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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People of Michigan v. Johnny Ray Brown Jr

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 367786
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.7K)

• PDF

Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
March 19, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellee, 9:16 AM

v No. 367786
Chippewa Circuit Court
JOHNNY RAY BROWN JR, LC No. 2022-005631-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and YATES and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

While defendant, Johnny Ray Brown Jr., was on bond awaiting trial, he tested positive for
a tricyclic antidepressant. Soon after defendant was informed that he would be taken to jail for the
positive drug test, defendant fled from the building and was later apprehended by a police officer.
Defendant was subsequently convicted by jury verdict of resisting or obstructing an officer, MCL
750.81d(1). On appeal, defendant contends that inadmissible evidence was presented at trial, that
the jury instructions were inadequate, that the prosecution engaged in misconduct, and that his trial
attorney was ineffective. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2022, defendant was on bond in an unrelated criminal case, and he was required
as a condition of bond to undergo drug testing. On that day, defendant reported to his tether officer,
Chippewa County Deputy Sheriff Michael Troyer, who administered a drug test. Defendant tested
positive for a tricyclic antidepressant even though he had no prescription for that antidepressant.
Deputy Troyer asked defendant about the positive result, and defendant said that had not taken the
tricyclic antidepressant, but his girlfriend uses the drug. Deputy Troyer asked defendant to sign a
drug book to confirm the positive test result, and the deputy informed defendant that he would be
taken to jail because of his positive drug test. In response, defendant “started to sign the book[,]”
but then “he grabbed his receipt and ran down the hallway.” Deputy Brad LaCross “yelled a couple
of times” telling defendant to stop, but defendant just “kept running” and “exited the building out
the exit door.”

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After defendant ran away from the tether office, Undersheriff Greg Postma saw defendant
“running out the door” with “a thin piece of paper in his hand.” Undersheriff Postma watched him
run “out towards Bingham,” and then defendant “turned the corner and went right, which seemed
odd.” Undersheriff Postma recognized the paper in defendant’s hand as a “tether receipt,” and he
thought: “something’s not right here; this person shouldn’t be exiting that door, they’re running
and they’re holding a tether receipt.” Undersheriff Postma “ran back to the door and was met at
the door by . . . Deputy LaCross,” who asked: “did you see Johnny Brown run by?” Undersheriff
Postma “[g]ot in [a] patrol car [and] activated the lights and siren.” Then he drove off in pursuit
of defendant. Shortly thereafter, Undersheriff Postma saw defendant run across the street and into
“the parking lot of Central Savings Bank.” Undersheriff Postma ordered defendant to stop, which
defendant did. Undersheriff Postma arrested defendant after recognizing him as the person who
ran out of the tether office moments earlier. At the time of the arrest, defendant still was holding
the tether receipt in his hand.

Defendant was tried from start to finish in a single day. Four witnesses testified at the trial:
Deputy Troyer; Deputy LaCross; Undersheriff Postma; and defendant. According to defendant’s
testimony, he went to the tether office as a routine matter on April 4, 2022, took a drug test as he
was required to do twice each week, waited for the test results, received a receipt of the test results,
and left the building because, in his words, “they never told me not to leave.” Defendant summed
up the incident by confirming that he “didn’t run” and he was not “told to stop.” After hearing all
the witnesses testify, the jury convicted defendant of resisting or obstructing an officer in violation
of MCL 750.81d(1). The trial court sentenced defendant for that crime, as a fourth-offense habitual
offender, MCL 769.12, to serve 34 months to 15 years in prison. Defendant now appeals of right
his conviction, but not his sentence.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

On appeal, defendant presents several issues. First, he asserts that the trial court erred when
it allowed testimony about his prior involvement with law-enforcement officers. Second, he faults
the trial court for giving the jury inadequate instructions about the charged crime. Third, he argues
that the prosecutor committed reversible error during closing argument and while cross-examining
him. Defendant concedes that his trial attorney did not object to any of those alleged errors during
the trial, but he blames his attorney for providing deficient representation by failing to object. We
will address each of those arguments in turn.

A. DEFENDANT’S PRIOR INVOLVEMENT WITH LAW-ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

Defendant contends that the trial court improperly allowed testimony about prior contacts
he had with police officers. Defendant further insists that that error was compounded by questions
from the prosecutor about defendant’s previous experiences on tether. Ordinarily, the admission
of evidence is subject to review for abuse of discretion. People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 251; 934
NW2d 693 (2019). Here, however, defendant offered no contemporaneous objection to any of the
evidence challenged on appeal. To preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal, the party contesting
the admission of evidence on appeal “must object at trial and specify the same ground for objection
that it asserts on appeal.” Id. at 252. Therefore, “a party asserting evidentiary error who fails to
object at a time that gives the trial court the opportunity to correct the error does not preserve that
evidentiary error by raising it for the first time in a postjudgment motion for a new trial.” People

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v Butsinas, ___ Mich App __, _; __ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 364778); slip op at 10.
Also, “challenged prosecutorial statements” have to be “preserved by contemporaneous objections
and requests for curative instructions,” so the failure to make a proper, timely objection in the trial
court dictates that “appellate review is for outcome-determinative plain error.” People v Mullins,
322 Mich App 151, 172; 911 NW2d 201 (2017). As a result, we must address defendant’s claims
of error by considering whether there was plain error that affected his substantial rights. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To avoid forfeiture of his claims under the
plain error rule, defendant must establish (1) error (2) that “was plain, i.e., clear or obvious,” and
(3) that “the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. To satisfy the third requirement, defendant
must show “prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id.
Applying these deferential standards, we find no basis for relief.

Defendant was charged with assaulting or resisting a police officer under MCL 750.81d(1).
That requires proof “(1) the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed,
or endangered a police officer, and (2) the defendant knew or had reason to know that the person
that the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered was
a police officer performing his or her duties.” People v Corr, 287 Mich App 499, 503; 788 NW2d
860 (2010). Additionally, “the prosecution must establish that the officers’ actions were lawful as
an element of resisting or obstructing a police officer under MCL 750.81d.” People v Quinn, 305
Mich App 484, 491; 853 NW2d 383 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The term
“obstruct” includes “a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.” MCL 750.81d(7)(a).

During the testimony of three law-enforcement officers, they referred to prior contact they
had had with defendant. Deputy Troyer stated that he knew defendant through “contacts with the
Sheriff’s Office.” Deputy LaCross testified that he was familiar with defendant due to “contacts
through the last 30 years,” and that he only had had contact with defendant when he was working.
He also commented that, when the charged offense occurred, defendant was on tether, and Deputy
LaCross was monitoring the tether and performing drug tests. He further explained that being “on
tether” meant that defendant was released from jail on bond and wearing a GPS tether on his ankle.
Finally, Undersheriff Postma testified that he knew defendant through “law enforcement contacts”
and that he knew defendant was on tether.

Contrary to defendant’s contention, we do not regard that testimony as improper other-acts
or character evidence. The testimony revealed that defendant was on tether, and it explained why
he was subject to drug testing. In order to establish the crime of assaulting or resisting an officer,
the prosecutor must prove that the defendant knew the officer was performing official duties. MCL
750.81d(1). Evidence that defendant was on tether established why defendant was present at the
tether office for a drug test, which in turn demonstrated that the officers had a legal basis to order
defendant not to leave. We cannot even imagine how the prosecution could have established why
defendant was at the tether office for a drug test without some evidence of defendant’s history with
law-enforcement officers. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not specific, and most
of the evidence simply concerned defendant’s contact with the police. It did not refer at any point
to any prior criminal charge against defendant. Hence, the testimony was sanitized to ensure that
the jury knew as little as possible about defendant’s prior criminal involvement.

Deputy LaCross’s comment that he knew defendant from contacts over the past 30 years
was less directly related to the circumstances of the offense, so it carried a greater risk of prejudice.

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But the prosecution did not ask Deputy LaCross for any details of the prior contacts. After Deputy
LaCross made the statement, the prosecutor asked him if defendant knew that Deputy LaCross was
a law-enforcement officer, which brought the direct examination back to the elements of the crime.
Thus, Deputy LaCross’s single statement about knowing defendant from contacts during a 30-year
period does not warrant relief on appeal. The admission of that lone statement neither rose to the
level of plain error nor affected defendant’s substantial rights.

Turning to the prosecutor, defendant blames her for improperly cross-examining him about
his experiences on tether and about cases unrelated to the instant case. But defendant volunteered
testimony about having been off tether, and he claimed that the offense for which he was on trial
was his newest case, so the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by posing questions designed
to counter those claims. A prosecutor may not inject “issues broader than the guilt or innocence
of the accused under the controlling law.” People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 284; 531 NW2d 659
(1995). But “[p]rosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in light of defense
arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial.” People v Brown, 279
Mich App 116, 135; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). If a “defendant has placed his character in issue, it is
proper for the prosecution to introduce evidence that the defendant’s character is not as impeccable
as is claimed.” People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 594; 569 NW2d 663 (1997). The exchanges
at issue are as follows:

Q. So, I guess, to be clear this is not your first time on tether?

A. No.

Q. You’ve been on and off of tether a few times; right?

A. I’ve been off tether one time.

Q. Okay. So in File—I guess would you agree with me—20-4063-FH you
were on tether from February 3rd of 2020 through February 11th of 2021?

A. Correct.

Q. And then you went back on tether in File 22-65850-FY on—well I guess
you were arraigned on March 29th of 2022 and you were placed out on tether again?

A. Yeah, I was tooken off tether for unauthorized visitors.

Q. Right.

A. Right.

Q. So you had some tether violations?

A. Uh—no drug—no drug failures; unauthorized visitors.

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Later, the prosecution asked defendant if he would have stopped if he had heard commands from
the deputies, and defendant responded that he would have done so, which resulted in the following
exchange:

A. Yeah, I paid $5,000.00 to bond out of jail four—four days prior so I
definitely wouldn’t have messed out—messed up bond. I—there was no reason for
me to try to run. I paid bond and I was doing everything legal; so no.

Q. I mean—but you already admitted at the last go around when you were
on tether you had bond violations; right?

A. I got out of jail though because you were—I’ve been waiting two and a
half years for—for a trial that you refuse to run.

Q. You’ve been waiting for quite a few trials?

A. Three years. Yeah, this is—this is the newest one.

Q. Oh, no.

A. This is the newest one and I’ve got witnesses to it. Three years ago I
allegedly stabbed somebody, but I’m still waiting for that trial because you guys
are trying to frame me.

Defense counsel objected, and the court cautioned defendant not to say too much. The prosecution
impeached defendant about the instant case being his most recent case, and then asked him about
several different charges he faced, although the prosecution did not provide details other than that
two of the cases involved “multiple felony charges.”

The prosecutor’s comments appear to be appropriate in the context of the trial. Defendant’s
theory of the case was that he had been on tether for more than 24 months and had been regularly
tested for drugs during that period, that he believed that his test was clean, and that he thought that
he was free to leave. When the prosecution asked defendant about his time on tether from 2020 to
2021 and about being placed back on tether in March 2022, it was in response to defendant’s claim
that he had been on tether for the past two years. Likewise, when defendant said that he would not
have intentionally violated bond conditions because of the money he had paid to bond out of jail,
it was appropriate for the prosecution to ask about the fact that he had just admitted to a previous
bond violation. Finally, when defendant asserted that the instant case was his newest case, it was
proper for the prosecution to question defendant about other cases that followed. Moreover, when
instructing the jury, the trial court stated that the fact that defendant “commented on other alleged
crimes are not evidence” and that the lawyers’ statements and questions were not evidence. “Jurors
are presumed to follow their instructions, and jury instructions are presumed to cure most errors.”
People v Mahone, 294 Mich App 208, 212; 816 NW2d 436 (2011). Accordingly, we find no error,
much less plain error that affected defendant’s substantial rights.

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B. JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE CHARGED OFFENSE

Defendant faults the trial court for inadequately and improperly instructing the jury on the
charged crime of resisting or obstructing a police officer under MCL 750.81d(1). To preserve an
instructional error for review on appeal, a defendant must object to the instruction before the jury
deliberates. People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 225; 663 NW2d 499 (2003). Defendant did
not voice any objection, so the issue is not preserved, and our review is limited to a search for plain
error that affected substantial rights. People v Spaulding, 332 Mich App 638, 652; 957 NW2d 843
(2020). Jury instructions must include every element of the charged offense, and must not exclude
material issues, defenses, or theories supported by the evidence. Id. at 653. It is a constitutional
error for a jury instruction to omit an element of a crime. People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503;
803 NW2d 200 (2011).

The offense of resisting or obstructing a police office under MCL 750.81d(1) requires the
prosecution to prove (1) the defendant resisted or obstructed a police officer, and (2) the defendant
knew or had reason to know that the person whom the defendant resisted or obstructed was a police
officer performing official duties. Corr, 287 Mich App at 503. Additionally, the prosecution must
prove that the actions of the officer were lawful. Quinn, 305 Mich App at 491-492. The trial court
appropriately instructed the jury that the prosecution had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
defendant resisted or obstructed Deputy LaCross, that defendant knew or had reason to know that
Deputy LaCross was “performing his duties at the time,” and that Deputy LaCross gave defendant
“a lawful command, was making a lawful arrest, or was otherwise performing a lawful act.” Thus,
the trial court instructed the jury on each element of the charged crime.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not reading M Crim JI 13.5(5), which states:

The prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [arrest was legal /
the (officer / (state authorized person) was acting within (his / her) legal authority].
It is up to you to determine whether the [officer’s / (state authorized person)’s]
actions were legal according to the law as I have just described it to you.

The trial court’s failure to read that instruction was not error at all, much less plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. The trial court’s instructions not only directed the jury to determine
whether Deputy LaCross gave defendant “a lawful command, was making a lawful arrest, or was
otherwise performing a lawful act[,]” but also explained that “[a]n arrest is legal if it is made due
to a violation of a condition of release” on bond. The trial court further informed the jury that “[a]
peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest and take into custody a Defendant” if “the peace officer
. . . has or receives positive information that another peace officer has reasonable cause to believe
. . . that he violated or has violated a condition of release as imposed by MCL 764.15e.” Because
the trial court accurately and completely defined the elements of the charged offense, defendant is
not entitled to any relief for the trial court’s failure to read M Crim JI 13.5(5) to the jury.

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C. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendant accuses the prosecutor of engaging in misconduct during her cross-examination
of him and in her closing argument.1 But defendant did not object at any point to the questions or
the arguments of the prosecutor, so our analysis is confined to a review for plain error that affected
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010).
A prosecutor may not inject “issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the
controlling law,” Bahoda, 448 Mich at 284 (quotation marks omitted), but prosecutorial remarks
“must be read as a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments and the relationship they
bear to the evidence admitted at trial.” Brown, 279 Mich App at 135. Generally, prosecutors
should be given “great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct,” and they “are free to argue
the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to [their] theory of the
case.” Bahoda, 448 Mich at 282 (citations and quotation marks omitted, alteration in original).
But prosecutors cannot “vouch for the credibility of a witness, nor suggest that the government has
some special knowledge that the witness is testifying truthfully.” People v Howard, 226 Mich
App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). In contrast, prosecutors may “argue from the facts that a
witness is credible” or that the defendant or another witness should not be believed. Id.

Here, the prosecutor suggested in her cross-examination of defendant, and then asserted in
her closing argument, that defendant lied. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated:

And then on the other hand you have [defendant] who disagrees. But you also
watched him lie about this is—sounds like its one big conspiracy theory against
[defendant] that this was the last case in time and we’re just holding him on all
these charges.

That statement was proper in the context of defendant’s trial. The prosecutor was allowed to argue
from the facts that defendant, who testified in his own defense, was not credible. See id. Defendant
testified that the charge in the instant case was his newest case, but the prosecutor impeached him
on that claim by questioning defendant about more recent cases against him. Hence, it was proper
for the prosecutor to refer to that exchange and use it to argue that defendant’s testimony was not
truthful.

The challenged portion of the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant is as follows:

Q. —so when Undersheriff Postma gets behind you and you stop and you
walk towards him—

A. Yep.

1
This Court has recognized a distinction between claims of technical or inadvertent prosecutorial
error and claims of prosecutorial misconduct, which would warrant professional discipline. People
v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 87-88; 867 NW2d 452 (2015). Here, defendant presents the issue as
one of true prosecutorial misconduct, so we must analyze it as such.

-7-
Q. —you acquiesce to the arrest?

A. Put my hands up.

Q. Yep.

A. Yeah, I mean yeah, usually when a cop pulls down on you with their
lights on, and they’re like hey, come here, you stop. So if I was in the—already in
the movement of running why—why would I have stopped and put my hands up?

Q. Well—I mean if you see cop cars coming from the—the south and then
you see a cop car coming from the north; right?

A. Uh—I just told you I didn’t see no other cop cars coming.

Q. Okay. Well I—

A. So—

Q. —also think that you’ve lied about a lot of stuff here today so.

A. That’s your opinion.

Q. Okay. Fair enough.

The prosecutor’s comment that she thought defendant “lied about a lot of stuff here today” was an
improper statement, as opposed to a proper question. Indeed, the prosecution concedes on appeal
that the comment was plainly inappropriate, but contends that that error did not affect defendant’s
substantial rights. We agree.

First, the prosecutor’s statement during cross-examination of defendant, although plainly
improper, did not imply that she had “special knowledge” about defendant’s veracity. See Bahoda,
448 Mich at 276. Second, the comment was an isolated remark made during a combative exchange
in the course of an otherwise-appropriate cross-examination. See People v Watson, 245 Mich App
572, 591; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Third, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming on the
charge of resisting or obstructing an officer. Three law-enforcement officers testified about how
defendant flatly ignored shouted commands to stop as he fled from the building after learning that
he was going to jail, and he had to be apprehended after he ran away as fast as he could from the
officers. Fourth, the trial court instructed the jurors that “[t]he lawyers’ statements and arguments
are not evidence. They are only meant to help you understand the evidence and each side’s legal
theories.” Additionally, the trial court told the jurors that “[t]he lawyers’ questions to the witnesses
. . . are also not evidence.” Because “jurors are presumed to follow their instructions,” People v
Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008), the jurors presumably understood that the
prosecutor’s statement was not evidence, nor could they accept the statement as true. As a result,
the plainly erroneous statement of the prosecutor did not affect defendant’s substantial rights.

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D. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant argues with respect to each claim of error that his trial attorney’s failure to make
an objection constituted ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to justify a new trial. “A claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and constitutional law.”
People v Isrow, 339 Mich App 522, 531; 984 NW2d 528 (2021) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Thus, we review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, and we review the legal
questions involved de novo. Id. Clear error exists when this Court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was made by the trial court. Id. Because defendant presented his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel in a posttrial motion, that claim is preserved for review. See
People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012) (explaining that “a defendant must
move in the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing to preserve the defendant’s claim
that his or her counsel was ineffective”).

The United States Constitution and Michigan’s 1963 Constitution both guarantee criminal
defendants the effective assistance of counsel. People v Yeager, 511 Mich 478, 488; 999 NW2d
490 (2023). To obtain a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show
that his attorney’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . .” People
v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). Also, defendant must demonstrate that,
“but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome [of the
trial] would have been different.” Id. A “reasonable probability” means “a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Yeager, 511 Mich at 488 (quotation marks and citations
omitted). As a general rule, “attorneys are given broad latitude to determine trial strategy, and
there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was born from sound strategy.” Id. Also,
“[f]ailing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.” People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). With
these standards in mind, we must consider each of the two requirements for ineffective assistance
of counsel, i.e., deficient performance and prejudice.

1. DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE

Defendant broadly faults his trial attorney for failing to object to the prosecutor’s conduct
at several stages of the trial. First, defendant asserts that his attorney should have objected to the
presentation of evidence that he had been on tether before and that all the law-enforcement officers
who testified had had contact with him for years in the course of their duties. Based on our ruling
that no error occurred in the admission of that evidence, we conclude that defendant’s attorney had
neither a reason nor a responsibility to object to that evidence because any objection would have
been futile. See id. Second, defendant blames his attorney for failing to ask the trial court to give
the jury instruction set forth in M Crim JI 13.5(5). But as we have explained above, the trial court
did not need to give that instruction because its instructions fully and fairly described the elements
of the charge against defendant. Therefore, defense counsel’s failure to request M Crim JI 13.5(5)
cannot be characterized as deficient representation because such a request would have been futile.
See id. Similarly, although defendant criticizes his attorney for failing to object to the prosecutor’s
closing argument, the prosecutor said nothing objectionable in her closing argument or her rebuttal,
so any objection would have been futile. See id.

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Defendant has a point, however, in claiming deficient performance based on his attorney’s
silence following the prosecutor’s statement during cross-examination of defendant that “I . . . also
think that you’ve lied about a lot of stuff here today so.” Perhaps counsel’s failure to object could
be characterized as a strategic decision not to engage in an argument about defendant’s credibility
in front of the jury, but that characterization seems too charitable to counsel. Instead, we conclude
that defense counsel should have objected to that plainly improper statement, so defendant has met
his obligation to show deficient performance in that one respect.

1. PREJUDICE

Although defendant has demonstrated deficient performance by his counsel in one respect,
defendant is not entitled to a new trial unless he can establish that the deficient performance caused
him prejudice. In other words, defendant must show that, “but for counsel’s deficient performance,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.” Trakhtenberg, 493
Mich at 51. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Yeager, 511 Mich at 488 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant has made
no such showing in this case.

As we have explained, the prosecutor’s comment was a single, isolated remark made during
a combative exchange in the course of an otherwise-appropriate cross-examination. Beyond that,
the evidence was overwhelming on the charge of resisting or obstructing an officer. Specifically,
three law-enforcement officers testified about how defendant blatantly ignored shouted commands
to stop as he fled the building after being told that he was going to jail, and then defendant had to
be apprehended after he ran away as fast as he could from the officers. Under the circumstances,
we find no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted defendant if his trial attorney
had objected to the prosecutor’s comment during her cross-examination that “I . . . also think that
you’ve lied about a lot of stuff here today so.” Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a new trial
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

Affirmed.

/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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