Migration appeal dismissed, leave to amend notice refused

Original Word Document (102 KB) Federal Court of Australia

Tahir v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 525

| Appeal from: | Tahir v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1368 |

| File number: | SAD 12 of 2025 |

| Judgment of: | MCDONALD J |

| Date of judgment: | 28 April 2026 |

| Catchwords: | MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCOA) dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – appellant seeks leave to amend notice of appeal to rely on ground of jurisdictional error not raised before FCFCOA – where appellant contends Tribunal failed to comply with s 359A of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Tribunal invited appellant to respond to information covered by certificate issued under s 375 of Migration Act – whether sufficient particulars of information provided – proposed new ground lacks sufficient merit to warrant grant of leave – leave to amend notice of appeal and rely on new ground refused – appeal dismissed |

| Legislation: | Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 116, 359A, 375

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.43 |

| Cases cited: | MZXKH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 663

SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 184 FCR 505; [2010] FCA 297

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588; [2004] FCAFC 158 |

| Division: | General Division |

| Registry: | South Australia |

| National Practice Area: | Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights |

| Number of paragraphs: | 41 |

| Date of hearing: | 21 April 2026 |

| Counsel for the Appellant: | The Appellant appeared in person |

| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Ms M Scanlon |

| Solicitor for the First Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |

| Counsel for the Second Respondent: | The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice |
ORDERS

| SAD 12 of 2025 |

| BETWEEN: | HASSAN TAHIR

Appellant | |
| AND: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent | |

| order made by: | MCDONALD J |
| DATE OF ORDER: | 28 APRIL 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCDONALD J:

Introduction

1 The appellant, Hassan Tahir, is a citizen of Pakistan who has resided in Australia since June 2008. He first arrived in Australia on a Student (Vocational Education and Training Sector) (Class TU) (Subclass 572) visa and later held a Partner (Class UK) (Subclass 820) visa (partner visa). Since arriving in Australia, Mr Tahir has accrued a substantial criminal record. By 2024, he had been convicted of a large number of offences, including driving offences, causing injury, and stealing, and had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment for some of those offences.

2 On two separate occasions, in March 2020 and June 2023, a delegate of the predecessor of the first respondent (Minister) invited Mr Tahir to comment on the possible cancellation of his partner visa. On both occasions, Mr Tahir provided responses to the invitation to comment. Following consideration of Mr Tahir’s responses to the March 2020 invitation to comment, the delegate decided, on 16 April 2020, not to cancel Mr Tahir’s partner visa. After consideration of the response provided by Mr Tahir to the invitation to comment in June 2023, on 6 September 2023, a delegate of the Minister made a decision to cancel Mr Tahir’s partner visa pursuant to s 116(1)(g) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

3 On 29 April 2024, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed the delegate’s decision to cancel Mr Tahir’s partner visa. Mr Tahir applied to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCOA) for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. On 12 December 2024, the FCFCOA dismissed the application for judicial review: Tahir v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1368. Mr Tahir now appeals against the decision of the FCFCOA.

4 On the appeal, Mr Tahir seeks leave to amend his notice of appeal and to rely on a new ground of appeal, alleging jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal of a kind that had not been identified in the application for judicial review before the FCFCOA. For the reasons that follow, the proposed new ground lacks sufficient merit to warrant the grant of leave. Mr Tahir has not established that the decision of the FCFCOA was affected by error, or that the decision of the Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

The Tribunal proceedings and the invitation to comment on information received

5 On 26 February 2024, Mr Tahir attended a hearing of the Tribunal in accordance with an invitation that had been sent to him.

6 Before the Tribunal had made a decision, the Tribunal sent Mr Tahir a letter dated 8 April 2024, entitled “Invitation to comment on or respond to information and to provide information – Mr Hassan Tahir”, and a certificate that had been issued pursuant to s 375 of the Migration Act. Insofar as it is relevant to the ground of review which Mr Tahir now seeks to argue in this Court, the letter included the following:

1. Invitation to comment on a s 375 certificate

In conducting the review, we are required by the Migration Act 1958 to invite you to comment on or respond to certain information which we consider would, subject to your comments or response, be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review.

Please note, however, that we have not made up our mind about the information.

The particulars of the information are:

• The Tribunal has information that on 20 March 2024 you were reported for driving unauthorised, having never held a licence.

This information is relevant to the review because if the Tribunal relies on this information, it would find you have a disregard for Australian laws, because this report occurred after the hearing of your matter.

If we rely on this information in making our decision, this would be the reason or part of the reason for finding your visa should be cancelled under s 116 of the Migration Act 1958. If the Tribunal finds your visa should be cancelled, it will affirm the decision under review.

You are invited to comment on the validity of a certificate issued under s 375A [sic ] of the Act attached to this letter.

7 On 15 April 2024, Mr Tahir provided a response by email. The response relevantly included the following:

My name is Hassan Tahir and I am writing to you in response to the outcome of my immigration review hearing. [I] have been invited to comment and put my proof forward, I would hope this is all taken of a serious nature as it is of a high relevance in my future.

I would like to say in my submission that I Hassan Tahir allegedly repo[r]ted for never held the license. This first being brought forward to light, when I was pulled over by an officer of the law that I was unauthorised to drive and never held a licence. But I did not receive any paperwork, summons or fine till this day. [T]herefore this should be null and void from my record.

In 2010 August the 18th I went to Vic Roads and showed my international driver[’]s license then I was given my learner[’]s and Hazard test to complete, upon succeeding and passing these test [sic ] I was given next date to receive my full Victorian driver’s licence. If you have a[n] international licence then the foreigner can get the full license without going through L and probationary licence.

This date was 27 of August 2010. License number is 097975449. Reference number is 7100389342171. Due to unforeseen circumstances I didn’t attend this appointment, which left me on my learner[’]s permit, which is still a form of licence to be driving on the roads. I have attached the Victorian learner permit to support my claim.

Later in my life 2016 again I was pulled over by the police for random licence check. I was charged with driving a motor vehicle on Port Wakefield road which I am not authorised to do so and never held a licence. This case was to be heard on 17 of October 2016. I contested this alleged allegations and won as the judge dismissed the charges and no history on record for me. I have attached [t]he court document to support my claim.

After all this and the fact it keep being an issue for me. Whilst driving I obtain a driver licence report from SA Services. which as documentation shows provides my contact details[,] licence number and demerit points on my licence. I have attached the demerit point notice and the client summary paper as a proof to support my statement.

If I in[]fact had no license to be on the roads, this would not be possible to obtain all these documents. It all based on my international driving licence. And my driver licence report would say I never held a licence, but that’s not a case. [I]t clearly shows my credentials.

8 On 29 April 2024, the Tribunal sent Mr Tahir a letter informing him that the Tribunal had affirmed the decision of the delegate and enclosing a statement of the Tribunal’s reasons.

The decision of the Tribunal

9 The issues for determination by the Tribunal were whether a ground for cancellation pursuant to s 116(1)(g) of the Migration Act existed and, if so, whether Mr Tahir’s partner visa should be cancelled.

10 Section 116(1) of the Migration Act relevantly provides:

(1)    Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that:

…

(g)    a prescribed ground for cancelling a visa applies to the holder.

11 Regulation 2.43(1)(oa) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) provides as follows:

Grounds for cancellation of visa (Act, s 116)

(1)    For the purposes of paragraph 116(1)(g) of the Act (which deals with circumstances in which the Minister may cancel a visa), the grounds prescribed are the following:

…

(oa)    in the case of the holder of a temporary visa (other than a Subclass 050 Bridging (General)) visa, a Subclass 051 (Bridging (Protection Visa Applicant)) visa or a Subclass 444 (Special Category) visa)—that the Minister is satisfied that the holder has been convicted of an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory (whether or not the holder held the visa at the time of the conviction and regardless of the penalty imposed (if any)).

12 The Tribunal first set out (at [16] of its reasons) that the Minister has the power to cancel a visa pursuant to s 116(1)(g) of the Migration Act if satisfied that certain grounds are made out, including the prescribed grounds in reg 2.43 of the Migration Regulations.

13 The Tribunal found that it was satisfied that the ground in reg 2.43(oa) of the Migration Regulations applied to Mr Tahir’s application, given that he had “been convicted of over 50 offences against the laws of Victoria and South Australia”.

14 Having come to the view that a ground for the cancellation of Mr Tahir’s partner visa existed pursuant to s 116(1)(g) of the Migration Act (and noting that mandatory cancellation was not required pursuant to s 116(3) of the Migration Act), the Tribunal proceeded to consider whether the visa should be cancelled. The Tribunal noted (at [22]) that there were no matters specified in the Migration Act or the Migration Regulations that the Tribunal was required to consider in the exercise of the discretion to cancel Mr Tahir’s partner visa, and explained that it “had regard to the circumstances of this case, including matters raised by Mr Tahir and matters in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) ‘General visa cancellation powers’”.

15 In considering whether to exercise the discretion to cancel Mr Tahir’s partner visa, the Tribunal took into account:

(a) the purpose of Mr Tahir’s stay in Australia (including by reference to the fact that he was no longer in a relationship with his former spouse) and whether he had a compelling need to remain in Australia (at [32]-[43]);

(b) that there was no information before the Tribunal which suggested that Mr Tahir had failed to comply with the conditions of his partner visa (at [44]);

(c) the degree of hardship that might be caused by the cancellation of Mr Tahir’s partner visa, including by reference to Mr Tahir’s intermittent contact with his mother in Pakistan, his employment at the time, his desire to study in Australia, his relationship with a Ms Nilsen (who has a mental illness), and a letter of support provided by a friend of Mr Tahir (at [45]-[51]);

(d) the circumstances in which the ground of cancellation of Mr Tahir’s partner visa arose (at [52]-[64]);

(e) Mr Tahir’s past and present behaviour towards the Department of Home Affairs (at [65]-[69]);

(f) that there are no consequential cancellations pursuant to s 140 of the Migration Act that apply in this case (at [70]);

(g) whether any mandatory legal consequences would flow from the cancellation of Mr Tahir’s partner visa (at [71]-[74]);

(h) whether Australia would breach any international obligations, including non-refoulement obligations, as a result of the cancellation of Mr Tahir’s partner visa (at [75]-[95]);

(i) Mr Tahir’s family, business or other ties in Australia (at [96]-[102]); and

(j) Mr Tahir’s desire to make a change in his life, the steps he claimed to have made to mitigate his past offending and drug use, and the Tribunal’s view that he had failed to make significant change despite having previously been issued with a notice of intention to cancel his visa (at [103]-[104]).

16 The Tribunal considered the information that it had received following the hearing, to the effect that, on 20 March 2024, Mr Tahir had been reported for driving unauthorised, having never held a licence, as well as Mr Tahir’s response to the Tribunal’s invitation to comment on that information. The way in which the Tribunal dealt with this information is reflected in the following passages of the Tribunal’s reasons:

After the hearing of this matter, further information came before the Tribunal that Mr Tahir had been reported for driving unauthorised, having never held a licence. Mr Tahir was invited to comment on this information. In response, he said he has not received any paperwork or been summonsed for this offence and therefore it should be considered null and void. He said that in 2010 he went to VicRoads and showed his international driver’s licence. He was given a learner permit and a hazard test to complete but “due to unforeseen circumstances I did not attend this appointment, which left me on a learners permit, which is still a form of licence to be driving on the roads.”

Mr Tahir provided various documents with his response, none of which are a driver’s licence. He has been convicted of driving unauthorised on a number of occasions including in 2022, 2020 and 2019 and is taken to be aware of the requirement to hold a driver’s licence. The allegation that he failed to present a licence, if this is established, shows he has not paid heed to the previous convictions. He was unable to provide a current driver’s license even during these proceedings.

…

Mr Tahir said at the hearing that when he drove a car unregistered, he did not realise the consequences and the impact on himself and others. This is at odds both with the report after the hearing that he had been driving while unlicensed, having never held a licence, and with his extensive history of driving unlicensed.

…

Mr Tahir said he had not committed a crime in the last two years, and there is only one pending charge of breaching the intervention order. There is also now a report of driving without a licence, but no notification of a charge being laid. In the context of his lengthy offending history, I do not consider a relatively short period where he did not commit further offences shows a significant change in his attitude towards Australian laws.

17 Having considered the circumstances, information and documents provided by Mr Tahir, the Tribunal concluded (at [105]) that his “lengthy and repeated offending outweighs those factors that are in favour of not cancelling his visa”. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to cancel Mr Tahir’s partner visa.

The decision of the FCFCOA

18 On 5 June 2024, Mr Tahir filed an originating application for judicial review in the FCFCOA. The primary judge (at [28]) described the grounds of judicial review and their particulars, which ran to some eight pages, as “excessive” and as taking the form of submissions. Mr Tahir had initially been legally represented in the FCFCOA proceedings, but his legal representatives withdrew before the hearing.

19 The primary judge was satisfied that the Tribunal had “considered all of the circumstances, information, and documents provided by [Mr Tahir]” before reaching its conclusion that Mr Tahir’s “lengthy and repeat offending outweighed those factors that were in favour of not cancelling his visa”. The primary judge considered the four grounds of judicial review advanced by Mr Tahir in writing. In summary:

(1) The primary judge (at [62]-[63]) rejected Mr Tahir’s contention that the Tribunal had failed to undertake a balancing exercise of the various matters that it considered. His Honour noted that there is no requirement for a decision-maker exercising the discretion in s 116(1) of the Migration Act to consider all of the matters referred to in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual or to weigh them against each other. All that was required was that weight be given to the various considerations, and then a final conclusion arrived at as to whether or not Mr Tahir’s partner visa should be cancelled. The primary judge was satisfied that the Tribunal did in fact weigh each of the various matters that it had referred to against each other.

(2) The primary judge (at [64]) rejected Mr Tahir’s contention, in ground 2 of his originating application for judicial review, that reg 2.43(1)(oa) of the Migration Regulations was inconsistent with the Migration Act. The primary judge did not accept that, through s 501 of the Migration Act, the Parliament had “exhaustively prescribed the visa consequences that flow from a criminal conviction”. Rather, as his Honour pointed out, s 501H of the Migration Act states that the powers in s 501 are “in addition to” any other powers in the Migration Act.

(3) The primary judge (at [65]-[70]) considered Mr Tahir’s contention that, by only considering public interest criterion 4013 and failing to consider the application of public interest criterion 4014, the Tribunal had failed to consider the legal consequences of its decision or that, alternatively, its decision was legally unreasonable. His Honour rejected Mr Tahir’s third ground of judicial review on the basis that public interest criterion 4014 would only apply if Mr Tahir failed to leave Australia within 28 days of the cessation of his substantive visa, and then only if he applied in the future for a visa that was subject to that criterion. His Honour was “not satisfied that reasonableness compelled the Tribunal to consider some speculative possibility which in fact was not even raised by [Mr Tahir] before the Tribunal”.

(4) In respect of Mr Tahir’s fourth ground of judicial review, the primary judge (at [71]-[72]) found that it was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, when exercising the discretion to cancel Mr Tahir’s partner visa, to consider Mr Tahir’s purpose for being in Australia. The primary judge found the purpose of the partner visa “had evaporated” following his divorce from his wife, and found that the Tribunal had properly considered the fact that Mr Tahir’s three children were no longer in the care of their mother but were in the care of the Minister.

20 The primary judge concluded (at [74]-[75]) that he was “unable to ascertain any articulated jurisdictional error” and that Mr Tahir’s application for judicial review must be dismissed with costs.

The appeal

21 Mr Tahir’s notice of appeal to this Court identifies several grounds of appeal. However, in the written submissions filed by him in advance of the hearing (and after the Minister had filed his written submissions), Mr Tahir identified a new ground on which he contended that the decision of the Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error. At the hearing, Mr Tahir confirmed that he does not press any of the grounds identified in the notice of appeal, and that he seeks leave to amend his notice of appeal so as to enable him to rely on the new ground.

22 The new ground of appeal is set out in Mr Tahir’s written submissions as follows:

… the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by contravening Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 359A in that the Tribunal relied upon adverse post-hearing information that [Mr Tahir] had been reported on 20 March 2024 for driving while unauthorised, having never held a licence, without disclosing the substance of that information so as to afford [Mr Tahir] a meaningful opportunity to comment …

23 Mr Tahir requires leave to amend his notice of appeal and leave to rely on a ground of alleged jurisdictional error that was not advanced before the FCFCOA. The considerations relevant to the grant of leave in each case are similar, and it is convenient to consider them together. In determining whether to grant leave, it is appropriate to consider any explanation advanced as to why the ground was not raised before the FCFCOA, any prejudice to the Minister should Mr Tahir be permitted to rely on the new ground, and the merits of the proposed ground: see, eg, VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588; [2004] FCAFC 158 at 598-9 [48].

Considerations relevant to the grant of leave to rely on a new ground

24 In his written submissions, Mr Tahir advanced no explanation as to why the ground on which he seeks to rely was raised for the first time on appeal (and, indeed, at a late stage, only after the Minister had filed written submissions responding to the grounds set out in the notice of appeal). At the hearing before this Court, Mr Tahir made oral submissions to the effect that, when the matter was before the FCFCOA, he had not been able to review his case or consider the material thoroughly enough to come up with the new ground of appeal. That was said to be because he had initially been legally represented in the proceedings before the FCFCOA, and then became unrepresented and had to prepare his own case only shortly before the hearing in the FCFCOA.

25 As the primary judge noted (at [29] of his Honour’s reasons), Mr Tahir’s legal representative filed a notice of intention to withdraw from the FCFCOA proceedings on 11 September 2024. On 1 November 2024, Mr Tahir filed written submissions and, in a separate document, written submissions in reply to the submissions earlier filed on behalf of the Minister. Mr Tahir appeared in person at the hearing in the FCFCOA on 4 December 2024.

26 As the Minister submits, although it is understandable that the withdrawal of Mr Tahir’s legal representation might have contributed to his failure to thoroughly review the material himself and identify the ground on which he now seeks to rely, the weight to be given to that explanation is reduced when it is appreciated that almost three months passed between the withdrawal of his legal representative and the hearing in the FCFCOA, and that Mr Tahir did advance relatively sophisticated written and oral submissions on his own behalf in the FCFCOA proceedings.

27 The Minister submits that there would be some prejudice to the Minister if leave were to be granted to rely on the new ground, because it was raised by Mr Tahir at a late stage. I do not accept that there is any relevant prejudice to the Minister. The new ground was identified late, but the Minister has had sufficient time to respond convincingly to the new ground by way of both written submissions in reply and oral submissions at the hearing. The Minister does not submit that there is evidence that he would have wished to adduce before the FCFCOA had the ground been advanced in the Court below. Indeed, to the extent that the failure to raise the ground before the FCFCOA may have resulted in the Minister’s not adducing evidence of the material that was covered by the s 375 certificate, any deficiency in evidence before the Court would tend to make it more difficult for Mr Tahir to succeed on his new proposed ground, and would not operate to the prejudice of the Minister.

28 In light of the foregoing, the question of whether leave should be granted to Mr Tahir to amend his notice of appeal to rely on the new ground of appeal depends on whether the new ground has merit. For the reasons set out below, it does not. It would serve little purpose to grant leave to Mr Tahir to file an amended notice of appeal to raise a new ground which is unmeritorious. Given that I have fully considered the merits of the new ground and have concluded that the appeal would have to be dismissed in any event, the grant of leave to file an amended notice of appeal to raise the new ground would be of no practical benefit to Mr Tahir. In these circumstances, in the absence of a compelling explanation for his failure to raise the new ground before the FCFCOA, leave should not be granted to Mr Tahir to file an amended notice of appeal.

The merits of the new ground

29 As mentioned above, a certificate had been issued pursuant to s 375 of the Migration Act in respect of the information that the Tribunal had, to the effect that, on 20 March 2024, Mr Tahir had been reported for driving while unauthorised, having never held a licence. The material before the Court (most of which was contained in a court book filed by the Minister before Mr Tahir identified his proposed new ground) did not include the information supplied to the Tribunal to which the s 375 certificate related.

30 The requirements for the Tribunal in inviting an applicant to comment on or respond to information was prescribed by s 359A of the Migration Act. Section 359A(1), as in force at the date of the Tribunal’s letter, as well as its decision, provided as follows:

359A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal

(1)    Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Tribunal must:

(a)    give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

(b)    ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

(c)    invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.

31 There is no clear line delineating what information the Tribunal must provide to an applicant pursuant to s 359A of the Migration Act; the question of what particulars must be provided must be determined by reference to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In MZXKH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 663, Tracey J explained (at [18]) that the question of whether or not information has been adequately particularised for the purposes of s 424A(1) of the Migration Act (relating to merits review under Part 7 of the Migration Act, but in equivalent terms to s 359A) is “a matter of fact, degree and context depending on the circumstances of the case”; see also SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 184 FCR 505; [2010] FCA 297 at 512 [23].

32 In the reasons for its decision (at [6]), the Tribunal acknowledged that it was required “to walk a fine line between keeping confidential information confidential but disclosing the substance of the particulars of the information”. This implies that the Tribunal had been provided with at least some additional information relating to the report, over and above what it told Mr Tahir in its letter of 8 April 2024.

33 Mr Tahir submits that the Tribunal was required to provide more detail about the incident the subject of the report. He asserts that, in order that he should have an opportunity to make “a meaningful response”, the Tribunal should have provided him with “factual particulars showing what conduct was actually alleged, in what circumstances, on what basis, and why the Tribunal would regard it as probative”. Mr Tahir further submits:

The absence of particulars meant [Mr Tahir] did not know the factual case to meet. He could not know whether to answer by proving mistaken identity, disproving that he was driving, challenging the asserted licence-status premise, identifying a factual impossibility, obtaining contradictory records, or exposing the allegation as unsubstantiated hearsay.

34 One potential difficulty with Mr Tahir’s submissions is that the evidence before the Court does not establish what further information the Tribunal had about the incident that was the subject of the report. Section 359A of the Migration Act could not require the Tribunal to provide particulars beyond those of which the Tribunal was aware, and Mr Tahir has adduced no evidence as to what was known to the Tribunal. However, this point may be put to one side.

35 What s 359A(1)(a) of the Migration Act (as then in force) required the Tribunal to provide to Mr Tahir, when inviting him to comment on or respond to the information in respect of his having been reported for driving while unauthorised on 20 March 2024, was “clear particulars of any information” which the Tribunal considered would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. Section 359A(1)(a) did not require the provision of any and all information which Mr Tahir might have considered relevant to a choice between possible strategic responses.

36 Having regard to the reasons of the Tribunal and, in particular, the passages set out at ] above, it is apparent that the information that the Tribunal considered would be part of the reason for affirming the decision under review in this case was the fact that Mr Tahir had again been reported for driving without a licence, rather than any details of the circumstances of the driving. In the circumstances of this case, to comply with s 359A of the Migration Act, it was sufficient for the Tribunal to provide Mr Tahir with particulars sufficient to enable Mr Tahir to understand that the Tribunal was proposing to have regard to the information that, at a time after the Tribunal hearing, he had been reported for driving while unauthorised, and to enable him to appreciate the occasion to which the report related and to provide a response.

37 By its letter dated 8 April 2024 (set out at ] above), the Tribunal provided to Mr Tahir particulars of the information that it considered could be adverse to Mr Tahir and could result in a finding being made against him. Contrary to Mr Tahir’s submission, the Tribunal explicitly identified the reason why the Tribunal would regard the information as probative.

38 Mr Tahir in fact provided a response by letter dated 15 April 2024 (set out at ] above). That response addressed a particular occasion on which he said he “was pulled over by an officer of the law”. It is apparent that the information provided by the Tribunal was in fact sufficient for him to identify the incident to which the information related. The particulars provided to Mr Tahir enabled him to respond to that information, meaningfully and in detail.

39 Mr Tahir’s response at least implicitly acknowledged that he had been detected driving a vehicle on 20 March 2024. He advanced arguments as to why the report should be disregarded (because no charge had been laid), and as to why the suggestion that he had never held a licence was wrong (because, as he claimed, he had held an international driver’s licence and a Victorian learner’s permit). After taking into account Mr Tahir’s response to the information, the Tribunal concluded that the uncontested history of repeat convictions by Mr Tahir over a “lengthy period” weighed heavily in favour of cancelling his partner visa, and that the recent report for driving without a licence undermined Mr Tahir’s claim at the Tribunal hearing that, when he had driven unlicensed on previous occasions, he had not realised the consequences and the impact on himself and others, and his submission that the absence of more recent convictions reflected a change in his attitude towards compliance with Australian laws.

40 Given the use to which the Tribunal proposed to, and ultimately did, put the information regarding his being reported for driving unauthorised on 20 March 2024, Mr Tahir was afforded procedural fairness in relation to that information, and s 359A(1)(a) of the Migration Act did not require that the Tribunal provide any greater particularity than was contained in its letter of 8 April 2024.

Conclusion

41 For the reasons explained above, Mr Tahir’s proposed new ground of appeal lacks sufficient merit to warrant his being granted leave to amend his notice of appeal so as to rely on the new ground. The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

| I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McDonald. |
Associate:

Dated: 28 April 2026