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April 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Marriage of Larock

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA0571

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (21)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (29.6K)

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Combined Opinion

25CA0571 Marriage of Larock 04-02-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0571
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23DR811
Honorable Christopher Boeckx, Magistrate

In re the Marriage of

Perry Gates Larock,

Appellant,

and

Terra Nicole Larock,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Kuhn and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 2, 2026

Maha Kamal, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Ciancio Ciancio Brown, P.C., Alexandra U. Goldstein, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellee
¶1 The district court dissolved the marriage of Perry Gates Larock

(Husband) and Terra Nicole Larock (Wife) and entered permanent

orders dividing marital property, allocating parental responsibilities,

determining spousal maintenance and child support, and denying

Husband’s request for attorney fees. Husband appeals several

aspects of the order. We affirm the judgment but remand the case

so the district court may correct a typographical error.

I. Background

¶2 The parties were married in June 2014 in Lyons, Colorado.

During the marriage they had two kids, acquired two homes, and

started a business. The parties jointly filed for divorce in June

2023 and consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate. Husband,

Wife, and three experts testified at a full-day hearing, and the court

issued its permanent orders on February 11, 2025.

¶3 On appeal, Husband challenges several aspects of the

permanent orders. He argues that the court erred by (1) misvaluing

the marital home awarded to him (Lincoln Residence); (2) failing to

include a marital balance sheet detailing its division of assets;

(3) allowing Wife two years to refinance the marital home awarded

to her (Grant Residence); (4) incorrectly imputing Wife’s income,

1
resulting in the denial of his request for spousal maintenance and

child support; (5) ordering a lump sum division of Wife’s stock in

her business; and (6) denying his request for attorney fees. While

we agree that the court made a typographical error in valuing the

Lincoln Residence, we otherwise affirm.

II. Valuation of the Lincoln Residence

¶4 After the parties separated in 2022, Husband lived at the

Lincoln Residence — one of two marital homes. The parties

stipulated in their “Joint Trial Management Certificate” (JTMC) that

the property “has an approximate fair market value (net equity) of

$357k.” Despite this, the district court adopted a $375,000

valuation when awarding the property to Husband.

¶5 The court provided no reason for the $18,000 discrepancy,

and Husband argues it resulted in an inequitable distribution of

marital assets. Wife believes the court made a typographical error.

In support of both parties’ positions, Wife points to the district

court’s statement that it “accepts the parties’ stipulation, set forth

on page 2 of the JTMC, that the net equity in the Lincoln Residence

is $375,000.” We agree that the error is clerical and remand the

case so the district court may correct the permanent orders to

2
reflect the stipulated valuation. See In re Marriage of Burford, 26

P.3d 550, 555, 560 (Colo. App. 2001) (the appropriate remedy for a

clerical error is correction on remand). However, because the

$18,000 discrepancy comprises only 2.3% of the marital estate, we

disagree that Husband was prejudiced by the error or that this

error requires reversal.1 See In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28,

36 (Colo. 2001) (an error affecting a small percentage of the marital

estate is harmless and does not require reversal); In re Marriage of

Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 893 (Colo. App. 2003) (same).

III. Division of Marital Property

A. Additional Background

¶6 In its permanent orders, the district court divided all marital

property. The court described each asset, provided a numerical

value when appropriate, and awarded it to Husband or Wife. The

court cited its duty to divide marital property in a just fashion

pursuant to section 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025, and explained its

reasoning behind its conscientious divisions. Ultimately, the court

1 For the same reason, to the extent Husband asks us to consider

this discrepancy in our review of other issues presented on appeal,
we decline to do so.

3
found that the “marital property apportioned to each party is

roughly equal in this case.”

¶7 Husband argues on appeal that the district court erred by

failing to include a “marital balance sheet” in its permanent orders.

Without citing law to support his position, Husband contends that

this omission deprived him of an equitable share of assets, leaves

the parties to “guess[] as to the ultimate division,” and prevents this

court “from conducting meaningful appellate review.” We disagree.

B. Standard of Review

¶8 The district court enjoys “great latitude to effect an equitable

distribution [of marital property] based upon the facts and

circumstances of each case.” Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35. Thus,

absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the district

court’s findings. Id. A court abuses its discretion when its decision

is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when it

misapplies or misconstrues the law. In re Marriage of Kann, 2017

COA 94, ¶ 56. An abuse of discretion amounts to reversible error

“only where the substantial rights of the parties are affected by the

trial court’s error when viewed in relation to its overall property

division.” Balanson, 25 P.3d at 36.

4
C. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶9 In marriage dissolution proceedings, section 14-10-113(1)

requires the district court to divide marital property in a just

manner. The distribution must be equitable, but it need not be

equal. Burford, 26 P.3d at 556. “The key to an equitable

distribution is fairness, not mathematical precision,” and the

district court considers several factors in a totality-of-the-

circumstances analysis. In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 537-

38 (Colo. 1995) (alterations omitted) (citation omitted). Allocation of

the parties’ marital debt is likewise part of the property division,

and the trial court should take care to ensure that marital liabilities

are also assigned equitably. In re Marriage of Speirs, 956 P.2d 622,

623 (Colo. App. 1997).

¶ 10 Here, the district court adequately described each asset or

liability and awarded it to Husband or Wife. Our review of the

permanent orders reveals that the court provided reasons for

awarding property to one party or the other and arrived at

numerical values based on the parties’ stipulations or evidence

presented at the hearing. From this, it is apparent that the

allocation of marital property was equitable and supported by

5
sufficient evidence. See In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 71

(A “court is not required to make specific findings as to each

statutory factor; its findings need only be sufficient to allow [the

appellate court] to determine whether its allocation of the marital

estate is supported by competent evidence.”).

¶ 11 Husband cites no case law, and we are aware of none, holding

that a district court’s failure to include a marital balance sheet

renders the permanent orders inadequate. Rather, “[i]n dividing the

marital estate, specific findings as to the value of each asset are not

required if the basis for the trial court’s decision is apparent from

its findings.” In re Marriage of Page, 70 P.3d 579, 582 (Colo. App.

2003). Thus, we will not disturb the district court’s allocation of

assets. See Hunt, ¶ 20 (trial courts are best situated to render

distribution in divorce proceedings, and absent an abuse of

discretion, an appellate court must not disturb the delicate balance

it achieved).

IV. Refinancing the Grant Residence

A. Additional Background

¶ 12 The district court awarded the Grant Residence — one of two

marital homes — to Wife. The property, valued at $415,000,

6
remained titled and financed in both parties’ names. Husband

desired removal from the mortgage, but Wife could not qualify for

refinancing at the time of the hearing because her “debt-to-income

ratio” was too high. The court therefore ordered the following:

Wife shall assume or refinance the mortgage
for the Grant Residence within two years from
the date of this Order. If Wife fails to do so,
then the Grant Residence shall be sold with
Wife to be solely responsible for all costs of
bringing the Grant Residence to market . . . .
Once Husband’s name has been removed from
the mortgage for the Grant Residence,
Husband shall execute a deed to remove his
name from the title for that residence within
14 days.

The court further explained that this arrangement allowed the

parties to remain in their respective homes and ensured minimal

disruption for their children, who had been spending time at both

residences.

¶ 13 Husband contends that by allowing Wife two years to

refinance, the court violated “fundamental principles of marital

dissolution by maintaining Husband’s liability on the mortgage for

an extended period of time.” Husband argues that Colorado law

favors complete financial disentanglement between spouses and

that the court undermined this by placing him in a situation that

7
may lead to future litigation. Wife counters that there are

circumstances when a continued economic relationship is

necessary, and in any event, the arrangement at issue here is

definite. We discern no error.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 14 We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of

discretion, applying the same principles outlined supra Part III.B.

C. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶ 15 Public policy “discourag[es] continued litigation and ongoing

financial interaction between divorced spouses.” In re Marriage of

Paul, 821 P.2d 925, 927 (Colo. App. 1991). Accordingly, “a division

of marital property should leave to each party a definable or

ascertainable portion of at least some of the attributes of

ownership.” Id. While the goal is to provide a sense of finality,

there are circumstances when a continued financial relationship is

necessary to achieve an equitable distribution of property. See

§ 14-10-113(1)(c); see also Hunt, 909 P.2d at 540 (acknowledging

certain circumstances do not warrant immediate distribution).

When this situation arises, courts should take care to ensure that

the arrangement disentangles the parties at a finite point in time.

8
Hunt, 909 P.2d at 540 (citing Shill v. Shill, 765 P.2d 140, 145 (Idaho

1988)).

¶ 16 While we agree with Husband that two years is a considerable

amount of time, the arrangement is not indefinite. The order

requires Wife to sell the Grant Residence if she cannot refinance

within the specified period. Cf. Paul, 821 P.2d at 927 (holding that

the trial court erred by failing to impose limitations on the time and

manner of payment of husband’s interest in wife’s company, nor

any restrictions on wife’s control of the asset). The alternative —

removing Husband’s name via immediate sale of the Grant

Residence — would have left Wife without a home while Husband

remained in the Lincoln Residence, a grossly inequitable

distribution of marital property. See § 14-10-113(1).

¶ 17 Additionally, the court was faced with Wife’s inability to

refinance at the time of the hearing, Husband’s desire to remove his

name from the mortgage, the well-being of the parties’ two minor

children, and the fact that the parties were already living separately

in their respective homes. Considering the competing interests at

play and the clear parameters the district court outlined when

9
distributing this asset, the court did not abuse its discretion by

allowing a two-year refinancing period. See Paul, 821 P.2d at 927.

V. Income, Spousal Maintenance, and Child Support

A. Additional Background

¶ 18 When the parties married, Wife worked as a school

psychologist and Husband as a data analyst. During their

marriage, Wife founded a tech company called Mindful Mamas.

Husband assisted Wife in starting the company and then worked for

Mindful Mamas as an accountant and administrative assistant. In

April 2024, after the parties filed for divorce, Wife terminated

Husband’s position with Mindful Mamas but continued to pay him

$1,000 per month as part of his severance package. After his

termination, Husband began driving for rideshare companies and

assisting a friend with home remodeling. Based on expert

testimony, the district court found Husband’s potential income to

be $75,000 for spousal maintenance and child support purposes.

¶ 19 Due to financial hardship, Wife decided to wind down Mindful

Mamas, and the company entered dissolution proceedings in

December 2024. As the CEO, Wife earned $175,000 annually.

However, because of the pending dissolution and the fact that she

10
allegedly would not receive a Mindful Mamas paycheck after

January 2025, the court determined that Wife’s actual income was

$0. To calculate spousal maintenance and child support, Wife

proposed that the court impute her income at the minimum wage or

at the $75,000 salary she earned as a school psychologist. Based

upon Wife’s testimony that she did not plan to operate another

business in the future and would likely return to her prior job, the

court imputed a $75,000 salary. The court then relied on these

imputations when declining Husband’s request for spousal

maintenance and child support.

¶ 20 Husband argues that the imputation of Wife’s potential income

is erroneous and should instead be $175,000, the salary she earned

as the CEO of Mindful Mamas at the time of the hearing. Husband

contends that the income imputation led to a cascade of errors,

including the district court denying his spousal maintenance and

child support requests. We are not persuaded.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 21 Income imputation is a question of fact, and the trial court’s

findings regarding potential income are entitled to deference if

adequately supported by the record. In re Marriage of Yates, 148

11
P.3d 304, 311 (Colo. App. 2006). We review maintenance and child

support orders for an abuse of discretion because “the issue of the

[parties’] financial resources is factual,” but we review de novo

whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard to its

factual findings. In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 533 (Colo.

App. 2011); see also In re Marriage of Wells, 252 P.3d 1212, 1213

(Colo. App. 2011) (child support); In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023

COA 42M, ¶ 28 (maintenance).

C. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶ 22 Trial courts generally determine child support and

maintenance based on the parties’ gross incomes. § 14-10-

114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(c), C.R.S. 2025 (maintenance); § 14-10-

115(5)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (child support). “Gross income” means

income from any source and includes potential income for a party

who the court finds is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.

§ 14-10-114(8)(c)(I), (IV); § 14-10-115(3)(c), (5)(a)(I), (5)(b)(I). If a

parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, the court must

calculate child support and maintenance based on the parent’s

potential, not actual, income. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV); § 14-10-

115(5)(b)(I). “Potential income” is “the amount a party could earn

12
from a full-time job commensurate with the party’s demonstrated

earning ability.” In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 26. “A

trial court may consider evidence of a party’s historical income in

determining the amount of income” to impute. Yates, 148 P.3d at

311.

¶ 23 The court addresses maintenance and child support after

dividing the marital assets and debt. See In re Marriage of Morton,

2016 COA 1, ¶ 31; § 14-10-113(1). Section 14-10-114(3) details the

process a trial court must follow when considering a maintenance

request. In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 13. The court

must first make findings concerning (1) the amount of each party’s

gross income; (2) the marital property distributed to each party;

(3) each party’s financial resources; (4) the reasonable financial

need established during the marriage; and (5) whether the

maintenance award would be deductible for federal income tax

purposes. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); see Wright, ¶ 14.

¶ 24 After making these initial findings, the court must determine

“the amount and term of the maintenance award, if any, that is fair

and equitable to both parties.” § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II); see Wright,

¶ 15. The court need not make explicit factual findings about each

13
factor in section 14-10-114(3)(c), which governs the amount and

duration of maintenance, as long as the record shows that it

meaningfully considered the factors and provides us with a clear

understanding of the basis for its decision. Wright, ¶ 20. Then,

after calculating the maintenance award, the court may determine

child support obligations. In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2,

¶ 22. To determine the amount of a child support award, the court

must consider several factors, including both parents’ financial

resources. § 14-10-115(2)(b).

¶ 25 Here, the district court determined that Wife was voluntarily

unemployed due to the dissolution of Mindful Mamas and imputed

to her a potential income of $75,000 based on her prior work as a

school psychologist. The court was well within its discretion to do

so, as Wife testified that she planned to return to this job and the

amount is commensurate with her demonstrated earning capability

as a psychologist. See Tooker, ¶ 26; Yates, 148 P.3d at 311.

¶ 26 Congruent with our conclusion that the district court did not

err regarding Wife’s income nor in its distribution of marital assets,

we further uphold the court’s denial of Husband’s maintenance and

child support requests. The record before us makes clear that the

14
parties’ financial resources are roughly equal and that the court

made explicit findings as to each relevant statutory factor when

determining the maintenance and support awards. Thus, the

district court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unfairly by

denying Husband’s requests. See In re Marriage of Camarata, 602

P.2d 907, 908 (Colo. App. 1979); cf. Wright, ¶¶ 20-23 (concluding

that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully

consider the section 14-10-114 factors and instead only alluding to

the criteria).

VI. Division of Mindful Mamas’ Stock

A. Additional Background

¶ 27 Initially, both parties used an online service called Carta to

value Mindful Mamas. Husband then retained expert Marty Wisott

to review Carta’s valuation, and Wife retained expert Jeremy

Harkness to conduct a rebuttal valuation of Wisott’s review. Wisott

valued Mindful Mamas at $620,000 in June 2024 and projected a

fair market value of $1,290,000 by December 2024. However,

Wisott noted at the hearing that Mindful Mamas lost nearly 11% of

its subscriber base in the first six months of 2024 and expressed

concern about the financial stability of the company.

15
¶ 28 Harkness valued Mindful Mamas at $95,000. He testified that

Mindful Mamas was a high-risk business and noted Wisott’s failure

to distinguish where the company’s revenue was coming from —

namely, a transient business-to-business consulting contract with

client Otsuka. Harkness submitted that the revenue from this

contract should be subtracted from the income because the

arrangement served to keep Mindful Mamas afloat for a limited time

and was separate from the company’s dwindling subscription-based

income. Harkness further testified that Mindful Mamas had

incurred $1.4 million in debt, offsetting its assets. Wisott and Wife

similarly acknowledged this debt, and Wife explained that she

would have to pay back creditors as part of the Mindful Mamas’

dissolution proceedings.

¶ 29 Finding both experts credible, the district court valued Mindful

Mamas at $0. The court recognized, however, that Wife owned

5,816,680 shares of common stock in Mindful Mamas that retained

value to the extent the business itself retained value. Accordingly,

“in the interest of avoiding a potential windfall to Wife if Mindful

Mamas retain[ed] some value,” the court awarded 50% of Wife’s

shares to Husband. Husband argues on appeal that the district

16
court erred by ordering this lump sum payout and should have

instead appointed a special master to oversee dissolution

proceedings. We disagree.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 30 We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion,

applying the same principles outlined supra Part III.B.

C. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶ 31 Generally, “property shall be valued as of the date of the

decree or as of the date of the hearing on disposition of property if

such hearing precedes the date of the decree.” § 14-10-113(5).

When an asset is not yet fully realized, the trial court may rely on

the net present value or reserve jurisdiction to distribute the

property at a later time. See Zappanti, 80 P.3d at 894; In re

Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1173 (Colo. App. 2006). The

former method allows the court to accord a present value to the

future benefit and allocate it between the parties immediately, while

the latter enables the court to wait until the benefit has accrued to

determine the proper division or allocation. Jorgenson, 143 P.3d at

1172-73.

17
¶ 32 The crux of Husband’s argument is that the district court

heard such competing evidence on Mindful Mamas’ value, and the

dissolution proceedings remained so complex, that the court should

have appointed a special master and reserved jurisdiction for a later

distribution. Our review of the permanent orders, however, reveals

that the court appreciated the complexity of this asset, carefully

weighed the experts’ testimony, and determined that Mindful

Mamas had “essentially no value.” Based on this net present value,

but to avoid any potential windfall, the court rightfully allocated

equal shares of Wife’s common stock to Husband and Wife. Even if

we were to come to a different conclusion ourselves on the

appropriate method of distribution, we cannot say the district court

abused its discretion because its decision is reasonable,

ascertainable from the record, and comports with the net present

value method. See id. at 1172-74.

VII. Husband’s Request for Attorney Fees

A. Additional Background

¶ 33 Husband requested attorney fees under section 14-10-119,

C.R.S. 2025, for a “substantial disparity in income” and section 13-

17-102(4), C.R.S. 2025, for Wife’s alleged conduct after “forcing a

18
Permanent Orders continuance.” The court denied both requests,

finding that “the financial resources of the parties are essentially

equal,” and “[n]either party engaged in conduct which lacked

substantial justification.”

¶ 34 Husband argues on appeal that the district court’s imputation

of Wife’s potential income renders the attorney fees determination

invalid for purposes of income disparity. Providing little to no

record support, he further maintains that Wife’s conduct associated

with the permanent orders hearing continuance entitles him to fees.

Wife counters that the continuance resulted from the fact that

neither party had sufficient time to present their testimony or expert

testimony in the time originally allotted. We perceive no error.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 35 We review the court’s decision to award attorney fees for an

abuse of discretion. Davis, 252 P.3d at 538.

C. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶ 36 In domestic relations cases, trial courts have the discretion to

order a party to pay the other party’s reasonable attorney fees “after

considering the financial resources of both parties.” § 14-10-119.

“Courts must consider a request for fees ‘in light of [section 14-10-

19
119’s] equitable purpose,’” which includes ensuring that “neither

party suffers ‘undue economic hardship’ as a result of the

dissolution.” de Koning, ¶ 23 (citation omitted). Under the statute,

courts may “equitably apportion costs and fees between parties

based on relative ability to pay, and courts have great latitude . . .

to craft attorney fee orders appropriate to the circumstances in a

given case.” Davis, 252 P.3d at 538.

¶ 37 Alternatively, under section 13-17-102(4), the court shall

assess attorney fees if “an attorney . . . or party brought or defended

an action . . . that lacked substantial justification” or if the action

“was interposed for delay . . . or if the court finds that an attorney

. . . or party unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other

improper conduct.” The two statutes are not mutually exclusive,

and the trial court may award attorney fees under section 14-10-

119, section 13-17-102(4), or both. In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945

P.2d 1370, 1377 (Colo. 1997).

¶ 38 The district court acted within its discretion by denying

Husband’s request under section 14-10-119 because the parties

have similar financial resources. See Davis, 252 P.3d at 538. And

because Husband fails to point us to locations in the record

20
supporting his position that Wife engaged in “dilatory tactics,” we

will not disturb the district court’s finding under section 13-17-

102(4). See C.A.R. 28(a)(7); see also Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am.

Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 2015 COA 135, ¶ 42 (declining to consider

conclusory allegations that lacked development); In re Marriage of

Boettcher, 2018 COA 34, ¶ 38 (“Fees should be awarded only in

clear and unequivocal cases . . . .”), aff’d, 2019 CO 81.

VIII. Disposition

¶ 39 We affirm the judgment but remand the case so the magistrate

may correct the permanent orders to reflect the proper valuation of

the Lincoln Residence.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

21