impermissibly invites merits review. The Minister contends that the Tribunal’s reasons plainly disclose an intelligible justification for its conclusion—namely, that the applicant might come into contact with children throughout his ordinary interactions in society. It is therefore logical, in the Minister’s view, to reason that, just because the applicant does not have any interaction with children now does not mean that the applicant would not interact with children ever. As the Tribunal said at T [99], it is not fanciful to anticipate that the applicant might come into contact with children again.

40 In my view, the Tribunal’s reasoning is neither illogical nor irrational.

41 The Tribunal at T [99] accepted Dr Zimmerman’s opinion as to the circumstances in which reoffending might occur and concluded that such a scenario was not fanciful in the context of the applicant’s life in the community. That conclusion rested on the uncontroversial proposition that a person’s current circumstances—including the absence of present contact with children—do not determine the entirety of their future interactions.

42 The Tribunal was also correct to proceed on the basis that the SORA regime primarily imposes reporting obligations, rather than a blanket prohibition on contact with children. The existence of such obligations does not eliminate the possibility that the applicant might come into contact with children in the course of his life, whether through changes in living arrangements, future relationships or other forms of social interaction.

43 The applicant’s submission that such interactions would not be “ordinary” reflects a different evaluative characterisation. It does not demonstrate that the Tribunal’s reasoning lacked an intelligible foundation. Nor was the Tribunal required to make a finding that the applicant would engage in surreptitious or unlawful conduct in order to conclude that a risk scenario might arise.

44 Regarding the alleged illogicality purportedly arising from the Tribunal’s observations about an irrelevant category of people who had never offended and the irrelevant small deterrent effect of public sex offender registration on that cohort, I accept the Minister’s submissions that any such reference went to the weight to be attributed to one aspect of the deterrent framework, and did not constitute a finding of a critical fact or disclose any misunderstanding that was material to the Tribunal’s assessment of risk.

45 Accordingly, the applicant has failed to establish Ground 1 or that the ground as alleged is within the purview of judicial review.

1. Ground 2

46 Ground 2 alleges that the Tribunal failed to give meaningful or “active intellectual” consideration to the applicant’s claim that his compliance with the SORA obligations would prevent the risk scenario identified by Dr Zimmerman from arising.

47 In Navoto, the Full Court observed at [87] that a decision-maker for the purposes of s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act “…is required to give active intellectual consideration to […] representations” made pursuant to that provision, and that “[t]he person making the representations and submissions should not be left to guess what role material considerations have played in the decision”. Their Honours further elaborated at [89]:

Excluding obvious cases, the determination of whether the decision-maker has given active intellectual consideration to a representation will frequently be a matter of impression reached in light of all of the circumstances of the case. In this context, whether or not the reasons of the decision-maker fall “on the wrong side of the line”, to quote Lafu at [49], will be a matter of inference to be drawn in particular from the manner in which the representation was advanced, and the structure, tone and content of the decision-maker’s reasons. What is required by a court upon judicial review is a qualitative assessment as to whether the decision-maker has, as a matter of substance, had regard to the representations made: Maioha at [45] per Rares and Robertson JJ.

48 A decision-maker is not required to make a finding of fact with respect to every claim made or issue raised by an application: Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo (2018) 267 FCR 320 at 46. However, it may in some cases be necessary to make specific findings of fact as part of the process of giving meaningful consideration to a claim or submission that has been clearly articulated, rather than simply acknowledging or noting the representation that has been made: GBV18 v Minister for Home Affairs (2020) 274 FCR 202 at 32(e).

49 The applicant submits that his claim regarding his compliance with the SORA obligations which would prevent the risk scenario identified by Dr Zimmerman from arising was central to his case, as it was the principal basis upon which he sought to demonstrate that his real-world risk of reoffending was lower than the “low-moderate” assessment derived from the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol tool used by Dr Zimmerman. The applicant claims that the Tribunal’s reasons at T [74] which record only that “…he expressed a commitment to comply…” left him “guessing” as to what role that claim played in the decision, and in substance meant that the Tribunal failed to engage with it.

50 Conversely, the Minister submits that the Tribunal did consider the claim, and that complaints as to the depth or quality of that consideration go to the merits rather than to jurisdictional error. While it may be necessary for a decision-maker to provide substantive reasons on a particular issue or representation by a party, the Minister aptly notes that arguments concerning a decision-maker’s active intellectual engagement, or matters which go to the degree or quality of consideration, are matters which go only to the merits: see Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582 at [24]–26; ECE21 v Minister for Home Affairs (2023) 297 FCR 422 at 8.

51 In my view, Ground 2 should also be rejected, including for the reason that it invites the Court to engage in merits review.

52 The Tribunal expressly recorded the applicant’s asserted commitment to comply with his reporting obligations and addressed the existence and operation of those obligations in its reasons. Hence, it cannot be said that the claim was overlooked or not otherwise meaningfully engaged with. The substance of the applicant’s argument is that the Tribunal did not accept that his asserted compliance would negate the risk of reoffending and did not make a specific finding to that effect. However, the Tribunal was not required to accept that submission, nor to make an express finding in the terms contended for by the applicant. The Tribunal’s task was to undertake a forward-looking assessment of risk, having regard to all relevant considerations. The applicant’s asserted intention to comply with the SORA regime was one such consideration, but it was not determinative. The Tribunal was entitled to consider that, notwithstanding that asserted intention, the possibility of contact with children—and thus the risk scenario identified by Dr Zimmerman—could not be excluded.

53 Read fairly, the reasons disclose that the Tribunal took the applicant’s claim into account but did not regard it as outweighing the risk. I consider that that conclusion was open to the Tribunal on the facts. The applicant’s complaint that the Tribunal failed to engage “meaningfully” or to the required degree impermissibly invites merits review.

54 Accordingly, Ground 2 also fails.

1. Disposition

55 For the above reasons, the amended application is dismissed with costs.

| I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Rofe. |
Associate:

Dated: 27 April 2026