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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Michael Weeks v. Chelsea Clay

Court of Appeals of Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A26A0661

• Disposition: Affirmed In Part/Vacated In Part

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.6K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed In Part/Vacated In Part

Combined Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION
BROWN, C. J.,
RICKMAN, P. J., and MERCIER, J.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 26, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0661. WEEKS v. CLAY.

MERCIER, Judge.

Michael Weeks appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition to

legitimate his biological daughter, R. C. Although we affirm the legitimation

determination, we find that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), OCGA § 19-9-40 et seq.,

to award custody in this matter. To the extent the trial court’s order addresses

custody, therefore, it must be vacated.

A trial court exercises its discretion in resolving a legitimation petition, and we

will not disturb the court’s ruling absent an abuse of that discretion. See Mathenia v.

Brumbelow, 308 Ga. 714, 715 (1) (843 SE2d 582) (2020). On appeal from a legitimation
determination, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling,

keeping in mind that

factual findings made after a hearing shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The appellate courts will
not disturb fact findings of a trial court if there is any evidence to sustain
them.

Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Viewed in this manner, the evidence shows that R. C. was born out of wedlock

to Weeks and Chelsea Clay in 2017. Following the birth, Weeks gave Clay money

“every blue moon” to help with R. C. , but he did not pay consistent child support.

Weeks eventually moved to Texas, and he periodically traveled to Georgia to visit R.

C.

In June of 2023, the parties agreed that R. C. would stay with Weeks in Texas

for the summer. Weeks picked R. C. up in Georgia and drove her to Texas, with the

expectation that he would return R. C. to Clay before school commenced in August.

As August approached, however, Weeks asked Clay whether he could keep R. C. in

Texas, noting that it was expensive for him to bring her back to Georgia. Clay allowed

2
her daughter to stay in Texas for the school year, but insisted that she be returned to

Georgia in May of 2024, and Weeks agreed to that condition. Clay gave Weeks money

and provided him with R. C.’s birth certificate so that he could enroll her in school.

At some point, Weeks stopped picking up Clay’s telephone calls, and she was

unable to contact R. C. using the tablet she had purchased for R. C. so that they could

communicate directly. When Clay finally spoke with Weeks, he told her that she could

only contact R. C. through him. Clay sent Weeks money for a rental car to return R.

C. to Georgia in May, and she also offered to arrange a plane ticket for R. C., but

Weeks did not bring the child back, again stopped answering Clay’s calls, and refused

to give Clay his address.

Approximately six months after R. C. began living with him in Texas, Weeks

spoke with an attorney about obtaining custody of her. He was told that he first needed

to be legitimated as R. C.’s father in Georgia, after which he could pursue custody

through the Texas courts. Weeks thus filed the instant petition for legitimation on July

19, 2024, asserting, among other things, that R. C. had resided in Texas for over one

year and that Texas was R. C.’s “home state.” The trial court denied the legitimation

petition and ordered Weeks to return R. C. to Clay. This appeal followed.

3
1. Weeks first argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard in resolving

the legitimation petition. Historically, courts addressing a petition for legitimation

have applied a two-pronged test based on the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in

In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292 (358 SE2d 459) (1987):

The court must initially determine whether the father has abandoned his
opportunity interest to develop a relationship with the child. Then,
depending on the nature of the putative father’s relationship with the
child and other surrounding circumstances, the standard for evaluating
whether legitimation is appropriate is either a test of his fitness as a
parent or the best interest of the child.

Smith v. Soligon, 254 Ga. App. 172, 173 (2) (561 SE2d 850) (2002) (citing In re Baby

Girl Eason, 257 Ga. at 296–297(1)); see also In the Interest of J. M., 337 Ga. App. 811,

813 (788 SE2d 888) (2016) (applying the Eason test).

Following a hearing at which both parties testified, the trial court determined

that Weeks had not abandoned his opportunity interest in having a relationship with

R. C. But it concluded that legitimation was not in R. C.’s best interests. Specifically,

it found that Weeks had used lies and deceit to gain control of R. C. and keep her from

Clay; had failed to facilitate and at times hindered communication between R. C. and

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Clay; had refused to return R. C. to Clay, despite his promises to do so; had made

unfounded attacks on Clay’s character; and would likely alienate R. C. from Clay.

On appeal, Weeks argues that the trial court improperly applied the best

interests standard — rather than the parental fitness test — in assessing his

legitimation effort. In 2016, however, the legislature amended the statutory provision

governing legitimation petitions to require consideration of the child’s best interests.

See Mathenia, 308 Ga. at 724 (4). Pursuant to that amendment:

Upon the presentation and filing of a legitimation petition, and after a
hearing for which notice was provided to all interested parties, the court
may issue an order declaring the biological father’s relationship with the
child to be legitimate, provided that such order is in the best interests of the
child.

OCGA § 19-7-22(d)(1) (emphasis supplied).

The legislature has made clear that the best interests of the child — not simply

parental fitness — are key to resolving a legitimation petition. See Sheppard v. Milsaps,

374 Ga. App. 480, 487(1)(a)(ii) (913 SE2d 117) (2025) (“[F]ollowing a hearing on a

legitimation petition, a court may issue an order granting that petition provided that

such order is in the best interests of the child.” (quotation marks omitted)); Schatte

5
v. McGee, 368 Ga. App. 868, 870(1) (891 SE2d 435) (2023) (“If the trial court

concludes that the biological father has not abandoned this opportunity interest, the

trial court must determine whether legitimation is in the best interest of the child.”).

The trial court did not use the wrong standard in assessing Weeks’s petition.1

1. Next, Weeks argues that the trial court failed to consider and properly weigh

all factors associated with the best interests of the child standard. Weeks notes that,

in the context of child custody and visitation, OCGA § 19-9-3(a)(3) sets forth 17

factors that a trial court may consider when determining the best interests of a child.

He contends that each of these factors must also be evaluated in the legitimation

context and, although the trial court can weigh the factors at its discretion, it “is not

free to ignore relevant factors[.]”

The statute provides, however, that a trial court assessing the best interests of

a child “may consider any relevant factor including, but not limited to[,]” the

enumerated factors. OCGA § 19-9-3(a)(3) (emphasis supplied). Even if Weeks is

1
Our Supreme Court has raised concerns regarding the constitutionality of the
best interests requirement in OCGA § 19-7-22(d)(1) “where the ‘fit parent’ standard,
rather than the ‘best interests’ standard, must be applied to protect an unwed father’s
constitutional rights.” Mathenia, 308 Ga. at 724 (4). Weeks, however, has not
challenged the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-22(d)(1) or presented any argument
as to why this statutory provision and its best interests requirement do not apply here.

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correct that OCGA § 19-9-3(a)(3) applies here, no particular factor or analysis is

mandatory. And nothing in the trial court’s order indicates that it failed to consider

any relevant evidence.

When determining whether legitimation is in a child’s best interests, a trial

court ultimately “must examine the benefits that might flow to the child if he [or she]

were legitimated and consider the legal consequences of the grant of the petition.”

Sheppard, 374 Ga. App. at 487(1)(a)(ii) (quotation marks omitted). In this case, the

trial court found that Weeks had used lies and deception to keep R. C. from her

mother and limit their communication, evidencing an unwillingness to facilitate and

encourage a close and continuing relationship between R. C. and Clay. See OCGA §

19-9-3(a)(3)(N) (in determining best interests of a child, trial court may consider

“[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close

and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent,

consistent with the best interest of the child”). The court also found that, given

Weeks’s failure to return R. C. to Georgia, he likely “would continue to keep [R. C.]

from [Clay], further eroding their relationship, if the Court were to grant him legal

rights to the child.”

7
The trial court further noted that Weeks had experienced extensive periods of

“no work[,]” which would not benefit R. C. And it expressed concern that R. C.

would not benefit from Texas custody laws that, the court feared, would favor Weeks

because he had managed to keep R. C. in Texas through deception. The trial court

concluded:

[Weeks] has continued to hold the minor child long past [Clay’s] initial
grant of consensual visitation, and long past the rescission of any grant
of visitation. [Weeks] is illegally depriving [Clay] of her [p]arental
[r]ights to her child. The [c]ourt will not aid [Weeks] in this kidnap by
fraud and deceit. For the [c]ourt to hold otherwise would be to sanction
the fraud and deceit of [Weeks].

Although Weeks testified that he wanted R. C. in Texas because he was worried

about Clay’s stability, living situation, and alleged drug use, and he claimed that the

parties had always planned for R. C. to remain in Texas for the entire 2023-2024

school year, the trial count deemed his testimony unfounded and lacking in credibility.

The trial court was authorized to reject Weeks’s testimony. See Sheppard, 374 Ga.

App. at 486(1)(a)(i) (“The trier of fact is not obligated to believe a witness even if the

testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony.”

(quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, at least some evidence supports the trial

8
court’s findings that Weeks did not return R. C. when promised, misled Clay about

his plans to bring R. C. home, hindered and at times cut off Clay’s communication

with R. C., made unsubstantiated allegations about Clay, experienced periods of

unemployment, and was trying to manipulate the custody situation by keeping R. C.

in Texas through deceit.

Given the particular circumstances of this case, the trial court properly

exercised its discretion in determining that legitimation was not in R. C.’s best

interests. See Davis v. Taylor, 370 Ga. App. 837, 843(2)(c) (898 SE2d 574) (2024)

(“Because there was evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that [the mother]

had undermined [the child’s] relationship with [the father] . . . , we cannot say that the

trial court abused her very broad discretion in concluding that the award of primary

physical custody to [the father] was in [the child’s] best interest.”). The trial court,

therefore, did not err in denying Weeks’s petition for legitimation. See OCGA § 19-7-

22(d)(1).

1. After rejecting the legitimation request, the trial court further ordered Weeks

to return R. C. to “the sole legal and physical custody of” Clay, explaining that Weeks

“ha[d] no right to hold the child against her mother’s will, and no rights to the child

9
at all[.]” Weeks now challenges the trial court’s authority to enter a custody order on

the ground that Texas — not Georgia — was R. C.’s home state.

As an initial matter, we note that Weeks’s legitimation petition did not ask the

trial court to enter an order as to custody; it only requested legitimation. At the

hearing on the petition, counsel for Weeks explicitly stated that Weeks was not

seeking a custody determination “because Georgia is not the child’s home state.”

Counsel further clarified Weeks’s intent, stating: “So, this is, essentially, a bifurcated

case. Georgia will have the legitimation portion, Texas will have the custody portion.”

See OCGA § 19-7-22(b) (“The biological father of a child born out of wedlock may

render his relationship with the child legitimate by petitioning the superior court of

the county of the residence of the child’s mother or other party having legal custody

or guardianship of the child[.]”); OCGA § 19-7-22(g) (“A legitimation petition may

also include claims for visitation, parenting time, or custody. If such claims are raised

in the legitimation action, the court may order, in addition to legitimation, visitation,

parenting time, or custody based on the best interests of the child standard.”

(emphasis supplied)). Nevertheless, Clay asked the trial court to “bring [her] baby

10
back,” and the trial court addressed custody, ordering Weeks to return R. C. to Clay

immediately.

We agree with Weeks that the trial court lacked authority to make such an

order. Under the UCCJEA, a Georgia court generally

has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if ...
[t]his state is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live in this state[.]

OCGA § 19-9-61(a)(1).

The UCCJEA defines the term “home state” as “the state in which a child

lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months

immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” OCGA § 19-

9-41(7); see also Markle v. Dass, 300 Ga. 702, 705–06 (797 SE2d 868) (2017) (“[T]he

term ‘lived’ in the definition of ‘home state’ refers to the state where the child is

physically present without regard to legal residence.” (quotation marks omitted)).

The record shows that R. C. had been living with Weeks in Texas for over one year

when Weeks filed the legitimation petition, a proceeding the trial court used as a

11
springboard for the custody order. Nothing indicates that a court had previously

entered a ruling regarding custody, rendering this the initial child custody

determination. See OCGA § 19-9-41(3) (“‘Child custody determination’ means a

judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical

custody, or visitation with respect to a child.”); OCGA § 19-9-41(8) (“‘Initial

determination’ means the first child custody determination concerning a particular

child.”). And although there are exceptions to the home state requirement, the record

contains no evidence that an exception existed here. See OCGA §§ 19-9-61(a)(2-4),

19-9-64, 19-9-68(a); Tex. Fam. Code § 152.208(a).

Because Texas was R. C.’s home state at the time, the trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to enter an order as to her custody. See Markle, 300 Ga. at 706–07

(Georgia trial court lacked jurisdiction to order putative father, who had not

legitimated his son, but had lived with the child in New Mexico for over six months,

to return the child to the mother in Georgia); OCGA § 19-9-61(a)(1). Thus, we affirm

12
the denial of Weeks’s legitimation petition, but we must vacate the trial court’s order

to the extent it attempted to resolve issues with respect to custody.2

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Brown, C. J., and Rickman, P. J.,

concur.

2
It appears that Weeks, in fact, returned R. C. to Clay on December 22, 2024.
It is unclear where and with whom R. C. is living at this point (over one year later). We
note, however, that under Georgia law, “[o]nly the mother of a child born out of
wedlock is entitled to custody of the child, unless the father legitimates the child as
provided in Code Section 19-7-22. Otherwise, the mother may exercise all parental
power over the child.” OCGA § 19-7-25.

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