Marzine Moore II v. Indiana Child Support Bureau, N.D. Indiana

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April 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Marzine Moore II v. Indiana Child Support Bureau, et al.

District Court, N.D. Indiana

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:26-cv-00115

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION

MARZINE MOORE II,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:26-CV-115-HAB-ALT

INDIANA CHILD SUPPORT BUREAU, et
al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Marzine Moore II (“Moore”) filed a civil rights complaint against a host of
individuals and entities—some private parties and others government actors, some in Indiana and
others in Arizona—for unlawful wage garnishment and “Negligence/Administrative Misconduct”
that arose from two Indiana child support cases against Moore. (ECF No. 1). Along with his
Complaint, Moore also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2).
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee to bring an action in federal court. 28
U.S.C. § 1914 (a). However, the federal in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, provides
indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts despite their inability
to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations: first, whether the
litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action, § 1915(a)(1); and second, whether the
action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, § 1915(e)(2)(B). In a Chapter
7 Bankruptcy case, the filing fee may be waived “if the court determines that such individual has
income less than 150 percent of the income official poverty line. . ..” 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (f)(1).1 This
is not a Bankruptcy case, but the judicial discretion afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits
application of the same threshold. See Merritte v. Templeton, 493 F. App’x 782, 784 (7th Cir.
2012) (“Courts have wide discretion to decide whether a litigant is impoverished.”). The Poverty

Line is set annually by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9902.
This Court has an approved form for litigants who wish to proceed IFP, but Moore has
instead opted to draft his own affidavit. (ECF No. 2). In that filing, Moore attests he is employed
with a monthly income of $2,000 (with wages of $20 per hour), that he has only one asset—a
single vehicle with an estimated worth of approximately $10,000—and less than $250 of cash on
hand or in his bank account. Moore further indicates he has substantial monthly expenses which
account for all (if not more) of his monthly income, over $120,000 in debt, and that he has five
dependents. Given these representations, Moore has demonstrated that he cannot pay the filing fee.
The Court’s inquiry does not end there, however. In assessing whether a plaintiff may

proceed IFP, a court must look to the sufficiency of the complaint to determine whether it can be
construed as stating a claim for which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. §1915(e)(2)(B). District courts have the power
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the complaint on the
defendants and must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778,
783 (7th Cir. 1999). Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) as when
addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Luevano v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1018, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013).

1 See https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/poverty-guidelines.pdf (150% Poverty Guideline table).
To state a claim under the federal notice pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations are accepted as true and need only give “fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” EEOC v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc., [496 F.3d

773](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1452795/equal-employment-opportunity-commission-v-concentra-health-services-inc/), 776–77 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moore’s Complaint need not provide overly detailed factual allegations, but he must provide
enough factual support to raise his right to relief above a speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. His complaint must provide more than “unadorned the-defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation[s].” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
Moore alleges multiple claims against Defendants for alleged violations of his rights in
connection with two Indiana child support actions filed against Moore while he was residing in
Arizona. Because he attests he never received proper service for these two actions, he believes the
state court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and that the actions ordered against him—
including wage garnishment—were in violation of due process. He further alleges that the

Defendants “had a duty to verify lawful service and jurisdiction before enforcing any order” and
that the “Defendants breached that duty by enforcing a judgment entered without proper service
of process.” (ECF No. 1 at 3). Moore asks this Court to grant him compensatory damages of $100
million for the unlawful garnishment, damages for emotional distress and mental suffering, and
“restitution of all wages unlawfully garnished.” (Id.)
Unfortunately, Moore’s Complaint suffers from several fatal deficiencies. First, many
Defendants listed are actors or entities which cannot be sued for violations of federal law under
Section 1983. For instance, Moore cannot pursue claims against any judge who presided over the
state court proceedings because they are immune from liability for actions taken in their official
roles. Coleman v. Dunlap, 695 F.3d 650, 652 (7th Cir. 2012); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
422–24 (1976). Likewise, the states listed and their agencies—such as the Indiana Child Support
Bureau and the Department of Child Services—are immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001); Roberts v. Indiana Bureau of

Motor Vehicles, 2011 WL 6943092, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 15, 2011) (“The doctrine of
sovereign immunity is embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and bars private lawsuits in federal
court against nonconsenting states, state agencies, or state officials acting in their official
capacities.”). Additionally, municipalities such as the cities of Fort Wayne, Indianapolis, Phoenix,
and Mesa, as well as Allen County and its many offices listed by Moore, may only be held liable
for constitutional violations caused by the municipality through its own policy, practice, or custom,
but Moore has not alleged that his injuries are the result of any policy, practice, or custom of any
municipality listed. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc.Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). And finally, Moore cannot pursue Section 1983 claims against private lawyers because
none of them are state actors. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,

49–50 (1999).
But even if Moore had listed any Defendants capable of being sued under section 1983, the
Court still would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims for two additional reasons. Though
Moore is challenging alleged due process violations, he is asking this Court to review and reverse
the state court’s decision ordering him to pay child support and garnishing his wages. The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine generally bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction over “cases brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of that
judgment.” Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see
also Homola v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1995). Moore’s injuries are the result of a
state court judgment, and granting his requested relief would essentially reverse or void that
judgment. See Taylor v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 374 F.3d 529, 532-34 (7th Cir. 2004). And this
Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Indiana state courts regarding Moore’s

child support obligations, even if the state court’s decision was unconstitutional. See District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (“United States District Courts
. . . do not have jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state court decisions . . . even if those challenges
allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may be had
only in this Court.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir.
2012) (“[N]o matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, only the
Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review it.”) (citation omitted).
Moreover, even if the Court did have subject matter jurisdiction, Moore’s claims fall under
the domestic-relations exception, which “discourages federal courts from hearing cases—
including both diversity and federal-question lawsuits—that would traditionally fall within the

ambit of domestic-relations or family courts.”. Royal v. Wheeler, No. 1:18-CV-412, 2019 WL
8334502, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2019) (quoting Liggins v. Ind. Child Support Bureau, No.
3:18-CV-486, 2018 WL 4053402, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 24, 2018)). This exception “precludes
federal jurisdiction when a plaintiff seeks ‘one or more of the distinctive forms of relief associated
with the domestic relations jurisdiction: the granting of a divorce or an annulment, an award of
child custody, a decree of alimony or child support.’” Dawaji v. Askar, 618 Fed. App’x 848, 860
(7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998). Because
Moore asks the Court to dive into a state court child support order and overturn that decision, the
domestic relations exception applies, and this Court does not have jurisdiction.
Although courts generally permit civil plaintiffs at least one opportunity “to amend after
dismissing a complaint, that’s unnecessary where, as here, it is certain from the face of the
complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” Carpenter v. PNC
Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 633 Fed. App’x 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2016). Because Moore has no non-frivolous

claims against any of the named defendants that can be pursued in federal court, the Court will
deny his request to proceed IFP and dismiss his case without leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
Moore’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED and the
Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED without leave to amend.
SO ORDERED on April 6, 2026.

s/Holly A. Brady
CHIEF JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT