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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Lenk v. Monolithic

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 25-0190

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (36.3K)

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Syllabus

Whether the superior court erred in enforcing a federal district court order for attorney fees and costs because the statute of limitations had expired under the Arizona Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Whether the superior court erred in denying a request for a stay of enforcement. Whether the superior court erred under A.R.S. § 25-215 when it enforced a foreign judgment entered solely against Lenk against Lenk's Marital Community Property.

Combined Opinion

                        by Veronika Fabian

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

KENNETH L. LENK, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0190
FILED 03-20-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023-000673
The Honorable Brian J. Palmer, Judge

VACATED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED

COUNSEL

Kenneth L. Lenk, Chandler
Plaintiff/Appellant

Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, Phoenix
By Jacob A. Maskovich and Matthew J. Stanford
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
LENK v. MONOLITHIC
Opinion

OPINION

Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Kenneth L. Lenk appeals the superior court’s domestication
and enforcement of two orders for attorney fees and costs entered by the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (the “District
Court”). He asserts the superior court erred because: 1) the statute of
limitations for domestication had expired, 2) enforcement should have been
stayed because of a pending appeal, and 3) his spouse was not properly
joined. Because the statute of limitations for domesticating one of the orders
for attorney fees and costs had expired, this Court vacates the superior
court’s order in part and affirms in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 From 2015-2020, Lenk brought four separate lawsuits in the
District Court against Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. (“MPS”), his prior
employer. All four cases were dismissed with prejudice and any appeals to
the Ninth Circuit were unsuccessful. Only the procedural history of Lenk II
and Lenk IV are relevant here.

Lenk II (Case No. 16-cv-02625-BLF)

¶3 The District Court dismissed the complaint in Lenk II and
entered judgment in MPS’s favor in July 2017. On January 19, 2018, the
District Court entered an order awarding MPS $17,665.74 in attorney fees
and costs (“order for fees and costs”). Although Lenk II was appealed, the
record does not show that enforcement of the order for attorney’s fees and
costs was ever stayed. In December 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
judgment in Lenk II. Lenk v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 754 F. App’x 554, 556
(9th Cir. 2018). In November 2022, the District Court issued an amended
judgment, which incorporated the order for fees and costs. Lenk appealed
again and the Ninth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in October
2023.

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LENK v. MONOLITHIC
Opinion

Lenk IV (Case No. 20-cv-08094-BLF)

¶4 The District Court dismissed the complaint in Lenk IV in
November 2021 and entered judgment for MPS. Lenk v. Monolithic Power
Sys., Inc., 2021 WL 5233078 (N.D. Cal. 2021). The Ninth Circuit dismissed
Lenk’s appeal in April 2022. Lenk v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 2022 WL
2062162 (9th Cir. 2022). In November 2022, the District Court issued an
amended judgment awarding $25,215.30, which incorporated a previous
order for attorney fees and costs to MPS. Lenk did not appeal from that
amended judgment.

Arizona State Court Proceedings to Enforce Foreign Judgments

¶5 In January 2023, MPS filed the amended judgments in Lenk II
and Lenk IV as foreign judgments under Arizona’s version of the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”). A.R.S. §§ 12-1701 to
1708. Lenk repeatedly moved to stay domestication of the amended
judgments based on an ongoing appeal in another one of his cases. He also
moved to vacate the domestication of the amended judgments as barred by
the statute of limitations. The superior court denied Lenk’s motions to stay
and vacate.

¶6 In November 2024, MPS filed an application in Arizona
superior court for writ of garnishment of Lenk’s joint bank account with his
spouse, based on the amended judgments. The bank’s answer showed that
it withheld $42,881.04 from Lenk’s joint account for garnishment. Lenk
opposed the application for writ of garnishment based on the same
arguments he made in his motion to vacate domestication of the amended
judgments. In addition, he argued that the garnishment was improper
because the bank account was community property and not subject to
garnishment for Lenk’s separate debt. The superior court ruled in favor of
MPS and entered a garnishment judgment against Lenk’s bank for
$42,881.04 (the total of both judgments) on January 13, 2025.

¶7 This Court has jurisdiction over Lenk’s timely appeal
pursuant to Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 2101(A)(5)(C).

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LENK v. MONOLITHIC
Opinion

DISCUSSION

I. The Statute of Limitations Barred MPS’s Domestication of the
Order for Fees and Costs in Lenk II.

¶8 The superior court rejected Lenk’s argument that
domestication of the order for fees and costs was barred by the four-year
statute of limitations contained in A.R.S. § 12-544. 1 It relied on McDaniel v.
Banes, 249 Ariz. 497 (App. 2020), to find the statute of limitations began to
run when the amended judgments were entered “on November 3, 2022 and
November 8, 2022.” Lenk argues this was in error because the limitations
period began to run when the order for fees and costs was entered in
January of 2018. This Court reviews the interpretation and application of
limitations statutes de novo. Costaras v. Costaras, 257 Ariz. 208, 212-13 ¶¶ 11-
16 (App. 2024).

¶9 A foreign judgment is enforceable in Arizona under the
UEFJA, which provides a procedural framework for enforcing judgments
from “any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States . . .
which is entitled to full faith and credit.” A.R.S. § 12-1701. The
domestication of foreign judgments is “subject to the time limitations
imposed by A.R.S. § 12-544(3).” Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Phifer, 181 Ariz. 5, 6
(App. 1994). As applicable here, that statute “bars the enforcement of a
foreign judgment . . . more than four years after the cause of action’s accrual
date.” Costaras, 257 Ariz. at 212 ¶ 13.

¶10 “As a general matter, a cause of action accrues, and the statute
of limitations commences, when one party is able to sue another.” Gust,
Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 588 (1995).
A party may enforce a foreign judgment in Arizona when it becomes final
in the jurisdiction in which it was rendered. Grynberg v. Shaffer, 216 Ariz.
256, 257-58 ¶¶ 7-8 (App. 2007). A judgment is “final” under the UEFJA
when the foreign judgment becomes enforceable in the foreign jurisdiction.
Id. at 258 ¶ 12. Thus, the limitations period accrues when the judgment
becomes enforceable in the foreign jurisdiction. See id. at 257-58 ¶¶ 7-8.

1 It is unclear whether Lenk makes this argument with respect to both Lenk

II and Lenk IV. However, because there is no evidence in the record that
there was any enforceable order or judgment for attorney fees and costs in
Lenk IV over four years prior to the domestication, there is no basis for any
claim that domestication of the Lenk IV judgment is barred by the statute of
limitations.

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LENK v. MONOLITHIC
Opinion

¶11 Here, because the order for fees and costs was rendered in a
federal district court, the question this Court must answer is when did that
order become enforceable under federal law. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(a) provides that a judgment “includes a decree and any order
from which an appeal lies.” This includes post-judgment orders such as an
order for attorney fees and taxable costs under Rule 54(d)(2). A post-
judgment order awarding attorney fees need not be set forth in a separate
judgment to be enforceable. Feldman v. Olin Corp., 673 F.3d 515, 516 (7th Cir.
2012). Instead, it is simply entered in the civil docket by the clerk. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 79(a)(2)(C), 58(a)(3), (c)(1).2

¶12 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a), there is an
automatic stay on the enforcement of a post-judgment order for 30 days
after entry. Once the stay expires, the order becomes enforceable. See
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259
F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001) (order becomes enforceable after automatic
stay provided by Rule 62(a) has expired).

¶13 Here, the post-judgment order for fees and costs entered on
January 19, 2018 became enforceable and entitled to full faith and credit on
February 18, 2018—30 days after its entry. Thus, the four-year statute of
limitations accrued on February 18, 2018. Because MPS did not file to
enforce the order until January of 2023, the four-year statute of limitations
set forth in A.R.S. § 12-544(3) barred MPS’s claim.

¶14 Although Lenk did appeal the order awarding fees and costs,
“the mere fact that [a judgment] was subject to appellate review . . . [does]
not render it less than final.” Grynberg, 216 Ariz. at 258 ¶ 12; see also Fid.
Nat’l Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, 855 F. Supp. 2d 948, 977 (D. Ariz. 2012) (rejecting
argument that judgment does not become final for the purposes of

2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure differ from the Arizona Rules of Civil

Procedure in that the final judgment in federal court does not include an
award of attorney fees or costs. Instead, within 14 days after a judgment is
entered, a party seeking attorney fees and costs must file a post-judgment
motion for attorney fees and a statement of taxable costs. Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d)(2); cf. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(1) (award of attorney fees and costs must
be included in judgment). Thus, unlike the Arizona Rules, the Federal Rules
contemplate: 1) a judgment addressing the merits and 2) a later order
addressing fees and costs. Both are judgments enforceable within thirty
days of entry. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a), (d)(2).

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LENK v. MONOLITHIC
Opinion

§ 12-544(3) until the appeal is resolved); A. Coolot Co. v. L. Kahner & Co., 140
F. 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1905) (“A judgment is none the less a final judgment,
within the meaning of the [federal] rule requiring judgments to be final in
order to sustain an action thereon, because an appeal is pending, if no
supersedeas bond on appeal is given.”). Thus, absent a supersedeas bond
or stay, the appeal of the order for fees and costs did not change the order’s
finality for purposes of full faith and credit. Here, there was no evidence
that enforcement of the order for fees and costs was stayed during the
pendency of the appeal.

¶15 In the case relied upon by the superior court, McDaniel v.
Banes, this Court considered the application of A.R.S. § 12-544(3) to a
Colorado state judgment originally issued in 2010 and then amended in
2019 to include additional interest, which was previously omitted by
mistake. 249 Ariz. 497 at ¶¶ 1, 4. The McDaniel court held that the entry of
the 2019 amended judgment triggered the statute of limitations because it
was considered the “final judgment” under Colorado law. Id. at ¶ 12
(quoting Luster v. Brinkman, 250 P.3d 664, 667 (Colo. App. 2010)). The
superior court misunderstood McDaniel to mean that an amended
judgment triggers the statute of limitations. But McDaniel is inapplicable
here because federal law, not Colorado law, governs this case.

¶16 As explained in Grynberg, for purposes of full faith and credit,
a final judgment means one that “is enforceable in the issuing jurisdiction.”
Grynberg, 216 Ariz. at 260 ¶ 18. Here, the order awarding fees and costs
became enforceable on February 18, 2018. The record provides no evidence
that the enforcement of the order for fees and costs was stayed. Thus, MPS’s
lawsuit to domesticate and enforce that order was barred by the four-year
statute of limitations set forth in A.R.S. § 12-544(3).

II. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Lenk’s Motion to Stay
Lenk IV Because Lenk Did Not Post Any Security.

¶17 Citing A.R.S. § 12-1704 and the California Code of Civil
Procedure § 1710.50(a), Lenk argues the superior court erred in not staying
the enforcement of the judgment in Lenk IV based on a pending or potential
appeal. Because MPS sought to enforce a California federal district court
judgment in Arizona and not an Arizona federal district court judgment in
California, A.R.S. § 12-1704 applies, not the California Code.

¶18 A.R.S. § 12-1704 requires the superior court grant a stay:

If the judgment debtor shows the superior court that an
appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken,

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LENK v. MONOLITHIC
Opinion

or that a stay of execution has been granted . . . upon proof
that the judgment debtor has furnished the security for the
satisfaction of the judgment required by the state in which it
was rendered.

Here, Lenk’s appeal was dismissed prior to the domestication action and
the record does not show that Lenk furnished any security as the statute
requires. Thus, the superior court did not err in refusing to grant Lenk’s
motion for a stay.

III. A.R.S. § 25-215 Does Not Preclude Enforcement of Judgment
Against Lenk’s Marital Community Property.

¶19 Lenk argues MPS’s failure to join his spouse as a party
violated A.R.S. § 25-215(D) and his spouse’s due process rights because the
Lenk IV judgment affected marital community property. As this Court has
explained, “A.R.S. § 25–215(D) provides that if a plaintiff wants to hold a
marital community accountable for an obligation, both spouses must be
sued jointly. A judgment against one spouse does not bind the community.”
Spudnuts, Inc. v. Lane, 139 Ariz. 35, 36 (App. 1984).

¶20 However, “neither § 25-215(D) nor due process requires a
defendant seeking an award of attorney fees and costs from a married
plaintiff to join the plaintiff’s spouse in the lawsuit to entitle it to later
execute a judgment against community assets.” Lattin v. Shamrock Materials,
LLC, 252 Ariz. 352, 356 ¶ 15 (2022). Instead, “the plaintiff’s spouse may
intervene in any subsequent attempt to execute the judgment against
community assets to argue the judgment is the plaintiff’s sole and separate
obligation, and community assets cannot be used to satisfy the judgment.”
Id. Here, judgment in Lenk IV was entered in favor of a defendant and
consisted solely of attorney fees and costs. Lenk’s spouse did not intervene
in MPS’s domestication of the judgment. Lenk does not claim that his
spouse did not have notice of the proceedings and the record shows MPS
served her with copies of the pleadings relating to the garnishment.
Therefore, the court did not err under A.R.S. § 25-215(D) in executing the
judgment in Lenk IV for attorney fees and costs against community assets.
See id.

¶21 Lenk does not have standing to assert that MPS’s failure to
join his spouse in the Arizona case violated her constitutional right to due
process. See Doty-Perez v. Doty-Perez, 245 Ariz. 229, 232 ¶ 8 (App. 2018).
Although Arizona’s Constitution does not have a standing requirement,
this Court follows a policy of judicial restraint where there is a lack of

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LENK v. MONOLITHIC
Opinion

standing. See State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., 133 Ariz. 99, 101 n.2 (1982). Thus,
this Court declines to address Lenk’s due process arguments.

IV. Attorney Fees on Appeal.

¶22 MPS requests attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21(a) and A.R.S. § 12-349. This
Court, in its discretion, denies the requests. Because Lenk is the successful
party on appeal, this Court awards him his taxable costs, see A.R.S. § 12-341,
contingent upon his compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate
Procedure 21.

CONCLUSION

¶23 The superior court’s judgment of garnishment is vacated with
respect to the Lenk II order for fees and costs and affirmed with respect to
the Lenk IV judgment. The case is remanded to the superior court for further
proceedings consistent with this decision and the superior court shall direct
MPS to refund any monies garnished in excess of the Lenk IV judgment.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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