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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kimberly Welch v. Michael D. Smoak

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2024-001681

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Kimberly Welch, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Judy Ann Haselden, Respondent,

v.

Michael D. Smoak and Murray Sand Co., Inc.,
Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001681

Appeal From Sumter County
George M. McFaddin, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-128
Submitted March 2, 2026 – Filed March 18, 2026

AFFIRMED

Jeffrey Ammons and Samuel Wallace Carnwath, III, both
of Walker Allen Grice Ammons & Foy, LLP, and Sarah
Rand-McDaniel, all of Mount Pleasant; and Andrew F.
Lindemann, of Lindemann Law Firm, P.A., of Columbia,
all for Appellants.

George Murrell Smith, Jr., of Smith Robinson Holler
DuBose Morgan, LLC, of Sumter; Frederick Newman
Hanna, Jr., of Smith Robinson Holler DuBose Morgan,
LLC, of Columbia; and Alexander S. Hogsette, of
Hatfield Temple Law LLC, and E. Hood Temple, of
Temple & Hogsette Law Group, both of Florence, all for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Michael D. Smoak and Murray Sand Co., Inc., (Murray Sand;
collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit court's sanctions order striking their
answer and holding them in default for discovery violations. Appellants argue the
circuit court erred in concluding they violated court orders; abused its discretion in
concluding that the production of the three pages of documents relating to Blue
Max Trucking (Blue Max) on September 30, 2021, warranted the striking of their
answer; and failed to properly exercise its discretion in considering lesser and more
narrowly tailored sanctions to address the misconduct as found. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by striking Appellants' answer
and holding them in default for discovery violations. See Rule 37(b)(2)(C),
SCRCP (providing a court may "order [the] striking out [of] pleadings . . . or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party" for failure to
comply with an order compelling discovery); Davis v. Parkview Apartments, 409
S.C. 266, 281, 762 S.E.2d 535, 543 (2014) ("The imposition of sanctions is
generally entrusted to the sound discretion of the [c]ircuit [c]ourt." (quoting
Downey v. Dixon, 294 S.C. 42, 45, 362 S.E.2d 317, 318 (Ct. App. 1987))); id.
("[A]n appellate court will not interfere with 'a [circuit] court's exercise of its
discretionary powers with respect to sanctions imposed in discovery matters' unless
the court abuses its discretion." (quoting Karppi v. Greenville Terrazzo Co., 327
S.C. 538, 542, 489 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 1997))); id. at 282, 762 S.E.2d at 543
("An 'abuse of discretion' may be found by this [c]ourt where the appellant shows
that the conclusion reached by the [circuit] court was without reasonable factual
support, resulted in prejudice to the right of appellant, and, therefore, amounted to
an error of law." (quoting Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. 499, 502, 381 S.E.2d 734, 735
(1989))). Initially, we find Appellants' argument that the circuit court failed to
differentiate the actions of Smoak and Murray Sand and imputed Murray Sand's
conduct to Smoak is not preserved for appellate review because Appellants raised
this argument for the first time in their Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure motion to alter or amend. See Johnson v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 381
S.C. 172, 177, 672 S.E.2d 567, 570 (2009) ("An issue may not be raised for the
first time in a motion to reconsider.").
We further find evidence supports the circuit court's decision to strike Appellants'
answer and hold them in default. Specifically, evidence showed Appellants
violated the circuit court's August 27, 2020 and May 17, 2021 discovery orders;
Welch was prejudiced by Appellants' misconduct; and Appellants acted willfully
and in bad faith with respect to the production of the Blue Max documents. See
Griffin Grading & Clearing, Inc. v. Tire Serv. Equip. Mfg. Co., 334 S.C. 193, 199,
511 S.E.2d 716, 719 (Ct. App. 1999) ("In determining the appropriateness of a
sanction, the court should consider such factors as the precise nature of the
discovery and the discovery posture of the case, willfulness, and degree of
prejudice."); id. at 198, 511 S.E.2d at 718 ("When the court orders default or
dismissal, or the sanction itself results in default or dismissal, the end result is
harsh medicine that should not be administered lightly."); Karppi, 327 S.C. at
542-43, 489 S.E.2d at 682 ("Before invoking [the] severe remedy [of default or
dismissal, or the sanction results in default or dismissal], the [circuit] court must
determine that there is some element of bad faith, willfulness, or gross indifference
to the rights of other litigants."); id. at 543, 489 S.E.2d at 682 ("The sanction
imposed should be reasonable, and the court should not go beyond the necessities
of the situation to foreclose a decision on the merits of a case."); id. ("[W]hatever
sanction is imposed should serve to protect the rights of discovery provided by the
[South Carolina] Rules of Civil Procedure.").

AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.