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April 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Shadrach Peeler v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2024-CA-0698
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Taylor

• Disposition: OPINION AFFIRMING

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (26.6K)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION AFFIRMING

Combined Opinion

                        by [Jeff S. Taylor](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/7344/jeff-s-taylor/)

RENDERED: APRIL 3, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2024-CA-0698-MR

SHADRACH PEELER APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LARRY ASHLOCK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CR-00236

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION
AFFIRMING

---

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Shadrach Peeler, pro se, brings this appeal from a May 6,

2024, order of the Hardin Circuit Court denying his Kentucky Rules of Criminal

Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On February 21, 2019, Peeler embarked on a killing spree. He shot

and killed his girlfriend, Cherie Turner. He initially shot Turner in the leg,

retreated home to reload the gun, and returned to shoot her to death. Peeler
proceeded to a convenience store and shot to death Subash Gale, a convenience

store employee. Peeler also shot another convenience store’s employee, Prayash

Baniya, who as a result was paralyzed. Peeler then shot Nadia Brown, who was

sitting in her car at the convenience store.

The Hardin County Grand Jury indicted Peeler upon two counts of

murder, one count of first-degree assault, one count of second-degree assault, one

count of being a convicted felon in possession of a handguns, one count of

tampering with physical evidence, and one count of resisting arrest. The

Commonwealth filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty.

Eventually, Peeler and the Commonwealth reached a plea agreement.

Thereunder, Peeler pleaded guilty to two counts of murder, first-degree assault,

second-degree assault, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, tampering

with physical evidence, and resisting arrest. The Commonwealth recommended

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon each count of murder,

twenty-years’ imprisonment upon first-degree assault, ten-years’ imprisonment

upon second-degree assault, ten-years’ imprisonment upon possession of a

handgun by a convicted felon, and twelve-months’ imprisonment upon resisting

arrest, to be served concurrently for a total sentence of life imprisonment without

the possibility of parole. The circuit court accepted Peeler’s plea of guilty, and on

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April 27, 2021, the circuit court sentenced Peeler to a total sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

On January 22, 2024, Peeler filed an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his

sentence of imprisonment. Peeler alleged trial counsel was ineffective for

recommending that he accept the plea agreement with the Commonwealth. In

support thereof, Peeler argued that trial counsel failed to inform him of possible

defenses at trial, i.e., intoxication, imperfect self-protection, and extreme emotional

disturbance. Peeler claimed that if he had known of these defenses, he would have

not entered the guilty plea but would have insisted upon a jury trial. By order

entered May 6, 2024, the circuit court denied Peeler’s RCr 11.42 motion without

an evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Kentucky Supreme Court has set forth the following standards for

our review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims:

We evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims
under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984),
adopted by this Court in Gall v. Commonwealth, 702
S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985). Under the Strickland framework,
an appellant must first show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052. A “deficient performance” contains errors “so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.
Second, the appellant must show that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced his defense at trial. Id. “This

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requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable.” Id. An appellant must satisfy both elements
of the Strickland test in order to merit relief. Id.

When faced with an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in an RCr 11.42 appeal, a reviewing court
first presumes that counsel’s performance was
reasonable. Commonwealth v. Bussell, 226 S.W.3d 96,
103 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Haight v. Commonwealth, 41
S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky. 2001) overruled on other grounds
by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky.
2009)). We must analyze counsel’s overall performance
and the totality of circumstances therein in order to
determine if the challenged conduct can overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s performance was
reasonable. Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 441-42. In addition,
the trial court’s factual findings and determinations of
witness credibility are granted deference by the
reviewing court. Id. Finally, we apply the de novo
standard when reviewing counsel’s performance
under Strickland. Bussell, 226 S.W.3d at 100.

Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Ky. 2016).

Where, as here, a trial court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on

an RCr 11.42 motion, “appellate review is limited to ‘whether the motion on its

face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if

true, would invalidate the conviction.’” Haley v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 744,

750 (Ky. App. 2019) (quoting Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky.

1967)). “A hearing is required if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be

conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of

the record.” Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001) (citing

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Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993)), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 1049 (1994); Lewis, 411 S.W.2d at 322; see also RCr 11.42(5).

Peeler contends the circuit court erred by denying his RCr 11.42

motion. Peeler alleges that at the time of the shooting, he was intoxicated and

suffered from mental illness. Peeler asserts that he and Turner were arguing

because he believed Turner and a store employee were planning to kill Peeler.

Peeler claims trial counsel failed to inform him of the possible defenses of

intoxication, imperfect self-protection, and extreme emotional disturbance. Peeler

maintains that Dr. Eric Drogin, an expert retained by the defense, “had made a

beneficial diagnosis to his defense that would have reduced his criminal

responsibility and charges and sentence[.]” Peeler’s Brief at 3. Peeler asserts that

trial counsel withheld from him Dr. Drogin’s favorable opinions, so Peeler

contends that he was unaware of the favorable opinion of Dr. Drogin at the time he

accepted the Commonwealth’s plea agreement.

A defendant bears the burden of proving ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. When a guilty plea is entered, defendant must demonstrate that trial

counsel’s “errors [were] so serious that counsel’s performance fell outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance” and that “but for the errors of

counsel [in the plea process], there is a reasonable probability that the defendant

would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.”

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Commonwealth v. Elza, 284 S.W.3d 118, 120-21 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Bronk v.

Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001)). And “where the alleged

error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative

defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend

largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.”

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). As noted, the circuit court may deny an

RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing where the allegations are refuted

upon the face of a record. Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 452.

In this case, it is unlikely that the defenses of intoxication, imperfect

self-protection, or extreme emotional disturbance would have been successful at

trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The record reflects that the evidence of Peeler’s

guilt was overwhelming. Store surveillance video captured Peeler entering the

store and directly shooting the two store clerks, and a neighbor testified that he

heard Turner beg for her life before being shot to death by Peeler. There was no

dispute that Peeler also shot two other individuals, which left one paralyzed.

Peeler’s actions were simply brutal and were unquestionably intentional. Even if

trial counsel could have introduced enough evidence at trial to support instructions

upon intoxication, imperfect self-protection, or extreme emotional disturbance, it

does not mean that a jury would have likely accepted any of such defenses, and

Peeler fails to demonstrate same. See Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 258 S.W.3d 435,

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440 (Ky. App. 2008). Based upon the heinous nature of the murders, Peeler faced

the real possibility of a death sentence if he went to trial, and the plea agreement

adverted the sentence of death. Additionally, Peeler fails to specifically reveal the

substance of Dr. Drogin’s opinions that would have supported a successful defense

at trial. Peeler merely advances general allegations. See Roach v. Commonwealth,

384 S.W.3d 131, 140 (Ky. 2012).

Therefore, we conclude that Peeler’s allegations are refuted upon the

face of the record, and the circuit court properly denied the RCr 11.42 motion

without an evidentiary hearing. See Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 452. Peeler simply fails

to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to accept the plea

agreement and fails to demonstrate that even if trial counsel were ineffective, there

is a reasonable probability that Peeler would have insisted upon a jury trial instead

of pleading guilty. See Elza, 284 S.W.3d at 120-21.

We view any remaining contentions of error as moot or without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Hardin Circuit Court is

affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Shadrach Peeler, Pro Se Russell Coleman
West Liberty, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny L. Sanders
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Solicitor General
Frankfort, Kentucky

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