Meiner v. Superior Court - Motion to Suppress Granted

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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Meiner v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: G065769M

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (43.6K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/26/26 (unmodified opn. attached)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SCOTT MEINER,

Petitioner, G065769

v. (Super. Ct. No. 25WF0813)

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ORANGE COUNTY,

Respondent;
ORDER MODIFYING
THE PEOPLE, OPINION; NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT
Real Party in Interest.

It is hereby ordered that the opinion filed on March 18, 2026, be
modified as follows:
On page 2, the first paragraph of the opinion, delete the first
sentence and replace with: “In this writ proceeding, Scott Meiner challenges
an order denying his motion to quash or traverse a warrant that he alleges
was obtained from an illegal probation search.”
On page 9, under DISPOSITION, delete the last sentence:
“Petitioner shall recover his costs on appeal.”
This modification does not change the judgment.

DELANEY, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, J.

SCOTT, J.

2
Filed 3/18/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SCOTT MEINER,

Petitioner, G065769

v. (Super. Ct. No. 25WF0813)

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ORANGE COUNTY, OPINION

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of
mandate/prohibition; Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Petition granted. Real-party-in-
interest’s Motion for Judicial Notice. Granted.
Sara Nakada, Public Defender, Adam Vining, Assistant Public
Defender, and Alexander Bartel, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Todd Spitzer, Orange County District Attorney, and Matthew O.
Plunkett, Senior Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.

---

Scott Meiner appeals from an order denying his motion to quash
or traverse a warrant that he alleges was obtained from an illegal probation
search. Specifically, Meiner contends the search of his Apple Pay account
exceeded the scope of his probation search terms, which expressly excluded
searches of “financial accounts.” As discussed below, we conclude the
suppression motion should be, and was brought as, a motion to traverse.
Turning to the merits, we conclude an Apple Pay account is excluded from
probation searches because it is a “financial account” pursuant to the
probation search terms. We thus order the superior court to vacate its order
denying the motion to suppress and to enter an order granting it.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The underlying facts are not disputed. While investigating
whether Meiner was stealing from an auto business by directing customers to
send money to him rather than to the business, officers learned Meiner was
on probation and had a probation officer. Officers then reviewed Meiner’s
probation terms, which were provided by his probation officer. As part of
probation, Meiner agreed to submit his person, residence, and electronic
devices to search at any time with or without warrant, and with or without
reasonable cause when required by his probation officer or law enforcement.
In an attachment, the probation search terms were limited as follows:
“Search authorization does not extend to medical/legal information, financial

2
accounts or transactions, or to any data created before the acceptance of this
probation grant.”
Officers then went to Meiner’s apartment, arrested him and
seized his cell phone. After obtaining his cell phone password, officers
searched the phone, including, as relevant to this matter, his Apple Pay
account. A review of the Apple Pay account showed two linked debit cards,
one with Chase and one with Credit One.
Officers then obtained a search warrant for Meiner’s Chase and
Credit One bank accounts. In the statement of probable cause submitted to
the magistrate, the detective handling the investigation stated he was shown
“a copy of Meiner’s [probation] search terms, which included electronic
devices.” He did not include the limitation excluding financial accounts.
After arresting Meiner, the detective seized his cell phone. The detective also
interviewed Meiner who “admitted he would instruct customers to pay him in
cash or through his personal banking applications (i.e. Apple Pay, Zelle and
Venmo).” The detective stated that after unlocking Meiner’s cellphone, he
“looked at [Meiner’s] Apple Pay, Zelle and Venmo applications. Both the Zelle
and Venmo applications were logged out so [the detective] could not gather
further evidence.” The detective then reviewed several Venmo transfers
between customers and Meiner to obtain Meiner’s Venmo account
information. “While viewing Meiner’s Apple Pay application, [the detective]
saw two debit cards linked to Apple Pay. One was a Chase debit card . . . the
other was a Credit One debit card . . . Apple Pay also has the ability to store
cash within the application, known as Apple Cash, for immediate use.”
The information returned from Chase and Venmo indicated
Meiner had transferred Venmo payments from customers to his Chase
account.

3
On May 22, an information was filed, charging Meiner with three
counts of grand theft in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (a).
Meiner plead not guilty.
On June 12, Meiner filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant
to Penal Code section 1538.5, and to quash a warrant issued based on the
suppressed evidence. In the motion, Meiner argued the officers’ search of his
Apple Pay account exceeded the scope of his probation search terms, and the
evidence obtained, i.e., that he had debit cards with Chase and Credit One,
must be suppressed. He then argued that excising this illegally obtained
information from the statement of probable cause would leave no probable
1
cause to obtain information from Chase or Credit One.
The People opposed the motion to suppress evidence and to quash
the warrant. In its opposition, the district attorney argued the motion is akin
to a motion to traverse the search warrant and should follow traversal
procedures, which includes making a substantial preliminary showing that
the statement of probable cause includes a false statement made “‘knowingly
and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,” and “‘the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.’” The
district attorney then argued that no tainted information was used to obtain
the search warrant because Apple Pay is not a “financial account” since

1 Meiner did not challenge the search of his Zelle and Venmo

accounts. He explained that, while he believes the Zelle and Venmo searches
also violated his Fourth Amendment rights, because no information was
discovered from those illegal searches, there was nothing to exclude.

4
2
neither Apple nor its affiliates are banks. Additionally, no transactions or
other information obtained from the search of Apple Pay, aside from the debit
card number and names of the issuing banks, was used in the statement of
probable cause. Thus, the motion should be denied.
In reply, Meiner disagreed that the appropriate vehicle to
challenge the search warrant is a motion to traverse. He stated he did not
bring a motion to traverse because “he is not positing that the information
contained in [the application for] the warrant is false or a material
misstatement per se. Instead, [he] asserts that information was unlawfully
obtained.” Nevertheless, he requested the court to consider it as a motion to
traverse if it deems it necessary.
As to the merits, Meiner argued the warrant’s probable cause is
based on tainted information. He disputed the People's argument that
“financial accounts” is the same as “bank accounts.” Meiner notes his
probation search terms reference “financial accounts” and not “bank
accounts.” Moreover, he argues Apple Pay is a “financial account” because it
provides many of the functions of a bank. Finally, even if Apple Pay is not a
financial account, it is linked to financial accounts. Thus, the search exceeded
the permissible scope of a probation search.
After hearing further arguments, the superior court denied the
motion to exclude and to quash the warrant, concluding the search was
permitted. The court did not rule on whether the motion should have been
deemed a motion to traverse.

2 We grant the People’s Request for Judicial Notice that Apple

Pay is licensed as a “money transmitter.” We note the judicially-noticed
evidence also shows Apple Pay is regulated by the Department of Financial
Protection and Innovation.

5
On July 21, Meiner filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or
prohibition. He sought an order directing the superior court to vacate its
order denying the motion and enter an order granting the motion, or
alternatively, an order to show cause (OSC) why the respondent court should
not be required to do so. The People filed a preliminary opposition on August
28. This Court issued the OSC on October 2. Thereafter, the People filed a
formal return, and Meiner filed a Reply and/or Traverse.
DISCUSSION
Meiner seeks to suppress the evidence obtained from the search
warrant directed to Chase and Credit One banks. Before reaching the merits
of his suppression motion, we first address whether it should be brought as a
motion to quash or a motion to traverse. The People argue the motion should
be deemed a motion to traverse. We agree.
“A defendant moving to quash a warrant asserts the warrant on
its face lacks probable cause.” (People v. Heslington (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th
947, 958, fn. 7.) “A defendant moving to traverse a warrant ‘mount[s] a
subfacial challenge, i.e., attack[s] the underlying veracity of statements made
on the face of the search warrant application.’” (Ibid.) “A defendant who
challenges a search warrant based on omissions in the affidavit bears the
burden of showing an intentional or reckless omission of material information
that, when added to the affidavit, renders it insufficient to support a finding
of probable cause.” (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 484 (Scott).)
Our review of the moving papers indicates the suppression
motion should be deemed a motion to traverse. Meiner is arguing the
statement of probable cause omitted material information that the probation
search terms did not authorize warrantless search of “financial accounts.”

6
Because that information was omitted, there is insufficient competent
evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
We thus turn to whether Meiner has shown, by a preponderance
of the evidence, an intentional or reckless omission of material information.
(See Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 484 [“[T]he defendant must make his
showing by a preponderance of the evidence, and the affidavit is presumed
valid”].) Meiner produced undisputed evidence that his probation search
terms excluded “financial accounts.” He also produced the statement of
probable cause, wherein the affiant officer admitted being shown the
probation terms. The officer also described Apple Pay as a “banking
application.” Thus, even if there is some confusion on whether a “financial
account” is limited only to bank accounts, it was, at a minimum, reckless for
the officer to omit the evidence that the Apple Pay account might not be
subject to warrantless probation search and the “financial account” exclusion
from the affidavit. Given that the only evidence that Meiner used Chase and
Credit One, instead of the numerous other banks, was the “fruit” of this
illegal warrantless search, it is material information that should have been
presented to the magistrate when seeking a search warrant directed to Chase
and Credit One. In sum, Meiner has met his burden of proof.
Turning to the merits, we conclude an Apple Pay account is a
“financial account” as stated in the probation search terms, when interpreted
“on the basis of what a reasonable person would understand from the
language of the condition itself.” (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 607.)
“Financial account” is not defined in Meiner’s probation search terms as
limited to banking accounts. As commonly used, “financial” means “relating

7
3
to finance.” “Finance” is commonly defined as “the system that includes the
circulation of money, the granting of credit, the making of investments, and
the provision of banking facilities” or its plural form, finances, as “money or
4
other liquid resources of a government, business, group, or individual.” Here,
Apple Pay is licensed in California as a money transmitter, governed by
Financial Code, section 2000 et seq., and regulated by the Department of
Financial Protection and Innovation. Additionally, as stated in the warrant
application, Apple Pay links to other financial accounts and has the ability to
store cash within the application for immediate use. A reasonable
interpretation of “financial account” would therefore include an Apple Pay
account. Thus, the warrantless probation search of Meiner’s Apple Pay
account exceeded the scope of the probation search terms.
When this omitted information is included in the warrant
application, it renders the application “insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause” as to Chase and Credit One. (Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p.
484.) The reason is that no other information in the application supports a
search of Meiner’s Chase and Credit One accounts. The information returned
from Chase and Credit One therefore must be excluded.
Finally, the district attorney argues exclusion of evidence
obtained from Chase and Credit One is not warranted because it is legally
debatable whether an Apple Pay account is a “financial account.” We disagree

3 (See Meriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026), at

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/financial [as of Mar. 12, 2026],
archived at: https://perma.cc/G22Q-VRBQ.)
4 (See Meriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026), at

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/finance#dictionary-entry-1 [as
of Mar.12, 2026] archived at: https://perma.cc/JV4K-MC23.)

8
that it is legally debatable. In any event, “the exclusionary rule serves to
deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” (Herring v. United States
(2009) 555 U.S. 135, 144.) Here, as discussed above, the officer was, at a
minimum, reckless in omitting information about the limitations on the
probation search terms in his statement of probable cause. Thus, application
of the exclusionary rule is appropriate.
DISPOSITION
The petition is granted. The superior court is directed to vacate
its order and to enter an order granting the motion to suppress the
information obtained from Chase and Credit One for the reasons set forth in
this opinion. Petitioner shall recover his costs on appeal.

DELANEY, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, J.

SCOTT, J.

9