In re Kevin J. Mattson, Chapter 7, Automatic Stay Terminated

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Kevin J. Mattson

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maine

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-20188

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.3K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
In re: )
) Chapter 7
KEVIN J. MATTSON, ) Case No. 24-20188
)
Debtor. )

ORDER CONFIRMING THE TERMINATION
OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY AS TO
THE DEBTOR AND PROPERTY OF THE DEBTOR

Creditor Severin M. Beliveau, Esq. seeks confirmation that the Court’s December 17,
2025 order approving Debtor Kevin J. Mattson’s written waiver of discharge constituted a
denial of discharge or, alternatively, that the automatic stay as to Mr. Mattson and his property
terminated on December 17, 2025 (the “Motion”). Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 245. This
determination is important because it affects whether the stay was in effect when Mr. Beliveau
undertook post-judgment collection activity against Mr. Mattson in March of 2026 and whether
it is still in effect now. For the reasons below, the Court grants the relief requested by Mr.
Beliveau.
Facts.
The key facts are not disputed. Three of Mr. Mattson’s creditors filed an involuntary
chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against him on September 12, 2024. D.E. 1. The case was later
converted to one under chapter 11 but reconverted to chapter 7 on February 11, 2025. D.E.
30, 80. Thereafter, Mr. Mattson’s counsel withdrew, and he proceeded in the case representing
himself. On December 16, 2025, before receiving a discharge of his debts under 11 U.S.C. §
727, Mr. Mattson filed a stipulation waiving discharge, which stated:
I, Kevin J Mattson, hereby stipulate to a waiver of my discharge under 11 U.S.C. §
727 (a)(10)[.] I make this waiver knowingly and with an understanding of the legal and
financial consequences of the same.

D.E. 191.

The next day, the Court approved his written waiver of discharge by entering the
following order:
On December 16, 2025, the Debtor filed a Stipulation to Waiver of Discharge stating
that he stipulates to a waiver of his discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(10). The
Debtor further stated that the waiver is made knowingly and with the understanding of
the legal and financial consequences flowing from that decision. Accordingly, the
Court hereby approves the waiver. No discharge shall enter in favor of the Debtor in
this case.

D.E. 192.
In March of 2026, Mr. Beliveau commenced collection activity against Mr. Mattson in
the District Court of the State of Maine and, in response, Mr. Mattson asserted that the
automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) was still in effect. Mr. Beliveau filed the Motion.
The parties filed additional pleadings on this issue, D.E. 249, 250, and 252, and oral argument
was heard on March 31, 2026.
Discussion.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (c)(1), the stay of an act against property of the bankruptcy estate
continues until that property is no longer property of the estate. In a chapter 7 individual case
like Mr. Mattson’s, the remaining protections of the automatic stay continue until the earliest
occurrence of one of three events: “(A) the time the case is closed; (B) the time the case is
dismissed; or (C) . . . the time a discharge is granted or denied.” 11 U.S.C. § 362 (c)(2)(C). The
bankruptcy court, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(10), “ . . . shall grant the debtor a discharge,
unless . . . the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor after the order
for relief under this chapter . . .”
There is no binding precedent in the First Circuit on whether a court order approving a
debtor’s written waiver of a discharge in a chapter 7 case operates as a denial of discharge for
purposes of § 362 (c)(2)(C). However, the majority of the cases that have addressed the question
conclude that it does. Exelero Corp. v. Cambece, No. 23-CV-12301, 2024 WL 1007836, at *14
(D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2024) (“The bankruptcy court's approval of the debtor's waiver of his

discharge serves as the denial of the discharge for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (c)(2)(C),
terminating the automatic stay.”); Barry v. Perkins, Bankr. L. Rep. P 83757, No. 20-CV-05050, 2022 WL 992530, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (“A bankruptcy court's approval of a waiver
of discharge operates to terminate the stay as to any act under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) other than an
act against property of the estate.”); Allgaier v. Peterson, No. 13 CV 5112, 2017 WL 11696197,
at *1; (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2017) (“[P]laintiff argues the Bankruptcy Court's October 13, 2016,
order accepting Aberle's waiver of discharge . . . had the effect of terminating the automatic stay.
The Court agrees.”); In re Dunne, No. 13-50484, 2015 WL 762560920, at *5 (Bkrtcy. D. Conn.
November 25, 2015) (“Since the Debtor waived his discharge, the automatic stay does not apply

to him.”), appeal dismissed, 684 F. App’x 85 (2d Cir. 2017); Red River Res., Inc. v. Collazo, No.
14-CV-04961, 2015 WL 1846498, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2015) (“[T]he Bankruptcy Court's
approval of Collazo's waiver of discharge lifted the automatic stay, exposing Collazo to
proceedings to recover the Mariner Note Claim.”); Smith v. C. I. R., 96 T.C. 10, 15 (1991)
(“[W]e agree with respondent that Stephen's waiver of his right to a discharge served as a denial
of a discharge so as to terminate the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section
362 (c)(2)(C).”); In re Shenberg, 433 F. Supp. 677, 679–80 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (“If such person is
adjudged a bankrupt, actions against him may be further stayed until the question of his
discharge is determined by the court after a hearing, or by his filing a waiver of, or having lost,
his right to a discharge, or, in the case of a corporation, by its failure to file an application for
discharge within the time prescribed under the Act.”) (Construing similar provisions under the
Bankruptcy Act.)
The Court could only find one case, In re Carlsson, No. 24-51952, 2024 WL 4806638 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2024), the case cited by Mr. Mattson, that supports the contrary

position. The Court is not persuaded by that case and concludes that the path followed by the
majority view—that a court order accepting a waiver of the discharge is the functional
equivalent to a denial of discharge—is the correct one.
Sections 362 and 524 of the Code allow individual chapter 7 bankruptcy filers
opportunities to protect non-exempt property, eliminate personal liability for certain non-
dischargeable debts, and gain a fresh financial start. Typically, a chapter 7 case has two
dispositive events: the case commencement and simultaneous imposition of the automatic stay,
and the entry or denial of the discharge. To be sure, other events can and do occur in chapter
7 cases, but these two are of paramount importance. As to the discharge, Mr. Mattson

maintains that an order accepting a waiver of discharge is not the same as an order specifically
denying discharge. The Court sees that distinction as meaningless: an elevation of form over
substance. Both are court orders that conclusively determine whether a discharge will enter
and, therefore, whether the protections of 11 U.S.C. § 524 (a) will be available to the debtor.
After the Court issued its December 17, 2025 order, there was nothing left to do to address
whether Mr. Mattson could qualify for a discharge. His waiver of discharge was unambiguous.
The last sentence in this Court’s order approving the waiver was also unambiguous: “[n]o
discharge shall enter in favor of the Debtor in this case.” D.E. 192.
The Court acknowledges that it did not use the words “deny” or “denied” in its order
and that the Bankruptcy Code does not define them. In re Graft, 489 B.R. 65, 69 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2013). However, a commonsense understanding of “deny” is the refusal to grant. St.
Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Magnolia Lady, Inc., No. CIV.A. 297CV153, 1999 WL 33537191,
at *3 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 4, 1999); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (fifth
definition for “deny” is: “[t]o say no to (a person with a request, or the request so made); to

refuse to allow.”); Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/deny (accessed last April 23, 2026) (Definition 3 b of deny is: “to
refuse to grant.”). The effect of the order is the same nonetheless: Mr. Mattson will not obtain
a discharge under § 727(a) in this case. There is nothing in the Code or Rules that distinguishes
between the result of a denial of discharge by judgment in a § 727 action and the result of a
court order approving a waiver of discharge. For example, both require notice by the clerk
under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4006 as provided by Rule 2002(f)(1)(G), as was done here. D.E. 197.
Therefore, the Court sees no reason why the character of the stay would be any different if the
discharge was denied by a court order or if the court order approved a discharge waiver.

Conclusion.
Because the Court concludes that its order accepting Mr. Mattson’s voluntary written
waiver of discharge was a denial of discharge for purposes of § 362(c)(2)(C), and that the
automatic stay as to any act under § 362(a) other than an act against property of the estate
terminated on December 17, 2025, Mr. Beliveau’s motion is granted.

Dated: April 24, 2026 /s/ Peter G. Cary
Judge Peter G. Cary
United States Bankruptcy Court
For the District of Maine