Lancaster v. State of Texas - Aggravated Assault Case Affirmed
Summary
The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decision denying a motion to set aside an indictment for aggravated sexual assault. The appellant argued a 30-year delay between indictment and arrest violated due process. The court found no due process violation and affirmed the conviction.
What changed
The Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco), has affirmed the trial court's denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment against Richard Dennis Lancaster. Lancaster was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to eight years in prison. His appeal centered on the argument that a 30-year delay between his indictment and arrest constituted a due process violation, citing relevant U.S. Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases.
The appellate court found no merit in Lancaster's due process claim regarding the delay and affirmed the trial court's judgment. This ruling means the conviction and sentence stand. For legal professionals, this case reinforces the established legal standards for due process claims related to prosecutorial delay, particularly when the delay does not demonstrably prejudice the defendant's ability to present a defense or when the state can show legitimate reasons for the delay.
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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Richard Dennis Lancaster v. the State of Texas
Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 10-24-00370-CR
- Nature of Suit: Aggravated Assault
Disposition: Affirmed
Disposition
Affirmed
Lead Opinion
Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-24-00370-CR
Richard Dennis Lancaster,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
On appeal from the
54th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
Judge Susan N. Kelly, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 1989-24-C2
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Richard Dennis Lancaster pled guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual
assault and was sentenced to eight years in prison. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.021. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to set aside
the indictment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In his first issue, Lancaster contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss his indictment based on a due process violation pursuant to
the State’s delay of 30 years between the indictment and his arrest. 1 Lancaster
cites to United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752
(1977), United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468
(1971), Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S. Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1969),
and United States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988) in support of his
contention that the State’s delay violated the due process clause and required
a dismissal of his indictment. The cases cited by Lancaster, however, do not
support his issue.
The United States Supreme Court in both Lovasco and Marion reviewed
potential due process violations for preindictment delay, not post-
indictment/pre-arrest delay. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790; Marion, 404 U.S.
at 325. Further, the opinions in Hooey and Diacolios pertain solely to a Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial not the denial of due process. See Hooey,
393 U.S. at 383; Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 80. In other words, Lancaster has
presented this Court with no case authority to support his issue that the trial
court erred. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Neville v. State, 622 S.W.3d 99, 104
(Tex. App.—Waco 2020, no pet.). Thus, this issue is improperly briefed and
presents nothing for review. See id.; Solis v. State, No. AP-77,109, 2025 Tex.
Crim. App. LEXIS 795, at *35 (Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2025) (publish); Lucio v.
1
Lancaster raised a Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial claim as well as the due process claim in
the trial court. However, on appeal, he only challenges the trial court’s determination of his due
process claim.
Lancaster v. State Page 2
State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Lancaster’s first issue is overruled.
In his second issue, Lancaster complains the trial court did not prepare
findings of fact and conclusions of law as requested, and thus, we should
require the trial court to do so. The State asserted in its brief that the appellate
record does not contain a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Lancaster has not contested the State’s assertion, and we have not found any
request in the record as well. 2 Thus, because there is nothing in the record to
indicate Lancaster requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, this issue
is not preserved and is overruled. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
Having overruled each issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
LEE HARRIS
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: March 19, 2026
Before Justice Smith,
Justice Harris, and
Senior Chief Justice Rose 3
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CR25
2
The record contains a motion for extension of time to file a request for findings of fact and conclusions
of law and a notice of past due findings and conclusions; but it does not contain the required request.
3
The Honorable Jeff Rose, Senior Chief Justice (Retired) of the Third Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002,
75.003.
Lancaster v. State Page 3
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