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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re reeves/reeves-knight Minors

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 374284
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED
March 19, 2026
10:16 AM
In re REEVES/REEVES-KNIGHT, Minors.

No. 374284
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2021-000196-NA

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and REDFORD and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
minor children, JJR and DRK, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii). We affirm.

I. FACTS

In February 2021, respondent and the children were living in a home with the children’s
father, Juma Reeves, as well as another of Reeves’ romantic partners, Brandy Nelson, and two of
Reeves’ other children. On February 16, 2021, Reeves reported to the police that Nelson burned
JJR and DRK on their cheeks with a lit cigarette. Nelson explained that she burned the children
accidentally but also reported to police that Reeves beat her and locked her in a closet for two days.

Children’s Protective Services (CPS) contacted the family several times in the following
days and observed that the home was dirty and lacked running water, the utilities to the home were
illegally connected, the home was strewn with feces and dirty diapers, the children did not have
their own beds, a window in the home was covered with plywood, the home was being heated by
a propane heater and the stove, and a dead dog was chained in the backyard. The children were
removed from the home and placed with a relative as part of a safety plan. Contrary to the safety
plan, Reeves retrieved the children from the relative’s home.

Meanwhile, Nelson was reported missing by her family. Police received a tip that Nelson
was being held in the trunk of a car driven by Reeves and respondent. Police stopped the car and
discovered JJR and DRK in the back seat without proper restraints; the children were covered in
feces and urine. Police also discovered a bloody handprint in the trunk of the car; the blood later

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was identified as Nelson’s. Nelson’s body thereafter was discovered in a garage two houses away
from Reeves’ home. Reeves was arrested and later pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in
connection with Nelson’s death.

Meanwhile, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), petitioned
to terminate Reeves’ and respondent’s parental rights to JJR and DRK. After the petition was
amended, respondent pleaded no contest to the court’s jurisdiction and agreed to participate in a
parent agency treatment plan with the goal of returning the children to her care. 1 Initially,
respondent participated in the ordered treatment plan. At a review hearing in June 2022, the foster
care worker testified that respondent had housing, was enrolled in domestic violence counseling,
and was visiting the children.

By November 2022, however, respondent no longer was participating in the treatment plan.
The foster care supervisor testified that respondent had not completed her individual therapy or
her domestic violence services, and she was failing to attend many of the scheduled visits with the
children. Respondent also was not participating in the children’s appointments to address their
significant special needs. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered DHHS to file a petition to
terminate respondent’s parental rights.

After a series of delays, DHHS submitted a supplemental petition seeking termination of
respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j), alleging that the
children have significant mental health needs and that respondent, although aware of her children’s
participation in mental health services, failed to participate in those services. The petition further
alleged that respondent failed to attend 55 of the 137 scheduled visits with the children.

Respondent thereafter pleaded no contest to the statutory bases for termination alleged in
the supplemental petition. She admitted that she was given a treatment plan with the goal of
reunification, and that she did not fulfill the requirements of her treatment plan. Following the
plea, the trial court found that statutory bases existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and are not
likely to be rectified within a reasonable time) and (c)(ii) (other conditions exist that cause the
children to come within the court’s jurisdiction, and the parent has not rectified those conditions
after being given an opportunity to do so).

At the hearing to determine the best interests of the children, the trial court admitted
respondent’s clinical evaluation without objection, and a foster care worker testified that
respondent had failed to comply with many aspects of the treatment plan, notably, visiting the
children and attending therapy with the children to learn about their needs in light of their
developmental delays. At the conclusion of the best interests hearing, the trial court issued its
order terminating respondent’s parental rights, finding that (1) the children have significant mental
and emotional needs, and respondent was not involved in their therapy, (2) while there was a
parental bond, the bond was not strong, (3) the children were thriving in foster care, and their foster

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Reeve’s parental rights to the children were terminated.

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parents were willing to adopt the children, (4) respondent’s untreated bi-polar disorder and
schizophrenia hampered her ability to care for the children, (5) respondent attended only 58% of
the visits offered, and (6) the children had been in care for almost four years, and respondent was
still unable to care for them independently. Respondent now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

Respondent contends that the trial court erred by determining that terminating her parental
rights was in the best interests of the children. We disagree.

This Court reviews the trial court’s decision regarding a child’s best interests for clear error.
In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 276; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). In doing so, we focus on the child
rather than the parent. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). A trial
court’s decision is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, upon reviewing
the entire evidence we are left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
In re Keillor, 325 Mich App 80, 93; 923 NW2d 617 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

When a trial court determines that a statutory basis for terminating a parent’s rights has
been established, the trial court must terminate the parent’s rights if a preponderance of the
evidence demonstrates that termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re
Lombard, ___ Mich App __, _; __ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367714); slip op at 5.
When determining the best interests of a child in a termination proceeding, the trial court must
weigh the available evidence and should consider a wide variety of factors, including the child’s
bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and
finality, the advantages of the foster home over the parent’s home, the likelihood that the child
could be returned to the parent’s home in the foreseeable future, and the parent’s compliance with
the case service plan. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 276-277. “The trial court may also
consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, . . . the parent’s visitation history with the child,
the children’s wellbeing while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re Rippy, 330 Mich
App 350, 360-361; 948 NW2d 131 (2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Also relevant
are a child’s safety and well-being and the risk a child might face if returned to the parent’s care.
In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 141-142; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).

A review of the record in this case demonstrates that a preponderance of the evidence
supports the trial court’s determination that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interests. Both children have significant developmental delays due, at least in part,
to the neglect and trauma they experienced as young children. Because the children have extensive
special needs, the trial court ordered respondent to participate in the children’s medical and
behavioral health appointments. Anjel Parkinson, a foster care specialist, testified that after years
of services, respondent had not attended any of the children’s appointments to learn about their
development and the care the children required. Parkinson testified that even when the possibility
of losing her children approached, respondent continued to demonstrate a lack of interest in the
children’s lives and failed to attend their appointments.

Parkinson also testified that although there was a bond between respondent and the
children, the bond was not strong. She observed that respondent’s visits appeared to be merely
part of the children’s routine and were “very transactional” rather than emotional. When the

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children needed assistance during their visits, they did not go to respondent for help, but instead
went to Parkinson, which led her to conclude that respondent’s “children are similarly bonded with
me as they are her.” Parkinson also testified that respondent’s visits with the children were
inconsistent. Although respondent testified that she lacked transportation to visit the children,
Parkinson testified that she repeatedly gave respondent bus tickets, but respondent nonetheless
missed approximately 58% of the offered visits.

The trial court considered the length of time since the children had been removed from
respondent’s care, noting that “[t]hese children waited four years” for respondent to become a
better parent, and “[w]e are no closer to that today than we were on the day the children came into
care.” Given the ages of the children, they had been in the custody of someone other than
respondent for approximately 80% of their lives as of the date of the best-interest hearing. During
that time, the children were with their foster families in long-term placements, and the foster
families were willing to adopt them. The trial court referee further found the children’s progress
in their foster homes was critically important, and that further time spent attempting to reunify
respondent with the children actually would be detrimental to the children.

The trial court thus considered respondent’s failure to adhere to the treatment plan,
respondent’s limited parenting ability, respondent’s lack of interest in the children’s
developmental and mental health progress, the advantages of the children’s foster-care placements,
and that the bond between respondent and her children was not strong. We observe that the
children’s need for permanency, stability, and finality with their foster families, where they are
thriving, is paramount. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347-348. Accordingly, respondent
failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred when it determined that it was in the children’s best
interests to terminate her parental rights.

Respondent also argues that petitioner’s reunification efforts were not reasonable given her
cognitive limitations. We note that this issue is not identified as an issue on appeal in respondent’s
statement of questions presented, and the issue thereby is abandoned. See In re Rippy, 330 Mich
App at 362 n 5. In any event, we find this argument unpersuasive. Respondent does not identify
the services she contends should have been provided, nor has she identified how those services
would have helped her become a better parent. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 341. Many of
the requirements of respondent’s treatment plan did not require a high level of comprehension or
were already tailored to her individual needs, such as individual therapy and parental visitation,
and yet she failed to complete these aspects of the plan. Her lengthy history of noncompliance
with the plan that she was offered, with many aspects achievable even with her cognitive
limitations, led the trial court reasonably to conclude that further reunification efforts would have
been futile. See In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
Affirmed.

/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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