Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re J.V. CA3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: C103279

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.2K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Filed 3/27/26 In re J.V. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

In re J.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C103279
Law.

THE PEOPLE, (Super. Ct. No.
JJC-JV-DE-2023-0001590)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

J.V. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court and
committing him to a secure youth treatment facility. J.V. contends: (1) the juvenile court
imposed unconstitutional probation conditions impossible for him to comply with while
confined in the secure youth treatment facility, and (2) his predisposition custody credits
should have been applied against the period of time from commitment until he reached
the age of 25. We affirm.

1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are not relevant to the issues on appeal. In sum, on
November 25, 2023, a window accidentally broken at an apartment complex led a group
to gather. While discussing the events leading to the broken window, the group used
gang slang and displayed gang signs. The group departed, but one of them, J.V., later
returned and shot the victim, who died in the hospital the next day.
On December 11, 2023, the San Joaquin County District Attorney filed a juvenile
wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 602, subdivision (a),
charging J.V. with murder (count 1), discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner
(count 2), two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (counts 3 & 4), and
criminal street gang activity (count 5). The petition further alleged as enhancements to
the murder count that J.V. personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great
bodily injury, as to counts 1 through 4 that J.V. committed these offenses for the benefit
of a criminal street gang, and as to counts 2 through 4 that J.V. personally used a firearm.
In November 2024, the juvenile court conducted a contested jurisdictional hearing.
After the close of evidence, the court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the
gang enhancements and gang charge. On December 12, 2024, the juvenile court found
counts 1, 2, 3, and the associated firearm enhancements to be true. The court found
count 4 to be not true. At a disposition hearing on January 13, 2025, the juvenile court
found J.V. to be a ward of the court, declared the current offense a felony, and committed
J.V. to a secure youth treatment facility for a baseline term of seven years, with a
maximum term of confinement of 25 years to life. The court applied 403 days of
predisposition custody credits against the maximum term of 25 years to life. The court

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
also ordered a number of probation conditions recommended by the probation
department.
J.V. appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
Probation Conditions
J.V. contends three of the probation conditions ordered by the juvenile court are
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Specifically, he complains these conditions
appear to apply immediately but are impossible to comply with while he is confined in
the secure youth treatment facility. We are not persuaded.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court adopted the “[f]indings and [o]rders”
attached to the probation report dated January 8, 2025, which were also attached to the
court’s January 13, 2025 minute order from the disposition hearing. This document
included a number of probation conditions, three of which J.V. challenges on appeal:
“19. The minor is ordered not to illegally use or possess any drug, narcotic, marijuana or
alcohol, or to associate with persons known to use, possess or traffic in these substances,
or to frequent places where he knows they are used unlawfully;” “27. The minor is
ordered not to associate with anyone known to the minor to be on probation or parole;”
“52. Parent(s)/[g]uardian(s) [are ordered] to participate in counseling with minor, and
cooperate fully with the [j]uvenile [c]ourt and the [p]robation [d]epartment, pursuant to
[section] 727.”
J.V. argues that probation condition No. 19 is (1) vague because it is unclear if it
applies immediately while he is confined in the secure youth treatment facility or on
release and (2) overbroad if applied while he is confined because it could apply to
prohibit him from associating with everyone in the secure youth treatment facility.
Similarly, J.V. argues probation condition No. 27 “not to associate with anyone on
probation or parole” could apply to prohibit him from associating with “everyone” in the

3
secure youth treatment facility. Lastly, J.V. maintains that probation condition No. 52 is
vague as to whether it applies to the present or future, because it “only makes sense, as
set forth in . . . section 727, subdivision (c), if [the parents] have physical custody of
[J.V.]”
J.V. bases these arguments on the purported uncertainty as to whether these
probation conditions apply while he is confined in the secure youth treatment facility. He
does not otherwise contend the content of the conditions renders them unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad.
Judges have broad discretion in establishing probation conditions in juvenile
cases. (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 940; § 730, subd. (b).) Juveniles
generally require more guidance and supervision than adults. (Antonio R., at p. 941.)
When the state assumes responsibility for a juvenile, it stands in the shoes of a parent and
may, like a parent, restrict the child’s exercise of constitutional rights. (Ibid.)
A probation condition that imposes limitations on constitutional rights, however,
must be closely tailored to the purpose of the condition to avoid being constitutionally
overbroad. (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118; In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 890.)2 In addition, a probation condition cannot be so vague that people

2 Section 730 was amended effective January 1, 2026. (Stats. 2025, ch. 575, § 9.)
As amended, section 730, subdivision (b) in relevant part now requires probation
conditions to meet the following requirements: “(1) The conditions are individually
tailored, developmentally appropriate, and reasonable. ¶ The burden imposed by
the conditions shall be proportional to the legitimate interests served by the conditions.”
While this amendment does not materially change the requirements articulated in
Sheena K., applicable law here is the statute in force at the time of disposition. (See
In re Etie (1946) 27 Cal.2d 753, 760.) In 2025, section 730, former subdivision (b)
provided in relevant part: “The court may impose and require any and all reasonable
conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done
and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (See In re Antonio R.,
supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.)

4
of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
(In re Sheena K., at p. 890; see also In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.)
Preliminarily, the People claim J.V. forfeited a challenge to these probation
conditions by failing to object below, arguing, “As applied constitutional challenges are
forfeited unless previously raised,” citing In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 889.
The People argue that, while J.V. claims to mount a facial challenge to his probation
conditions, he states in his opening brief that the conditions are vague and overbroad in
their application, in that he cannot comply with them while confined in a secure youth
treatment facility. While a claim on appeal that a probation condition is facially
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad is not forfeited by failure to raise the issue in
juvenile court, the claim is forfeited when a challenge requires reference to the record
developed in the lower court or remand for further findings, i.e., an as-applied challenge.
(Id. at pp. 886-887; People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 947.) We need not
resolve whether J.V. has made a facial or as‑applied challenge to these probation
conditions. Notwithstanding a claim of forfeiture, the People address J.V.’s claims on the
merits. We will exercise our discretion to do the same. (Sheena K., at p. 887, fn. 7 [“In
general, forfeiture of a claim not raised in the trial court by a party has not precluded
review of the claim by an appellate court in the exercise of that court’s discretion”].)
Turning to the merits, we disagree that the challenged probation conditions are
vague or overbroad because they are seemingly applicable to J.V. when confined in the
secure youth treatment facility. J.V. fails to consider the nature of probation. Probation
by definition refers to a period when an offender is released into the community. (Pen.
Code, § 1203, subd. (a) [defining probation as “the suspension of the imposition or
execution of a sentence and the order of conditional and revocable release in the
community” (italics added)].) “ ‘Probation is generally reserved for convicted criminals
whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public safety and promotes
rehabilitation.’ ” (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402, italics added, quoting

5
People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) “Generally speaking, conditions of
probation ‘are meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine
rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at
large.’ ” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 380, italics added.) Thus, probation
conditions apply upon a juvenile’s release from the custody of the secure youth treatment
facility.
In addition, “[a] probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would
appear to [be reasonable to] a reasonable, objective reader.’ ” (People v. Olguin, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 382.) Applying this standard, examination of the wording of the
conditions challenged confirms that they are intended to apply upon release. Probation
condition No. 19, for example, orders J.V. not to “frequent places where he knows” drugs
or alcohol are used unlawfully. While confined, J.V. has no occasion to “frequent
places” other than the secure youth treatment facility where he is confined. Probation
condition No. 27 orders J.V. not to associate with anyone he knows “to be on probation
or parole.” J.V. argues, “Every person in that [secure youth treatment facility] placement
must be on probation.” Not so. No one committed to a secure youth treatment facility is
on probation; they are confined. As to probation condition No. 52, J.V. acknowledges,
“[T]his seems like a term better served when [J.V.] is out of placement and presumably
living with his parents.” Indeed, section 727, subdivision (c) referenced in this condition,
provides, “[I]f the court orders that a parent or guardian shall retain custody of that minor
. . . the parent or guardian may be required to participate with that minor in a counseling
. . . program.” (Italics added.) We conclude a reasonable interpretation of these
particular conditions is that they apply to J.V. upon his release on probation.
Accordingly, J.V. has not established that the challenged conditions are
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

6
II
Predisposition Credits
J.V. claims that the juvenile court chose confinement “until age 25” as the
maximum period of confinement, therefore section 875 requires that the 403 days of
predisposition credits awarded be applied against the period from disposition until he
reaches the age of 25. We disagree.
J.V. quotes the “[f]indings and [o]rders” from the probational dispositional report
attached to the juvenile court’s minute order from the disposition hearing, which stated:
“8a. The [c]ourt determines the maximum period of confinement time to be until age 25.”
J.V. contends that this is the relevant period of time for application of predisposition
credits. J.V. omits that the juvenile court stated at the disposition hearing: “The
maximum confinement time is as stated in the report. [¶] If this were charged -- if the
minor were charged and tried in [a]dult [c]ourt, that would be 25 years to life.” The
juvenile court subsequently stated that J.V. “has 403 days of credit toward the aggregate
maximum confinement time.”
The juvenile court’s ruling reflects the timelines set forth in section 875, which
governs juvenile wards placed in a secure youth treatment facility. Section 875,
subdivision (c)(1) provides: “In making its order of commitment, the court shall . . . set a
maximum term of confinement for the ward based upon the facts and circumstances of
the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the
court and as deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation. The maximum term of
confinement shall represent the longest term of confinement in a facility that the ward
may serve subject to the following: (A) A ward committed to a secure youth treatment
facility under this section shall not be held in secure confinement beyond 23 years of age,
or two years from the date of the commitment, whichever occurs later. However, if the
ward has been committed to a secure youth treatment facility based on adjudication for an
offense or offenses for which the ward, if convicted in adult criminal court, would face an

7
aggregate sentence of seven or more years, the ward shall not be held in secure
confinement beyond 25 years of age, or two years from the date of commitment,
whichever occurs later. ¶ The maximum term of confinement shall not exceed the
middle term of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same
offense or offenses. . . . ¶ Precommitment credits for time served must be applied
against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision.” (Italics
added.)
In In re L.H. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 591, 606, the court held, “[T]he age limits
found in section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(A) constitute a cap on the length of a ward’s
physical confinement separate from the maximum term of confinement set by the
juvenile court in its order of commitment.” (See also In re M.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
435, 449-450 [maximum term of confinement of 22 years went beyond the statutory age
cap].) The L.H. court reasoned that the “ ‘subject to’ ” language at the end of
subdivision (c)(1) of section 875 preceding subparagraph (A) “is consistent with an
interpretation of the subparagraph[] . . . as more broadly governing the ward’s actual
length of confinement instead of the juvenile court’s discretion to set a maximum term of
confinement.” (L.H., at p. 600.) In other words, if subparagraph (A) “limit[s] a ward’s
confinement time to a term shorter than that set by the juvenile court in the exercise of its
discretion, the shorter term governs the ward’s actual confinement time.” (L.H., at
p. 601.) This subparagraph, while “limiting the actual length of a ward’s confinement
time,” does not limit “the juvenile court’s discretion to set a maximum term of
confinement.” (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court determined J.V.’s maximum term of confinement was 25
years to life under section 875, subdivision (c)(1) and applied his 403 days of
predisposition credits against that term under section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C). Where
the plain meaning of statutory language is clear, we must follow it. (In re N.R. (2023)
15 Cal.5th 520, 538; In re L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 607.) Therefore, the

8
juvenile did not err in applying J.V.’s predisposition credits against the maximum term of
25 years to life. (L.H., at p. 607.)
DISPOSITION
The January 13, 2025 disposition order is affirmed.

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

• Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

9